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PUBLISHER’S NOTE
It is a privilege to publish for general circulation a volume 
of such permanent importance as Twenty-five Years of Ac­
counting Responsibility, 1911-36, by George O. May. The 
essays and discussions assembled here were first gathered and 
published privately by the author’s associates to commemo­
rate his completion of twenty-five years as their senior part­
ner. This compilation reflects the developments during one 
of the most important epochs in the history of professional 
accountancy. The author from his eminent position as head 
of one of the largest firms in the world has had peculiar op­
portunities to contemplate the changes in accounting and 
their effect upon the business of this and other countries. 
The present publisher sought and obtained permission to 
reproduce this vital contribution to the literature of ac­
countancy.
The matter included in this volume consists of expressions 
of personal views and opinions, with the single exception of 
an extract from correspondence between the New York 
Stock Exchange and the American Institute of Accountants 
through its committee on cooperation with stock exchanges. 
Mr. May was chairman of the committee, and the corre­
spondence is included by permission of the Stock Exchange. 
It is closely related to other matter in the volume.
After the first edition had gone to press Mr. May pre­
sented testimony on the revenue bill of 1936 which attracted 
wide attention. In the present edition that testimony and 
also a recent address upon the same subject are included.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
For permission to reprint material first published 
elsewhere, we wish to express our thanks to the 
editors and publishers of the American Bar Asso­
ciation Journal, The Atlantic Monthly, The En­
cyclopedia Britannica, Foreign Affairs, Harvard 
Business Review, The Journal of Accountancy, 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
The Sun (New York), Proceedings, Academy of 
Political Science, and The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics; and to Northwestern University and 
the Ronald Press Co.

CONTENTS
PAGE
Foreword ........  . v
Volume One
part I
The Profession of Accounting
CHAPTER
THE ACCOUNTANT AND THE INVESTOR (1932) . . 3
11. QUALIFICATIONS IN CERTIFICATES (1915) . . 26
III. A PROPER COURAGE IN THE ASSUMPTION OF RESPON­
SIBILITY BY THE ACCOUNTANT (1926) . . . 40
IV. PUBLICITY OF ACCOUNTS (1926) . . . . 49
V. CORPORATE PUBLICITY AND THE AUDITOR (1926) . 53
VI. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AFFECTING ACCOUNTING
PRACTICE (1929)  ............................................................. 60
VII. EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL MERGERS ON ACCOUNTING
PRACTICE (1929)........................................................................73
VIII. THE ROYAL MAIL (KYLSANT) CASE (1931) . . 76
IX. INFLUENCE OF THE DEPRESSION ON THE PRACTICE OF
ACCOUNTANCY (1932) ...... 82
X. ADVANTAGES OF ELECTION OF. AUDITORS BY SHARE­
HOLDERS (1932)......................................................................100
XI. KREUGER AND TOLL (1933).................................................104
XII. AUDITS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTS (1932-1934) . 112
XIII. THE IMPORTANCE OF INSISTING ON SOUND METHODS
of accounting (1933).................................................145
PART II
Depreciation
I. THE PROBLEM OF DEPRECIATION (1915) . . . 149
II. ON A PROPOSED DEFINITION OF DEPRECIATION (1922) 163
ix
X CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
III. “a confusion of terms” (1927) . . . . 166
IV. RAILROAD DEPRECIATION (1927).................................................168
V. CARRIER PROPERTY CONSUMED IN OPERATION AND
THE REGULATION OF PROFITS (1929) . . . 194
VI. FURTHER THOUGHTS ON DEPRECIATION AND THE RATE 
BASE (1930)...........................................................219
VII. THE UNITED RAILWAYS DECISION EXAMINED (1930) 231
PART III.
Valuation
i. THE VALUATION OF GOODWILL (1912) . . . 237
II. VALUATION OF MINES (1916)...............................................247
III. THE MAXIMUM SELLING PRICE OF NEWSPRINT
PAPER (1918)..................................................................... 263
IV. cross examination in Allied Chemical & Dye
Corporation v. The Steel & Tube Company of
America (1923) . .  ................................................ 283
V. VALUATION AND THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
(1924)..............................................................  287
VI. THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER REORGANIZATION OF
1920 IN RETROSPECT (1927).................................................291
VII. THE BETHLEHEM-YOUNGSTOWN MERGER SUIT (1930) 317
viii/fair market value of stock on July 10, 1929
(1933).......................................................................................... 337
IX. FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK IN 1930 (1934) . 361
Volume Two
x. testimony in State of Minnesota v. Republic Steel 
Corporation (1934)....................................................3
PART IV
Regulation of Securities
I. MEMORANDUM REGARDING SECURITIES BILL—H R
4314 (1933).................................................................................. 49
  II. THE PROSPECTUS AND THE INVESTOR (1933) . . 60
CONTENTS xi
CHAPTER PAGE
III. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: ITS PEDIGREE (1934) 62
IV. LETTER TO THE HON. JAMES M. LANDIS (1933) •   64
V. THE POSITION OF ACCOUNTANTS UNDER THE,SECU­
RITIES ACT (1933)........................................................................67
VI. THE OPPOSITION TO ANY AMENDMENT OF THE SECU­
RITIES ACT (1934).........................................................................85
VII. TESTIMONY ON THE NATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE.
BILL (1934).........................................................................  91
VIII. MEMORANDUM ON THE NATIONAL SECURITIES EX­
CHANGE BILL (1934)..........................................   103
IX. INFORMATION FOR INVESTORS: THE TASK OF THE 
NEW SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
(1934)..................................................................... 113
X. DISCUSSION OF COMMISSIONER LANDIS’ PAPER (1935) 118
PART V
T axation
A. General
I. THE TAX MAZE (1925)......................................................... 127
II. THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS (1922) . . . 144
III. TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES
(1) TAX EXEMPTION AND THE CHAMBER OF COM­
MERCE (1923)............................................................... 159
(2) TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AS ISLE OF SAFETY (1923) 161
(3) TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AS BURDEN ON PUBLIC
(1923)...........................................................................................164
IV. SCIENTIFIC TAX RELIEF (1923) . ... 167
V. THE INCOME TAX: SECRETARY MELLON’S PROGRAM
(1923)................................................................................... .169
VI. SOME ASPECTS OF TAX AVOIDANCE (1924) . 172
VII. METHODS OF TAXING WAR PROFITS COMPARED
(1917)...........................................................................................176
VIII. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRITISH INCOME TAX
LAW (1924).......................................................................... 180
CONTENTSxii
CHAPTER PAGE
IX. DOUBLE TAXATION (1926)......................................................... 187
X. FEDERAL TAX LEGISLATION IN 1935 AND IN 1936 . 201
XL THE PROPOSED GRADUATE TAXES ON UNDISTRIBUTED
CORPORATE PROFITS.................................................... 229
B. Taxation and Accounting
I. CLASSIFICATION OF PROFITS ON INVESTMENTS
(1921).......................................................................................... 263
II. THE SOURCE OF PROFITS (1922)............................................. 265
III. TAXABLE INCOME AND ACCOUNTING BASES FOR DE­
TERMINING IT (1925)...........................................................267
IV. ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING AND RESERVES IN TAX PRAC­
TICE (1925)................................................................................290
v. obsolescence of goodwill: Haberle Crystal 
Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke (1930) . . 295
PART VI
The Influence of Accounting on the Development of an 
Economy
I. THE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING (1936) .... 305
II. CAPITAL VALUE AND ANNUAL INCOME (1936) .  319
III. RAILROAD RETIREMENTS AND DEPRECIATION (1936) . 336
PART VII
Reviews and Criticisms
I. REASONS FOR EXCLUDING INTEREST FROM GOST
(1916).......................................................................................... 355
II. COST ACCOUNTING (1925)...........................................................364
III. an examination of affidavits in De Koven et al.
v. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Rail­
way ^2^) ........................................................370
TV. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE VerSUS MR. HOOVER
(1926)...............................................• . • • -374
CONTENTS xiii
CHAPTER PAGE
V. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE 
relations, G. O. May, Chairman, to the social 
SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL (1927) . . . 376
VI. SOME MEMORANDA
(1) CONSOLIDATED RETURNS (1929) . . . . 381
(2) THE CORPORATION LAW OF DELAWARE (1929) . 383
(3) CAPITAL STOCK OF NO PAR VALUE (1020) . . 383
(4) ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK DIVIDENDS RECEIVED
(1920)   ...............................................................387
(5) THE PROPRIETY OF A CORPORATION’S TRADING
IN ITS OWN STOCK (1020).......................................... 302
VII. SOME BOOK REVIEWS
(1) scovell, Interest as a Cost (1924) . . . 394
(2) seligman, The Economics of Instalment Sell­
ing (1928)................................................................................306
(3) rorem, Accounting Method (1929) . . . 399
(4) IRVING FISHER’S DEFINITION OF INCOME . . 404
(5) canning, The Economics of Accountancy
(1929)..........................................................................................405
(6) sloan, Corporation Profits (1929) . . . 407
(7) keynes, The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money (1936)................................................ 408

PART I
THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING

ITHE ACCOUNTANT AND THE INVESTOR *
(1932)
When I was invited to be one of the lecturers in this series, 
I hesitated on account of a conflict of feelings. I was gratified 
by an invitation to lecture at an institution which means so 
much as Northwestern has come to mean in the field of busi­
ness education, but I felt that ethics should be practiced 
rather than preached; and I was dismayed at the thought of 
contributing one of several lectures on the ethics of a single 
profession. When, however, Professor Custis suggested that 
I talk on the ethical obligations of the accountant to the in­
vestor, my doubts were resolved, because the suggestion of­
fered an opportunity to discuss before a sympathetic audience 
some of those phases of accounting practice which make it, 
to me, the most attractive of the professions which are closely 
allied with business; and an opportunity, also, to discuss 
some questions possessing a broader interest.
Before discussing the ethical questions which arise between 
the accountant and the investor, it seems desirable to con­
sider briefly the nature of the investor’s interest in the work 
of the accountant and the conditions under which that work 
is ordinarily done. Accountancy today has become an im­
portant profession, the work of which varies greatly in char­
acter and purpose. Its work may, perhaps, be divided into 
three broad classes: first, the constructive work, such as the 
formulation and installation of systems of accounting; sec­
ond, the detailed auditing of cash and other transactions; and 
third, the preparation and verification of financial statements.
* A lecture given at Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois, on January 
11, 1932, under the auspices of the William A. Vawter Foundation on Busi­
ness Ethics. Published in The Ethical Problems of Modern Accountancy, 
Ronald Press Co. (1933), pp. 26-54.
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It is with this third class of work that the investor is more 
particularly concerned.
Investors are interested in the reports of accountants on 
the affairs of businesses in which they already are, or con­
template becoming, security holders. If they already hold 
securities of a corporation carrying on a business, they are 
concerned with the annual reports presented by the directors 
to keep them informed of the progress of the enterprise. 
These reports contain, among other things, annual accounts, 
which may be certified by accountants. If investors are only 
potentially interested in any securities, they may turn either 
to the annual reports or, if the securities are newly created, 
to the “offering” or prospectus issued by the banking house 
sponsoring them. This prospectus is likely to contain finan­
cial statements made by or on the authority of accountants.
It is interesting to note that the development of the work 
of the accountant in relation to annual reports and pro­
spectuses dates from the last great period of depression which, 
beginning in 1893, came to an end with the sound money 
victory of 1896. My own experience in Wall Street began 
just as that period ended; and the. memory of the disastrous 
losses, shown year after year in the middle 90’s, and of the 
successes subsequently achieved around the end of the cen­
tury by the same companies, enables me to take heart of 
grace in even this distressing time.
The practice of having annual accounts audited, which 
began to make headway in the late 90’s, has grown so that 
today about eighty to ninety per cent of all industrial com­
panies whose securities are listed on the New York Ex­
change publish audited accounts.
In the early days of my experience, representations in 
prospectuses as to earnings and assets were usually based 
on information furnished to the bankers by the officers of 
the company, and were made by the issuing house itself. 
Later, it became more and more customary for the issuing 
houses to secure confirmation of the accounts by accountants, 
but they continued to make the representations themselves.
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More recently the practice has developed (which has long 
been customary and is now compulsory in England) of pub­
lishing the results of the accountants’ investigations in the 
form of a report from the accountants themselves, embodied 
in the prospectus. Some concerns, however, still cling to 
the old procedure and rely on accountants’ reports only to 
support their own representations should those representa­
tions later be challenged. 
With the rapid development of this field of accountancy, 
it is not to be expected that standards either of practice or 
of ethics should be uniform throughout the profession or 
uniformly satisfactory. It is in times of depression such as 
we are now passing through that reforms are most easily 
initiated, and it is timely, therefore, to consider now what 
standards of ethics the profession of accountancy can fairly 
be asked to accept and adhere to.
It will be well, next, to consider the nature of the account­
ant’s responsibility in respect of financial statements which 
are embodied either in a prospectus or in the annual report 
of a corporation. As a preliminary to a consideration of this 
question, I should like to emphasize the fact that the accounts 
of a corporation carrying on a complex modern business are 
not, and cannot be, statements of absolute fact. They are 
necessarily based largely on conventions, on estimates, and 
on opinions. I shall return later to a further discussion of this 
point, but think it desirable to mention it early in my ad­
dress, as, I have found from experience that it is by no means 
always fully appreciated even by people who might be sup­
posed to be well versed in financial affairs.
The character of the accountant’s responsibility in respect 
of accounts embodied in a prospectus or in an annual re­
port rests naturally on the nature and purpose of those 
documents. The prospectus is a document issued by a 
vendor of securities, and is frankly designed to induce in­
vestors to purchase securities. An annual report is a docu­
ment addressed by the directors to shareholders reporting 
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on their administration of the affairs of the company for the 
year and the financial results thereof.
A number of differences between the two cases at once 
suggest themselves. The banker, who is offering securities, is 
not expected himself to be informed regarding the financial 
status and past earnings of a corporation. He must make 
his representation on the authority of others. He may con­
ceivably rely on the representations of the officials of the 
company, but obviously this course involves a certain danger, 
since they are interested parties. Therefore, he is likely to 
have recourse, instead, to the accountant, who can furnish a 
disinterested report. In such a case, the full responsibility is 
put squarely on the shoulders of the accountant.
In the case of the annual report, however, the primary 
responsibility for the financial statements submitted to share­
holders rests with the officers and directors, and the function 
of the accountant is to advise the shareholders whether, in 
his opinion, the statements so submitted fairly present the 
position of the company and the results of its operations. 
The investor has the right to assume that the figures, let us 
say, of earnings, presented by an accountant in a prospectus 
represent the accountant’s own best judgment of the results 
for the period which they cover. In the case of similar fig­
ures appearing in the annual report of a corporation, not 
quite the same assumption can properly be made. In that 
case, the figures should represent the best judgment of the 
officers and the directors—a judgment, however, which the 
auditor either concurs in or regards as being within the 
reasonable limits of a legitimate difference of opinion, un­
less the contrary is indicated by his certificate.
Every balance sheet is, as judicial authorities have recog­
nized, necessarily a matter of estimate and opinion, and in 
some cases the limits of a reasonable difference of opinion 
may be fairly wide. I do not wish to make too much of the 
point, but the investing public generally fails to appreciate 
that there is any distinction at all, and therefore it is essen­
tial to mention that it does exist, and that it must exist.
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Often, perhaps usually, the accounts presented in an annual 
report are the results of discussion between the officers or 
directors of the corporation and its independent auditors, 
and represent their combined judgment. But the represen­
tatives of the corporation, on the one hand, and the account­
ant, on the other, may not entirely agree, and in such a case 
the accountant can properly accept the judgment of the cor­
poration’s representatives if he is satisfied that it is honestly 
formed and inherently reasonable.
Suppose, for instance, the question to be what provision 
for depreciation is required; and suppose that the directors, 
if left to themselves, would consider a provision of $50,000 
as adequate, while the auditor would favor the provision of 
from $80,000 to $100,000. The directors may agree to 
provide $70,000 if thereby they can secure the auditor’s 
unqualified certificate to the accounts. For the purposes of 
an annual report, the auditor would be quite justified in 
accepting this solution, perhaps saying in his certificate that 
the provision made is reasonable. But if he were preparing 
figures for a prospectus, the sole responsibility for which 
would be his, he would be bound to give expression to his 
own final judgment, though in reaching that judgment he 
would naturally give full consideration to the views of the 
company’s representatives.
Another and perhaps more important distinction between 
the prospectus and the annual report is that the annual re­
port is essentially historical in its character, whereas the pro­
spectus, even when it deals with events in the past, does so 
solely for the bearing that they have on the prospects for the 
future. For, obviously, the intending investor has no inter­
est in what has happened in the past merely because it has 
happened; he is interested only to the extent that the past 
is a guide to the probable future.  
I should like to emphasize this point particularly, because 
in recent years there has, to my mind, grown up a tendency 
to attach an altogether exaggerated importance to the earn­
ings reported annually by corporations as an index of future 
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earning capacity and, consequently, of the value of the busi­
ness. This tendency has, I think, incidentally had the effect 
of magnifying the swings in the market prices of stocks. In 
passing, I might express the opinion that the habit of valu­
ing stocks at ten, twelve or any other number of times the 
annual earnings applicable thereto, and using for the pur­
pose of the calculation the earnings of a single year, has 
tended to bring about excessive valuations for stocks in 
periods of great prosperity and correspondingly inadequate 
values in times of depression such as we are now passing 
through.
Perhaps I can sum up the position by saying that the in­
vestor should be entitled to regard an accountant’s statement 
in a prospectus as a little more objective and more clearly 
indicative of earning capacity than a statement made in an 
annual report primarily by the directors but with the concur­
rence and approval of the auditor.
I should like, now, to consider in more detail the position 
of the accountant in relation to the prospectus and the an­
nual report of a corporation. I will take the prospectus first 
because, as I have already pointed out, the accountant as­
sumes the greater responsibility in respect of such a docu­
ment.
When a banker contemplates an issue of securities of, let 
us say, an industrial company, he is likely to take steps to 
secure the report of an accountant on the financial position 
and past earnings of the business. In doing so, he has two 
purposes in mind: first, to decide whether the proposed issue 
is one that he cares to undertake; secondly, to ascertain what 
sort of a presentation of facts he is likely to be able to secure 
for the purpose of influencing the judgment of potential 
investors. Very commonly he will ask the corporation pro­
posing the issue to cause an examination to be made by ac­
countants satisfactory to him. In such work, the accountant 
is retained at the request of one party, but is actually em­
ployed and paid by another, and the purpose of his work is 
ultimately to influence the attitude of third parties with 
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whom he never comes into contact. It is apparent at once 
that he owes an obligation to each of three groups or parties, 
and that the interests of these groups are by no means 
identical.
Now, the most difficult ethical problems .generally arise 
from conflicts of interests and conflicts of loyalties. The 
simplest case is that in which the personal interest of the 
accountant conflicts with the interest of his client; but ob­
viously no one can claim to be a member of a profession, or 
expect to succeed in one, unless he is prepared, when neces­
sary, to subordinate his own interest to that of his client.
More difficult problems arise in cases such as the one I 
have just outlined, in which the accountant owes an obliga­
tion or a loyalty to more than one individual or group of 
individuals, and the interests of the different parties conflict. 
Naturally, the problem is not made any less delicate by the 
fact that the accountant is dealing with matters of opinion 
in relation to operations with which one of the parties (the 
corporation) through its officials should be more completely 
informed than he can be.
Frequently, the first stage of his work is an investigation 
and report to the issuing house upon representations previ­
ously made to it by the corporation, and upon his report 
the issuing house decides whether those representations have 
been borne out and whether the issue is one which it is will­
ing to sponsor. During this stage, the corporation and the 
issuing house are on the opposite sides of the table. If this 
stage is successfully completed, and mutually satisfactory ar­
rangements are agreed upon by the corporation and the 
issuing house, the questions arise what is to be shown in the 
prospectus, and in what form, and from this point onwards 
the interests of the issuing house and the corporation are, 
broadly speaking, identical.
The accountant is apt to encounter difficult ethical prob­
lems at both stages of the procedure, but those encountered 
in the later stage are by far the more difficult and are the 
only ones with which we are concerned today. In the first 
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stage, the issuing house is trading with the corporation and 
has an interest in stressing any weaknesses in the corpora­
tion’s position in order to secure more favorable terms. The 
accountant is frequently under pressure from two parties ad­
vancing conflicting views on the question at issue, and owing 
a duty to each party. He has, however, the advantage of 
hearing fully the arguments on both sides and reaching his 
decision with due regard thereto.
In the second stage—when the prospectus is being prepared 
—the banker and the corporation are, as I have said, united 
in presenting their views. The banker is sometimes found 
to be minimizing at this stage weaknesses which he had 
stressed in the first stage. The accountant must recognize 
that his paramount obligation is to the investor, to whom his 
report is in reality to be addressed; and that the investor is 
someone with whom the accountant in the nature of things 
is not in touch, and who is incapable of presenting argu­
ments counter to those presented on behalf of the banker 
and the corporation. The problem is made the more diffi­
cult because the importance of the accountant’s report often 
lies as much in what it implies as in what it says, and because 
the differences relate almost universally to questions, not 
of right or wrong, but of judgment.
To illustrate my point—the fact that a corporation has 
made money in the past has absolutely no significance to the 
potential investor except for its bearing on the probable 
earnings of the future. Therefore, neither the issuing house 
nor the accountant has any ethical right to put forward a 
statement of past earnings if to their knowledge it is calcu­
lated to mislead the investor as to the reasonable prospects 
for the future. On the other hand, what has been accom­
plished in the past is usually the main factual basis for esti­
mating future prospects, and it is certainly no part of the 
work of the accountant to make estimates for the future; so 
that if he is to make any contribution at all to the knowl­
edge of the investor, it must be in the form of a report on 
what has taken place in the past.
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What position, then, ought the accountant to take if either 
general conditions or the conditions specifically affecting the 
business under consideration have changed since the profits 
proposed to be reported were earned? This is a question 
which has occasioned conscientious accountants much con­
cern. Conditions are never exactly the same from one year 
to another, and investment must, as a practical matter, al­
ways be based on imperfect knowledge and approximations.
I suggest that the auditor should always consider how far 
conditions at the time of issue differ from those obtaining 
during the period covered by his report, and particularly 
how far any changes are a matter of common knowledge. He 
may, for instance, properly certify accounts covering a period 
of five years even though in his judgment general business 
conditions are as a whole less favorable than the average dur­
ing the period covered by his report. He might conceivably 
justify certifying profits earned during the boom period 
which culminated in 1929, after the collapse of that year, 
upon the ground that the change of conditions was a matter 
of common knowledge and that everyone must judge for him­
self how far-reaching its effects would be. He certainly 
would not be entitled to certify figures for a prospectus if to 
his knowledge, but not to the knowledge of the public, new 
conditions had arisen within the corporation itself which 
practically negatived the possibility of a continuance of any 
such earnings in the future, or made earnings dependent 
upon entirely different considerations.
An accountant would hot, for instance, be justified in giv­
ing a certificate which he knew to be desired for use in a 
prospectus in circumstances such as came to my notice (not 
in this country) recently. A corporation had conducted a 
very satisfactory and profitable general investment business 
for a number of years. Control of it was acquired by a 
financier of somewhat doubtful reputation, who proceeded 
at once to dispose of the investments previously held and to 
reinvest the proceeds in a series of companies controlled by 
himself. He also put out a prospectus in which he invited
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subscriptions to new securities of the investment company 
on the basis of the results obtained in the past under condi­
tions entirely different from those existing when the issue 
was made.
Obviously, problems of great nicety must constantly arise, 
and in order to solve them properly the accountant must 
possess good judgment and be willing and able to exercise 
that judgment objectively and dispassionately. The investor 
must rely on the judgment and ethical standards of. the ac­
countant, and except in cases so flagrant as to be fraudulent, 
the community will be wiser to leave the penalty for failure 
to justify such confidence to be inflicted through the loss 
of standing in business which is likely to follow upon it, 
than to attempt to impose legal penalties.
To be willing to exercise his judgment objectively and dis­
passionately the accountant must be a man of high character, 
prepared to recognize and observe high ethical obligations 
even to his own immediate disadvantage. To be able to do 
so he must be free from any relation to the subject matter 
or to the parties in interest which might cloud his judgment 
or impair his loyalty to the investors to whom his paramount 
duty is owed. As I have indicated, he necessarily stands in 
some business relation to the corporation creating the securi­
ties and the banking house undertaking their issue, but he 
should be careful to keep those relations on such a footing 
as to insure that his freedom of action and independence of 
judgment will not be affected.
It might be a counsel of perfection to suggest that no ac­
counting firm should give a report or certificate if any mem­
ber of the firm has any interest, however slight, in the cor­
poration creating the securities to be sold. On the other 
hand, it would seem unnecessary to say that an accountant 
should regard himself as disqualified from giving any certifi­
cate or opinion if he has any substantial interest in the cor­
poration whose securities are to be sold. Yet I have en­
countered at least one case in which this principle has been 
ignored by accountants carrying on a large business and
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claiming a good standing. As a practical rule, an accountant 
should run no risk of putting himself in a position where his 
interest might with any reason be thought to be large enough 
to affect his judgment, and it is the part of wisdom to re­
solve all doubts on such a question conservatively by declin­
ing the doubtful appointment.
Similarly, the accountant should be extremely careful not 
to put himself at any time in the position of accepting from 
the issuing house any favor, or of buying securities from it 
on any terms more favorable than those offered to the gen­
eral public. His compensation for services should be fixed, 
so as to make it as nearly as possible a matter of indifference 
to him whether the issue is or is not made, or whether if 
made it is or is not successful. Any agreement in advance 
whereby the compensation to be received is directly depend­
ent on the success or failure of the financing destroys the dis­
interestedness of the accountant and is wholly objectionable.
These general considerations seem to me to offer little 
difficulty. The really difficult ethical problems of the ac­
countant arise when differences of opinion develop between 
him and the officers of the, corporation or the representatives 
of the issuing house, and when actual or potential weaknesses 
in the position of the issuing corporation are disclosed. Fre­
quently, the facts of an industrial situation are uncertain, 
and the most correct accounting treatment of them is a 
matter of opinion. The officials of the corporation may 
represent the situation forcefully, and the accountant, while 
taking a different view, may believe them to be honest and 
may be conscious of the fact that their familiarity with the 
subject and knowledge of the details are necessarily greater 
than his own. He should, however, remember that as against 
their advantage of greater familiarity he possesses the im­
portant advantage of greater objectivity, and though he 
should always be open to conviction by sound reasoning, he 
should never allow his judgment to be overborne by the 
mere authority of interested parties.
Perhaps I might illustrate the difficulties of the situations
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which arise by an actual case, where the differences of opin­
ion became a matter of public record. In connection with 
an important recent issue, the accountants, after listening to 
the views of the management, felt compelled to formulate 
their conclusions on a basis different from that which the 
management thought appropriate. In the prospectus it was 
explained that the earnings, as reported by the accountants 
employed in that connection, were based on amortization 
tables which differed “drastically” from those theretofore 
accepted by the corporation on the advice of accountants, and 
the following statement was made: “The management be­
lieves that the adjustment, which accounts in large measure 
for the variation between the figures shown above and the 
interim figures reported by the Corporation, is extremely con­
servative and in the light of subsequent experience, may 
prove to be excessive.”
It is easy to realize how embarrassing the situation in this 
case must have been. The question was purely one of opin­
ion, the correct answer to which only time could determine. 
The management was, as the prospectus indicated, very defi­
nite in the expression of its opinion, and had the support 
of other accountants. The financial issues at stake were im­
portant. No doubt the accountants engaged in connection 
with the prospectus could have framed a form of statement 
which would have conformed to the views of the manage­
ment, and which would have left them in a position legally 
secure. But ethically they were bound to give effect to the 
judgment which, whether right or wrong, they had honestly 
and definitely formed.
It is painful to have to disagree with those by whom one 
has been retained, and the person in whose interest one 
does so is unlikely ever to know what has been done or to 
appreciate the stand that has been taken on his behalf. But 
in the long run, the willingness of an accountant to do what 
he conceives to be his duty to the unknown investor, even if 
by so doing he alienates a client and suffers a present loss of 
business, brings a rich reward both in self-respect and in a
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professional reputation which, in turn, brings a pecuniary 
benefit.
Fortunately, in recent years a clearer recognition on the 
part of issuing houses of their own true interests has tended 
to make such controversies less frequent and less acute. The 
wise issuing house today recognizes that the prospectus is the 
basis of its contract with the investor and that all questions 
of ethics apart, it is not even expedient to issue a prospectus 
in which material facts are unfairly or inaccurately stated or 
suppressed. Such a course may help the sale of securities at 
the moment, but that is of little worth if it creates possible 
ground of action against the banker later, should the securi­
ties for any reason involve the investor in loss. It is to the 
interest of the issuing house to see that no pretext is afforded 
for a later claim for rescission or damages. Here, again, an 
illustration may be helpful.
A few years ago, in discussion of a proposed issue, the ac­
countants insisted that the existence of certain litigation 
should be disclosed. The junior representatives of the issu­
ing house strongly opposed this suggestion, saying that it 
would be fatal to the issue, and the lawyers seemed disposed 
to agree with them. The matter was, however, taken by 
the accountants to the head of the firm, who instantly decided 
that the existence of the litigation must be disclosed so 
clearly as to preclude any possibility of a claim being made 
against his firm later in the event that the litigation should 
result adversely to the corporation. He further expressed 
the opinion that such frank disclosure would affect the issue 
favorably, not unfavorably; and events seemed to bear out his 
judgment, the issue being extremely successful.
I believe that every high-minded accountant has accepted 
the principle that, once his conclusions are reached, the re­
port or certificate which he issues, and which is designed to 
influence action, must be so worded that not only will every 
statement made therein be literally true, but every inference 
which could legitimately be drawn from the language will 
be warranted by the facts. There is no place in accountants’ 
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certificates for what President Roosevelt once called “weasel 
words.’’
In England, it would appear that what has heretofore been 
regarded as a canon of ethics may sometimes be a legal obli­
gation, enforcible, possibly, under the criminal law. As long 
ago as 1884, Lord Blackburn, in the House of Lords, in a 
civil case expressed admirably his view of the position of 
those concerned in the issue of a prospectus: “If,” he said, 
“with intent to lead the plaintiff to act upon it, they put 
forth a statement which they know may bear two meanings, 
one of which is false to their knowledge, and thereby the 
plaintiff putting that meaning on it is misled, I do not think 
they can escape by saying he ought to have put the other. If 
they palter with him in a double sense, it may be that they 
lie like truth, but I think they lie, and it is a fraud. Indeed, 
as a question of casuistry, I am inclined to think the fraud 
is aggravated by a shabby attempt to get the benefit of a fraud 
without incurring the responsibility.” Since that time, many 
an embittered victim of a disingenuous prospectus has no 
doubt echoed the outburst of Macbeth which Lord Black­
burn had in mind:
“And be these juggling fiends no more believ’d, 
That palter with us in a double sense;
That keep the word of promise to our ear
And break it to our hope.”
In the case against Lord Kylsant, which attracted attention 
here as well as in England and which was recently decided 
adversely to him both on his trial and in the Court of Crimi­
nal Appeal, it was admitted by the Crown that every state­
ment in the prospectus was literally true. Nevertheless, the 
Judge charged the jury that if they believed that when the 
language was used the defendant knew that it was calculated 
to induce investors to draw entirely false inferences and in­
tended that it should have this effect, they should convict him 
of the. charge, which was that he had issued a prospectus 
which he knew to be “false in a material particular” with
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intent to induce persons to subscribe for the debentures 
offered.
Unfortunately, the precise grounds on which the pro­
spectus was held to come within the statute are not entirely 
clear. Two paragraphs were specified in the indictment- 
one, giving average profits for ten years, the other, which 
followed immediately, containing a statement of dividends 
which showed that dividends had been paid in all but one 
of the last seventeen years. On the trial, the Crown in stat­
ing its case and the Judge in summing up seemed to take 
the view that the statement of an average for ten years, when 
in fact all, or substantially all, of the profits were earned 
in the first four of the ten years and the operations in some 
of the later years resulted in losses, was a statement false in a 
material particular, even though the average was authenti­
cally true. In sustaining the verdict, however, the Court of 
Appeal pointed to the statement of dividends paid as being 
the portion of the prospectus that was particularly deceptive 
by reason of the false inferences it was likely and intended 
to create.
To justify a criminal conviction on the ground that a state­
ment of dividends created a natural inference as to earnings, 
when there was, in fact, a separate paragraph dealing with 
earnings, might seem to be straining the law. Possibly, how­
ever, what the Court had in mind was that the statements 
made in successive paragraphs regarding earnings and divi­
dends were together so misleading as to justify a jury in find­
ing a criminal intent. Fortunately, no accountant was 
chargeable with responsibility for the language used in the 
Royal Mail prospectus; and I think most accountants would 
refuse to certify an average alone where the figures for indi­
vidual years were ascertainable.
This is not the place in which to pursue the particular 
question before the courts in the Kylsant case. For the pres­
ent it is sufficient to say that all questions of criminality or 
even civil liability apart, the ethical obligation of the ac­
countant is clearly to see that no statement is put forward
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which is a half truth or which he realizes will probably give  
rise to inferences which would, in fact, be ill founded. Of 
course, he cannot be held responsible for every inference, 
however unwarranted, which the ignorant or careless in­
vestor may draw from the appearance of his name in a pro­
spectus. Every accountant with any considerable practice has 
probably, after a company with which he has been associated 
has come to grief, been told in aggrieved tones: “I took it 
for granted that if your name was on the document it was 
all right; I didn’t trouble to read just what you said.” Such 
an attitude is wholly unreasonable; but if a statement carries 
a natural and almost irresistible inference, the accountant 
is ethically and perhaps legally as responsible for that infer­
ence as for the literal truths of the words he uses.
The question of phraseology assumes a different form 
when we come to consider accounts embodied in annual re­
ports. As I have pointed out, the figures and the language 
of an accountant’s report or certificate, given for use in a 
prospectus, are his own. Others may make suggestions, but 
the final decision is entirely in his hands. The annual ac­
counts of a corporation, on the other hand, are those of its 
officers and directors, and the primary responsibility is shared 
between them. In this case, it is the accountant who makes 
suggestions and the directors who must make the final de­
cisions. When they have done so, the accountant must con­
sider what report he will make to the shareholders on the 
accounts which the directors have adopted.
Clearly it is not desirable that he should insist on register­
ing every difference of opinion, however slight, that may arise 
between the directors and himself. His power to render 
service to the shareholders, and his ability to influence direc­
tors towards sound decisions, will be impaired if he adopts a 
too pedantic or too captious attitude. But when he differs 
with the directors on a point which he deems really impor­
tant, he should indicate his dissent and express it clearly.
There is probably considerable justice in the criticism that 
qualifications of accountants’ reports are frequently inade-
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quate to convey to the average shareholder the precise nature 
and extent of the accountant’s reservation. Those versed in 
financial affairs regard any sort of a qualification as a danger 
signal and refuse to pass it until they are satisfied just what 
danger threatens. But it would be a distinct forward step if 
auditors would aim to express their qualifications in clear, 
non-technical as well as unambiguous language. This point 
may be elaborated by a future lecturer, as Mr. Hoxsey of 
the New York Stock Exchange is taking a keen and active 
interest in such questions.
In relation to annual accounts, a conflict of interests, which 
I have not heretofore mentioned, may arise between those 
who are already shareholders and those who may become so. 
The auditor’s primary ethical duty is clearly to existing 
shareholders, but since he knows his report is likely to influ­
ence others to become shareholders, he must recognize some 
obligation to that class of investors. At the same time, an­
nual accounts are historical in their nature. They are not 
intended to be and cannot properly be regarded as designed 
to indicate earning capacity. And if accounts are fair as an 
historical record, no one can justly assert a grievance against 
the accountant on the score that they led him to draw infer­
ences as to future earning prospects which the accountant 
with his greater knowledge might have known to be un­
warranted.
To illustrate the point—suppose a company to have been 
operating during a year on the basis of a sales contract cov­
ering the bulk of its output at a high price, which at the end 
of the year has expired and been replaced by a contract at a 
substantially lower price. An accountant would not be justi­
fied ethically in giving a certificate of the profits for the year 
for use in a prospectus, without referring to the expiration of 
the old contract and the making of the new one. It would, 
however, be no part of his duty to refer to the contract situ­
ation in his certificate to the annual accounts, though it 
might be a part of the ethical duty of the directors to do so 
in their report.
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While everyone experienced in corporation finance must 
recognize the impossibility of giving to annual accounts all 
the significance as indices of earning capacity which in­
vestors (and those who undertake to advise investors) too 
often attribute to them, neither directors nor auditors can 
completely ignore the fact that the history of the past is 
commonly regarded as some guide to the prospects for the 
future. The obligation of directors is, it would seem, greater 
if they have caused the securities of their company to be 
listed on a public exchange, for in doing so they have invited 
the public to trade in those securities. They have endeav­
ored to secure for their shareholders the advantage which a 
broader market sometimes affords; and both they and the 
shareholders should be willing to pay the fair price for this 
benefit.
That fair price seems to me to be a sufficient disclosure of 
the affairs of the corporation to enable the public to deal 
in its securities with a reasonable degree of understanding. 
I have heard it argued that it is impossible to throw the full 
light of day on the affairs of a corporation, and that it is 
therefore unwise for a body like the New York Stock Ex­
change to exert its influence actively to secure more dis­
closure than corporations would otherwise undertake. The 
suggestion is, that as a result of such efforts the public is de­
ceived because it is led to believe that it is trading in the 
full light of day when it is trading only in the twilight. 
Personally, I have no sympathy with this point of view, but 
favor a liberal standard of disclosure. Inasmuch as Mr. 
Hoxsey has been one of the most persistent and effective cam­
paigners in favor of publicity, I trust that he, when he comes 
to lecture to you, will discuss the question more fully than 
I can now attempt to do.
The difficult questions in this field revolve largely around 
two classes of items frequently referred to as “non-recurring 
items” and “secret reserves.” The term “non-recurring 
items” is applied to those items, whether of income or outgo, 
which, although relating to the business and properly finding 
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their way into the income account, are in character quite ex­
ceptional and not likely to be repeated at all regularly. Illus­
trations may be found in the case of recovery of insurance on 
the life of the president of the company, or a loss through 
fire of an important plant. “Secret reserves” is the term ap­
plied to amounts set aside out of income purely as a precau­
tion and not in respect of any losses presently known or an­
ticipated. The amounts so set aside may be used to meet 
totally unexpected losses in the future, or may be restored at 
a later date to the income account.
It is obvious that both classes of items require either to be 
eliminated or given special consideration in any study of 
the income account which is designed to determine the 
normal earning capacity of the business; but how these items 
should be treated in the regular annual reports of corpora­
tions is a question on which there is considerable divergence 
of opinion and practice. I think the minimum which a rea­
sonable standard of ethics calls for on the part of directors 
and auditors of companies whose securities are listed on ex­
changes is that when any important non-recurring items are 
included in the income of the year, the fact that they are so 
included shall be clearly stated; and that where secret reserves 
are drawn upon to improve the profits of the year, this fact, 
also, shall be disclosed. I do not think there is room, thus 
far, for any serious disagreement. Differences, however, 
would arise on the further suggestion which I would make, 
that the amounts involved should in all cases be indicated.
There remains for consideration the attitude of the ac­
countant towards the original establishment of secret re­
serves, the result of which is, of course, that the profits for 
the period in which they are established are understated. 
This is a particularly difficult problem because of the varied 
ways in which what are substantially secret reserves can be 
established. There is the simple case of a general reserve for 
contingencies; but there are more difficult cases, such as 
the under-valuation of inventories or securities, which have 
precisely the same effect.
22 THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING
One view of the question is that the directors should al­
ways submit accounts that represent as accurately as possible 
their best judgment of the true profits for the year, accord­
ing to the general method of accounting adopted by the 
corporation. Others take the position that all businesses are 
subject to many hazards which cannot be accurately meas­
ured; that the attribution of profits to years is at best largely 
conventional; that business moves in cycles; and that a cer­
tain amount of deliberate understatement in good years is 
warranted and in the interests of the shareholders.
The question is partly a practical and partly an ethical 
one, and my own judgment is that directors would usually 
be well advised to follow their own judgment in regard to 
the establishment of precautionary reserves, but to disclose 
to shareholders the fact that the reserves have been made. 
Whether they should give general publicity to the amount 
of the reserves established is a matter of judgment. Their 
ethical obligation is probably discharged if they tell share­
holders explicitly that reserves have been made, and give 
them the opportunity to make further inquiries if they so 
desire. Drawing on reserves to supplement current profits 
is, as I have indicated, an entirely different matter, and 
should be fully disclosed.
So far as the accountant is concerned, I do not think that 
in the present state of public opinion and general practice 
he can be charged with an ethical duty to insist on the dis­
closure even of the fact that a secret reserve has been created, 
if he believes that the action was taken in good faith and if 
the amount involved is not so large that ignoring it com­
pletely distorts the earnings picture. Cases occasionally arise 
in which the accountant may be convinced that earnings are 
being deliberately understated in order that one group, often 
referred to colloquially as the “insiders,” may profit at the 
expense of the general body of shareholders. There can be 
no question of his ethical obligation to the shareholders as a 
whole in such a situation. His position at such times would 
be greatly strengthened if he were elected by the shareholders
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and directly responsible to them instead of being appointed 
by and responsible to the officers or directors as is the com­
mon case in our country.
I hope that this discussion of the ethical obligations of the 
accountant to the investor will be sufficient to convince you 
that the high-minded accountant who undertakes to practice 
in this field assumes high ethical obligations, and it is the 
assumption of such obligations that makes what might other­
wise be a business, a profession. Of all the group of pro­
fessions which are closely allied with business, there is none 
in which the practitioner is under a greater ethical obliga­
tion to persons who are not his immediate clients; and it is 
for this reason that I believe accounting ought, and can be 
made, to take an outstanding position in this group.
I would not have you think that because the investor is not 
his immediate client the accountant owes nothing to the in­
vestor except legal duties and ethical obligations. This is 
not, of course, the fact. It is to the investor that he owes his 
entire practice in the field of financial auditing, and it is only 
because the investor exists and attaches, weight to an ac­
countant’s report that the banker employs the accountant’s 
services in this field. And the continued success of the ac­
countant is dependent on his retaining the confidence of the 
investing public. An enlightened self-interest, therefore, as 
well as self-respect calls for the maintenance of a proper 
ethical standard by the practitioner.
The young accountant may find it hard to take the first 
stand for the principles that have been suggested for his ob­
servance, but he will find that this is essentially a case in 
which “it is the first step that costs.” Perhaps, therefore, I 
may, in bringing this discussion to a close, indulge in a per­
sonal reminiscence which bears on this point and which as it 
happens relates, also, to the question of showing average 
profits, which arose in the Kylsant case.
A good many years ago—as a matter of fact, in 1899—owing 
to the death of one of the senior partners, I was called upon 
to settle with an important New York banker the form of
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a certificate for use in connection with a prospectus. As the 
issue was to be made on both sides of the Atlantic, it was 
planned to print the accountants’ certificate in the prospectus 
as was and is customary in England.
The profits of the company showed a fairly steady decline 
over a period of ten years except that in 1898, owing to the 
Spanish-American War, they rose considerably to a point 
higher than the average of the ten years. The banker de­
sired the certificate to show only the average for the ten years 
and the profits for the last year. I demurred to this sugges­
tion on two grounds: first, that it was contrary to the practice 
of my firm to show only averages where the profits for sepa­
rate years were readily ascertainable; and, secondly, that the 
information proposed to be given would create a natural 
but erroneous impression as to the trend of profits.
The discussion became difficult, and it was indicated to me 
that if we adhered to the position I had taken there would 
be no possibility of any similar differences with that particu­
lar banker in the future. However, I refused to modify the 
stand I had taken and was supported by the senior partner, 
with the result that no certificate was printed in the pro­
spectus, but a statement was made by the banker on his own 
responsibility. I felt that I was right, but I could not fail to 
be conscious of the fact that my first important interview 
with a banker had not been a success and promised to result 
in the loss of an important client.
There was, however, a sequel. Some six months later, the 
same banker was contemplating the purchase of a business 
and desired a full and reliable report on its operations. His 
lawyers approached the firm saying that while he still 
thought we were entirely wrong in the stand we had taken 
six months earlier, he believed that we had taken it in per­
fect good faith and that the incident should not, therefore, 
be a bar to friendly relations between us. They thereupon 
gave us instructions to make the investigation, and further 
intimated that the banker desired that I should personally
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take charge of it; and I may add that the banker is today a 
valued client of the firm.
This sequel made the whole incident one of the most help­
ful of my experiences, and I hope it may also be of service 
in encouraging those of you who may be about to start prac­
tice, or are in the early days of practice, to take a firm stand 
for sound ethical principles, which I am sure will ultimately 
tend to bring you professional success as well as a conscious­
ness of professional integrity. 
II
QUALIFICATIONS IN CERTIFICATES *
(1915)
First of all, the fact that the qualified certificate has been 
selected by the authorities of the association as a suitable 
topic for discussion is evidence of the progress our profession 
is making, for it is not so many years since the qualified 
certificate was not sufficiently common for the subject to be 
of importance.
Twenty years ago an audit certificate seldom assumed any 
special importance. It was regarded rather as a frame which 
helped to set off the financial picture. Obviously it is better 
to present a picture unframed than in a frame showing bare 
spots from which the gilt has disappeared; and so the de­
mand was for an unqualified certificate or none at all. This 
condition is at least in part responsible for the opinion some­
times expressed that an accountant should give no certificate 
but an unqualified one, though often the opinion is the re­
sult of a failure to read a certificate properly and a desire to 
blame the accountant for subsequent failure of the enter­
prise, possibly due to the very causes which necessitated a 
qualification in the certificate. We too frequently hear in­
vestors say: “Oh, well, I didn’t read every word of the cer­
tificate; I saw it was signed by so and so and I thought that 
was good enough.” Of course, the position is unreasonable, 
but if we remember that there was a time when practically 
all certificates printed were unqualified because qualified 
certificates were wrongly regarded as valueless and promptly 
suppressed, we may find for those who take the position some
* An Address at the annual meeting of the American Association of Public 
Accountants, Seattle, Washington, September 21, 1915. Cf. The Journal of 
Accountancy, Vol. XX (October, 1915), pp. 248-59.
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better excuse than mental laziness or an unfair desire to 
make the accountant the scapegoat.
The impracticability of the suggestion that only unqualified 
certificates should be given is apparent. A client retains an 
auditor to audit his accounts, with a view to certifying a bal­
ance sheet. The auditor dissents from the treatment of an 
item in the balance sheet but finds the books and accounts in 
all other respects correct. Clearly the client is entitled to a 
certificate as to their correctness subject to the one point; and 
it is desirable too, as a matter of broad policy, that he should 
get it, otherwise one of two things would be likely to happen 
—either an exaggerated impression as to the unreliability of 
the accounts would be created by the refusal of a certificate, 
or the auditor to avoid that serious result would waive or 
sink his convictions and sign an unqualified certificate. 
Moreover, every balance sheet, as has been judicially pointed 
out, is necessarily to some extent a matter of estimate and 
opinion, and qualifications often represent an honest differ­
ence of opinion between directors and auditors. What more 
effective disposition can be made of such a case than for the 
stockholders to have placed before them the two views—the 
one perhaps possessing the advantage of greater familiarity 
with the subject matter, the other the advantage of a more 
detached viewpoint, and then for the final disposition of the 
question to be determined by the stockholders?
Before leaving this question it may not be amiss to point 
out that among the things to be done by investors and bank­
ers to make audit certificates attain their full value (what 
accountants have to do is not now discussed) are these:
(1)  Use every opportunity to extend the practice of hav­
ing auditors appointed by and report to stock­
holders;
(2) Note and require explanations where companies 
which present audited accounts one year present un­
audited accounts the next or change their auditors.
The next question to be considered is the more difficult 
one as to the form and character of qualifications. In the 
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consideration of this question, qualifications may be divided 
into two groups—those that merely limit responsibility with­
out expressing or implying disapproval of the accounts (as, 
for instance, where branch accounts have been accepted with­
out audit) and those that constitute criticisms of the accounts 
(as, for instance, where proper provision for depreciation 
has not been made).
The great essential of any proper qualification is, of course, 
that it shall be clear and readily understandable by anyone 
not expert in accounts, and shall be expressed directly and 
not implied by subtle refinements in wording which may 
easily escape the notice of many who read the certificate. An 
accountant who relies on fine distinctions of language, or the 
assignment of wider meaning to a word or phrase than it 
would ordinarily be given, to limit his responsibility for ac­
counts he has certified, may succeed in avoiding any legal 
liability therefor but prejudices the interests of the whole 
profession. This is not to say that great care in the choice 
of words in a certificate is undesirable or superfluous; on the 
contrary, the ideal certificate is the one that conveys precisely 
. the right shade of meaning to anyone who carefully studies 
its every word and at the same time creates the correct gen­
eral impression in the mind of anyone who reads it hurriedly 
and with no more than ordinary care.
Qualifications which limit responsibility should not only 
indicate the extent of the limitations but their importance; 
at least, if the limitation is of marked importance, that fact 
should be made clear. Thus, in the illustrative case above 
cited, it should not be considered sufficient to state that the 
branch accounts have been accepted without audit if the 
branch assets constitute, say, 75% or more of the total so that 
only a small proportion of the total has been really verified.
As to qualifications which are in the nature of criticisms 
of the accounts, it would clearly be desirable that they should 
show the exact or approximate effect on the accounts of the 
adoption of the auditor’s view; but such an ideal is not always 
attainable, and it cannot be said that any qualification which 
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falls short of this standard is defective. The generally ac­
cepted rule is that a qualification is adequate if it is sufficient 
to put the reader on notice and afford him a basis for investi­
gation if he desires to carry the matter further. Thus, a 
qualification “subject to the fact that no provision has been 
made for depreciation” is regarded as sufficient without any 
statement by the auditor as to what provision he thinks 
should be made.
Although in some cases a more specific qualification which 
would indicate the precise amount involved might be unde­
sirable from the business standpoint in a certificate receiv­
ing wide publicity, yet there is some justice in the demand 
for less general qualifications, which is sometimes heard. So 
long as audits are not compulsory, however, progress in the 
desired direction can be made only with the assistance of 
bankers and investors—particularly the former, since the in­
vestors are not organized and are not in so advantageous a 
position for making their wishes effective as the bankers. 
Accountants gladly recognize the help which bankers have 
given in recent years, and the resulting improvements in the 
form of accounts and certificates is apparent. Continued 
cooperation will produce continued improvement.
So long as the discontinuance of audits or change of au­
ditors passes without comment from stockholders or creditors, 
the auditors are hampered in their efforts to make accounts 
as accurate and their certificates as complete and informative 
as possible. If auditors take too rigid a stand the directors 
will simply publish unaudited accounts or perhaps seek some 
more amenable auditors. It is not the financial effect on 
themselves of such a course that influences those auditors 
who view their responsibility most seriously to modify their 
position so as to reach an agreement with directors if pos­
sible; it is the knowledge of the fact that too rigid an attitude 
will defeat the very purpose they are seeking to accomplish. 
They realize that it is to the public interest that they should 
concede something in the language of a certificate or that 
they should bring the accounts nearer to the correct standard 
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even though that standard be not quite attained, rather than 
that the accounts should be published entirely uncorrected 
and unexplained. There are many accountants who would 
never pass accounts they did not thoroughly approve for the 
sake of retaining the audit, who have done so for the reason 
just given. Of course, there can be no compromise on really 
vital questions, and the determination of the proper limit of 
concessions calls for the nicest judgment. Extended experi­
ence convinces, however, that the policy has in the long run 
resulted in greater improvement in accounting standards 
than a more drastic policy would have produced and has 
been beneficial to the business and financial community.
Turning now to the consideration of specific forms of 
qualification, it should perhaps be pointed out that in the 
ordinary certificate that “in our opinion the balance sheet is 
properly drawn up so as to set forth the true financial posi­
tion of the company as shown by the books and accounts,” 
neither of the expressions “in our opinion” and “as shown 
by the books and accounts” should be regarded as a quali­
fication. The insertion of the words “in our opinion” is an 
honest recognition of the fact that the certificate can be but 
an expression of opinion, as indeed a balance sheet itself 
is in a large measure. The use of the expression “as shown 
by the books and accounts” does not justify the certification 
of accounts which are in accord with the books if the audi­
tor has reason to believe that the books are not correct or has 
not satisfied himself that they are correct. It is suggested, 
however, that the phrase is so frequently regarded as a limi­
tation, or in some cases an attempted evasion of responsi­
bility, that it would be well to omit it. The statement that 
“the balance sheet is in accord with the books and in our 
opinion, etc.,” is suggested as a preferable form.
The insertion of limiting phrases should not be regarded 
as absolving the auditor from all duty and responsibility 
in regard to the assets or liabilities to which the phrases 
apply. Thus, before issuing a certificate containing a state­
ment that the branch accounts have been accepted without 
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audit, the auditor should look into the way in which the 
branch accounts are prepared and satisfy himself as far as is 
possible without auditing the branch accounts that he is 
justified in accepting them, and that there is no evidence 
tending to show that they are unreliable. In the same way 
a statement that valuations of certain assets by persons indi­
cated have been accepted should not be embodied in a cer­
tificate if the auditor suspects the good faith or qualifications 
of the valuers.
It is, naturally, the qualification which constitutes a criti­
cism that offers the greatest difficulty. Much of the objection 
offered by directors to qualifications seems shortsighted. 
For instance, if it is apparent on the face of a company’s 
accounts that no provision has been made for depreciation 
where a provision is ordinarily regarded as necessary, it 
would seem wise for the directors to accept a certificate with- 
that one qualification, and to offer an explanation of the 
omission if they deem it proper to do so. If an unqualified 
certificate is given, any competent person examining the ac­
counts. and finding that no depreciation is provided and no 
comment on the fact is made by the auditors will begin at 
once to suspect other defects in both the accounts and the 
auditors. No doubt there are many less careful or com­
petent recipients of reports who would not carry their 
analysis so far, but of these a large part probably would not 
read the certificate at all and others would take the qualifica­
tion lightly, perhaps dismissing the requirement of a pro­
vision for depreciation as one of the accountant’s fetishes. 
The readers whose impressions are of most importance to 
the directors issuing the report are, it is believed, more 
likely to be unfavorably impressed by the unqualified than 
by the qualified certificate in such a case. That this is so 
is perhaps indicated by a growing tendency to discard the 
ostrich-like policy in such matters and to aim rather to mini­
mize the effect of unfavorable features in accounts and re­
ports by stating them boldly.
An amusing feature of the continual discussion of the form 
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of qualification is the way in which an expression, such, for 
instance, as “subject to,” acquires an evil significance, and 
great effort is expended in finding a more acceptable equiva­
lent. The equivalent in time falls into disrepute, and a 
fresh search is instituted. The attitude of those to whom 
the qualified certificate is given is perhaps natural—no great 
harm results—and possibly in so far as the attitude stimulates 
the ingenuity of the auditor, widens his vocabulary and tends 
away from stereotyped forms of expression, it may be said 
to be positively beneficial.
An interesting question arises as to how far an exposi­
tion of the views of directors may properly be, appended to 
a qualification. In general the more detached the attitude 
of the auditor, the more his certificate creates the impres­
sion that it was designed to benefit his ultimate clients to 
whom the certificate is to be presented, rather than his im­
mediate clients—those by whom the certificate is sought—, 
the greater weight his audit will carry. But where an audi­
tor in a certificate intended for stockholders criticizes the 
accounts in any particular, the directors may reasonably de­
sire to be sure of having their point of view put before the 
stockholders, and that at as nearly as possible the same time 
as the criticism. Hence, such expressions as “no provision 
has been made for-------- , the directors considering, etc.”
It is suggested, however, that this practice should be resorted 
to only very sparingly. The comment that no provision has 
been made for something implies that the auditor thinks 
some provision should have been made. If the auditor then 
proceeds to state the directors’ reasons for not making the 
provision, it may be urged that he should logically go on to 
show why these reasons were not accepted by him as con­
clusive. There are, of course, cases where the value of 
certain assets' or the amount of certain liabilities is so un­
certain that neither auditors nor directors can form definite 
opinions. If in such cases the best judgment of the auditor 
differs from that of the directors, or if the auditor is not 
prepared either to endorse the directors’ opinions or express
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one of his own, a statement of the facts and of the directors’ 
views thereon may, it would seem, properly be embodied in 
the audit certificate. An alternative course which has often 
proved convenient and satisfactory to all concerned is for the 
auditor to agree with directors on a statement to be made 
by the latter in their report to stockholders regarding the 
special point involved, and for the auditor then to certify 
that the accounts, “read in conjunction with the explanation 
regarding-------- contained in the directors’ report, set
forth, etc.”
One note of warning may be sounded. It must be remem­
bered that some rules of accounting are rules of conserva­
tism, not of law, and an auditor cannot compel his client 
to be conservative under penalty of receiving only a quali­
fied certificate. If accounts clearly state the method of treat­
ing certain items and that method is not improper, though 
not the most conservative, the auditor is not justified in giv­
ing his certificate a qualified form.
In general where facts are fully disclosed in the accounts 
in such a way as to be readily understood, one of the great 
objects for which auditors are constantly striving is attained, 
and the references to features which are not treated precisely 
in accord with the auditor’s view may be made less severe 
than where suppression of material fact aggravates error in 
treatment.
Pursuing this line of thought, it is suggested that com­
ments, not really critical, but which clients will nevertheless 
resent as being likely to be regarded by the public as quali­
fications, may often be obviated by embodying the equivalent 
explanation in the accounts. Suppose, for instance, that 
during the year the basis of valuation of capital assets has 
been changed with a resulting large credit to surplus: if the 
accounts do not disclose these facts the auditor must bring 
them out in his certificate. The change may be perfectly 
proper, and the client may object to the reference in the 
certificate on the ground that it implies—or will be regarded 
by many as implying—a doubt as to the propriety of the
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change. The natural solution of such a difficulty is to 
amplify the accounts so as to bring out the facts, and the 
reference in the certificate can then be omitted. Experience 
suggests that this alternative is not used so freely as it might 
properly be, and that, consequently, much friction that could 
easily be avoided occurs between auditors and clients.
It may be well now to consider briefly some of the points 
on which qualifications are more commonly necessary, and 
in doing so the balance sheet items may be taken in the 
usual order: capital assets, investments, inventories, accounts 
receivable, deferred charges, capital and current liabilities, 
surplus.
Qualifications as to capital assets are perhaps the most fre­
quent, the reasons being partly that there is more room for 
difference of opinion as to capital assets than as to current 
assets or liabilities and that capital assets are not of great 
importance for credit purposes, and directors are, therefore, 
willing to accept qualifications as to capital assets where 
they would prefer to adjust current items rather than have 
any qualification in regard to them.
Depreciation and discount on bonds charged to capital are 
time-honored subjects of qualification. Fortunately, the 
auditor’s position as to both has been made easier by the 
growing insistence of courts and regulating authorities upon 
their correct treatment. Those who urged ten years ago that 
discount was not a proper charge to capital were faced by 
interstate commerce regulations providing for its charge to 
cost of property, but the rule has since been changed, and 
other regulating bodies have followed the Interstate Com­
merce Commission. Today an auditor comparatively seldom 
has difficulty in securing acceptance of the sound accounting 
principles regarding depreciation and discount, and the issue 
is usually only as to the amount to be written off—an issue 
that must always be open for discussion.
Another question as to capital assets concerns the adoption 
of valuations in lieu of previous book figures. In such cases, 
unless the auditor has reason to doubt the good faith of the
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valuation, the question is, as already suggested, best dealt 
with by clear explanations in the accounts.
Investments frequently offer difficulty where values have 
depreciated or are not well established. The auditor’s con­
tention that provision should be made for a fall in value of 
marketable securities, though appreciation should not be 
taken up until realized, is attacked as illogical, though it 
obviously is the one safe rule. An explanation or qualifica­
tion in the certificate is desirable where the rule is not fol­
lowed, unless the amounts involved are relatively small and 
the facts are clear in the face of the accounts as, for instance,
Marketable investments at cost $..............
(market value $.............. )
In the case of investments the value of which is uncertain 
(which include securities the quoted prices of which are 
nominal), the basis of valuation should -be made clear either 
in the accounts or certificate; and where the amount is at all 
material and the valuation is not at cash cost, a reference 
to the item in the certificate is always desirable. If the audi­
tor regards the securities as not being worth the value at 
which they are taken, a qualification is required such as: 
“Subject to the value of the investments, we certify, etc.” 
If the auditor has no reason to dissent from the valuation 
and yet is unable fully to confirm it independently, the cer­
tificate may read: “Accepting the valuation placed on the 
investments by-------- , I certify, etc.” Where the auditor
is unwilling to go so far as to “accept” the valuation he can 
state the basis and say: “Upon this basis, I certify, etc.,” leav­
ing every reader to decide for himself as to the propriety of 
the basis.
Inventories may probably be valued legally at a figure not 
exceeding their net realizable value (i.e., their selling value, 
less costs of realization), but the “cost or market, whichever 
is lower” basis is so obviously sound and so generally adopted 
that a departure from this basis should be indicated either 
in the accounts or certificate; except, perhaps, in certain in-
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dustries, such as the leather or packing-house businesses, 
where it is a matter of common knowledge that costs are 
practically unobtainable for finished products, and that it is 
a trade custom to adopt a valuation based on selling prices 
with conservative deductions.
Differences of opinion as to the necessary reserves for bad 
debts sometimes give rise to qualifications, and even more 
generally the necessity for reserves for collection expenses 
on debts where collection cost is an important item (as, for 
instance, in instalment businesses) is or should be the sub­
ject of comment in the auditor’s certificate. The necessity 
for such reserves is not yet fully recognized, and the practice 
of establishing them is by no means universal. The position 
regarding future collection expenses now is similar to the 
position regarding depreciation a few years ago, and it is to 
be hoped that the coming years will furnish a parallel to the 
steady growth of sounder opinion on that question.
Deferred charges are a fruitful source of qualifications: 
officers who are anxious to avoid showing a deficit but are 
unwilling to overstate “real” assets are tempted sometimes 
to solve the difficulty by carrying as deferred charges items 
which ought to be charged to profit and loss and would have 
been so charged without question if operating results had 
been more favorable. The particular forms of qualification 
are so varied that no general comment is possible.
Qualifications as to liabilities usually relate to liabilities 
unascertained in amount or contingent, which exist and are 
not noted on the balance sheet, or to such special liabilities 
as indebtedness for goods in transit, or for goods intended 
for sale in a future season, the invoices for which are post­
dated. In such cases both the asset and the liability are 
sometimes omitted, but they should be disclosed or the fact 
of their being omitted clearly brought out.
In addition to the questions which have been already dis­
cussed and which indirectly affect the amount of the sur­
plus, questions arise as to the manner of stating the surplus. 
These questions include the proper disclosure of extraor-
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dinary profits, the separation of earned surplus from surplus 
arising in other ways, and the treatment of losses which it 
is claimed are chargeable against prior surplus instead of 
against current operations. These questions often give rise 
to serious differences between client and auditor, the client 
arguing that “it is all the same in the end and that there 
is nothing in the balance sheet that is riot literally true.” 
The auditor’s position must be that to receive a clear Cer­
tificate accounts must be fair as well as literally true. Ac­
counts are often more important on account of the infer­
ences that may be drawn from them than as mere statements 
of a past condition. We all know how easy it is. to join to­
gether a series of statements, each of which is literally true, 
in such a way that an inference will naturally be drawn 
which is in reality incorrect. The auditor aims to ensure 
not only that statements he makes or certifies shall be true, 
but that every legitimate inference drawn from them shall 
also be correct. Of course, he can accept no responsibility 
as to unwarranted inferences, though it is often sought to 
impose such a responsibility on him.
Qualification is sometimes necessary as to the general form 
of accounts submitted to the auditor, especially in the case 
of holding companies. While the general adoption of the 
practice of publishing consolidated balance sheets affords the 
auditor a strong argument in favor of that form of state­
ment, clients who desire to publish a holding company bal­
ance sheet have the legal position in their favor. The audi­
tor can, however, meet such cases by insisting that while 
the balance sheet is a correct balance sheet of the holding 
company, it does not adequately disclose the financial posi­
tion unless supplemented by a consolidated balance sheet of 
the subsidiaries or its equivalent.
Questions also arise where extraordinary transactions such 
as the declaration of a large dividend which very materially 
affects the financial position, have taken place shortly after 
the date of a balance sheet and before the certificate is 
signed. These questions are of great importance where the 
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balance sheet is likely to be used for the purpose of securing 
credit. Irrespective of any technical view of such a question, 
which might seem to justify a clear certificate, the auditor 
should take a broader view; and if he feels that there is 
danger that the statement prove seriously misleading, he 
should take adequate steps to avoid that result.
Another general question which it may be well to touch 
upon is the position where an auditor is appointed by a 
company long in existence to make an audit of its accounts 
for one year. Is a specific disclaimer of responsibility as to 
the accounts prior to the year under audit necessary? The 
correctness of current assets and liabilities can be deter­
mined without delving into the past to any great extent, 
but capital assets carried at cost are not so easily verified. 
Where the balance sheet shows the figures of capital assets 
at the beginning of the year and the charges during the 
year, and the auditor states that he has audited the accounts 
for the year, he is justified in accepting the opening balance, 
unless he has reason to believe it to be incorrect, because 
the capital assets could only be verified by auditing, at least 
in part, the accounts of a prior period. Taking into con­
sideration the fact that capital assets are not usually stated 
on the basis of present values, the magnitude of the task 
involved in a complete verification of the capital assets, and 
the clear indication on the face of the balance sheet that the 
opening balances have been accepted, no one would be jus­
tified in assuming that the auditor had in such a case done 
more in connection with capital assets than verify the 
changes during the year. This is especially true where the 
long form of certificate is given, stating specifically that the 
changes during the year have been examined and- found to 
be proper, the inference clearly being that the auditor is 
not prepared to accept responsibility for the treatment of the 
accounts in the past, though in practice auditors usually look 
cursorily over the past history of capital asset accounts with 
a view to detecting any gross inflation or special adjustments 
thereof.
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This discussion of specific qualifications has been limited 
to those arising on the certification of annual balance sheets. 
The questions arising on certificates of profits for prospec­
tuses and other special work are to a large extent similar and 
will offer no difficulty to anyone who has a clear idea of the 
principles which govern the issue of certificates as to annual 
accounts.
In granting certificates the accountant stands between his 
client and the public, and the decision as to how far he can 
go to meet his client’s wishes and still do his full duty to 
the public is often difficult to make. Upon his ability to 
decide such questions rightly his ultimate standing and suc­
cess largely depend. He should err, if at all, on the side 
of the public, for undue laxity will damage the profession 
and himself; at the same time excessive rigidity, as has been 
suggested, will often defeat the purpose he is seeking. As 
in most walks of life, success lies in finding the happy mean.
III
A PROPER COURAGE IN THE ASSUMPTION OF 
RESPONSIBILITY BY THE ACCOUNTANT *
(1926)
When your Committee invited me to speak tonight, they 
suggested that I should, if possible, select a topic which 
would possess not only a professional but a more general 
interest. Since that invitation was extended, the article 
by Professor Ripley on corporate publicity, which has re­
ceived such general notice, has appeared in the Atlantic 
Monthly, and it has seemed to me to raise questions of great 
professional importance which affect also the whole financial 
community. In speaking before the American Institute of 
Accountants at Atlantic City recently, I drew attention to 
the significance of the movement initiated by Professor 
Ripley as affecting accountants, and with your permission I 
should like to develop more fully some of the thoughts then 
briefly expressed.
It is not perhaps inappropriate to do so in the State of 
New Jersey, as, though your State is no longer a pennant 
holder in what has become a somewhat undignified compe­
tition for new incorporations, some of the country’s most 
important industries are still conducted by corporations or­
ganized under your laws,
At Atlantic City I suggested that an extension of the 
practice of having accounts audited annually, which has now 
become almost universal among the important industrial 
companies, might do much, perhaps more than supervision 
by the Federal Trade Commission, to bring about improved 
standards of corporate publicity. I may say that I have since 
received, with much gratification, a very cordial letter from
* An address delivered to the Society of Certified Public Accountants of 
the State of New Jersey, Newark, N. J., October 19, 1926.
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Professor Ripley welcoming the suggestions I then put for­
ward.
At that time I expressed the view that if the desired end 
were to be accomplished it would be necessary that the re­
sponsibilities of auditors should be made more real and 
definite, and that as a necessary corollary auditors would 
have to be given fuller and more clearly defined authority 
and be reasonably assured of an opportunity to present their 
views to stockholders if they should unfortunately come into 
serious disagreement with the directors or officers of the cor­
poration under audit.
The status and responsibilities of an auditor who certifies 
or reports upon the annual accounts of a corporation are 
at present vague and indefinite; some accountants, I believe, 
would be glad to have them remain so. Why, they would 
ask, should we add to our responsibilities? The answer is, 
of course, simple. We cannot expect, for any length of 
time, to get something for nothing; and if we wish to see the 
prestige and authority of the profession, or for that matter 
its financial rewards, continue to increase, we must be pre­
pared to assume correspondingly greater responsibilities. 
We should, nevertheless, be careful what responsibilities we 
assume; a rash assumption of responsibility in matters be­
yond our competence would be as disastrous to the profes­
sion as unwillingness to assume it in matters which are 
within our competence.
From time to time we see corporations which have been 
audited fail as a result of conditions which were either not 
discovered or not brought out by the auditors; in connection 
therewith we hear comments on the uselessness of audits. 
As well might we complain of the uselessness of doctors be­
cause people die of complaints other than old age. Some­
times no doubt the auditor is fairly subject to criticism- 
just as doctors sometimes are; in other cases no such criticism 
is warranted.
The position is simply that an audit is not a complete 
safeguard and insurance against all financial ills any more
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than the doctor’s services are against all bodily ills. Quacks 
there are of course in both professions who assert extravagant 
pretensions, and they are a menace to both the professions 
and the general public. Few people are so foolish as to 
reject medical advice entirely because it sometimes proves 
defective; it would be equally foolish to deny the value of 
audits on similar grounds. Fortunately this elementary fact 
seems to be generally recognized if we may judge from the 
rapid and widespread growth of the practice of having ac­
counts audited. This growth is the more remarkable when 
we recall that in the early years little support was given to 
the movement by bankers and others who should have been 
the first to recognize the possibilities of the development.
I believe, however, the time has come for a great step 
forward in the interests both of the financial community and 
of the profession. Unless some effective steps are taken to 
meet criticisms such as those voiced by Professor Ripley, the 
result will be some sort of bureaucratic control, and I am 
satisfied that through proper cooperation methods can be 
devised, without resort to government, which will be more 
effective and at the same time less burdensome and vexatious 
than control by a governmental body is likely to be.
It may be said, and we should have to admit, that there is 
not in the profession as it now exists a body of men capable 
of dealing adequately with the problem of securing full and 
fair publicity in corporation matters, laying down proper 
standards and seeing that they are duly observed. It is, 
however, even clearer that there is no such body outside the 
profession, and the extent to which corporations are already 
audited shows that at least we have an adequate nucleus 
about which we can build.
As I have already suggested, it seems to me that if the 
profession is to take its proper place in this development 
two things are essential: first, that it should squarely face its 
responsibilities; secondly, that it should strenuously resist 
any attempt to impose on it responsibilities beyond its ability 
to bear. I think the profession as a whole will gladly assume 
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its proper responsibilities if those responsibilities are reason­
ably defined and if commensurate powers are given to it. 
When I say the responsibilities of the auditor should be 
defined I do not mean that a fixed code of procedure must 
be laid down; that is not possible; much must always be left 
to the judgment of the individual auditor. Such general 
guides as, for instance, the memorandum on balance sheet 
audits which was drafted by the American Institute of Ac­
countants in the first year of its existence, and provisionally 
adopted and circulated by the Federal Reserve Board, are 
of very great value, and much more might be done along 
similar lines.
Useful work has since been done by the Institute’s Com­
mittee on Cooperation with Bankers and by other commit­
tees of the Institute or State Societies; and similar coopera­
tion with such bodies as the Listing Committee of the New 
York Stock Exchange might lead to the formulation of other 
standards with which it would be the duty of every prac­
ticing accountant to be familiar.
In any such work we must be practical; it is no use laying 
down counsels of perfection or attempting to extend the 
scope of an audit unduly. An audit is a safeguard; the 
maintenance of this safeguard entails an expense; and this 
expense can be justified only if the value of the safeguard 
is found to be fully commensurate with its cost. The cost 
of an audit so extensive as to be a complete safeguard would 
be enormous and far beyond any value to be derived from it. 
A superficial audit is dangerous because of the sense of false 
security which it creates. Between the two extremes there 
lies a mean, at which the audit abundantly justifies its cost.
The problem is to determine this happy mean, to ensure 
that the auditor does not fall short of a reasonable discharge 
of his duties, and that the investor or lender does not at­
tribute to the audit a greater significance than it can as a 
practical matter possess. And it must be recognized that 
skilled dishonesty, especially collusive dishonesty, may at 
times and for a time deceive even the auditor who conducts
44 THE profession of accounting 
what is regarded as a reasonable audit, and that this should 
be so is not to be regarded as a defect of the system, since, 
as I have said, audit procedure represents a balancing of the 
consideration of risks on the one side and cost on the other. 
As a matter of fact, investors and lenders need protection 
against deliberate dishonesty less than protection against un­
sound practices and undue optimism. In the experience of 
my firm, and probably it is also the experience of other 
firms, cases of deliberate dishonesty are trivial in number 
in comparison with cases where misrepresentations have been 
made on the basis of excessive hopes, or as the result of un­
willingness to face unpleasant facts, or through an incorrect 
treatment of facts which there was no attempt to conceal, or 
which the ordinary procedure of an audit would readily dis­
close.
To illustrate the point I am attempting to make, I might 
refer to the demand which has sometimes been made, as for 
instance by a banker in an address before the New York 
Society of Certified Public Accountants some time ago, that 
auditors should assume complete responsibility for the cor­
rectness of inventories. Now, every banker no doubt would 
be glad to have the auditor assume such a responsibility if he 
would be willing to do so without any increase in his fee, 
but I do not believe one banker in a thousand would advo­
cate such an extension of responsibility at the price of the 
increase of the cost of auditing which would be necessary 
if the auditor were to undertake the work which would 
justify acceptance of so great a responsibility. I will not 
undertake to say how many times the present cost of audit­
ing would be multiplied if this suggestion were universally 
adopted, but it would clearly be a case of multiplication, not 
one of relatively simple addition.
I am whole-heartedly opposed to any such proposition. 
In the first place, I do not believe the verification of physical 
inventories is within the competence of auditors; in the 
second place, I do not think any case has been made out for
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the verification of inventories in the manner suggested either 
by auditors or by any other independent experts.
As in most other financial matters, the problem presents 
different phases in the case of the large and small corpora­
tions respectively. In the case of the large companies the 
loss to an individual grantor of credit in a particular case 
might be substantial and very serious. In such companies, 
however, if a reasonable system of inventory is in force (and 
it is a part of the ordinary procedure of audit to see whether 
such a method is employed), then the collusion necessary to 
perpetrate an inventory fraud on any large scale is so ex­
tensive that only the most desperate of dishonest executives 
would ever think of resorting thereto.
In the case of smaller companies, deliberate falsification 
is no doubt more easily effected, but unless and until ex­
perience shows it to be a common occurrence, grantors of 
credit should find their protection in the distribution of 
risks and rely on the law of averages rather than attempt to 
enforce safeguards involving an expense wholly out of pro­
portion to the demonstrated risks.
The conclusions thus reached by reasoning are confirmed 
by experience. Going back over that of my own firm in the 
last thirty years I find it difficult to recall more than, at most, 
a single case in which material overstatement of inventories 
occurred that would not have been disclosed by the work 
done in an ordinarily efficient audit, but which independent 
inventory checkers might reasonably have been expected to 
detect. In the course of this period we have by ordinary 
audit methods in very many cases found that inventories 
were overstated either in quantities, as the result of incor­
rect methods of inventory determination, or in valuation.
I think those who advocate a complete change in the 
auditor’s work and responsibilities in relation to inventories 
both overlook the great practical value of the work now 
done by auditors in relation to inventories, and also greatly 
exaggerate the value and importance of the further verifica­
tion which they would like auditors to undertake.
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Some bankers appear to think that auditors at present do 
practically nothing to ascertain whether the inventories are 
correctly stated, and are surprised when confronted with a 
statement of what the auditor can and should do—such, for 
instance, as is set forth in the Federal Reserve Bulletin on 
the audit of credit statements. It is only fair to say that 
others are very appreciative of the auditor’s work, and such 
publications as the Institute’s bulletin in 1921, when prices 
were crumbling and inventories and commitments were mat­
ters of vital importance, have elicited warm expressions of 
approval from well-informed bankers.
If the question be considered, as I think it should be, from 
the standpoint of a comparison between the risks involved 
and the costs of eliminating, or materially reducing, those 
risks, then I am satisfied that the independent verification of 
annual inventories will be found not to be a practical sug­
gestion.
The demand has arisen, I think, as a result of a few 
sporadic cases, and I feel sure there will always be enough 
experienced men in both the banking and the accounting 
worlds to appreciate the unwisdom of adding to the general 
credit system an expensive piece of machinery, the need for 
which seldom arises. No doubt, however, special inventory 
verification should and will be made where suspicions are 
aroused or unusual conditions seem to make them necessary.
Returning to my main subject, I have said that if auditors 
are to assume greater responsibilities they not only should 
be given adequate powers but should also be put in a 
stronger position in the event of their finding themselves in 
serious disagreement with the directors or officers of a com­
pany which they audit. At the present time auditors hold 
office usually at the pleasure of the officers of the company. 
We have all known cases in which the auditor, possibly 
towards the end of his audit, finds himself unable to approve 
of the accounts which the officials of the company have pre­
pared, and on informing them of his position, is told, po­
litely or otherwise, to discontinue his work, and later finds a 
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statement issued by the company signed by more subservient 
auditors. To meet this situation it seems to me that the 
auditor should be assured of a right to report to the stock­
holders the results of an audit once he has been commis­
sioned to make it.
I think also that he should not be liable to be superseded 
without having an opportunity to state his case to the stock­
holders. I have, therefore, suggested that auditors should be 
elected by, and should report to, stockholders, and that no 
auditors other than the retiring auditors should be eligible 
for appointment unless due notice should have been given 
to the stockholders and the retiring auditors of the intention 
to nominate such new auditors. This, as you know, is the 
rule under the English law.
I have heard some objection to this suggestion on the 
ground that it would operate to the advantage of large firms 
of accountants, but I do not believe that it would operate 
in any such way. I believe that where auditors are changed 
the change is more frequently from a small firm to a large 
firm than the reverse, and the suggestion that I have made 
seems, therefore, to be calculated to protect the smaller firms 
in the retention of the business which they have or may 
secure. Certainly nothing would be farther from my wish 
than that the provision should operate to deprive small 
firms of business.
Since the question has been raised I should like, by way of 
conclusion, to say just a few words on the relationship be­
tween the large and small firms. I believe the large firm 
with numerous offices is a natural result of the form our 
industrial and financial development has taken; but I think 
there is room and need for both types of organizations, and 
that they should be able to practice side by side in amity 
and with mutual respect. Many of our ablest practitioners 
are connected with relatively small organizations. I recog­
nize that the large firms must attract some business from 
smaller ones, but I feel very strongly that the larger firms 
should do nothing to encourage such transfers, and person­
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ally try to discourage them when I have the opportunity. 
My firm is altogether unwilling to build up its practice at 
the expense of other firms of good standing, large or small.
I believe that the existence of the large firms has created 
a greatly increased demand for accounting services, and I 
suggest that the smaller firms should regard the indirect 
benefits resulting to them from this source as an offset to the 
direct losses to which I have referred, and which are nat­
urally galling to them. The large firms also provide a train­
ing school for young accountants, and in other ways by mere 
size they are able to do for the profession things which 
smaller organizations could scarcely undertake to do.
I think, however, that the larger firms have a further duty 
as a result of their position in the profession. That duty is 
to take the lead in correcting defects in practice, and to take 
a strong stand with their clients where necessary in order 
to maintain sound principles. They can do so more easily 
and at the risk of relatively less important sacrifices than 
smaller organizations, and the precedents they establish have 
more far-reaching effects. The large firms owe it to them­
selves and to the profession at large that the precedents they 
set should always tend to advance the standing of the pro­
fession; should make the work of the large body of thor­
oughly conscientious, though less conspicuous, members con­
stantly easier; and, above all, should never by laxity or want 
of courage create embarrassment for others.
We are sometimes told that some firms can afford to adopt 
such policies—the implication being that others less for­
tunate cannot. But I believe everyone can afford to do so 
because, apart from every other argument in favor of such 
policies, experience shows that they pay; not only in our 
own, but in other fields we constantly see that fairness, cour­
age and honesty do really pay. It is not necessary to at­
tribute to the business world of today a higher natural 
morality than past generations possessed. The undoubted 
improvement in methods can be quite adequately explained 
by a constantly increasing recognition of this heartening fact.
IV
PUBLICITY OF ACCOUNTS *
Professor Ripley’s Position
(1926)
The contention of Professor Ripley that stockholders are 
entitled to receive reasonably full information regarding the 
affairs of a company in which they are interested can scarcely 
be questioned.
It is, however, wholly unfortunate that he should in his 
enthusiasm for his objective have allowed himself to be be­
trayed into inaccuracy and injustice of statement, more es­
pecially as his cause is so obviously good. It is because I 
fear that the movement toward fuller and fairer informa­
tion to stockholders, which has been making great progress 
in recent years, may be injured by this unwise advocacy 
that I venture to write to you.
Only reference to annual reports is necessary to demon­
strate the inaccuracy of such statements as that the Bethle­
hem Steel Company does not disclose the method of inven­
torying its assets, whether the reference be to fixed assets 
or to inventories in the narrower sense of the term. Simi­
larly, while Professor Ripley states that the word deprecia­
tion might just as well not exist for the National Cash 
Register Company under its present management, the only 
annual report issued since the recent financing not only 
states that depreciation has been provided for but states the 
precise amount.
In the same way, references to the prospectuses which one 
receives daily will prove the inaccuracy of the statement that 
appraisals contained in such prospectuses “are invariably 
made up not by experts of independent status, but by those
• A Letter to the New York Times (August 27, 1926).
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whose prospects and emoluments are • directly dependent 
upon the existing management.”
Anyone familiar with British practice will be amused or 
amazed at the statement that in England questions such as 
whether a given item should be charged to capital or income 
account “would be referred for decision to an independent 
executive committee of the shareholders.”
Moreover, Professor Ripley’s criticisms are neither con­
sistent nor judicial. We find him criticizing one company 
for a given procedure, while for another which has followed 
substantially the same procedure he has nothing but praise. 
He is so convinced of the inequities of Dodge Brothers, Inc., 
that he devotes a substantial part of his article to them, 
though the one virtue he is prepared to concede is the com­
plete frankness of disclosure for which his whole article is a 
plea. And, as he himself points out, disclosure is the vital 
thing; the form of disclosure is of minor importance.
Professor Ripley seems more concerned to heighten the 
color of his picture than to secure either accuracy of detail 
or justness of proportion—else why cite as illustrative pf the 
attitude of men in executive positions today a foolish ut­
terance of more than a quarter of a century ago?
It is impossible here to deal fully with his comments on 
corporate accounting, but as an accountant of many years’ 
standing I may perhaps be permitted to say that his state­
ments do not seem to me to indicate a grasp of the prob­
lems. For instance, he begins his criticism of no par value 
stocks with the statement that under the old par value stock 
laws the accounts started from “a bench mark solidly estab­
lished—theoretically, at least.” The belief that bench marks 
established (however solidly) only in theory were useless, if 
not dangerous, was one of the reasons why such practical 
men as Francis Lynde Stetson advocated no par value stock 
laws.
That these laws have brought new problems and dangers 
is realized by no one more fully than by the accountants. 
Indeed, the American Institute of Accountants offered $10,­
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000 in prizes for the best discussion of the various aspects— 
legal, financial, economic and accounting—of the question, 
though, unfortunately, the offer elicited no adequate res­
sponse. One looks in vain in Professor Ripley’s article for 
either sympathetic appreciation of the difficulty of these 
problems or constructive suggestions for their solution.
While the subtitle of Professor Ripley’s article is “The 
Shareholder’s Right to Adequate Information,” the article 
itself is wider in its scope, and the demand for publicity is 
urged also in the interests of the speculator, as an adjunct to 
industrial efficiency, and on other grounds. This results in 
confusion. Everyone will recognize the claim of the in­
vestor-stockholder who is in a real sense an owner of the 
business. The information best calculated to further his 
interests is by no means identical with that desired by the 
speculator for a turn who never assumes the full responsi­
bility of ownership.
In any consideration of this subject it must be borne in 
mind, first, that stock values are usually influenced more by 
prospects than by past events; and, second, that, as a dis­
tinguished English judge has pointed out, every balance 
sheet and income account is necessarily in large measure a 
matter of estimate and opinion. If those on the inside in a 
corporation desire to profit at the expense of those on the 
outside, it is often as easy for them to achieve their purpose 
by issuing statements which are adequate and correct accord­
ing to every accepted canon as in any other way. No amount 
of regulation will make a dishonestly managed company 
a satisfactory investment.
I suggest that Professor Ripley’s article presents a picture 
of the present situation which is unfair both in detail and 
in the large. I believe his perspective is wrong. While 
much remains to be done, American stockholders today in 
general get fairly adequate information—certainly far more 
than the average English stockholder, though Professor Rip­
ley compares our practice to the British to our detriment. 
Indeed, British practice after years of experience and nu­
52 THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING
merous investigations has come to rely for the protection of 
stockholders less upon detailed disclosure than upon the in­
tegrity, competence and judgment of the auditors, whose 
position has been made stronger in every recent revision of 
the Companies Acts.
V
CORPORATE PUBLICITY AND THE AUDITOR *
(1926)
My presence here tonight is a direct result of the publica­
tion by Professor Ripley of his article in the September 
Atlantic Monthly on the subject of publicity of corporation 
accounts.
Soon after that article appeared I wrote to a leading New 
York newspaper, drawing attention to certain inaccuracies 
in it and suggesting that it did not constitute an altogether 
fair presentation of the situation which exists today. Your 
committee then invited me to speak at this meeting, and, as 
the regular business programme was filled, they suggested 
that I might take this occasion to make a few remarks on the 
subject of publicity of accounts from the standpoint of di­
rectors and auditors.
I do not propose to discuss Professor Ripley’s article in 
detail. I dissent from him on some of his facts and on some 
of his arguments, and I entirely disagree with his suggestion 
as to the rôle which should be played by the Federal Trade 
Commission. But I do not wish tonight to discuss these 
disagreements; I would rather express my gratification at the- 
success with which he has attracted the attention of the 
public to the subject, and consider what we, as accountants, 
can do to bring about that improvement in the information 
furnished to stockholders and potential stockholders of cor­
porations for which his article is a plea. No doubt the pri­
mary responsibility for furnishing the stockholders adequate 
information rests on the directors, but the auditor ought to 
use his best efforts to ensure that the directors publish ac-
* An address at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Account­
ants, Atlantic City, New Jersey, September 22, 1926. Cf. The Journal of 
Accountancy, Vol. XLII (November, 1926), pp. 321-26.
53
54 THE profession of accounting 
counts which conform to the highest established standards, 
and ought to be able to advise directors what these standards 
are.
I am not sure that auditors have done their full duty in 
this respect in the past. To some extent this may have been 
due to the limitations of their authority and the rather pre­
carious tenure of their appointments. I think the time has 
come when auditors should assume larger responsibilities, 
and their positions be more clearly defined.
The practice of having independent audits has become so 
general that it is no longer necessary to demonstrate its value. 
In discussing the subject, therefore, we are now free from 
any imputation that we are crying up our own wares.
After undertaking to speak tonight I caused an examina­
tion to be made to ascertain what percentage of the com­
panies whose stocks were dealt in on a given day on the 
New York Stock Exchange had their accounts audited an­
nually, and I was myself surprised to find that in the case of 
industrial companies the practice had become almost uni­
versal; certainly over ninety per cent of all the industrial 
companies on the list were audited.
In these circumstances it seems to me that the extension of 
the independent audit, accompanied by a clearer definition 
of the authority and responsibility of the auditors, is one of 
the most valuable remedies to be found for the defects of 
which Professor Ripley complains; and I think the Institute 
should consider very seriously—and should invite the coopera­
tion of other bodies in considering—what are the proper re­
sponsibilities of auditors and what can be done to hold them 
to such responsibilities and to put them in a position to as­
sume all the responsibilities which they ought to assume.
 In England, to which country Professor Ripley pointed, 
the situation is now fairly clearly defined by statute. I 
recognize, of course, that owing to the fact that incorpora­
tion is a state question it is not readily possible here to define 
audit standards by legislation, but a reference to the English
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statutes may at least be helpful in suggesting the objectives at 
which we ought to aim.
Under the English law the independent audit has for 
many years been compulsory, the auditors sharing with the 
directors the responsibility for the accounts as published.
Auditors have been held liable for damages, and have even 
been subjected to criminal prosecution, for participation in 
the issue of false accounts. As a necessary corollary they have 
been given adequate powers. The language of the English 
Companies Act is simple:
Every auditor of a company shall have a right of access 
at all times to the books and accounts and vouchers of the 
company, and shall be entitled to require from the directors 
and officers of the company such information and explana­
tion as may be necessary for the performance of the duties 
of the auditors.
The following clause provides that the auditors shall make 
a report to the shareholders on every balance sheet laid be­
fore a shareholders’ meeting during their term of office and 
shall state whether or not they have obtained all the infor­
mation and explanations they have required and whether 
the balance sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true 
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs. It is 
made a misdemeanor to circulate a balance sheet which has 
not been audited and which does not bear a copy of the 
auditor’s report or a sufficient reference thereto.
Finally, the position of the auditor is strengthened by a 
provision that no auditor other than the retiring auditor 
shall be eligible for election at an annual meeting of share­
holders unless due notice has been given in advance of the 
intention to nominate a new auditor, and this notice must 
be given to every shareholder and also to the retiring audi­
tor. If, therefore, directors are disposed to seek new auditors 
because of differences of opinion with the existing auditors, 
ample opportunity is afforded for the shareholders to be­
come informed of the merits of the case and act accordingly.
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A government committee which recently reviewed the 
English company law in the light of developments during 
the last twenty years felt able to report:
We are of the opinion that in general the law as it stands 
with regard to the powers and duties of auditors is satis­
factory.
and also:
Cases in which auditors fall below the level of their duty 
are few and far between.
Now, while it is doubtless impracticable to bring about 
through legislation in this country a development similar to 
that which has proved so satisfactory in England, I see no 
reason why this should not be done in a large measure 
through the cooperation of such bodies as the leading stock 
exchanges, the investment bankers and the banks which 
grant credit, and I suggest that the Institute should en­
deavor to bring about cooperation to this end. Every mem­
ber of the Institute, I believe, appreciates the value to its 
membership, to the banks and to the business of the country, 
of the cooperation with bankers in regard to credit state­
ments which has been developed in recent years. I think 
the Institute should seek to extend such cooperation to the 
field with which Professor Ripley’s article deals. The New 
York Stock Exchange, for instance, could readily bring about 
through its listing agreements a situation as respects com­
panies listed on its exchange similar to that which exists in 
England. In recent years the Stock Exchange has given vari­
ous indications that it attaches constantly greater importance 
to the work of accountants and it has also shown a disposi­
tion to examine sympathetically any proposal which may 
tend to protect those who deal in the securities which it lists. 
It would, I think, therefore be receptive to a suggestion such 
as I have put forward.
As I have said, the accounts of a very large proportion of 
the industrial companies whose stocks are listed (and I limit
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for the present the suggestion to industrial companies and 
exclude railways, public utilities and other companies which 
are under some form of public supervision) are now audited; 
the public would welcome a clearer definition of the sig­
nificance of such audits and of the responsibilities of audi­
tors. Such clearer definition, though it might increase the 
accountant’s obligation, would also in the long run be of 
advantage to the members of the profession and give them 
enhanced importance in the business world, just as it has 
done in England.
By similar cooperation, standards might be established 
for balance sheets and income accounts which would be wel­
comed by many corporation executives and accountants who 
desire to be guided by the best practice, if they can be as­
sured what that practice is.
As regards balance sheets, the essential points are fairly 
well established and observed by the leading companies. A 
clear statement of the way in which the capital assets are 
valued is one requirement of an adequate disclosure which 
is not now generally observed, and there might be some dis­
cussion as to the form of statement of surplus. The object 
should be so to state the surplus as to indicate what part of 
it is legally available for dividend distributions and what 
part is not so available; but in the present state of the law, 
particularly in the case of companies with stock of no par 
value, this is not always easy, and it is impossible to lay 
down hard and fast rules.
The practice in regard to the income account is not so 
well established, and there is probably room for more dif­
ference of opinion as to what would constitute a proper dis­
closure. The difficulties arise largely from two facts which 
are not at all times adequately appreciated. The first is, 
that the significance of an income account is two-fold: it 
shows what amounts have been earned and are available for 
distribution in dividends if the directors see fit to make 
the distribution. The income account of the past is also in 
a measure a guide to the expectations of income in the
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future. In many cases this second use is the more important 
because it is the reasonable expectation of yield in the future 
which determines the value of any property today. This 
economic truism, which incidentally makes much of the dis­
cussion of the values of capital assets from the standpoint of 
reproduction cost irrelevant and meaningless, should never 
be lost sight of or obscured.
The second difficulty is that the attribution of income to 
particular periods of time is at best in a large measure 
arbitrary and based on conventions. While we accountants 
recognize this fact more fully the longer we practice, it is 
by no means properly appreciated by the general public, and 
far too much significance is commonly attached to the figure 
of income for a particular year or other period.
Bearing in mind these two points, it seems to me that 
fairness in the presentation of an income account is even 
more important than fulness. Much of the information that 
is contained in more elaborate reports is no doubt interesting 
to stockholders and appeals to their sense of proprietorship, 
but is of little practical value to them. The vitally impor­
tant requirements are that, if the profits of the year include 
extraordinary or extraneous profits which render the figures 
useless as a guide to earning capacity, these should be clearly 
disclosed; and, second, that where the accounts are based on 
any conventions other than those commonly accepted, that 
fact should also be clearly disclosed. I have in mind such 
departures from accepted convention as the valuing of in­
ventories on a basis other than cost or market, or the failure 
to provide for depreciation or depletion. Probably discus­
sion would arise as to whether the amount of depreciation 
provided should be shown separately; probably on the whole 
it should, although the precise amount set aside for depreci­
ation or the amount expended for maintenance is of less 
real significance to a stockholder than the statement of a 
competent and disinterested person who is familiar with the 
details of the business that the amount provided or expended 
is in his judgment adequate for the purpose.
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Undoubtedly there would be differences of opinion on 
the question whether gross sales should be disclosed. View­
ing the matter solely from the standpoint of the stockholder 
it seems to me this is a question of expediency. Where the 
percentage of gross profit is high, the profit is apt to be re­
garded as unreasonable, although in judging its reasonable­
ness many factors besides the percentage it bears to sales 
ought really to be taken into account. A packing company 
which can earn a fair return on its investment with a rela­
tively small percentage of profit on a large turnover can very 
well afford to publish its sales and to point to the small 
percentage of profits with an expression of surprise at its own 
moderation. On the other hand, an agricultural-implement 
company with a large investment and a relatively small turn­
over might be merely inviting ill-informed criticism by a 
similar disclosure.
Undoubtedly many of the objections to fuller disclosure 
are based on unsubstantial grounds and would be cleared up 
by frank discussion. Many corporations, as Professor Ripley 
points out, disclose in their listing applications information 
which they do not give in their reports to their stockholders.
I have been able to touch only briefly tonight on some 
of the important phases of the question of publicity of cor­
poration accounts; my main purpose is to urge that coopera­
tion between interested bodies should do much to improve 
the existing situation and that the American Institute of 
Accountants might well take the initiative in an effort to 
bring about such cooperation. I think the Institute has 
reason to be proud of its accomplishments in the single 
decade of its existence, but I believe that there is here a field 
in which the Institute could do still greater service and in 
doing so could help its members to render a higher service 
to the community.
VI
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AFFECTING ACCOUNTING 
PRACTICE *
(1929)
In any attempt to deal with a subject such as has been as­
signed to me, the first necessity is to place limitations upon 
its scope, and on such an occasion as this the limits must be 
narrow. I purpose, therefore, to limit the discussion to the 
United States and to the period of one generation, which is 
about the time that has elapsed since I began accounting 
work in New York. Further, I shall deal only with business 
accounting, and not with governmental, institutional, or 
professional accounts. In drawing the line between external 
and internal influences, I shall consider accounting as a serv­
ice department of business; and all increases in its efficiency 
as an aid to business 1 shall regard, therefore, as created 
by internal influences even though they may be attributable 
in part to external causes, such as the growing pressure of 
competition in business.
The external influences I propose to consider include 
regulation, official or unofficial; new taxation; changes in the 
form and distribution of the ownership of business; radical 
changes in price levels and the like. I shall not attempt to 
deal with any phases of the question exhaustively, but shall 
try to draw your attention to some of the less obvious as well 
as some of the more important of the effects of the external 
influences with which I shall deal. The first is the regula­
tion of the accounting of public service corporations which 
began to be effective about the beginning of the present cen­
tury.
In general the effect of regulation has been to produce
* An address to the International Congress on Accounting, New York, 
1929. Cf. Proceedings, pp. 686-97. 
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more precise but, I believe, less conservative accounting. To 
the economist this is probably an improvement; to the ac­
countant and the business man the gain may not be so as­
sured. Certainly under regulation there has been a far more 
extensive capitalization of minor betterments and of interest 
and expense items, and to some extent this influence has ex­
tended to other fields of business. I admit that in past times 
I have felt that the tendency was regrettable and the regulat­
ing bodies to blame. But at least on the second point I have 
been compelled to change my view. The tendency seems to 
me now to be the inevitable result of our constitution as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
The position seems to be as follows. Whether a rate struc­
ture is compensatory or confiscatory is determined broadly 
by a comparison between the earnings it produces and the 
sum of three things: (1) the cost of rendering the service, 
exclusive of property consumption; (2) a fair allowance for 
property consumption; and (3) a fair return on the value 
of the property employed in rendering service. The value 
of the property employed must be its fair present value, and 
the determination thereof seems under the Federal decisions 
to be almost if not quite unrelated to the determination of 
the other elements in the comparison.
It follows that if a minor betterment is charged off as an 
operating cost but remains in existence, it is also included 
at present value in the capital sum on which a return is 
allowed—the rate base, as it is termed—and the public is thus 
charged twice. Obviously the only way in which the regu­
lating bodies could protect patrons of the utilities against 
such results was by insisting on the exclusion from operat­
ing charges of expenditures for property which was still in 
existence and therefore included in the rate base. This they 
have fairly generally done.
A similar question has arisen in regard to depreciation. 
The Supreme Court has held that in fixing the rate base only 
“observed depreciation” may be deducted from new value. 
While neither the Court nor the engineers have made very 
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clear just what observed depreciation is (what, for instance, 
is the observed depreciation on an installation of electric 
light bulbs?) they have made it clear that it is something 
quite different from and less than the depreciation which is 
computed on the basis of distributing the new value over the 
useful life upon some regular plan—a basis which has been 
regarded by many regulating bodies and most accountants 
as the proper and prudent one. Upon this point varying 
policies have been followed by regulating bodies. Some clas­
sifications, such as those for gas and electrical utilities pro­
mulgated by the National Association of Railway and Util­
ities Commissioners and adopted in the State of New York, 
appear to accept the Court’s decisions regarding the deduc­
tion to be made from new value for depreciation in fixing the 
rate base, and to limit the income charge correspondingly. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission has taken the opposite 
course and has tried to insist on more liberal depreciation 
charges against operations, evidently hoping eventually to se­
cure harmony in treatment for the two purposes by a re­
versal of the attitude of the courts on the valuation aspect 
of the question. In other jurisdictions some utilities at least 
have been fairly successful in securing the allowance of de­
preciation as an operating charge on a higher scale, and 
limiting the deduction therefor in valuation to a lower scale, 
to their obviously great advantage.
Before passing from this question, I would like to point 
out that the differing degrees of conservatism which un­
doubtedly exist are a material consideration when the capi­
talization of values on an earning basis for utilities and other 
business activities is under consideration. If the ratio of 
capital value to earnings of utilities is being compared, for 
instance, with that of banks, it is necessary to take into ac­
count not only the comparative risks and opportunities in 
the two fields, but also the fact that if an accountant were 
adjusting the earnings so as to make them fairly comparable 
his adjustments of the utility figures (if any) would probably 
be downward, while there would probably be substantial up­
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ward adjustments of the bank figures. This point is not, I 
think, so widely appreciated as it should be.
The tendency towards less conservative accounting which 
regulation produced was counteracted in general business, 
at least for a time, by the development of the income tax 
as a part of the fiscal machinery of the Federal and of many 
state governments.
It was surprising to note how immediate was the effect of 
even such a small tax as the one per cent corporation excise 
tax of 1909 in inducing a conservative view of debatable 
questions. And all of us who were practicing in the war 
years will be able to recall instances of taxpayers seeking 
to anticipate deductions in 1916 in order to reduce their 
taxes at the 2% rate then in force. Some of us can also 
recall cases in which the Bureau of Internal Revenue insisted 
on the postponement of the deduction to the year 1917 or 
1918 in which the taxpayers, as it turned out, became subject 
to tax at rates of perhaps 50% or more. The high taxes 
in the war years put a premium on conservatism which 
none could ignore, and in the Act of 1918 the Congress gave 
legislative sanction to a reasonable conservatism in the ac­
counting for profits as between the taxpayer and the taxing 
authority by the provision that net income should be com­
puted in accordance with the method of accounting regularly 
employed in keeping the books of the taxpayer, unless that 
method did not clearly reflect income.
In this provision Congress went further than the English 
practice; there the law taxed annual gains and profits without 
defining them; and the courts had held that profits were to 
be determined in accordance with the usages of business 
men, and that estimates must be recognized where it was 
usual and practically necessary to make them.
For instance, the House of Lords approved * a method of 
computation of the income of a fire insurance company 
which involved the use of the customary 40% reserve for
* Clark v. Sun Insurance Office, A. C. (1912), 443. 
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unearned premiums, Lord Atkinson saying, in an opinion 
which will repay perusal:
It is obvious that the amount of the taxable profits and 
gains can only be ascertained by some system of averages, or 
estimation, or by some other practical rule of thumb based 
upon experience and the facts of different cases.
Congress not only accepted the English view that profits 
are to be determined by the methods used by business men 
but provided in substance that where those methods vary, 
any reasonable and well-established variant employed regu­
larly by a taxpayer should be accepted. Ever since the Act 
of 1918 was passed, however, minor administrative officials 
and some of the courts have whittled away from the im­
portance of this provision, and have stopped short of the 
English precedent in recognizing common business usage, 
instead of going beyond it as the Congress did. They have, 
for instance, refused to approve the use of estimates in cir­
cumstances in which they are customarily employed in busi­
ness and undoubtedly would have been sanctioned by the 
English House of Lords. They have attempted to establish 
rigid and uniform methods and to set up utterly imprac­
ticable standards of exactness in the attribution of income 
and expenses to particular periods of time. As a result, 
many of them (and many others) have come to believe that 
the amount of the profits of a given business for a given year 
is a fact almost as precise as the amount of gold in a twenty- 
dollar coin.
At first the effect was to increase the tax revenues by deny­
ing to taxpayers the benefit of methods of accounting, legiti­
mately conservative, which they had employed for many 
years for good reasons quite unrelated to taxation. But any 
seeming advantage to the Government was short-lived and 
the position soon reversed, so that today there are many cor­
porations computing their taxable income with the approval 
of the authorities on bases far more conservative than those 
they employ in their reports to their stockholders. Now it 
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may be argued that stockholders who share losses as well as 
gains and who may cease to be stockholders any day should 
be furnished with reports which represent the management’s 
best judgment of the profits fairly attributable to the year for 
which the report is made, without exaggeration and without 
conscious understatement, and that a more cautious view 
may quite properly be taken and should be permitted in re­
turns to a government which takes a toll of all profits from 
year to year but bears no share of losses, except of course as 
such losses may reduce its share of future profits.
These considerations are certainly not those which deter­
mined the attitude of the authorities; and personally I am 
not convinced that the view is a sound one, but believe that 
in the long run the best interests of the stockholders will be 
served by making reports to them on a basis at least as con­
servative as tax returns. I should perhaps make it clear 
that I am here referring only to alternative bases of account­
ing, such as are applied for instance to installment sales, and 
that my remarks have no reference to deductions allowed by 
statute, such as discovery depletion, which have nothing to 
do with the determination of actual income.
I come now to a third influence on accounting practice 
which is of very great importance, namely, the change in 
the form and nature of ownership of business. In 1897 there 
were about thirty industrial stocks listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange; today there are about a thousand, and the 
listings on other Exchanges have increased similarly. The 
income tax statistics show that of the total net income re­
ported by the 450,000 corporations which make returns, more 
than one-third is reported by about 200, and more than one- 
half by about 1,000 corporations.
These two sets of figures illustrate two pronounced tend­
encies of the last thirty years; one towards mergers and con­
solidations, and the other towards diffusion of the ownership 
of corporations. The first tendency has manifested itself in 
various ways. In the first part of the period combinations 
were mainly in the form of what is sometimes called vertical 
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integration, that is, the combining of the ownership of enter­
prises engaged in the successive stages of the process of con­
version of raw materials into final products; later horizontal 
integration came into favor and combinations were formed 
of businesses which were related to one another mainly by 
having similar markets and marketing problems. The chain 
system has also developed on a large scale in the last quarter 
of a century. In some cases chains have been created 
through the opening of new branches by an existing corpora­
tion, but in other cases the chains have been constituted 
largely by the combination of existing companies. Inci­
dentally, as this development threatened the existence of the 
wholesalers, we have recently seen some important combina­
tions of wholesalers in an effort to maintain their place in 
the economic life of the day.
Another influence which has greatly affected accounting 
practice has been the general rise in price levels brought 
about by the war. This change affected accounting practice 
directly in various ways, some of which are being discussed 
at this meeting. For instance, it raised the question of the 
wisdom of adjusting book values of capital assets to the new 
price levels, and also the question of the validity of costs 
and profits which were computed on the basis of charging 
exhaustion of plant only at cost. It also affected account­
ing practice indirectly through the change in the attitude of 
investors which it produced. Holders of fixed income se­
curities who saw the capital value of their investments sink 
because of the increase in interest rates, and the purchasing 
power of the yield of their investments lessen because of 
higher price levels, began to wonder whether such invest­
ments afforded real safety or whether there was not ulti­
mately greater safety to be secured by taking a certain com­
mercial risk and investing in securities which possessed more 
capacity for adaptation to changed conditions. Common 
stocks which represented an interest in actual property obvi­
ously were more likely to maintain a constant real value in 
the face of a major change in the general standard of money 
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values of property or in the yield from property than bonds 
or preferred stock the principal and yield of which were 
fixed in terms of money.
A realization of these truths brought common stocks into 
favor among investors and caused a marked enhancement in 
their market value. Furthermore, even those who were not 
prepared to make such a radical change in their investment 
policy as to buy common stock came to demand that fixed 
yield securities should carry with them some form of par­
ticipation in excess earnings. This has led to the creation 
of an extraordinary variety of security issues carrying all 
sorts of combinations of preferential rights with participa­
tions in excess earnings, options and the like. There is little 
doubt that in many cases these securities have been created 
with only shadowy ideas in the minds of the creators as to 
the nature and extent of the rights conferred thereby. Pres­
ent litigation indicates that this was true of issues of non- 
cumulative preferred stock in the past; and, while issues of 
that particular type of stock are not now common, stocks 
carrying a fixed dividend and an additional interest in the 
profits of any year in which more than a certain rate is 
earned on senior issues are common and present substan­
tially the same question. It seems to me a fundamental 
objection to this type of security that it attaches an impor­
tance to the earnings of a particular year, which is unde­
sirable in view of the extreme difficulty of the problem of 
subdivision of profit between years in a complex business.
I will defer discussing the effect on accounting of these 
developments until I shall have referred briefly to the last of 
the external influences which I propose to consider—my 
reason being that that influence operates, in general, in the 
same direction as the influences just mentioned.
The trend of modern legislation in regard to corporations, 
and particularly the developments following the authoriza­
tion of stock without par value, seem to me to be of the 
utmost importance to accountants. The events to which I 
have already referred led to reincorporation of businesses
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on a very large scale and hence to keen competition among 
what have been described as the “charter-mongering States” 
for the business of the corporation lawyers—a competition in 
which the State of Delaware will, I think, be generally ad­
mitted to have outbid all its competitors. That state has, for 
instance, legalized the favorite device of promoters of get- 
rich-quick schemes of paying dividends to subscribers to 
capital stock out of the amounts paid in by them on their 
subscriptions; it has obliterated, so far as statutes can do so, 
the distinction between capital and income, and has enacted 
provisions which seem likely to destroy the significance of 
such terms as “dividend.” Other states are not far behind.
In 1849, in one of the earliest of the English dividend 
cases, Lord Campbell said:  
It is most nefarious conduct for the directors of a joint 
stock company, in order to raise the price of shares which 
they are to dispose of, to order a fictitious dividend to be 
paid out of the capital of the concern. Dividends are sup­
posed to be paid out of profits only, and when directors order 
a dividend, to any given amount, without expressly saying 
so, they impliedly declare to the world that the company 
has made profits which justify such a dividend. If no such 
profits have been made, and the dividend is to be paid out 
of the capital of the concern, a gross fraud has been practised.
To the business man this is still sound sense, but anyone 
who indulges in any such inferences from the declaration of 
a dividend by a company incorporated in a state such as Del­
aware may find himself grossly mistaken and yet without any 
grounds for complaint in law. We are sometimes told 
that power to pay dividends, even though the paying cor­
poration has not earned profits to the amount thereof, should 
be granted to meet the cases of successor corporations created 
by an exchange of stocks without any substantial change of 
interest and the like. It would seem that the ingenuity of 
lawyers should be equal to the task of devising provisions 
that would meet such cases (if that be really necessary) with­
out providing such unlimited opportunities for abuse or de­
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stroying the significance of terms of established usage which 
the public believes it understands.
Our foreign visitors may not be aware that under some 
of our state laws stock which has no par value has a “stated 
value.” It is common practice to fix this stated value at a low 
figure; companies commence business with a small stated 
value of capital stock and a relatively large excess of the 
value of net assets paid in over that stated value. In the 
general affairs of the company the stated value is ignored; it 
possesses only a technical legal significance.
It is not surprising that this lack of significance should 
tend to extend to the valuation at which capital assets are 
entered on the books—one curious result may be noted. If 
property acquired for stock having no par value is entered on 
the books at a nominal or low value, the annual charge for 
the exhaustion of this property is correspondingly reduced 
and the book profits to that extent increased. If then the 
value of a property or business is to be measured mainly by 
its earning capacity, the paradoxical result is reached that the 
lower the value at which the property of a business is re­
corded on the books the greater becomes the apparent value 
of the business.
It is true that numerous states have passed so-called blue 
sky laws designed for the protection of investors but, while 
some of these have had useful influence, they have not, as a 
whole, proved particularly effective. There is, I believe, 
more ground for hope in the activities of private organiza­
tions of which the most powerful is, no doubt, the New 
York Stock Exchange. Those who have followed the devel­
opments of the Exchange’s policy in relation to the listing of 
securities in recent years will, I think, agree as to the value 
of its influence in promoting sound financial practices among 
corporations. That influence has been the greater because 
the Exchange has exercised its great powers with moderation 
and at the same time with courage. All accountants should 
lend their full support to such policies as that of the Ex­
change and other bodies which are aiming to bring about 
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the adoption and maintenance of sound business standards 
through non-governmental regulation. If such efforts fail, 
we shall be likely to see rigid governmental regulation which, 
though it may curb undesirable practices, will also seriously 
hamper legitimate business.
Another phase of corporate development needing consider­
ation at this time is the change in the relation of stock­
holders to the business, brought about by the development of 
non-voting stocks and the elimination of pre-emptive rights 
of stockholders to acquire new issues of stock. These two 
developments have done much to strengthen the position of 
the management of corporations. Once a group comes into 
control of a corporation it is a difficult task to dislodge it, and, 
if new capital is needed, the group can determine whether it 
shall be secured from old stockholders or from new sources. 
The stockholders’ meetings which may be necessary will 
probably be formal affairs unless there is not only strong 
opposition but an opposition prepared to spend large sums 
of money to defeat the proposal to which it is opposed. So 
long as a management exercises its powers with discretion and 
shows even a moderate competence, it usually has little diffi­
culty in maintaining its position.
It will be clear, I hope, that the tendencies I have men­
tioned affect accounting and accountants in an important 
way. The allocation of profits to particular years has be­
come both more important and more difficult as a result 
thereof. The simple rule of conservatism, under which 
profits were never anticipated but probable or even potential 
losses were provided for, was satisfactory as long as the inter­
ests of only long-time stockholders had to be considered. It 
is not equally satisfactory to a management that feels that it 
may have occasion to trade with other companies on the 
basis of comparative earnings, and it is thought by some to 
be unfair to stockholders who may desire or be compelled 
to realize their holdings.
The task of those responsible for the financial reports of 
corporations has become more difficult and more delicate 
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and, since the accountants for the corporations should be 
their most competent and disinterested advisers, the oppor­
tunity of the accountants, both corporation accountants and 
practicing accountants, is enlarged. The service of the pub­
lic accountant may take one of two forms; the first, and I 
trust the most common form (in which he and the corpora­
tion accountant should be found in cooperation), should be 
in giving sound advice to those responsible for the reporting 
and financial policies of the corporations and in dissuading 
them from any accounting policy which might be unjust 
to any group of persons having a legitimate interest therein; 
the second, where the first fails, lies in protecting the inter­
ests of those who may be adversely affected by action of the 
management by insisting on a proper disclosure of what has 
been done either in the accounts or in the auditors’ certifi­
cate.
I would like, however, to emphasize that even when the 
accountant has done his best to attain accuracy, investors 
must still recognize the limitations on the significance of 
even the best of accounts, and the shorter the period covered 
the more pronounced usually are these limitations. Accounts 
are essentially historical reqords and, as is true of history in 
general, correct conclusions cannot be reached by a hurried 
survey of temporary conditions, but only by a longer retro­
spect and a careful distinction between permanent tendencies 
and transitory influences. I cannot help feeling that today 
undue importance is frequently attached to the earnings of 
a single year or even a single quarter.
Modern developments have tended also to reduce the im­
portance of the balance sheet, and they seem to me to neces­
sitate reconsideration of the methods of preparation of cor­
porate reports.
As business grows more complex it becomes more and 
more impracticable to present in a single picture a represen­
tation of the position of any important corporation which 
will be accurate in detail and perspective in all its parts, and 
will tell an intelligible story to the average investor. A series 
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of pictures, rather than a single one, is needed—and in such a 
series the balance sheet will perhaps be of least significance 
to any but the technical experts who will find in it a check 
on other parts of the series.
Corporations have generally forsaken the old debit and 
credit account form of income statement for the narrative 
form which is more intelligible to the layman though less 
elegant in the eyes of the technician. They need to do some­
thing of the same kind for the balance sheet which is, even 
more than the old income account, a creation of technique. 
It should be made clearer to the general public that only 
in part is a balance sheet in the nature of an instantaneous 
picture and that in part it is merely historical and in part 
purely conventional. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to explain why this should be so, but even if it must re­
main so, the fact should be more generally known and the 
historical, conventional and photographic parts more clearly 
identified.
An annual report which contains a series of separate state­
ments including: (1) a well-arranged income and surplus ac­
count; (2) a classified statement of quick assets and liabili­
ties; (3) summaries of capital obligations and capital assets; 
and (4) a lucid statement of resources which have become 
available during the year, and the disposition thereof, will 
not gain greatly by the addition of a balance sheet in which 
all assets and liabilities are brought together, though custom 
and a sense of completeness may call for its inclusion.
Finally, the legal position has become so unsatisfactory 
that accountants guided by sound principles and the best 
opinion of the day must assume a large responsibility in ap­
proving or. disapproving practices admittedly not illegal. 
Thus, as I see the position, the opportunity for us to render 
service of a highly professional and valuable character is 
greater today than ever before, and I trust we shall prove 
equal to the opportunity offered us.
VII
EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL MERGERS ON ACCOUNTING 
PRACTICE *
(1929)
There is one tendency in modern corporation development 
that I would like to speak on especially—that is the tendency 
towards mergers and consolidations throughout the country. 
I suppose it is an economic development that can hardly 
be arrested, but it brings in its train a great many unfortu­
nate consequences, as I suppose is true of all important eco­
nomic changes.
I cannot view, without regret, the elimination of so many 
independent business men throughout the country or their 
being forced to choose between accepting the position of 
salaried employees and being forced out of business alto­
gether, though this is an inevitable incident of this develop­
ment.
Another thing that I view with regret is the displacement 
of local auditors of these smaller concerns and their replace­
ment by firms which enjoy a national reputation. The rela­
tions between the national firms and the local firms have al­
ways seemed to me a question of very real importance to the 
profession. I have never regarded their positions as at all 
antagonistic. In the past, undoubtedly a certain amount of 
work of the local accountants has passed in the natural de­
velopment of business to the national firms, but I have felt 
that that was far more than compensated for by the general 
development of accounting throughout the country, which 
could not have been accomplished without the national firms, 
and I still feel that the national firms ought to be an asset to 
the local firms.
* Excerpt from an address delivered at the New England regional meeting 
of the American Institute of Accountants held at Boston, May 6th, 1929.
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I do not think that the national firms any more than the 
local firms can prevent the operation of an economic trend 
such as I have referred to. I know—speaking for my own 
firm—we have tried at times to do it but unsuccessfully. We 
have never wished to grow at the expense of the local ac­
countants. We have encouraged our clients more than 
once to retain the local accountants where we felt there was 
reason to believe that the local accountant could render all 
the service that was required; but I know that, nevertheless, 
we and other national firms must have taken a very consider­
able business from local accounting firms and that the loss 
of that business to the local accounting firms has been far 
more important to them than its gain has been to us. Now, 
what can we do to compensate? The one thing above all 
that I think every national firm should do is to maintain 
standards commensurate with its position; I fear that there 
are some national firms that do not, either in the ethics of 
getting business or in the ethics of doing business. I think 
it is the duty of the big firms to fight the battles for the 
whole profession. They can do it at much less relative 
cost. In order to fight these battles of principle, one has to 
be prepared to lose connections which carry remunerative 
fees or prestige that is valuable in itself. If the small firm 
loses an important audit, it means a substantial share of its 
total business; a big firm can lose a number without really 
feeling it. And that is why I feel that the first and foremost 
duty of the national firms is to take the strongest possible 
stand on questions of ethics and on questions of principle, 
and in both these fields to fight the battle of the whole profes­
sion. Now, I don’t think that we are all doing it, but I think 
we ought to do it, and I am glad of an opportunity to express 
myself very plainly on the subject.
I sympathize very heartily with the local firms, which are 
doing good work in a professional spirit but complain that 
the national firms are not always maintaining the standards 
of either accounting principles or ethics that they advocate 
and seek to impose on the profession as a whole.
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There is no doubt that there is room in the profession for 
both national firms and local firms, and I don’t think if 
the two work together properly that anything essentially 
antagonistic in their position can develop. That it is pos­
sible to make a great success without having a national or­
ganization is obvious.
VIII
THE ROYAL MAIL (KYLSANT) CASE *
A LETTER TO H. L. H. HILL, ESQ., PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTE 
OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
(1931)
My dear Mr. Hill:
As a result of the Royal Mail case the Institute is obviously 
face to face with one of the greatest problems and, as I see it, 
one of the greatest opportunities presented to it in the course 
of its existence.
For many years I have taken an active interest in the ques­
tion of disclosure of financial information to shareholders, 
and at the moment I am chairman of a committee of the 
American Institute, appointed to cooperate with the New 
York and other stock exchanges in this field. This may serve 
as my excuse for laying before you, as President of the Insti­
tute, the views herein expressed. If I put them forward 
merely as my own views, it is because I have had no 
opportunity to discuss them with others who might be in­
terested and entitled to address you; but they are the result 
of many discussions and of contributions from many and 
varied sources.
I do not feel any embarrassment in discussing the question 
by reason of the fact that one of my partners was involved in 
the Royal Mail case, because the view taken here (and, as I 
judge, in London) has, I think, generally been that upon the 
accounts charges in that case it was a system, rather than indi­
viduals, that was on trial; and I think the general conclusion 
has been that though the individuals were clearly entitled to 
acquittal, the system must be condemned and must be 
changed.
• Rex v. Kylsant (1931).
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It has come as a surprise to many people here to find that 
the practice in respect to disclosure was so much better than 
in England. Many, both inside and outside the accounting 
profession, had thought that by long and laborious effort 
they were gradually raising the standard to a point which had 
been reached in London many years ago; and to find the case 
entirely otherwise has come as a distinct shock to them.
I think opinion here would generally agree with the view 
expressed in the evidence submitted on behalf of the Insti­
tute before the Greene Committee in 1925, that the form and 
content of commercial accounts are matters that cannot be 
satisfactorily dealt with by legislation. There are, however, 
it would seem, two corollaries to this proposition: the first, 
that neither directors nor auditors can properly regard legal 
requirements as setting the measure of their obligation to 
shareholders; the second, that it is incumbent on all the 
parties interested to work continuously to improve standards, 
and by precept and example to endeavor to secure a reason­
able degree of publicity in corporate accounts.
If I might offer criticisms of the evidence to which I have 
referred, my first would be that it failed to emphasize these 
corollaries. For instance, the Institute, in my opinion, can­
not properly take the position (which it took in its evidence) 
that the requirements for disclosure should not be enlarged 
by law, unless it is prepared to do everything it can to insure 
that auditors shall use their power and influence to secure a 
reasonable degree of disclosure; it cannot properly oppose 
enlargement of the rights of shareholders' to inspect books 
unless it can say that it is improper practice for any of its 
members to certify accounts which do not constitute a rea­
sonably adequate and fair disclosure; and it cannot properly 
oppose disclosure in regard to secret reserves unless the code 
of practice which it enforces, or at least enjoins on its mem­
bers, calls for adequate disclosure when such reserves are 
established or drawn upon. The case is the stronger where 
the shares of a company are listed on the Stock Exchange 
and the public thus invited to buy and sell them.
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I cannot help thinking that it is a reproach to all con­
cerned in the City—the Stock Exchange, the banks, the ac­
countants, the solicitors, and the directors of large commer­
cial companies—that the standards of disclosure by public 
companies should have remained or become so low, while the 
distribution of shareholdings has been becoming so much 
wider. I recognize that such powerful bodies as the Stock 
Exchange and the big banks have been inert, and that this 
has made the task of improving standards more difficult. But 
it seems to me that this merely made the opportunity of the 
Institute the greater; and that with the stronger position 
given auditors under the Act of 1908, and with the enhanced 
prestige which accountants have enjoyed, especially since the 
war, the profession could have accomplished most of what 
was needed without other aid.
Undoubtedly the American point of view on these ques­
tions has been greatly influenced by the extent of the effort 
which has been made to convert shares of industrial and 
other companies into a more liquid form of asset. Obviously, 
if such shares are to be regarded as a liquid asset and freely 
traded in, there must be available at all times reliable in­
formation upon which estimates of value may be predicated. 
Whatever may be the cause, there is no doubt that in the last 
twenty years there has been an enormous improvement in the 
standards of disclosure here. That improvement has been 
brought about by the cooperation of a number of bodies; the 
banks through their credit departments and the Stock Ex­
change through its listing committee have played a very im­
portant part, but the accounting profession has, I believe, 
also contributed in a very substantial way to the results which 
have been achieved.
My second criticism of the Institute’s evidence would be of 
the statement that to attempt to prescribe that there should 
be a profit and loss account published as well as a balance 
sheet “is considered likely to do more harm than good.” 
It is, I think, generally recognized that earning capacity is 
the most important single test of value; and if any accounts 
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are to be given to shareholders, it is difficult to see why the 
profit and loss account is not at least equally as important 
as the balance sheet.
Since this evidence was given, Parliament has, of course, 
reached a conclusion opposed to that reached by the Insti­
tute, and a profit and loss account is now required by statute. 
The question at present, therefore, is what is the object of 
the profit and loss account, and how can that object be best 
served without detriment to other interests of the share­
holders.
The answer to the first part of the question is, I suggest, 
that the profit and loss account is valuable to shareholders 
principally for the light it throws on the efficiency of the 
management and on the earning capacity of the company 
under the conditions existing during the period to which it 
relates, and the form and content of the account should be 
determined with the purpose of making it as effective as 
possible for these uses. It is not to be expected that the 
account will afford complete illumination on either point; 
but present shareholders in respect of the first, and both 
present and potential shareholders in respect of the second 
point, are entitled to demand that it shall afford them all the 
light that can properly be given, and above all, that it shall 
not mislead them.
It is easy to cite difficulties which may be encountered in 
formulating accounts; but experience shows that in the great 
majority of cases the issues are simple, and the auditor has 
no real difficulty in determining whether accounts submitted 
to him for approval are adequate or inadequate, helpful to 
shareholders or misleading; and every auditor should as a 
matter of professional ethics, not of law, refuse to recognize 
law or custom as justification for signing them if he regards 
them as either inadequate or calculated to give rise to infer­
ences which are not warranted by the facts. If a new manage­
ment draws on secret reserves created by conservative pred­
ecessors, to eke out the meager results of its own inefficiency, 
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without disclosing the fact to the shareholders, can there be 
any doubt that the auditor has a moral duty to reveal it?
In saying this, I am in no wise oblivious of the impossibil­
ity of establishing fixed standards of accounting, nor of the 
necessity of leaving the control of company matters generally 
in the hands of directors. Within the limits of a reasonable 
difference of opinion an auditor may properly subordinate 
his own judgment to that of directors, and unless the point 
is of crucial importance he can quite properly refrain from 
telling the stockholders of that difference of opinion. Nor 
have I any sympathy with the view that the so-called “man 
in the street,” supposedly of subnormal intelligence, should 
set the standards of disclosure. If the accounts are clear 
enough to enlighten a normally competent analyst, that is 
sufficient; he can interpret to the less intelligent, if necessary.
It must be borne in mind that when a reputable company 
publishes and a reputable auditor accepts accounts which 
are lacking in fairness or frankness, the value of all accounts 
and of all audits is impaired. If some accounts bearing emi­
nent names are known to be unreliable as indices of value or 
of the results of operations, the public has no means of know­
ing which are and which are not reliable.
Before concluding, I should like to say a word on the diffi­
cult question of wholly owned subsidiaries. The present 
English law on the subject seems scarcely worth the paper 
on which it is written. I suggest that the Institute should 
tackle seriously this vexed question. Accounts which ignore 
the operations of subsidiaries except the payment of divi­
dends are inadequate. How the facts regarding such opera­
tions should be disclosed is a matter of judgment, and I 
should not advocate insistence by the Institute on any partic­
ular method. But at least it can and should insist that if 
the operations of the subsidiaries are not fairly reflected in 
the dividends received by the parent, some proper reflection 
must be given if the auditor is to certify that the accounts 
of the parent company show the true position of its affairs.
The Institute and the leading firms have an opportunity 
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at the present time by a display of courage and independence 
to effect a great reform and are assured of public support in 
doing so, and I hope they will make the most of the oppor­
tunity.
Yours very truly,
George O. May. 
August 21, 1931.
IX
INFLUENCE OF THE DEPRESSION ON THE PRACTICE 
OF ACCOUNTANCY *
(1932)
I am not one who believes that any benefit can be derived 
from the mere contemplation of misfortune, and I should 
not, therefore, undertake to address you today were it a ques­
tion merely of dwelling on the unfortunate immediate effects 
on the profession of the unparalleled depression through 
which we have been passing. I deeply regret the loss of em­
ployment by many worthy members of our profession and 
the difficulties which some of our practitioners have expe­
rienced; but I should not feel that the depression would be 
worth our study unless we could derive either some legiti­
mate satisfaction or some instruction, or both, from the 
process.
I think we can derive satisfaction from the abundant evi­
dence of the importance of our profession which the depres­
sion has elicited. The numerous defalcations which have 
unfortunately but naturally resulted from it have brought 
home the importance of detailed audits by outside auditors 
in the case of those companies which are not of sufficient 
magnitude to justify the maintenance of an adequate system 
of internal check. Other incidents have demonstrated the 
importance of external audits in the case of companies at 
the other extreme of the range: namely, those companies 
which in their magnitude and importance have sometimes 
been deemed to be above the need of auditing. I think that 
in both fields we can look forward confidently to a perma­
nent growth in the work of the profession as the result of
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute 
of Accountants, Kansas City, Missouri, October 18, 1932. Cf. The Journal 
of Accountancy (November, 1932), Vol. LIV, pp. 336-50.
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this temporary depression and that the outlook is favorable 
to those carrying on efficiently either large practices or small. 
It is, however, the lessons which we can learn from the 
depression that I propose particularly to consider.
It is in times of stress that defects and inadequacies of a 
structure become most readily apparent; and it has seemed 
to me that it would be worth while to consider what defects 
in the economic structure the present depression has revealed, 
and how far accountants have any responsibility therefor or 
any opportunity to bring about improvement in the future. 
Obviously, the depression is not the resultant of any single 
cause but of a multiplicity of causes. Of the many to which 
it has been partly attributed, most lie in fields with which 
the accountant as such is not concerned, and this group in­
cludes those in regard to which controversy has been the 
keenest—such as the relation to the depression of the develop­
ment of intense post-war nationalism, tariffs, war debts, and 
the gold standard. Some, however, seem to me to relate to 
phases of our economic life with which the accountant has 
a very direct concern.
First of all, I propose to discuss a phase of the question 
with which, as Chairman of your Committee on Cooperation 
with. Stock Exchanges, I have been much concerned in recent 
months. No one doubts that one of the major contributing 
causes to the depression was the enormous volume and ex­
travagantly high prices which characterized the dealings in 
corporate stocks in the period prior to the collapse of 1929. 
An outstanding characteristic of that movement was the new 
emphasis laid on earning capacity as the measure of value 
of such securities; and, as frequently happens when new 
recognition is given to an old truth, we have seen during 
periods of inflation and deflation this truth applied in a most 
reckless and ill-advised manner, not only by investors, but 
by many who have undertaken to advise others. Such people 
were no doubt right when they argued that earning capacity 
was usually the main criterion of value. They may have 
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been right in their second proposition, that the fair value 
of securities of a given type was a multiple—ten, or fifteen, 
or twenty—of the earning capacity attached to the security. 
They were, however, hopelessly wrong when they predicated 
their calculations on the assumption that the earning capacity 
was fairly measured by the past or prospective earnings for 
a comparatively short period, without any adequate knowl­
edge of the way in which the figures of earnings employed 
in their calculations were derived.
Nothing has astonished me more in conversations with 
men fairly well versed in financial matters than their failure 
to appreciate the importance of methods of accounting in 
relation to corporate earnings and to capital values predi­
cated on earnings. We accountants know how varied are the 
methods commonly and legitimately employed, how great 
the effect of a difference of methods on the earnings of a par­
ticular short period may be, and how erroneous may be con­
clusions as to capital value based on such earnings. An illus­
tration may make clearer the point I have in mind.
Let me take a simple case of one of the unemployed who 
joined the apple-selling rush in the winter of 1931. He 
started on the first day believing that he could sell two crates 
of apples, which cost him $2.00 each, at a profit of more 
than one hundred per cent. At the end of the first day he 
found that he had sold the contents of one and collected 
$5.00. The wholesale price of apples remained unchanged 
and it was quite clear to him, and it must be to everyone 
else, that he had made a profit of $3.00.
The second day, however, complications arose. As a re­
sult of the rush, the wholesale price of apples had risen to 
$2.25 a crate, and at that price he bought one crate. He was 
also able to increase his price slightly, and the sale of one 
crate produced $5.50. Apples were still quoted wholesale at 
$2.25 when he ended his day’s work, and the question arose 
in his mind whether his profit for the day was $3.25 or $3.50. 
Looking at the matter one way, he had $3.25 more cash 
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than he had at the beginning of the day, and he had 
one crate of apples on hand just as he had at the beginning. 
Looking at it another way, the crate of apples that he had 
bought that day had cost him $2.25 and was still worth that 
sum, and what he had sold was the crate of apples bought 
the previous day at $2.00; and as he had realized $5.50, he 
had made a profit of $3.50.
The third day, the public demand for apples began to de­
cline. He was able to buy another crate of apples for $2.00, 
and the sale of one crate produced only $4.50. To make 
matters worse, he found that by the end of the day the whole­
sale price of apples had fallen to $1.75. He was sorely 
puzzled to determine how much profit he had made that 
day. He still had a crate of apples, as he had had in the 
morning, and he had $2.50 more cash, so that from this 
standpoint his profit was $2.50. If, however, he took the 
view that what he had on hand was the crate he had bought 
that day, and that what he had sold was the crate which had 
cost $2.25 the previous day, his profit was only $2.25. Look­
ing at it in a third way he perceived that at the close of the 
previous day he had had a crate of apples that had cost him 
and was worth $2.25; at the end of that day he had a crate 
of apples which was worth $1.75 and $2.50 in cash, a total 
of $4.25, so that from this standpoint his gain for the day 
was only $2.00.
He concluded that, anyhow, the business was an unsatisfac­
tory one, and decided to buy no more apples; and on the 
fourth day he was able to sell the contents of the crate he 
had on hand for $4.00.
Looking back over the experience of the four days, it was 
clear that he had bought four crates of apples at a total 
cost of $8.25 and had sold the contents for a total of $19.00, 
and thus had made a total profit of $10.75. It was apparent, 
however, that the profit from day to day varied according 
to the way in which the stock he carried over from day to day 
was treated. The only day in which the amount of profit was
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clear was the first day. The following table shows the distri­
bution of profits between days on the different theories, 
which I may now describe in the terms in which they are
commonly described by 
methods are familiar:
accountants, to whom all three
First 
day
Second 
day
Third
day
Fourth 
day Total
On the basis of stating the in­
ventory at latest cost, the 
profit was ........................... $3.00 $3.50 $2.25 $2.00 $10.75
On the basis of inventorying at 
cost or market, whichever was 
lower .................................. 3.00 3.50 2.00 2.25 10.75
On the basic stock method (that 
is, valuing stock at a uniform 
price) .................................. 3.00 3.25 2.50 2.00 10.75
If next we assume three men, A, B, and C, having exactly 
the same experience but using the three different inventory 
methods, respectively, in the order above named and report­
ing their profits accordingly—then if we were to appraise the 
value of the respective businesses by multiplying the profits 
shown in, say, the second period, by a uniform multiple, we 
should reach the conclusion that the businesses of A and B 
were worth substantially more than that of C; while if we 
made the calculations a day later and used the third period as 
our basis, we should conclude that C’s business was by far the 
most valuable of the three.
Of course, on the illustrative case assumed the conclusion 
is fantastically absurd; but enlarge the scale of the illustration 
in volume, time and complexity, so that it will deal with 
years and millions of dollars instead of days and dollars, and 
you have exactly the situation that has been presented in the 
period that has elapsed between the close of the last depres­
sion in 1921 and the present time.
Nor do the three methods of computing profits for the 
different periods exhaust the variations in commercial prac­
tices. Some corporations, for instance, would treat the re­
duction of inventory from cost to market value as a charge to 
surplus, and show:
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Net income
First day...................................................... $ 3.00
Second day.................................................. 3.50
Third day.................................................... 2.25
Fourth day.................................................. 2.25
$11.00 
Less—Charge to surplus
Third day.................................................... 25
$10.75*
Now investors, and even some who undertake to advise 
investors, are apt to give the same weight to profits of com­
panies in the same business without knowing whether the 
profits to which their calculations are applied have been 
computed on the same basis or how great the effect of a 
difference in method might be. And as most of you prob­
ably know, such computations have frequently been made 
on the basis of profits for a single year if not for a shorter 
period. I remember, for instance, the case of a banking house 
acquiring the business of a large corporation for the purpose 
of resale to the public on an agreed basis measured by the 
earnings of a past year, without any specification of the way 
in which the earnings had been or were to be determined 
except that it was to be in accordance with good accounting 
practice; and as this paper was being written I happened 
to see a publication of a firm of investment advisors contain­
ing this language: “When the statement is made that the 
majority of common stocks are overvalued at current levels, 
it is meant that they are selling at higher values than are 
justified by a six to nine months’ improvement in earning 
power at the best rate foreseeable.”
By comparing the figures in the table I have already given,
* Those desiring to pursue the question further may be interested to com­
pare the annual reports for 1931 of the National Lead Company, the Good­
year Tire & Rubber Company and the American Smelting and Refining Co. 
Such a comparison affords much food for thought, and I was very much in­
terested, therefore, to see a question in a recent examination paper on ac­
counting principles of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administra­
tion, calling for a discussion of the difference of method between the Good­
year and National Lead companies, 
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you will notice that the method of valuation at cost or 
market, whichever is lower (which is by far the most com­
monly employed of all methods), results in showing larger 
profits in a period of rising wholesale and retail prices and 
lower profits in a period of declining prices than the basic 
stock method. For this reason, it has been urged that the 
basic stock method is really a safer and saner way of measur­
ing earnings than the cost or market basis. . I think it must 
be admitted that the cost or market basis is designed prima­
rily to afford a sound balance sheet value, and that some 
change of method, or some change in the form of presenta­
tion of results, may be called for at this time, when the in­
come account is becoming recognized as potentially, at least, 
more significant than the balance sheet. But without pass­
ing on this minor question, I think we can agree on the 
major point that, particularly in times of changing prices, it 
is very important that those who undertake to appraise capi­
tal values on the basis of current earnings should know just 
how the earnings are computed.
I chose my illustration from the field of inventory valua­
tion, but this is by no means the only part of corporate ac­
counting in respect of which legitimate methods vary. Meth­
ods of treatment of plant and equipment, for instance, vary 
even more widely. I noticed recently a statement by an 
economist that the heavy investment in capital equipment 
characteristic of the present age tended to make the process 
of readjustment in a period of falling prices more painful 
and prolonged than it would otherwise be.* Certainly, this 
characteristic of heavy capital investment gives rise to the 
most difficult problems of modern accounting—problems 
which cannot be solved by any precise mathematical or logi­
cal processes but require foresight and judgment in their 
handling if even measurably accurate solutions are to be 
reached.
The questions what expenditures ought to be capitalized
* Frederick C. Mills, Economic Tendencies in the United States; Aspects 
of Pre-War and Post-War Changes (1931). 
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and when expenditures so capitalized ought to be charged 
off are not easy to answer, and experience shows that corpora­
tions adopt an infinite variety of methods in dealing with 
them. At the one extreme are the methods prescribed by 
many public-service commissions, according to which all ad­
ditions and improvements are capitalized and units of prop­
erty are charged off only as they are actually retired or are 
about to be retired, when the charge may be made against 
either operating expenses or surplus. At the other extreme 
is the method formerly employed by the General Electric 
Company, by which all capital expenditures are charged off 
against income in the year in which they are incurred, no 
charge being made, naturally, for depreciation of previously 
existing plant. Between these extremes the accounts of cor­
porations reflect every gradation from over-liberality to over­
conservatism in attributing charges to capital and amortiz­
ing them through depreciation charges or otherwise. Here, 
again, anyone appraising the stock of a corporation on the 
basis of its earnings should know what methods of account­
ing have been followed.
It may be suggested that the accountant who audits the 
accounts of a corporation and satisfies himself that they are 
presented on a fair basis has no further responsibility to the 
individual investor or analyst who may draw unwarranted 
inferences from the accounts. That is, no doubt, quite true; 
but if the profession is to render the fullest possible service, 
surely it must keep in touch with the trend of economic 
developments and try to meet the legitimate demands that 
grow out of such developments.
Now, one of the major economic developments of recent 
years has been the change in the nature and status of cor­
porate securities. This change has been brought about by 
two tendencies in the development of corporations: first, the 
tendency to consolidate businesses into large units and, sec­
ondly, the ever-widening diffusion of security holdings. The 
great social significance of these tendencies was recognized 
some years ago by the Social Science Research Council, and 
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that body instituted a study which resulted in the publica­
tion of a work bearing the title, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property.* From this work it appears that 
roughly 40% of the business wealth of the country (other 
than banking) is controlled by the two hundred largest cor­
porations. It also appears that the control of the two hun­
dred corporations in turn is roughly as follows:
100% 100%
By number By wealth
Management control. . . 44% 58%
Legal device.................. 21% 22%
Minority control............ 23% 14%
Majority ownership.. .. 5% 2%
Private ownership........ 6% 4%
In hands of receiver.. .. 1% negligible
It was impracticable to carry the study further to cover 
smaller, but still large corporations, but the analysis shows 
clearly how very far the separation between beneficial owner­
ship and control of corporate property has already proceeded, 
and doubtless the process will continue in the future.
Concurrently, there has been a constant attempt to make 
corporate stocks, which in essence are capital assets, more and 
more into a liquid security, readily marketable and suitable 
as collateral for demand or short-time obligations. The 
three tendencies combined seem to me to have created a legit­
imate basis for the demand for full and more enlighten­
ing information in regard to the operation of the larger 
companies whose securities are widely distributed and sub­
ject to continuous market dealings. If market values are to 
be fairly appraised, information throwing light on the earn­
ing capacity is of the first importance. The reports issued 
by such corporations must not be regarded as having only 
historical interest—it must be recognized that their principal 
value lies in enabling thousands or tens of thousands of 
stockholders to deal intelligently with their investments in
* A. A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property. 
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corporations and potential investors to form reasonably in­
formed opinions on the attractiveness of the stocks of corpo­
rations at the prices at which they are available. I think 
the accountant should take cognizance of this situation and 
do his part toward securing the fulfillment of the require­
ments to which it gives rise, and I think his part can be made 
a very important one.
To my mind, the first essential is to bring about a better 
understanding by investors of what accounts are of should be, 
and what they are not and cannot be. Investors should be 
brought to realize that the value and significance of corporate 
accounts depend partly on the methods of accounting em­
ployed by the corporation and partly on the degree of wis­
dom and honesty displayed in applying those methods. And 
here it is important to note that the use of the most conserva­
tive method may, for a short period, result in an overstate­
ment of earnings. If, for instance, during a year of depres­
sion, a corporation which capitalizes nothing and charges no 
depreciation, suspends all construction work, the results for 
that year will be presented in an unduly favorable light, al­
though the accumulated surplus may still be conservatively 
stated.
In the second place, it seems to me highly desirable that 
the reports and accounts of corporations should be made 
more fully explanatory, so that investors and others inter­
ested will know generally what methods of accounting have 
been followed and be in a position to appraise the value of 
the resulting figures accordingly. This development seems 
to me infinitely preferable to the alternative which at once 
suggests itself of uniform methods imposed by external au­
thority. I think, also, that in the formulation of methods 
of accounting the preeminent importance of earning capac­
ity should be recognized and the consequent importance of 
furnishing to stockholders and investors an income account 
which will give as fair an indication of the earning capacity 
of the business during the period to which it relates as can be 
given.
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I think it only fair to add that, from a fairly wide interna­
tional experience, I believe information is more fairly given 
in respect of corporate affairs in this country than in per­
haps any other important commercial country. This, how­
ever, ought to be so, for the simple reason that the three 
tendencies to which I have referred (those towards concen­
tration into larger units, diffusion of shareholdings, and the 
creation of a status of liquidity for corporate stocks) have 
proceeded much further in this country than elsewhere.
Your Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges, of 
which I am chairman, has been much impressed with the de­
termination of the New York Stock Exchange to exercise 
its influence more than in the past in the direction which I 
have indicated and with the possibilities of helpful coopera­
tion on the part of accountants. This committee during the 
past year has given much consideration to the subject, and 
the views which I am expressing today are in a large measure 
the result of that consideration.
It is quite true that the public accountant has no power to 
initiate improvements in corporate methods of accounting or 
reporting, nor to exercise pressure to bring them about. The 
initiative lies theoretically with the shareholders; practically, 
with the directors or officers of corporations. The power to 
exercise pressure resides mainly in those bodies which afford 
a market in which dealings mainly take place. But the ac­
countant who has earned the confidence of his clients can, by 
influencing them, contribute greatly to the success of the 
movement. Most corporation executives will, I believe, be 
found willing to afford reasonable information to their share­
holders if the question is placed fairly before them.
I venture, therefore, to express the hope that accountants 
in their audit practice and in their conferences with corpo­
rate officers regarding the form and content of annual ac­
counts will bear constantly in mind the desirability of indi­
cating clearly on what bases assets and liabilities are stated 
and results computed; the growing relative importance of the 
income account as compared with the balance sheet; and the 
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fact that the value of the income account depends on its be­
ing a fair indication of the earning capacity of the business 
under the conditions existing during the year to which it re­
lates as determined by a fair and consistent application of ac­
ceptable methods of accounting.
There are one or two other problems in accounting which 
have assumed much greater importance as a result of the de­
pression, and with which I should like to deal briefly. One 
is the acquisition by corporations of their own capital stock.
It would be out of place to discuss the broad question 
whether corporations should enjoy the unrestricted right to 
acquire their own capital stock, though accountants who 
have seen the unfortunate consequences that flowed from 
some such acquisitions in the latter part of 1929 and in 1930, 
and the abuses of the right in certain cases, cannot fail to 
recognize that there is a case for some restriction. I propose 
to deal only with the treatment in accounts of purchases 
actually made.
I- have never been able to agree with the view that a cor­
poration’s own stock is ordinarily an asset of the corpora­
tion, though I have been willing to recognize the practical 
convenience of treating it as such where stock is acquired as 
a part of a related series of transactions which include its 
resale in the immediate future. Certainly, if it is to be 
classified as an asset it should be excluded from current as­
sets (unless under contract for early realization) and should 
be separately disclosed. Even if such stock may be shown 
as an asset, it is incorrect, in my view, to include dividends 
thereon in the income of the corporation.
It is even more important that accountants should set their 
faces against the practice of treating a resale of the corpora­
tion’s capital stock as producing a profit which can properly 
be credited to the income account. My objection to the prac­
tice is threefold:
In the first place, the view taken by the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue that a corporation cannot derive income from deal­
ings in its own capital stock appears to me sound in theory. 
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A special case is presented where the corporation has agreed 
with the subscriber to preferred stock to repurchase that 
stock at a fixed price. There is some argument that when it 
purchases stock and thereby extinguishes such an obligation 
for less than its face value it makes a profit which is analo­
gous to the profit on the retirement of a bond at less than 
par. But in the case of purchase and resale of a pure stock, 
I think the Bureau’s rule is economically as well as legally 
correct.
In the second place, the case for permitting corporations to 
trade in their stocks is much weaker than the case for per­
mitting mere acquisition. It is a plausible argument that 
the purchase of capital stock, when it is selling below its fair 
value and the corporation has available funds, is advantage­
ous to all the shareholders: to those who sell or may want to 
sell, by tending to prevent the price from falling still further 
below its fair value; to other shareholders, by increasing their 
proportionate interest in the company on favorable terms. 
It is not easy to see in what circumstances a similar plea 
could be offered in relation to the resale. The acquisition of 
stock seems to me to be justifiable only for retirement or for 
use in some way other than in ordinary trading operations 
(e.g., for issue to employees or in conjunction with a new 
acquisition of property); and such use should not be re­
garded as giving rise to income.
Thirdly, there is the important practical reason that recog­
nition of such profits would open the way to a particularly 
vicious abuse in the case of corporations which have stock 
outstanding that is selling at a price substantially below the 
figure at which it is stated in the company’s balance sheet. 
If the view were accepted that a profit which would be a 
legitimate credit to income might be derived from the pur­
chase and sale of the capital stock of the corporation, the 
management would be able to buy the stock, and if the price 
should rise, to derive from resale a profit which could be 
credited to income; while if the price should decline, the 
company would be in a position to cancel the stock and thus 
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to avoid any charge to income account, showing, instead, a 
credit to capital surplus arising from the cancellation of the 
stock acquired at less than book value.
Another practice is that of writing down the property ac­
counts of a corporation and correspondingly reducing the de­
preciation charges against income. Whether such a proce­
dure is proper seems to me to depend on the facts in relation 
to the property and on the way in which the transaction is 
effected and disclosed. Some would argue that the exhaus­
tion of capital value (depreciation) during a year is a ques­
tion of fact unrelated to the values at which the assets are 
carried; but this contention seems to me to be applicable 
where the object is to determine the profits of an enterprise 
(which is no doubt sometimes the proper objective of the 
investor or analyst), rather than in the ordinary case where 
we are trying to determine the profits of a continuing com­
pany which is carrying on the enterprise.
There must be continuity in corporate accounting, and 
the figures at which property legitimately stands on the books 
of a corporation cannot be ignored in calculating its depre­
ciation charges. If a company has acquired assets at less than 
their fair present value, it is entitled to reap the benefit in its 
income account as the assets are gradually used up in service. 
The converse is in theory equally true; but, as a practical 
matter, if as a result of either purchases or revaluation at a 
time when price levels were higher a company is carrying 
depreciable assets at a figure clearly and substantially in ex­
cess of the fair value which such assets possess today and seem 
likely to possess in the near future, it seems to me desirable 
to permit it to deal with the excess book value as a capital 
loss and by formal action to reduce the book value of the 
assets to a fair figure and thereafter compute depreciation on 
the basis of the reduced value, unless such action would 
prejudice the position of a senior security which the corpora­
tion has a legal or moral obligation to preserve intact. If the 
company could legally accomplish the desired result by re­
organization, it seems desirable to permit it to do so without 
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that expense, provided that the same respect is shown for 
prior interests as would be enforceable in a reorganization, 
and that the action taken is fully disclosed and formally ap­
proved by the shareholders.
Such a course seems particularly justifiable where the 
market value of the stock of the corporation is far below the 
value at which it appears in the balance sheet. In such cir­
cumstances, it would be pedantic and foolish to insist that 
the company should by excessive depreciation charges make 
real a value for the capital stock which at present exists only 
on the books, especially as such a course would necessarily re­
duce reported earnings and tend to reduce the current 
market value of. the stock so far as that value is predicated 
on earnings.
It is, however, always desirable to consider the collateral 
effects of any such action, as, for instance, in relation to 
taxes; and certainly no adjustment should be made unless the 
present value is carefully determined, the excess is substantial, 
and the management is satisfied that the level of values to 
which the properties are to be reduced is likely to persist for 
a period of years. Much embarrassment has been occasioned 
to companies which in the period of inflation wrote up their 
properties to values which have since proved to have been 
only, temporary; and it is easy today to err in the opposite 
direction.
Moreover, the new value should be fair. It is obviously 
improper to reduce the book value to a value below the fair 
value, thus reducing the charge for depreciation to a figure 
which is less than the actual exhaustion of values that is tak­
ing place and overstating the earnings of the company. Ex­
perience shows this point to be one of very considerable im­
portance; the attempt is sometimes made to pave the way 
for the future inflation of earnings by deliberate understate­
ment of present assets.
As I have indicated, also, the rights of prior security hold­
ers should be respected. If, for instance, a corporation has 
issued prior securities on a representation as to the amount 
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of assets available as security therefor, this would seem to im­
ply at least a moral obligation to charge depreciation on a 
scale sufficient to maintain such values; and the reduction 
of book value, followed by a reduction of depreciation 
charges, might in such a case easily result in distributing, by 
way of dividends, sums that ought rightly to be retained for 
the protection of prior securities.
Action would seem to be permissible and desirable where 
the facts are such as those set out in the annual report for 
1931 of the Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, from 
which I quote:
During the past year a detailed survey of all plants, items 
of equipment and other fixed assets has been made to deter­
mine the changes which have taken place in their productive­
ness and replacement value. Since the formation of the 
corporation in 1917, there have been improvements in manu­
facturing methods and changes in location of plants to areas 
permitting more favorable manufacturing and distribution 
operations. Because of the decrease of approximately 21% 
in general construction costs during the past two years, the 
present book value of many items of property acquired, con­
structed or appraised during periods of high labor and ma­
terial costs exceeds the present replacement value.
The constantly changing costs of labor and material make 
it impossible to maintain property records sufficiently flex­
ible to show at all times the true replacement value of the 
fixed assets of the corporation.
However, when the change in values is as great as that 
which has occurred in the last few years, a restatement is de­
sirable. To permit the records to continue to show the 
values of earlier years might easily become misleading, 
especially to those who lay great emphasis upon the ‘book 
value’ in evaluating the corporation’s securities.
Accordingly, in the balance sheet submitted herewith the 
value of buildings, machinery and equipment has been writ­
ten down to the extent of $39,794,031.11. A portion of this 
was charged directly to surplus and a portion to the reserve 
for depreciation. The amount charged to reserve has in 
turn been restored by a transfer from surplus as a provision 
for unidentified obsolescence, thus leaving the reserves for 
depreciation, etc., intact. It is true that many items of prop­
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erty, such as real estate, mining lands and water powers, have 
enhanced in value much beyond their cost and that this is 
nowhere reflected in the records. The enhancement of such 
items, not being structures, cannot be measured by the cost 
of labor and materials.
Aside from the consideration of a nearer approach to 
accuracy, the readjustment of the account will relieve the 
consolidated income from the burden of annual deprecia­
tion and amortization charges on property or values which 
do not contribute to earnings.
The percentage of reduction in capital value was less than 
the percentage of decrease in general construction costs, so 
that depreciation calculated on the reduced values would 
presumably be sufficient to provide for replacement of the 
property at current price levels; the revised value was care­
fully ascertained; the excess of book value to be dealt with 
was substantial; the amount of prior securities outstanding 
was small; the action taken was fully disclosed; and the 
amount written off was charged against a previously existing 
surplus.
There are other questions which have arisen or the im­
portance of which has greatly increased as a result of the 
depression. On the other hand, the depression has both 
demonstrated the unsoundness and minimized the impor­
tance of the practices of treating stock dividends as income 
in the amount of the market value of the stock received, and 
regarding the proceeds of the sale of rights as wholly income, 
by means of which stocks of holding companies which formed 
the apices of pyramids were raised to heights from which 
they have since crashed, in some cases to complete ruin. This 
paper has, however, already reached its appointed length; 
and it has seemed to me better to concentrate our attention 
today on a small number of important issues, rather than to 
attempt to cover too wide a field.
In concluding, may I say that I recognize that the issues I 
have discussed are of particular importance to companies 
whose securities are listed on exchanges and to members 
whose practice brings them into contact with such com­
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panies. I should like, therefore, to explain that the choice 
is not due to any failure to recognize that such practice con­
stitutes only a small percentage of the accounting work of 
the profession today, but to a desire to deal with questions in 
relation to which I could feel that my experience both in my 
practice and in my capacity as chairman of one of your special 
committees qualified me to express an informed opinion.
XTHE ADVANTAGES OF THE ELECTION OF AUDITORS 
BY THE SHAREHOLDERS *
(1932)
When one finds people for whom one has respect expressing 
different views on a question, one is very apt to think that 
the real difference lies not in their opinions so much as in 
the subject with which they conceive themselves to be deal­
ing. That is universally recognized in all sorts of affairs. 
Most of the plans for promoting peace between nations rest 
on the proposal that if people only agree thoroughly upon 
what they are talking about most of their differences will 
disappear.
So when I see people advocating different ways of appoint­
ing auditors, I think very possibly it is because they have 
different kinds of audits in mind and different purposes to be 
accomplished by auditors. Obviously there are at least as 
many different kinds of audits as there are different proposals 
before the meeting tonight. The officers of a company may 
desire an audit for a check on their employees. The directors 
may desire an audit as a check on their officers. The stock­
holders may desire an audit as a check on the directors. 
And possibly a large part of the difference that may develop 
tonight may turn on those differences in the purposes of an 
audit.
I have assumed, however, that we were talking about some­
thing such as your President just referred to, a proposal to 
require audits for the protection of investors; and if the 
audit is primarily for the protection of the investor, it seems
* From a discussion on "Election or Appointment of Auditors” at a meet­
ing of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, January 
18, 1932. 
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to me entirely natural that the investor should be the person 
who chooses the auditors.
Now I think, by way of clearing the ground further, that 
we might as well be realistic and take it for granted that 
whatever form of election of auditors is provided for, the 
auditors will, in the first place, be chosen by the officers of 
the company in the great majority of cases.
I remember when the Canadian Bank Audit Act was under 
consideration I was talking to one of the most influential 
directors of one of the biggest banks, and I said to him, “I 
suppose that although the law calls for the election of 
auditors by the stockholders, they won’t have anything to do 
with it; but do you, as directors, expect to have anything to 
do with it?”
He said, “Oh, good heavens, no! The general manager 
will pick the auditors.” (Laughter.) But it is just because 
I think the officers will pick the auditors in the first place 
that I think they ought to be elected by the shareholders, 
although that may sound a bit paradoxical—but paradoxes 
are very often well founded.
In order to make my position entirely clear I would say 
that I do not think it is any use having auditors elected by 
the shareholders unless you take some further steps to safe­
guard the situation.
The real difficulty of the audit situation, viewed from the 
standpoint of the auditor as the protector of the investor, is 
that if the auditor and the management do not agree, it is 
the easiest thing in the world, as things now are, for the 
management, in saying good-bye to the auditors, to say, “We 
will get somebody else.” That proved to be one of the great 
defects in England, where for many years they have had the 
system of election of auditors by the shareholders. So, to 
meet that situation, in a revision of the Companies Act some 
years ago in England, they put in a provision which has 
been very effective, or rather, two provisions:
First, that no auditors, other than the retiring auditors, 
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could be nominated unless notice were given to the share­
holders at a certain time in advance of the meeting;
Secondly, that at any meeting of shareholders, up to the 
meeting at which the successors were elected, the auditors 
should have the right to appear and to address the sharehold­
ers. The result of that has been that if the auditors and the 
officers or directors fail to agree on a question, the auditors 
can say: “If you adhere to this position we shall have to 
qualify our certificate and appear at the annual meeting and 
state our reasons for doing so.” It doesn’t often happen that 
that comes about because the auditors won’t take that posi­
tion unless they are very sure of their ground. On the other 
hand, if the auditors are sure of the ground, the directors 
won’t risk going to the meeting with a situation of that 
kind.
So that just gives the auditor the additional weight in 
the scales to enable him to stand up against the directors 
and management and insure what he regards as a proper 
presentation of the accounts, without being in such a strong 
position that he overrides the officers and directors. It 
brings about a very nice balance of power between them 
and, generally speaking, I think gives a very effective pro­
tection.
That is the scheme that I think ought to be employed if at 
any time the legislature in this State sees fit to prescribe an 
audit for the protection of investors. The audit as between 
directors and officers or as between officers and employees 
is a purely internal matter with which I think the State legis­
lature should not concern itself, but I do think that the in­
vestor needs a great deal more protection today than he is 
getting.
The New York Stock Exchange is doing quite a little for 
him, but I don’t think it ought to depend entirely on bodies 
of that kind, and I think it would be a great step forward if 
the legislature of New York, the great commercial State 
of the Union, would take the lead, as it took the lead in 
creating this profession as an organized profession, and adopt 
ELECTION OF AUDITORS 103
some measure requiring the election of auditors for the pro­
tection of investors.
I wouldn’t by any means suggest that every corporation in­
corporated in the State should be required to have auditors— 
I think that would probably be premature at this time. But 
I do think that at least every corporation which offers its 
securities publicly for sale or causes its securities to be listed 
on any exchange might reasonably be subjected to that pro­
vision; and it might possibly also be wise to extend it to any 
corporation having an outstanding capital sto,ck beyond a 
certain minimum and having more than a certain number of 
shareholders, although that is a secondary question on which 
I wouldn’t pass at this time. But I do think that if they are 
going to do anything for the protection of investors they 
should let the investors who are the stockholders elect the 
persons who are to protect their own interest.
XI
KREUGER AND TOLL *
(1933)
From your experience in this entire Kreuger & Toll picture, 
what is your professional opinion of an arrangement wherein 
the auditor reports to shareholders rather than to the com­
pany, Mr. May?
Mr. May. Well, as the result of all my professional ex­
perience, I am heartily in favor of such an arrangement, and 
I have strongly advocated it; and I have had some part in 
bringing about the action of the New York State Chamber 
of Commerce recently favoring that action.
Mr. Marrinan. May I ask as a matter of helpfulness to 
the committee that you give us your professional opinion 
as to the relative development of accountancy in England 
and in the United States?
Mr. May. Well, that is rather a large order. It is by no 
means a one-sided question. In some respects English prac­
tice has gone ahead of American. In other respects I think 
American practice has gone distinctly ahead of English. I 
think it may surprise you, but American practice is distinctly 
ahead of English in the amount of information which is 
given to shareholders—unquestionably.
The Chairman. Do they seem to need more information 
over here?
Mr. May. Well, if you like I will tell you—I do not want 
to volunteer remarks, but if it will throw any light I will 
tell you how, in my judgment, that has come about. It 
happens to be a situation that I have studied rather inten­
sively the last two or three years. I think there is a strong
* Testimony before Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Cur­
rency, United States Senate, “Stock Exchange Practices,” 72nd Congress, Sec­
ond Session, Part IV (1933). pp. 1265-66; 1273-74.
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feeling to the same effect in England that information is 
inadequate in England. And the reason has largely been 
that the regulation in England is statutory. And, of course, 
statutes can lay down only what I call minimum standards, 
failure to comply with which subjects them to penalty. 
What we want is much higher standards than that. And 
the result of these standards laid down by law in Eng­
land has been that company officials who were reluctant to 
give information have said, “Well, that is all the law re­
quires, and you have got no right to ask us to give more.” 
And some auditors have accepted that position. Whereas 
here I think the profession has taken the position that what 
is due to shareholders is a matter of good conscience and 
good business practice. And there are no legal limitations 
on it. So they must use their own judgments when they 
consider that the directors are giving a reasonable amount of 
information to the shareholders. That, I think, is the history 
of the development.
Mr. Marrinan. That does not, of course, prevent the pos­
sibility of regulation which would compel all necessary in­
formation?
Mr. May. Well, that is a difficult branch of legislation; 
and when you come to formulate it, I think you will find, 
for the reason that I have said, you can set down only a 
standard which everybody is bound to observe, and that 
must be a relatively low standard. You cannot put it so 
high as the best practice should be when you establish a 
practice by law.
Mr. Marrinan. We of course are searching the picture 
here, Mr. May, for any safeguards that may be discovered 
in this Kreuger & Toll secured debenture issue situation in 
behalf of the stockholders or investors. Would you say that 
in the field of accounting, and confining yourself wholly to 
the secured debenture issue, any adequate safeguards were 
set up in the matter of accounting?
Mr. May. I am not familiar with that particular issue. 
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I have seen the prospectus, but I have not carefully studied 
it. I do not know what kind of protection there was, if any.
Mr. Marrinan. There was no audit, Mr. May, of any 
kind, as nearly as we can ascertain. Would you think it 
possible to keep faith with investors without an audit?
Mr. May. In 1929; yes. Today, perhaps hot. Then I 
would say, especially with a security issue, I would not have 
thought that an audit was a normal part of the protective 
machinery that was provided. That is one of the good 
things that I think has come out of this—that people have 
realized that, however trustworthy people may seem to be, 
some objective study is eminently desirable. In fact, the 
whole advance of accounting in this country is marked by a 
series of events like this. The Claflin incident gave tre­
mendous impetus to accounting. Banks in those days used 
to say that they would not give that for an audit certificate 
when they had a name like Claflin on the papers. Now 
they have come to find that, even though it may be only one 
case out of a hundred, it may sometimes be a valuable ad­
ditional protection. And I think it has developed fairly 
logically and fairly satisfactorily.
Of course, all these things are a question of balancing 
risks against costs. If you create a machinery of protection 
that is unduly expensive, you kill industry and you put a 
burden on new financing that is out of proportion to its 
value. It is a very nice question of adjusting the degree of 
precaution to the reasonable expense. And you will always 
find some outstanding cases where an exceptionally clever 
crook will beat the precautions that are, as a practical mat­
ter, advisable for the general run of business. It is no good 
legislating to surround every transaction with every precau­
tion that seems necessary when you are dealing with a 
supercrook. And if you did so in ordinary banking, you 
would make ordinary banking out of the question. And if 
you take every precaution, you will realize that there will 
be a certain amount that will slip through in spite of the 
high degree of protection that you put forth,
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Mr. Marrinan. By that statement you do not wish to be 
understood as minimizing the recommendations that you 
have made in your report?
Mr. May. Not at all. I think those are well within the 
limits, and I think if I should be erring I should err on the 
side of a little extra precaution. But at the same time it 
would be disastrous to attempt to weigh down business with 
precautions that would be very expensive and in ninety-nine 
cases out of a hundred would be supererogatory.
CONCLUSIONS OF FINAL REPORT OF
PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO. ON THE KREUGER & TOLL 
GROUP OF COMPANIES, 1932.*
In concluding this Report we propose to deal briefly with 
three questions of general interest, namely:
(1) Where has the money gone which the public has sub­
scribed?
(2) To what extent were reported earnings real?
(3) How early did Kreuger’s irregularities begin and 
what enabled them to be concealed?
To answer the first question it is necessary to deal with 
the combined position of five of the principal Companies 
taken collectively: i.e., the three which sought money from 
the Public on a large scale, comprising:
(1) A. B. Kreuger & Toll
(2) International Match Corporation, and
(3) Svenska Tandsticks A.B. (The Swedish Match Com­
pany)
and the two underlying Finance Companies, viz.;
(4) N.V. Financieele Maatschappij Kreuger & Toll, and
(5) Continental Investment A.G.
The aggregate Funds made available to these Companies 
during the period of 14¼ years from January 1, 1918, to
* Printed in “Stock Exchange Practices,” op. cit., pp. 1262-4. Mr. May 
participated in the preparation of this final Report.
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March 31, 1932, inclusive, and the eventual disposition 
thereof, as revealed by our Investigations, expressed in 
Swedish Kronor at par and in round numbers, is shown in 
the following statement:
Funds Provided
 (1) Net Proceeds of Share and Debenture Is­
sues, i.e., including Premiums and de­
ducting Discounts and Issue Expenses
(2) From Bank Loans and Bill Credits
(3) From Other Credits (Net)
(4) From Revenue Sources
Net income before providing for shrink­
age in value of Securities, Debenture 
Interest and Dividends paid
Total Funds Provided
2.104.569.000
613.892.000
5.320.000
150.962.000
S.Kr. 2.874.743.000
Disposition of Funds.
(1) Debenture Interest and Dividends paid to
Security holders outside the Group
(2) Withdrawn by Ivar Kreuger
On Current Accounts 347.363.000
Securities and other Assets 
appropriated 468.492.000
Less:—Assets introduced
668.280.000
815.855.000
383.809.000
(3) Invested in Securities acquired and in
Associated and Subsidiary Companies 
(Net)
In Government and
other Marketable
Securities 1.127.405.000
In Associated Com­
panies 548.544.000
Together 1.675.949.000
Less:—Appropriated by
Ivar Kreuger (in­
cluded in appropri­
ations shown above) 207.341.000
In Subsidiary Manu­
facturing and Trad­
ing Companies
(4) Invested in Intangible Assets (Monopoly
Concessions)
Total accounted for
1.468.608.000
432.046.000
241.585.000 1.710.193.000
64.224.000
S.Kr. 2.874.743.000
The approximate value of the Investments at March 31, 
1932, as based on the best information available (i.e., 
market quotations, carefully considered estimates and, as 
regards Investments in Subsidiary Manufacturing and Trad­
ing Companies, their provisional book values), is about
S.Kr. 775.000.000, which, when compared with the aggregate 
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Book Value above shown of S.Kr. 1.710.193.000, reveals a 
shrinkage of about S.Kr. 935.000.000.
Turning to the second question, our examination has dis­
closed that during the same period of 14¼ years the ap­
parent reported Earnings and Income of these Companies 
combined in the aggregate were grossly overstated. The ex­
tent of this overstatement is shown in the following com­
parison of the reported Earnings (adjusted to eliminate Inter- 
Company Dividends, Debenture Interest and other Items 
irrelevant to the present consideration) with the approximate 
aggregate Combined Earnings and Income as now ascer­
tained:
Earnings and Income as based on Published or Book Figures 
adjusted to eliminate Inter-Company Dividends, Debenture 
Interest and other items irrelevant to the present consid­
eration ........................................................................................ 1.179.357.000
Approximate Real Earnings and Income (both Normal and
Extraordinary) on the same basis, which is before providing 
for shrinkage in value of Investments estimated at about 
S.Kr. 935.000.000 ........................................................................... 150.962.000
Excess of Reported Earnings as above over Real Earnings as
above .....................................................................................S.Kr. 1.028.395.000
This difference of S.Kr. 1.028.395.000 is made up of Fic­
titious Credits to Income Accounts, aggregating S.Kr.
1.043.693.000,  less a sum of S.Kr. 15.298.000 representing 
the net adjustment of normal Profit and Loss Items.
The amount of Fictitious Earnings and Income includes 
some items which may have had an appearance of reality 
when considered solely from the standpoint of the individual 
Companies receiving the credits, in that they were supported 
by what purported to be Guarantees of another Company 
within the Group or by actual Cash Remittances.
There are a number of items, aggregating a fairly sub­
stantial sum, the genuineness of which is doubtful, and in 
regard to these the lenient view has been taken in that for 
the purpose of this analysis they have been classed as 
“Genuine.”
The total Earnings of S.Kr. 150.962.000 shown above, 
which, it should be reiterated, are before providing for 
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Debenture Interest and shrinkage in Investment Values, are 
equivalent to about 1½% on the relative average Capital 
(Share and Debenture) invested in these Companies during 
the same period.
Neither these Earnings nor any other facts developed by 
our examination lend any support to the view that Kreuger 
possessed business ability so extraordinary as to warrant the 
grant to him of the freedom from control or disclosure of 
his actions which he enjoyed.
With regard to the third question, we have already in­
dicated that the manipulation of accounts goes back at least 
as far as 1917. The fraudulent practices assumed large pro­
portions in 1923 and 1924 and continued thereafter, cul­
minating in the fabrication of £21.000.000 (nominal) of 
Italian Government Bonds.
The perpetration of frauds on so large a scale and over 
so long a period would have been impossible but for (1) the 
confidence which Kreuger succeeded in inspiring, (2) the 
acceptance of his claim that complete secrecy in relation 
to vitally important transactions was essential to the success 
of his projects, (3) the autocratic powers which were con­
ferred upon him, and (4) the loyalty or unquestioning obedi­
ence of Officials, who were evidently selected with great care 
(some for their ability and honesty, others for their weak­
nesses), having regard to the parts which Kreuger intended 
them to take in the execution of his plans.
The absolute powers with which Kreuger was vested gave 
him complete domination of the entire Group and of all the 
Executive and Administrative Staffs. Indeed he conducted 
the entire business as though he was accountable to no one, 
as evidenced by his action in Inter-Company matters in re­
spect of which the rights of third parties, such as the Security 
Holders and Creditors of each Unit, were completely ig­
nored.
Closely related to the causes already mentioned are the 
complicated and confused bookkeeping in regard to many 
important transactions, and the gross inadequacy of the docu­
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mentary evidence in support of accounting entries which 
our examination has disclosed.
The frauds could not have been consummated without 
assistance—witting or unwitting—of some of his associates, in­
cluding some of the Officers of the Holding and Financial 
Companies; nor could they have been concealed if either 
the Audits of the Companies had been coordinated under 
a single control, or if the Audits, though not so coordinated, 
had been carried out in all cases with proper honesty, effi­
ciency and independence. It is apparent that the employ­
ment of different Auditors for different closely associated 
Companies, restrictions in the scope of examinations, sub­
serviency if not complicity on the part of some of the em­
ployees and some of the Auditors, and forgery of documents 
in order to meet demands for evidence confirmatory of book 
entries, all contributed to prevent such Audits as were made 
from resulting in exposure.
The history of this Group of Companies emphasizes anew 
the truth that enterprises in which a complete secrecy on the 
part of the chief executive officer as to the way in which 
important parts of the capital are employed is, or is alleged 
to be, essential to success are fundamentally unsuited for 
public investment, since such secrecy undermines all ordi­
nary safeguards and affords to the dishonest executive un­
equalled opportunities for the perpetration and concealment 
of frauds.
Upon the conclusion of our investigation, which has now 
extended over seven months, we desire to place on record 
that in the course of our work we have received throughout 
the most sympathetic cooperation and support of the various 
Committees, Liquidators and Administrators, as well as the 
whole-hearted assistance of the present Officials and Staff. 
Our cordial thanks are due for this cooperation and for the 
unfailing patience and courtesy in difficult circumstances 
which have everywhere been accorded to us.
XII
AUDITS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTS *
(Extracts from correspondence between the Special 
Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges, G. O. 
May, Chairman, of the American Institute of Account­
ants and the Committee on Stock List of the New York 
Stock Exchange)
(1932-1934)
September 22, 1932.
The Committee on Stock List,
New York Stock Exchange,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Sirs:
In accordance with suggestions made by your Executive 
Assistant, this Committee has given careful consideration to 
the subject of the general line of development of the ac­
tivities of the Exchange in relation to annual reports of 
corporations.
It believes that there are two major tasks to be accom­
plished-one is to educate the public in regard to the sig­
nificance of accounts, their value and their unavoidable limi­
tations, and the other is to make the accounts published by 
corporations more informative and authoritative.
The nature of a balance sheet or an income account is 
quite generally misunderstood, even by writers on financial 
and accounting subjects. Professor William Z. Ripley has 
spoken of a balance sheet as an instantaneous photograph of 
the condition of a company on a given date. Such language 
is apt to prove doubly misleading to the average investor—
* “These letters constitute a history of an important development in the 
recognition of the place which accountancy occupies in modern finance and 
business.” The first communication which follows was placed in evidence 
by the Chairman of the Committee on Stock List of the New York Stock 
Exchange in a hearing before the United States Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency, January 12, 1933.
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first, because of the implication that the balance sheet is 
wholly photographic in nature, whereas it is largely histori­
cal; and, secondly, because of the suggestion that it is possible 
to achieve something approaching photographic accuracy 
in a balance sheet which, in fact, is necessarily the reflection 
of opinions subject to a (possibly wide) margin of error. 
Writers of textbooks on accounting speak of the purpose 
of the balance sheet as being to reflect the values of the 
assets and the liabilities on a particular date. They explain 
the fact that in many balance sheets certain assets are stated 
at figures which are obviously far above or far below true 
values by saying that the amounts at which such assets are 
stated represent “conventional” valuations. Such statements 
seem to involve a misconception of the nature of a balance 
sheet.
In an earlier age, when capital assets were inconsiderable 
and business units in general smaller and less complex than 
they are today, it was possible to value assets with com­
parative ease and accuracy and to measure the progress 
made from year to year by annual valuations. With the 
growing mechanization of industry, and with corporate or­
ganizations becoming constantly larger, more completely 
integrated and more complex, this has become increasingly 
impracticable. From an accounting standpoint, the distin­
guishing characteristic of business today is the extent to 
which expenditures are made in one period with the definite 
purpose and expectation that they shall be the means of pro­
ducing profits in the future; and how such expenditures 
shall be dealt with in accounts is the central problem of 
financial accounting. How much of a given expenditure of 
the current or a past year shall be carried forward as an asset 
cannot possibly be determined by an exercise of judgment 
in the nature of a valuation. The task of appraisal would 
be too vast, and the variations in appraisal from year to year 
due to changes in price levels or changes in the mental atti­
tude of the appraisers would in many cases be so great as to
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reduce all other elements in the computations of the results 
of operations to relative insignificance.
Carrying the thought one stage further, it is apparent that 
the real value of the assets of any large business is de­
pendent mainly on the earning capacity of the enterprise. 
This fact is fairly generally recognized by intelligent in­
vestors as regards capital assets such as plant and machinery, 
but it is not equally generally recognized that it is true, 
though to a lesser extent, in respect of such assets as inven­
tories and trade accounts receivable. Those, however, who 
have had experience in liquidations and reorganizations 
realize that in many industries it becomes impossible to 
realize inventories or accounts receivable at more than a 
fraction of their going-concern value, once the business has 
ceased to be a going concern. To attempt to arrive at the 
value of the assets of a business annually by an estimation 
of the earning capacity of the enterprise would be an im­
possible and unprofitable task. Any consideration of the 
accounts of a large business enterprise of today must start 
from the premise that an annual valuation of the assets is 
neither practical nor desirable.
Some method, however, has to be found by which the pro­
portion of a given expenditure to be charged against the 
operations in a year, and the proportion to be carried for­
ward, may be determined; otherwise, it would be wholly 
impossible to present an annual income account. Out of 
this necessity has grown up a body of conventions, based 
partly on theoretical and partly on practical considerations, 
which form the basis for the determination of income and 
the preparation of balance sheets today. And while there is 
a fairly general agreement on certain broad principles to be 
followed in the formulation of conventional methods of ac­
counting, there remains room for differences in the applica­
tion of those principles which affect the results reached in a 
very important degree.
This may be made clearer by one or two illustrations. It 
is a generally accepted principle that plant value should be
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charged against gross profits over the useful life of the plant. 
But there is no agreement on the method of distribution. 
The straight-line method of providing for depreciation 
which is most commonly employed by industrial companies, 
the retirement-reserve method used by utilities, the sinking- 
fund method, the combined maintenance-and-depreciation 
method, and others, are supported by respectable argument 
and by usage, and the charges against a particular year may 
vary a hundred per cent or more according as one or the 
other permissible method is employed.
Again, the most commonly accepted method of stating in­
ventories is at cost or market, whichever is lower; but within 
this rule widely different results may be derived, according to 
the detailed methods of its application. For instance, at 
times like the present, cost of finished goods may be deemed 
to be the actual cost, as increased by subnormal operation, 
or a normal cost computed on the basis of a normal scale of 
operations. It may or may not include interest during the 
period of production or various kinds of overhead expenses. 
Market value may be either gross or net after deducting 
direct selling expenses. The choice between cost or market 
may be made in respect of each separate item or of classes 
of items or of the inventory as a whole. Frequently, whether 
a profit or a loss for the year is shown depends on the precise 
way in which the rule is applied. And since the conventions 
which are to be observed must, to possess value, be based 
on a combination of theoretical and practical considerations, 
there are few, if any, which can fairly be claimed to be so 
inherently superior in merit to possible alternatives that they 
alone should be regarded as acceptable.
Most investors realize today that balance sheets and in­
come accounts are largely the reflection of individual judg­
ments, and that their value is therefore to a large extent de­
pendent on the competence and honesty of the persons ex­
ercising the necessary judgment. The importance of 
method, and particularly of consistency of method from year 
to year, is by no means equally understood.
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In considering ways of improving the existing situation, 
two alternatives suggest themselves. The first is the selec­
tion by competent authority out of the body of acceptable 
methods in vogue today of detailed sets of rules which would 
become binding on all corporations of a given class. This 
procedure has been applied broadly to the railroads and 
other regulated utilities, though even such classifications as, 
for instance, that prescribed by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission allow some choice of method to corporations 
governed thereby. The arguments against any attempt to 
apply this alternative to industrial corporations generally 
are, however, overwhelming.
The more practicable alternative would be to leave every 
corporation free to choose its own methods of accounting 
within the very broad limits to which reference has been 
made, but require disclosure of the methods employed and 
consistency in their application from year to year. It is sig­
nificant that Congress in the federal income-tax law has 
definitely adopted this alternative, every act since that of 
1918 having contained a provision that the net income shall 
be computed “in accordance with the method of accounting 
regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer” 
unless such method does not clearly reflect income. In its 
regulations the Bureau of Internal Revenue has said, “The 
law contemplates that each taxpayer shall adopt such forms 
and systems of accounting as are in his judgment best suited 
to his purpose.” (Reg. 45, Art. 24.) The greatest value of 
classifications such as those imposed on regulated utilities lies 
in the disclosure of method and consistency of method which 
they tend to produce.
Within quite wide limits, it is relatively unimportant to 
the investor what precise rules or conventions are adopted 
by a corporation in reporting its earnings if he knows what 
method is being followed and is assured that it is followed 
consistently from year to year. Reverting to the illustrations 
already used, the investor would not need to be greatly con­
cerned whether the straight-line or the sinking-fund method
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of providing for depreciation were being employed by a 
given corporation, provided he knew which method was 
being used and knew that it was being applied in the same 
way every year. But if depreciation is charged in one year 
on the straight-line basis applied to cost and in another is 
charged on a sinking-fund basis applied to a valuation less 
than cost, the investor may be grossly deceived unless the 
change is brought to his notice. For this reason, the re­
quirement of the Exchange that the depreciation policy of a 
company applying for listing shall be stated in the applica­
tion is valuable, and it might well be amplified to include 
an undertaking to report to the Exchange and to stockhold­
ers any change of policy or any material change in the man­
ner of its application.
Again, it is not a matter of great importance to investors 
whether the cost-or-market rule for stating inventories is 
applied to individual items or to the inventory as a whole, 
but it is very important to the investor that he should be 
advised if the test is applied to individual items at the be­
ginning of the year and to the inventory as a whole at the 
close thereof.
It is probably fairly well recognized by intelligent in­
vestors today that the earning capacity is the fact of crucial 
importance in the valuation of an industrial enterprise, 
and that therefore the income account is usually far more 
important than the balance sheet. In point of fact, the 
changes in the balance sheets from year to year are usually 
more significant than the balance sheets themselves.
The development of accounting conventions has, con­
sciously or unconsciously, been in the main based on an 
acceptance of this proposition. As a rule, the first objective 
has been to secure a proper charge or credit to the income 
account for the year, and in general the presumption has 
been that once this is achieved the residual amount of the 
expenditure or the receipt could properly find its place in 
the balance sheet at the close of the period, the principal 
exception being the rule calling for reduction of inventories
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to market value if that is below cost. But if the income 
account is to be really valuable to the investor, it must be 
presented in such a way as to constitute to the fullest pos­
sible extent an indication of the earning capacity of the 
business during the period to which it relates. This Com­
mittee feels that the direction of the principal efforts of the 
Exchange to improve the accounting reports furnished by 
corporations to their stockholders should be towards making 
the income account more and more valuable as an indication 
of earning capacity.
The purpose of furnishing accounts to shareholders must 
be not only to afford them information in regard to the 
results being achieved by those to whom they have entrusted 
the management of the business, but to aid them in taking 
appropriate action to give effect to the conclusions which 
they reach regarding such accomplishments. In an earlier 
day, stockholders who were dissatisfied with the results se­
cured by the management could perhaps move effectively to 
bring about a change of policy or, failing that, a change of 
management. With the growth in magnitude of corpora­
tions and the present wide diffusion of stock holdings, any 
such attempt is ordinarily impracticable because of the effort 
and expenditure that it would entail. The only practical 
way in which an investor can today give expression to his 
conclusions in regard to the management of a corporation 
in which he is interested is by retaining, increasing or dis­
posing of his investment, and accounts are mainly valuable 
to him in so far as they afford guidance in determining which 
of these courses he shall pursue.
There is no need to revolutionize or even to change ma­
terially corporate accounting, but there is room for great 
improvement in the presentation of the conclusions to which 
accounts lead. The aim should be to satisfy (so far as is 
possible and prudent) the investor’s need for knowledge, 
rather than the accountant’s sense of form and respect for 
tradition, and to make very clear the basis on which accounts
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are prepared. But even when all has been done that can 
be done, the limitations on the significance of even the best 
of accounts must be recognized, and the shorter the period 
covered by them the more pronounced usually are these 
limitations. Accounts are essentially continuous historical 
records; and, as is true of history in general, correct inter­
pretations and sound forecasts for the future cannot be 
reached upon a hurried survey of temporary conditions, but 
only by longer retrospect and a careful distinction between 
permanent tendencies and transitory influences. If the in­
vestor is unable or unwilling to make or secure an adequate 
survey, it will be best for him not to rely on the results of a 
superficial one.
To summarize, the principal objects which this Commit­
tee thinks the Exchange should keep constantly in mind and 
do its best gradually to achieve are:
' 1. To bring about a better recognition by the investing 
public of the fact that the balance sheet of a large modern 
corporation does not and should not be expected to repre­
sent an attempt to show present values of the assets and lia­
bilities of the corporation.
2. To emphasize the fact that balance sheets are neces­
sarily to a large extent historical and conventional in char­
acter, and to encourage the adoption of revised forms of 
balance sheets which will disclose more clearly than at pres­
ent on what basis assets of various kinds are stated (e.g., cost, 
reproduction cost less depreciation, estimated going-concern 
value, cost or market, whichever is lower, liquidating value, 
et cetera).
3. To emphasize the cardinal importance of the income 
account, such importance being explained by the fact that 
the value of a business is dependent mainly on its earning 
capacity; and to take the position that an annual income 
account is unsatisfactory unless it is so framed as to con­
stitute the best reflection reasonably obtainable of the earn­
ing capacity of the business under the conditions existing 
during the year to which it relates.
4. To make universal the acceptance by listed corpora­
tions of certain broad principles of accounting which have 
won fairly general acceptance (see Exhibit I attached), and
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within the limits of such broad principles to make no at­
tempt to restrict the right of corporations to select detailed 
methods of accounting deemed by them to be best adapted 
to the requirements of their business; but—
(a) To ask each listed corporation to cause a statement 
of the methods of accounting and reporting employed by 
it to be formulated in sufficient detail to be a guide to its 
accounting department (see Exhibit II attached); to have 
such statement adopted by its board so as to be binding 
on its accounting officers; and to furnish such statement 
to the Exchange and make it available to any stockholder 
on request and upon payment, if desired, of a reasonable 
fee.
(b) To secure assurances that the methods so formu­
lated will be followed consistently from year to year and 
that if any change is made in the principles or any material 
change in the manner of application, the stockholders and 
the Exchange shall be advised when the first accounts are 
presented in which effect is given to such change.
(c) To endeavor to bring about a change in the form of 
audit certificate so that the auditors would specifically re­
port to the shareholders whether the accounts as presented 
were properly prepared in accordance with the methods of 
accounting regularly employed by the company, defined as 
already indicated.
This Committee would be glad to discuss these sugges­
tions with you at any time, and to cooperate with the Ex­
change in any action it may see fit to take along the lines 
indicated.
Yours very truly,
George O. May, 
Chairman.
EXHIBIT I
It is suggested that in the first instance the broad prin­
ciples to be laid down as contemplated in paragraph 4 of 
the suggestions should be few in number. It might be de­
sirable to formulate a statement thereof only after consulta­
tion with a small group of qualified persons, including cor­
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porate officials, lawyers and accountants. Presumably the 
list would include some if not all of the following:
1. Unrealized profit should not be credited to the income 
account of the corporation either directly or indirectly, 
through the medium of charging against such unrealized 
profits amounts which would ordinarily fall to be charged 
against income account. Profit is deemed to be realized 
when a sale in the ordinary course of business is effected, 
unless the circumstances are such that the collection of the 
sale price is not reasonably assured. An exception to the 
general rule may be made in respect of inventories in in­
dustries (such as the packing-house industry) in which owing 
to the impossibility of determining costs it is a trade custom 
to take inventories at net selling prices, which may exceed 
cost.
2. Capital surplus, however created, should not be used to 
relieve the income account of the current or future years of 
charges which would otherwise fall to be made thereagainst. 
This rule might be subject to the exception that where, upon 
reorganization, a reorganized company would be relieved of 
charges which would require to be made against income if 
the existing corporation were continued, it might be regarded 
as permissible to accomplish the same result without re­
organization provided the facts were as fully revealed to, and 
the action as formally approved by, the shareholders as in 
reorganization.
3. Earned surplus of a subsidiary company created prior 
to acquisition does not form a part of the consolidated earned 
surplus of the parent company and subsidiaries; nor can any 
dividend declared out of such surplus properly be credited 
to the income account of the parent company.
4. While it is perhaps in some circumstances permissible 
to show stock of a corporation held in its own treasury as an 
asset, if adequately disclosed, the dividends on stock so held 
should not be treated as a credit to the income account of the 
company.
5. Notes or accounts receivable due from officers, em­
ployees, or affiliated companies must be shown separately and 
not included under a general heading such as Notes Receiv­
able or Accounts Receivable.
The Exchange would probably desire to add a rule regard­
ing stock dividends.
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EXHIBIT II
The statement of the methods of accounting contemplated 
in paragraph 4a of the suggestion would not be in the nature 
of the ordinary detailed classification of accounts, nor would 
it deal with the machinery of bookkeeping. It should con­
stitute a clear statement of the principles governing the 
classification of charges and credits as between (a) balance 
sheet accounts, (b) income account and (c) surplus account, 
together with sufficient details of the manner in which these 
principles are to be applied to enable an investor to judge 
of the degree of conformity to standard usage and of con­
servatism of the reporting corporation. Its content would 
vary according to the circumstances of individual com­
panies, but some of the more important points which would 
be disclosed thereby would be as follows:
THE GENERAL BASIS OF THE ACCOUNTS:
Whether the accounts are consolidated, and if so, what 
rule governs the determination of the companies to be in­
cluded in consolidation; also, a statement as to how profits 
and losses of subsidiary and controlled companies not con­
solidated are dealt with in the accounts of the parent com­
pany.
THE BALANCE SHEET:
(a) In respect of capital assets, the statement should show:
(1) What classes of items are charged to property ac­
count (whether only new property or also replacements 
and improvements);
(2) Whether any charges in addition to direct cost, 
either for overhead expense, interest or otherwise, are 
made to property accounts;
(3) Upon what classes of property, on what basis, and 
at what rates provision is made for, or in lieu of, depreci­
ation;
(4) What classes of expenditures, if any, are charged 
against reserves for depreciation so created;
(5) How the difference between depreciated value and 
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realized or realizable value is dealt with on the sale 01 
abandonment of units of property;
(6) On what basis property purchased from subsidiary 
companies is charged to property account (whether at cost 
to subsidiary or otherwise).
(b) In respect of inventories: The statement should show 
in fairly considerable detail the basis of valuation of the in­
ventory. The statement under this head would be substan­
tially a summary in general terms of the instructions issued 
by the company to those charged with the duty of preparing 
the actual inventories. It would not be sufficient to say that 
the inventory was taken on the basis of cost or market, which­
ever is lower. The precise significance attached to these 
terms should be disclosed, for the reasons set forth on page 
3 of the letter.*
The statement should include a specific description of the 
way in which any intercompany profit on goods included in 
the inventory is dealt with. It should show under this head, 
or in relation to income or surplus account, exactly how re­
ductions from cost to market value are treated in the ac­
counts and how the inventories so reduced are treated in the 
succeeding period. It is, for instance, a matter of first im­
portance to investors if inventories have been reduced to 
cost or market at the end of the year by a charge to surplus 
account, and the income for the succeeding year has been 
determined on the basis of the reduced valuation of the 
inventory thus arrived at. Obviously, under such a proce­
dure the aggregate income shown for a series of years is not 
the true income for the period.
(c) In respect of securities: The statement should set forth 
what rules govern the classification of securities as market­
able securities under the head of “current assets” and se­
curities classified under some other head in the balance sheet. 
It should set forth in detail how any of its own securities 
held by the reporting corporation, or in the case of a con­
solidated statement any securities of any company in the 
group held by that or any other member of the group are 
dealt with in the balance sheet. (Stock of subsidiaries held 
by the parent will of course be eliminated in consolidation.) 
The disclosure of the basis of valuation of securities is cov­
ered in paragraph 2, page 6, of the recommendations con­
tained in the letter.f
* Cf. above, p. 115. † Cf. above, p. 119.
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(d) Gash and receivables present few questions, though 
where sales are made on the instalment plan, or on any other 
deferred basis, their treatment should be fully set forth, in­
cluding a statement of the way in which provision is made 
for future collection or other expenses relating to sales al­
ready made but not liquidated, and to what extent deferred 
accounts are included in current assets.
(e) Deferred charges: The statement should set forth 
what classes of expenditures are in the company’s practice 
deferred, and what procedure is followed in regard to the 
gradual amortization thereof. (This question is of consider­
able importance, as substantial overstatements of income may 
occur through deferment in unprosperous periods of ex­
penses ordinarily chargeable against current operations, pos­
sibly followed by writing off such charges in a later year 
against surplus account.)
(f) Liability accounts: There is normally less latitude in 
regard to the treatment of liability accounts than in respect 
of assets. The statement should clearly show how un­
liquidated liabilities, such as damage claims, unadjusted 
taxes, etc., are dealt with. The statement should disclose 
whether it is the practice of the company to make a pro­
vision for onerous commitments or to deal with such com­
mitments in any way in the balance sheet.
(g) Reserves: A statement of the rules governing credits 
and charges to any reserve account (including both those 
shown on the liability side and those deducted from assets) 
should be given in detail. It is particularly important to 
know whether losses, shrinkages or expenses which would 
otherwise be chargeable against income accounts are in any 
circumstances charges against contingent or other reserves, 
and whether such reserves are built up partly or wholly 
otherwise than by charges to income account.
THE INCOME ACCOUNT:
An adequate statement in regard to the treatment of 
balance sheet items discloses by inference what charges and 
credits are made to income account or surplus. The addi­
tional points required to be disclosed are the principles fol­
lowed in allocating charges and credits to income account 
and surplus account respectively, and the form of presenta­
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tion of the income account. The form should be such as to 
show separately: (a) operating income; (b) depreciation 
and/or depletion if not deducted in arriving at (a), in 
which case the amount of the deduction should be shown;
(c) income from companies controlled but not consolidated 
(indicating the nature thereof); (d) other recurring income; 
(e) any extraordinary credits; (f) charges for interest; (g) 
income taxes; and (h) any extraordinary charges.
The company’s proportionate share of the undistributed 
earnings or losses for the year of companies controlled but 
not consolidated should be disclosed in a note or otherwise 
on the face of the income account. Stock dividends if cred­
ited to income should be shown separately with a statement 
of the basis upon which the credit is computed.
January 6, 1933.
An announcement by Richard Whitney, President of the New York 
Stock Exchange, in regard to the requirement adopted by the Ex­
change that listed companies have their annual accounts audited 
by independent public accountants.
Since April of 1932 all corporations applying for the list­
ing of their securities upon the New York Stock Exchange 
have been asked to enter into an agreement to the effect 
that future annual financial statements published more than 
three months after the date of the agreement shall be audited 
by independent public accountants qualified under the laws 
of some state or country, and shall be accompanied by a cer­
tificate of such accountants showing the scope of the audit 
and the qualifications, if any, made by them in respect 
thereto. The Committee on Stock List has considered any 
reasons advanced why this procedure should not apply in 
particular cases, but has made exceptions only in the case 
of certain railroad companies.
During this period, the New York Stock Exchange has 
not required that audited statements be filed with applica­
tions for listing, because it was felt that applicants who had 
relied upon the former practice of the Exchange would have
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been subjected to undue delay if the Committee had pur­
sued any other course.
The New York Stock Exchange now announces that its 
present policy in this respect will be continued until July 1, 
1933, after which date all listing applications from corpora­
tions must contain the certificate of independent public ac­
countants, qualified under the laws of some state or country, 
certifying to the correctness of the balance sheet, income 
statement and surplus statement for the most recent fiscal 
year. In general, the audit or audits must cover all sub­
sidiaries, and the scope of the audit must be not less than 
that indicated in a pamphlet entitled “Verification of Finan­
cial Statements” issued by the Federal Reserve Board in 
May, 1929, and obtainable from that board at Washington, 
D. C. All applications must include an agreement to the 
effect that future annual reports published or sent to stock­
holders will be similarly audited and accompanied by a 
similar certificate.
The Committee on Stock List may make exceptions to 
these requirements in unusual or extraordinary cases where 
the enforcement of the requirements would, in its opinion, 
be manifestly unwise or impracticable. The Committee 
has concluded that for the present it will not require audited 
statements from railroad companies reporting to the Inter­
state Commerce Commission, except in the case of those 
railroads whose accounts have heretofore been currently 
audited by independent accountants.
Representative houses and banks of issue have been ad­
vised of the foregoing program, and have expressed them­
selves as in accord with the plan outlined above which they 
believe is sound and consistent with the importance of af­
fording to the public the most complete and accurate infor­
mation in regard to the financial condition of corporations 
whose securities are publicly dealt in.
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Letter to presidents of corporations listed on New York Stock Exchange
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
Office of the President
January 31, 1933. 
Dear Sir:
The New York Stock Exchange has recently announced 
its intention of requiring audited statements in connection 
with listing applications made after July 1, 1933. The pub­
lic response to this announcement indicates clearly that in­
dependent audits are regarded by investors as a useful safe­
guard.
If, however, such a safeguard is to be really valuable and 
not illusory, it is essential that audits should be adequate in 
scope and that the responsibility assumed by the auditor 
should be defined. The Exchange is desirous of securing 
from companies whose securities are listed, and which now 
employ independent auditors, information which will en­
able it to judge to what extent these essentials are assured 
by such audits. In furtherance of this end, we should be 
greatly obliged if you will secure from your auditors, upon 
the completion of the audit for the year 1932, and furnish 
to the Committee on Stock List, for its use and not for pub­
lication, a letter which will contain information on the fol­
lowing points:
1. Whether the scope of the audit conducted by them is 
as extensive as that contemplated in the Federal Reserve 
bulletin, “Verification of Financial Statements.”
2. Whether all subsidiary companies controlled by your 
company have been audited by them. If not, it is desired 
that the letter should indicate the relative importance of 
subsidiaries not audited as measured by the amount of assets 
and earnings of such companies in comparison with the total 
consolidated assets and earnings, and should also indicate 
clearly on what evidence the auditors have relied in respect 
of such subsidiaries.
3. Whether all the information essential to an efficient 
audit has been furnished to them.
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4. Whether in their opinion the form of the balance 
sheet and of the income, or profit-and-loss, account is such 
as fairly to present the financial position and the results of 
operation.
5. Whether the accounts are in their opinion fairly de­
termined on the basis of consistent application of the system 
of accounting regularly employed by the company.
6. Whether such system in their opinion conforms to ac­
cepted accounting practices, and particularly whether it is in 
any respect inconsistent with any of the principles set forth 
in the statement attached hereto.
I shall personally appreciate very much your prompt con­
sideration of this matter and any cooperation which you may 
extend to the Exchange in regard thereto.
Faithfully yours,
(Signed) Richard Whitney, 
President.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
. COMMITTEE ON stock list
October 24, 1933. 
To the Governing Committee,
New York Stock Exchange. 
Gentlemen:
On January 31, 1933, the President of the Stock Exchange 
addressed a general inquiry to all listed corporations, de­
signed to secure information regarding the scope of audits 
and the responsibilities assumed by auditors which would 
put the Exchange in a better position to judge the value of 
audits to investors. In this letter, the request was made that 
companies whose accounts were audited should secure from 
their auditors and furnish to the Exchange, for its use and 
not for publication, answers to six questions. Of these 
questions, three dealt with the scope of the audit and three 
with the principles governing the accounting methods of the 
corporation and the form of presentation of accounts to 
shareholders,
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The response to this request has been satisfactory, replies 
having been received from a large majority of the companies 
employing independent auditors regularly. A careful study 
of the replies received has brought to the attention of the 
Committee a number of points affecting particular com­
panies which it has been deemed desirable to take up with 
those companies. In a few cases, the questions involved 
have been of very substantial importance, but the majority 
have been of relatively minor significance.
The replies have indicated very general acceptance of cer­
tain principles which the Exchange regarded as of primary 
importance and set forth in a statement attached to the 
letter of request [see above].
This Committee feels that all these principles should now 
be regarded by the Exchange as so generally accepted that 
they should be followed by all listed companies—certainly, 
that any departure therefrom should be brought expressly to 
the attention of shareholders and the Exchange.
In announcing on January 6, 1933, its intention of re­
quiring after July 31, 1933, that there should be included 
in all listing applications, certificates of independent ac­
countants in respect of the balance sheet, income statement 
and surplus statement for the most recent fiscal year, the 
Exchange indicated that in general the audit must cover all 
subsidiaries and the scope thereof be not less than that in­
dicated in a pamphlet entitled “Verification of Financial 
Statements” issued by the Federal Reserve Board in May, 
1929. The request of January 31 called for information as 
to whether these standards were currently being maintained 
in the audits of listed companies.
Upon the subject of the scope of audits, the existing posi­
tion is outlined in a communication addressed by nine lead­
ing firms of accountants to the Exchange under date of 
February 24, 1933, a copy of which is attached hereto. In 
the interests of investors it seems desirable to make clear 
what is the scope of audits as currently conducted and to 
consider how far it is practicable to extend such scope and 
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the responsibilities of auditors within the limits of a wise 
economy.
The bulletin issued by the Federal Reserve Board, to 
which reference has been made, indicated clearly that the 
scope of the examination therein provided for was not such 
as would lead naturally to detection of (1) defalcations on 
the part of employees or (2) any understatement of assets 
and profits resulting from charges to operations of items 
which might have been carried as assets. The nine firms 
of accountants in the letter above referred to pointed out 
that the former limitation is particularly applicable to ex­
aminations of the larger companies which, generally speak­
ing, constitute the class whose securities are listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange.
Your committee is satisfied that the detailed scrutiny and 
verification of the cash transactions of large companies can 
most efficiently and economically be performed by per­
manent employees of the corporation, particularly today, 
when bookkeeping is to so large an extent done by mechan­
ical means, and that it would involve unwarranted expense 
to transfer such work to independent auditors or to require 
them to duplicate the work of the internal organization. 
Your committee, however, feels that the auditors should 
assume a definite responsibility for satisfying themselves that 
the system of internal check provides adequate safeguards 
and should protect the company against any defalcation of 
major importance. Unless so satisfied, the auditors should 
make clear representations on this point—in the first place, 
to the management and, in default of action by the manage­
ment, to the shareholders. Your committee also suggests 
that this limitation on the scope of the audit, though an 
entirely proper one, should be specifically mentioned in the 
common form of audit report.
The Committee feels that the auditors should recognize 
a responsibility to verify and, if necessary, to report to the 
shareholders upon any transactions affecting directors or offi­
cers of the corporation in respect of which there might be
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a conflict of interest between such directors and officers and 
the general body of shareholders.
Turning to the second limitation on the scope of audits 
as outlined in the Federal Reserve bulletin, the accountants 
indicated that, generally speaking, their examination of the 
income or profit-and-loss account was perhaps less extensive 
than the procedure contemplated in that bulletin. The 
classification of the income or profit-and-loss account is 
clearly a matter of great importance to investors. Whether 
income is of such a nature that it may reasonably be expected 
to recur or is of an exceptional character is often a vital con­
sideration in the appraisal of an enterprise, and failure to 
make such distinctions clear in annual accounts is one of the 
defects to which the Exchange has had to call attention most 
frequently in the accounts of listed companies.
The Committee recognizes that it is neither necessary nor 
reasonable to hold auditors responsible for minor errors in 
classification, or to ask corporations to incur the expense of 
examinations such as would justify the acceptance of such a 
responsibility. Auditors should, however, in addition to 
satisfying themselves that the net income reported is not 
overstated, accept the burden of seeing that the income 
received and the expenditures made are properly classified 
in so far as the facts are known to them or are ascertainable 
by reasonable inquiry. For instance, when non-recurring in­
come, shown separately on the books, is merged with recur­
ring income in the annual accounts, or when items properly 
chargeable against current income are charged against sur­
plus or reserve, the facts are bound to come to the attention 
of the accountant who makes even the most cursory exami­
nation, and he should not certify without a clear qualifica­
tion accounts in which anything of this kind has been done.
The inquiry has again emphasized the importance and 
the difficulty of the problem of properly reflecting the opera­
tions of subsidiary and controlled companies. Consolidation 
of accounts of companies in which there are very substantial 
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outstanding interests is not a satisfactory solution—indeed, 
the Committee is satisfied that no method can be prescribed 
which could be applied in every case. Operations of con­
trolled companies may be as important an element in the 
value of the parent company as those of the parent company 
or its wholly-owned subsidiaries. Even where the operations 
of controlled companies are conducted at a negligible profit 
or loss, this fact cannot be ascertained if the result of such 
operations is nowhere reflected in the published financial 
statements. The Exchange has recognized that there must 
be an element of flexibility in the method of such presenta­
tion, so that corporations may choose, from among the sev­
eral methods which will give the desired information, that 
one most suitable to its individual circumstances. For a 
considerable period of time past, the agreement covering this 
matter which the Exchange has requested from corporations 
applying for listing has read as follows:
To publish at least once in each year and submit to 
stockholders at least fifteen days in advance of the annual 
meeting of the corporation, but not later than...................... .
a Balance Sheet and Income Statement for the last fiscal 
year and a Surplus Statement of the applicant company as 
a separate corporate entity and of each corporation in which 
it holds directly or indirectly a majority of the equity stock; 
or, in lieu thereof, eliminating all intercompany transactions;
A similar set of consolidated financial statements. If 
any such consolidated statements exclude any companies a 
majority of whose equity stock is owned, (a) the caption will 
indicate the degree of consolidation; (b) the Income Ac­
count will reflect, either in a footnote or otherwise, the 
parent company’s proportion of the sum of or difference 
between current earnings or losses and the dividends of 
such unconsolidated subsidiaries for the period of report; 
and (c) the Balance Sheet will reflect, in a footnote or 
otherwise, the extent to which the equity of the parent com­
pany in such subsidiaries has been increased or diminished 
since the date of acquisition as a result of profits, losses and 
distributions. Appropriate reserves, in accordance with 
good accounting practice, will be made against profits arising 
out of all transactions with unconsolidated subsidiaries, in
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either parent-company statements or consolidated statements.
Such statements will reflect the existence of any default 
in interest, cumulative dividend requirements, sinking-fund 
or redemption-fund requirements of any controlled corpora­
tion whether consolidated or unconsolidated.
The most costly, and the less satisfactory in some respects, 
of the suggested methods is the publication separately of the 
financial statements of each unconsolidated controlled cor­
poration, for the reason that this imposes upon the stock­
holder, or analyst, the burden of determining for himself 
the equity of the parent company in the earnings of each 
such corporation, making it a burdensome matter for him 
thus to secure a true picture of the results of operation of the 
system as a whole.
With less information than is suggested by one of the 
methods in the foregoing agreement, the reports of any com­
pany having unconsolidated majority-owned companies are 
necessarily incomplete and may be positively misleading. 
The Committee believes that this is a subject which might 
well receive the consideration of corporate management and 
of organized bodies of accounting officers and independent 
accountants in order that adequate disclosure may become 
generally prevalent and not be confined merely to those 
companies which have executed the foregoing agreement 
with the Exchange.
At the same time, it might be desirable to attempt to 
develop a form of audit report or certificate which would be 
more informative to and more clearly understood by in­
vestors than the forms now currently in use. It would, in 
the opinion of the Committee, be advantageous if audit re­
ports were so framed as to constitute specific answers to the 
last three questions embodied in the President’s letter to 
listed companies of January 31, 1933, namely:
4. Whether in their opinion the form of the balance sheet 
and of the income, or profit-and-loss, account is such as fairly 
to present the financial position and the results of operation,
5. Whether the accounts are in their opinion fairly de- 
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termined on the basis of consistent application of the system 
of accounting regularly employed by the company.
6. Whether such system in their opinion conforms to ac­
cepted accounting practices, and particularly whether it is in 
any respect inconsistent with any of the principles set forth 
in the statement attached hereto.
As suggested earlier in this communication, also, it might 
contain a clear statement of the scope of the audit in relation 
to detection of defalcations by employees.
The matters herein discussed seem to the Committee those 
in respect of which clarification and improvement of ac­
counting practice are most desirable in the interest of in­
vestors. It suggests to the Governing Committee that these 
matters should be brought to the attention of listed com­
panies and organized bodies of accountants and accounting 
officers, with a view to definite action along the lines in­
dicated herein.
By the direction of the Committee on Stock List,
J. M. B. Hoxsey, 
Executive Assistant.
Resolved, That the Governing Committee of the New York 
Stock Exchange concurs in the suggestions herein con­
tained and authorizes the Committee on Stock List to 
bring them to the attention of those concerned, as recom­
mended.
Ashbel Green, Secretary. 
October 25, 1933.
Following is the text of the letter written by nine accounting firms 
and enclosed with Mr. Hoxsey’s letter of October 24th:
New York, February 24, 1933.
Richard Whitney, Esq., President,
New York Stock Exchange,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Sir:
As auditors of a substantial number of corporations whose 
securities are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, we
AUDITS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTS 135 
have received copies of the letter in relation to audits ad­
dressed by you to such companies under date of January 31. 
We are anxious to do everything in our power to assist the 
Exchange, and it has seemed to us that it will be helpful 
and more convenient to the Exchange for us to deal with 
some of the general phases of the subject under consideration 
collectively in a single letter, reference to which will make 
it unnecessary to discuss these points in the letters which 
we shall in due course furnish to our clients and which they 
in turn will presumably furnish to the Exchange for its 
confidential use.
We fully recognize the importance of defining the re­
sponsibility of auditors and of bringing about a proper 
understanding oh the part of the investing public of the 
scope and significance of financial audits, to the end that 
their importance should not be underrated nor their pro­
tective value exaggerated in the minds of investors. This is 
the more necessary because the problem of delimiting the 
scope of audits or examinations is essentially one of ap­
praising the risks against which safeguards are desirable in 
comparison with the costs of providing such safeguards. The 
cost of an audit so extensive as to safeguard against all risks 
would be prohibitive; and the problem is, therefore, to de­
velop a general scheme of examination of accounts under 
which reasonably adequate safeguards may be secured at a 
cost that will be within the limits of a prudent economy. 
The position was clearly stated by a partner in one of the 
signatory firms in 1926 as follows:
In any such work we must be practical; it is no use laying 
down counsels of perfection or attempting to extend the 
scope of the audit unduly. An audit is a safeguard; the 
maintenance of this safeguard entails an expense; and this 
expense can be justified only if the value of the safeguard 
is found to be fully commensurate with its cost. The cost of 
an audit so extensive as to be a complete safeguard would 
be enormous and far beyond any value to be derived from 
it. A superficial audit is dangerous because of the sense of 
false security which it creates. Between the two extremes 
136 THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING 
there lies a mean, at which the audit abundantly justifies its 
cost.
We are in accord with the general concept of the scope 
of an examination such as would justify the certification of a 
balance sheet and income account for submission to stock­
holders which is implied in the reference to the bulletin 
“Verification of Financial Statements” contained in the first 
question asked by the Exchange. That bulletin was de­
signed primarily as a guide to procedure which would af­
ford reasonable assurance that the financial position of the 
borrower was not less favorable than it was represented by 
him to be; and, as the bulletin explicitly states, it was not 
contemplated that such an examination would necessarily 
disclose under-statements of assets (and profits) resulting 
from charges to operations of items which might have been 
carried as assets or defalcations, oh the part of employees.
This latter point is particularly applicable to financial 
examinations of larger companies which, generally speaking, 
constitute the class whose securities are listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Such companies rely on an adequate 
system of internal check to prevent or disclose defalcations, 
and independent accountants making a financial examina­
tion do not attempt to duplicate the work of the internal 
auditors.
The bulletin “Verification of Financial Statements,” to 
which reference has been made, was, as was clearly pointed 
out in the first edition, framed to fit the case of borrowers 
engaged in business on a relatively small or medium-sized 
scale. It was recognized in that bulletin (see paragraph 131 
of the present edition) that an effective system of internal 
check would make some portions of the procedure outlined 
in the bulletin unnecessary. Naturally, the larger a corpora­
tion and the more extensive and effective its system of ac­
counting and internal check, the less extensive is the de­
tailed checking necessary to an adequate verification of the 
balance sheet. Since companies listed on your Exchange
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are among the larger corporations, it is in general true that 
the procedure in examinations of annual accounts is less 
detailed in the case of those companies than in the class of 
cases which the framers of the bulletin had particularly in 
mind. It is, however, true, we think, that the examinations 
made by independent auditors in such cases, coupled with 
the system of internal check, constitute at least as effective 
a safeguard as is secured in the case of smaller corporations 
having a less adequate system of internal check, in the ex­
amination of which the procedure outlined in the bulletin 
has been more closely followed.
The ordinary form of financial examination of listed 
companies, in so far as it relates to the verification in detail 
of the income account, is not, we believe, so extensive as 
that contemplated by the bulletin. To verify this detail 
would often be a task of a very considerable magnitude, par­
ticularly in the case of companies having complex account­
ing systems, and we question whether the expense of such a 
verification would be justified by the value to the investor 
of the results to be attained. The essential point is to guard 
against any substantial overstatement of income, and this 
can be reasonably assured by the auditor’s satisfying himself 
of the correctness of the balance sheets at the beginning and 
end of the period covered by his examination and reviewing 
the important transactions during the year.
The second point on which information is requested in 
your letter to listed companies relates to subsidiary com­
panies. This question is obviously pertinent, and presents 
no difficulty to the accountant called upon to reply to it.
The third question, calling for a statement whether all 
essential information has been furnished to the auditors 
contemplates, we take it, that the auditors shall indicate 
whether all the information which they have deemed essen­
tial and sought has been furnished to them. It is obviously 
conceivable that a management might be in possession of 
information which would have a material bearing on the 
accountant’s view of the financial position if he knew of
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its existence, but that the auditor might have no way of 
discovering that such information existed.
Your fourth question relates to the form in which the 
accounts are submitted. We take it that you desire to be 
informed whether the accounts in the opinion of the auditor 
set forth the results fairly to the extent that they purport 
to do so, and that the inquiry does not go to the question 
whether regard for the interests of the stockholders calls for 
more detailed statements of the financial position and the 
operations of the company than those now given. The 
question how much information should be given to stock­
holders is one on which wide differences of opinion exist, 
and it is not our understanding that the Exchange is at­
tempting to deal with this point in this inquiry.
Referring to the fifth question, we attach as great im­
portance as the Exchange evidently does to consistency of 
method in the presentation of financial statements by cor­
porations. The only further comment on this question 
which seems called for is to emphasize the part which judg­
ment necessarily plays in the determination of results, even 
if principles are consistently adhered to. There would, we 
take it, be no objection to an accountant’s answering the fifth 
question in the affirmative, even though in his opinion the 
judgment of the management had been somewhat more 
conservative at the close of a year than a year earlier, or vice 
versa. We think it well to mention this point and to em­
phasize the fact that accounts must necessarily be largely 
expressions of judgment, and that the primary responsibility 
for forming these judgments must rest on the management 
of the corporation. And though the auditor must assume 
the duty of expressing his dissent through a qualification in 
his report, or otherwise, if the conclusions reached by the 
management are in his opinion manifestly unsound, he does 
not undertake in practice, and should not, we think, be ex­
pected to substitute his judgment for that of the manage­
ment when the difference is not of major importance, when
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the management’s judgment is not unreasonable, and when 
he has no reason to question its good faith.
Your sixth question, apart from the specific reference to 
the principles enumerated, aims, we assume, to insure that 
companies are following accounting practices which have 
substantial authority back of them. Answers to this ques­
tion of an affirmative character will not, of course, be under­
stood as implying that all of the clients of a given firm ob­
serve similar or equally conservative practices, either in the 
case of companies engaged in the same industry or in the 
case of different industries, or even that the accounting prin­
ciples adopted are precisely those which the accountant 
would have himself selected, had the sole choice been his.
We agree with the five general principles enumerated 
in the memorandum attached to your letter, but it may, we 
suppose, be understood that rigorous application of these 
principles is not essential where the amounts involved are 
relatively insignificant. We mention this point not by way 
of any substantial reservation, but to avoid possible later 
criticism based on narrow technicalities.
We shall be glad, if desired, to go further into any of the 
questions herein discussed, in such a way as may be most 
convenient to the Exchange.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COOPERATION
WITH STOCK EXCHANGES
135 CEDAR STREET, NEW YORK
December 21, 1933. 
Mr. J. M. B. Hoxsey, Executive Assistant,
Committee on Stock List
New York Stock Exchange
New York, N. Y.
Dear Sir:
The copy of the communication addressed by your com­
mittee to the governing committee of the Stock Exchange 
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under date of October 24, 1933, regarding audits, which 
was sent to the President of the American Institute of 
Accountants, has been referred to this committee. We wel­
come the suggestion that the matters therein dealt with 
should be brought to the attention of listed companies and 
organized bodies of accountants and accounting officers, and 
shall be glad to cooperate with the Exchange in the manner 
contemplated.
We are glad to note that the replies received to the letter 
of the President of the Exchange dated January 31, 1933, 
indicate general acceptance of the principles set forth in 
the communication of this committee to the Exchange 
dated September 22, 1932, and we propose to recommend to 
the Institute that these rules, and such acceptance, should 
be brought to the attention of all members of the Insti­
tute.
We have noted with interest the views expressed by the 
committee on stock list with regard to the problem of safe­
guarding the transactions of corporations. While agreeing 
with your committee that in the case of large companies the 
safeguarding of transactions is primarily a matter of internal 
organization, we should like to make it clear that we fully 
appreciate the value of the detailed audit in appropriate 
cases. Where the internal check and control are necessarily 
limited or severely restricted, the detailed audit serves a most 
useful purpose, though no audit should be regarded as tak­
ing the place of sound measures of internal check and con­
trol, except in cases where the organization is so small as 
to make adequate internal check impracticable.
We believe that accountants, in cases where they do not 
make a detailed audit, now regard it as a part of their duty 
to inquire into the system of internal check—indeed, this 
duty is expressly recognized in the pamphlet “Verification 
of Financial Statements’’ as revised by the American Institute 
of Accountants in 1929, the first sentence of the general in­
structions contained in that pamphlet reading in part:
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The scope of the work indicated in these instructions in­
cludes ... an examination of the accounting system for the 
purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of the internal 
check.
We would, however, point out that it is always a matter of 
judgment on the part of corporate management to weigh the 
risks against which safeguards are desirable in comparison 
with the cost of providing safeguards. The whole matter 
lies in the field of discretion, and if in any case a defalcation 
should occur and escape detection, the accountants cannot 
be expected to accept any financial responsibility, but only 
to accept such blame as may attach to a possible error of 
judgment on their part with respect to their review of the 
methods and extent of the internal check and control. The 
effect on the reputation of a public accountant, arising from 
such an error of judgment, is serious and quite sufficient to 
ensure care on his part.
We agree with your committee in the view that auditors 
cannot properly disclaim all responsibility for the correct­
ness of the classification of an income or profit-and-loss ac­
count merely because they are not in a position to assume 
full responsibility therefor. Your suggestion that auditors 
should “accept the burden of seeing that the income received 
and the expenditures made are properly classified in so far 
as the facts are known to them or are ascertainable by reason­
able inquiry” seems to us a reasonable one, and we believe 
it is calculated to afford investors in the great majority of 
cases the protection which your committee desires. Our only 
further comment on this portion of the communication is 
that where the facts are clearly disclosed on the face of the 
statement it may not be necessary for the accountants to 
embody a qualification in their report.
We agree that the problem of reflecting the operations 
of subsidiary and controlled companies is one of real dif­
ficulty. Experience here and abroad confirms the view that 
there is no single satisfactory solution. We believe, how­
ever, that if corporate managements and accounting officers 
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approach the question with an honest desire to make the 
statements as fair and informative as possible, a solution 
appropriate to each individual case will always be found, 
and we propose to ask the Institute to bring the point to the 
attention of all its members and urge their fullest coopera­
tion to this end.
We shall be very glad to join in any cooperative effort to 
develop a form of accountants’ reports which will be more 
valuable to investors. We agree that such reports should 
be so framed as to constitute answers to the three questions 
contained in President Whitney’s letter of January 31, 1933, 
mentioned by you; viz.:
Whether in their [i.e., the auditors’] opinion the form 
of the balance sheet and of the income, or profit-and-loss, 
account is such as fairly to present the financial position and 
the results of operation.
Whether the accounts are in their opinion fairly deter­
mined on the basis of consistent application of the system of 
accounting regularly employed by the company.
Whether such system in their opinion conforms to ac­
cepted accounting practices, and particularly whether it is 
in any respect inconsistent with any of the principles set 
forth in the statement attached hereto.
We think it desirable, also, as suggested in our report of 
September 22, 1932, to emphasize the fact that accounts, and 
consequently any statements or reports based thereon, are 
necessarily in large measure expressions of opinion. To this 
end, we think it desirable that the document signed by the 
accountants should be in the form of a report, as in England, 
rather than a certificate, and that the words “in our (my) 
opinion” should always be embodied therein. It is imprac­
ticable to indicate in a standard form of report exactly the 
procedure followed, since it will vary in different cases, and 
it will be desirable to use language which may understate 
what has been done rather than to incur the risk of the ex­
tent of the examination being exaggerated by the reader.
With these considerations in mind, we have drafted as a 
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basis for discussion a form of report, a copy of which, with 
some explanatory notes, is attached hereto, and we should 
be glad to have an expression of opinion thereupon from 
your committee or others interested. As indicated in the 
first note, it would be our view that before issuing such a 
report as we have drafted the accountant should have at 
least made an examination of the character outlined in the 
bulletin, “Verification of Financial Statements” as inter­
preted in the communication of your committee to the gov­
erning committee of the Exchange dated October 24, 1933.
With renewed assurance of our willingness to cooperate, 
and awaiting your advice as to the way in which you think 
such cooperation can best be extended, we are
Yours very truly, •
George O. May, Chairman.
REVISED SUGGESTION OF A FORM OF ACCOUNTANTS’ 
REP.ORT
TO THE XYZ COMPANY:
We have made an examination of the balance sheet of the 
XYZ Company as at December 31, 1933, and of the state­
ment of income and surplus for the year 1933. In connec­
tion therewith, we examined or tested accounting records 
of the Company and other supporting evidence and obtained 
information and explanations from officers and employees 
of the Company; we also made a general review of the ac­
counting methods and of the operating and income accounts 
for the year, but we did not make a detailed audit of the 
transactions.
In our opinion, based upon such examination, the ac­
companying balance sheet and related statement of income 
and surplus fairly present, in accordance with accepted prin­
ciples of accounting consistently maintained by the Company 
during the year under review, its position at December 31, 
1933, and the results of its operations for the year.
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NOTES
1. It is contemplated that before signing a report of the 
type suggested, the accountant should have at least 
made an examination of the character outlined in the 
bulletin, “Verification of Financial Statements,” as in­
terpreted in the communication of the Committee on 
Stock List to the Governing Committee dated October 
24, 1933.
2. The report should be addressed to the directors of the 
company or to the stockholders, if the appointment is 
made by them.
3. The statement of what has been examined would, of 
course, conform to the titles of the accounts or state­
ments reported upon.
4. In the second sentence, any special forms of confirma­
tion could be mentioned: e.g., “including confirma­
tion of cash and securities by inspection or certificates 
from depositaries.”
5. This certificate is appropriate only if the accounting 
for the year is consistent in basis with that for the pre­
ceding year. If there has been any material change 
either in accounting principles or in the manner of 
their application, the nature of the change should be 
indicated.
6. It is contemplated that the form of report would be 
modified when and as necessary to embody any qualifi­
cations, reservations or supplementary explanations.
XIII
THE IMPORTANCE OF INSISTING ON SOUND 
METHODS OF ACCOUNTING *
(1933)
The recent action of the New York Stock Exchange and the 
similar action on the part of the Curb and the New York 
Produce Exchanges, which followed quickly, mark a very im­
portant step in the development of financial auditing. These 
developments are undoubtedly due largely to the experience 
in the Kreuger and other cases. That experience has also 
created a demand for legislation for the protection of in­
vestors which might or might not be of a character favorable 
to the profession. In our view, the profession stands today 
at a critical moment in its history, and on the way in which 
it discharges the responsibilities placed upon it within the 
next year or two will depend to a very large extent its 
future.
Holding these views, and realizing as we do the responsi­
bilities which attach to the position our firm holds in the 
profession, we wish to impress on all offices the importance 
of insisting on sound methods of accounting and presenta­
tion of facts, however difficult the circumstances may be and 
however important may be the client with whom the ques­
tions are raised. We are perfectly prepared to sacrifice pres­
ent business and profits to maintain the position of the firm 
and discharge our obligations to the profession, and have 
no doubt that such a policy will also prove ultimately the 
most profitable. Naturally, we do not wish to be too tech­
nical, nor to attempt to override ruthlessly the judgment of 
directors and officials; but we must not lay ourselves open 
to the criticism of being subservient to our clients.
* A letter to all United States and Canadian offices of Price, Waterhouse & 
Co., January 16, 1933.
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We request that you bring to the notice of this office any 
proposals as to the form or substance of accounts with which 
you are not in entire agreement and upon which you are 
not able to induce your clients to accept your views. In 
this way you can share with this office the responsibility of 
deciding whether to withdraw objections or to insist on a 
position whatever the consequences may be;
We must, of course, have proper regard for the views of 
directors, but we should be careful not to allow ourselves 
to be put in the position of accepting views with which we 
are not in full accord on the plea that the directors have 
determined the question, without satisfying ourselves that 
the views are really those of the directors and not merely 
those of the officers, and that the directors have reached, their 
conclusions with the full knowledge of the considerations 
which have led us to disagree therewith.
This general question is likely to be under discussion in 
the Institute and with the exchanges in the near future, but 
we think it is well to write you promptly so that there may 
be no question of our failing to recognize our full duty to 
the profession at this time. Obviously, unless the leading 
firms take a stand for proper principles when the necessity 
arises, it is not fairly to be expected that the smaller firms, 
which occupy a much less favorable position, will do so.
PART II
DEPRECIATION

ITHE PROBLEM OF DEPRECIATION *
(1915)
In recent years the problem of depreciation has received 
steadily increasing attention as its importance has become 
more widely recognized. Its treatment even today is, how­
ever, not in general adequate or satisfactory, and undoubt­
edly this condition is in a large measure attributable to a 
failure to appreciate fully the many-sided character of the 
problem. In this article, therefore, an attempt will be made 
to analyze it and to point out its more important features, 
and at the same time some consideration will be given to 
the question as to how far the problem is one of account­
ing and how far it is one of physical inspection and valua­
tion.
In the first place it is necessary to consider the causes 
which contribute to bring about depreciation and the in­
fluences which tend to modify or obscure its effects.
The most convenient subdivision of the natural causes 
of depreciation is threefold:
(1) Fall in new value due entirely to external conditions 
and not caused in any way by age or change in con­
ditions of use of the property;
(2) Exhaustion through age or wear of the property;
(3) Obsolescence or supersession by superior types or 
methods.
The essential distinction between the three causes of de­
preciation is readily apparent. The first is an influence 
which is spasmodic and uncertain, and its effect today may
* The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XIX (January, 1915), pp. 1-13.
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be offset by an exactly opposite tendency tomorrow. The 
second is a relentless force operating continuously in one 
direction only. Its effects may be modified by skillful, or 
aggravated by unskillful, management, just as human life 
may be prolonged by care and shortened by neglect; but its 
ultimate effects are certain. The third cause is like the 
second in that it operates in one direction only, but differs 
in that its operation is not steady and persistent but ex­
tremely uncertain. In some industries at some stages it may 
almost cease to be felt; in other industries or at other stages 
it may be the most potent influence of the three.
In any consideration of the question of depreciation the 
corresponding question of appreciation cannot be ignored. 
The word “appreciation” is etymologically so precisely the 
converse of “depreciation” that the element is often regarded 
as an equally complete offset to the element of deprecia­
tion. It is important, however, to note that (except pos­
sibly as to the increase in efficiency up to the point that a 
plant has “found itself”) appreciation is practically the 
converse only of the first class of depreciation above enu­
merated.
In addition to causes beyond human control, depreciation 
may arise from causes which are within human control, such 
as neglect, misuse or disuse; on the other hand, depreciation 
may be arrested or diminished by human effort either 
through renewals which restore usefulness or changes which 
arrest obsolescence.
Any adequate disposition of the question of depreciation 
must, therefore, deal with numerous influences which may 
be conveniently tabulated as follows:
Causes Countervailing Influences
Beyond human control
Fall in new value 
Exhaustion 
Obsolescence
Beyond human control
Rise in new value
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Causes Countervailing Influences
Within human control Within human control
Neglect Renewals which prolong useful
life
Misuse Changes to retard obsolescence
Disuse
The next step in any attempt to deal with the problem 
must be a consideration of the purposes for which deprecia­
tion is required to be measured. These purposes may be 
stated broadly as twofold:
(1) In order to determine the value of property; and
(2) To ascertain what provision is required to be made 
out of earnings before the true operating profit can 
be determined.
Considering these two purposes in relation to the foregoing 
analysis of the classes of depreciation, it is apparent that the 
depreciation due to fluctuations in new value and the cor­
responding appreciation have a very important bearing on 
the valuation of property, but have no proper place in the 
determination of the results of operations. Property em­
ployed in operation is not purchased with a view to sale but, 
with the exception of land, is intended to be used in pro­
duction and distribution. Therefore, any increase or de­
crease in the new value thereof has little or no practical 
bearing on the question of operations. In an extreme case 
the fall in new values may be so great as to render a unit 
obsolete, but such cases are comparatively infrequent and 
form a part of the problem of obsolescence rather than a 
part of the question of fluctuations in new value. In measur­
ing depreciation for operating purposes, therefore, fluctua­
tions in new value may be and usually are disregarded, but 
in any attempt to maintain continuously a figure of capital 
investment based on valuation these fluctuations would be 
a most important and difficult factor to deal with.
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In the case of obsolescence the difficulties are greater from 
the operating than from the valuation point of view. In 
dealing with this question for the purpose of valuation of 
any unit it is sufficient to determine whether changes in 
methods or types have already taken place to such an extent 
as to cause an impairment in its value beyond the impair­
ment due to exhaustion. From an accounting standpoint it 
is necessary to go further and in fixing charges against opera­
tions to allow for the probability that in the future the life 
of the unit will be terminated by obsolescence rather than 
by exhaustion.
The uncertainty as to the precise effects of obsolescence 
is sometimes urged as an argument in favor of making no 
provision therefor; but though the effect of obsolescence on 
individual units is uncertain, it is usually possible to estimate 
its effects on the operations of a business as a whole—and 
depreciation schemes are almost necessarily based on aver­
ages. Moreover, unless some provision is made, it will be 
necessary to write off large sums against operations when 
units are abandoned on account of obsolescence before 
being exhausted by use. A failure to provide for obsoles­
cence is therefore open to the objection that it tends towards 
wider fluctuation in results arid is lacking in conservatism. 
If a provision is made on a larger scale than proves necessary 
the ultimate result will be merely to increase profits in the 
future. If, however, provision is omitted, it may result in 
inability to meet requirements for modernizing in the fu­
ture which may be essential to the continued success or even 
to the existence of the business.
The proper course is, therefore, clearly to attempt to pro­
vide in advance for obsolescence, though on account of the 
uncertainty characterizing the element such an allowance 
cannot be calculated with the same degree of accuracy as 
that for exhaustion of life through use or wear. All that 
can be done is to make the provision as accurate as possible 
by the exercise of good judgment and by frequent revisions 
and reconsiderations of operating conditions.
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The foregoing considerations suggest the reason for the 
difference between engineers and accountants in their atti­
tude on the subject of depreciation. Engineers are more 
frequently required to consider the question from the stand­
point of valuation; accountants are usually concerned to 
ascertain the proper charge against operations. As has been 
indicated, the problems have very different features; indeed, 
it is not going too far to say that periodical valuations may 
be a hindrance rather than an aid to an accountant in the 
determination of a proper charge for depreciation.
To illustrate this point:
Assume a plant unit of which copper is an important part, 
say, for simplicity, one containing 5,000 pounds of copper, 
and whose cost, apart from the copper, is $200. If bought 
when copper is at 16¢ it would cost $1,000 and naturally 
the new value would fluctuate $50 for every fluctuation of 
1¢ in the price of copper.
Now assume that a valuer making periodical inspections 
and valuations finds the depreciated value to be 96% of new 
value at the end of the first year; 92% at the end of the sec­
ond year; and 89% at the end of the third year; and that at 
the end of those years the price of copper is 18¢, 13¢ and 15¢.
From the standpoint of valuation—
at the end of the first year the new value of the unit
would be $1,100 and the depreciated value 96%
of $1,100, or $1,056, showing an appreciation of $ 56.00 
at the end of the second year the new value would
be $850 and the depreciated value 92% of $850, 
or $782, showing a depreciation for the year of.. 274.00 
at the end of the third year the new value would be
$950 and the depreciated value 89% of $950, or
$845.50, showing an appreciation of...................... 63.50
From an accounting standpoint the operations of the first 
year would be considered chargeable with 4% of $1,000, 
or $40, instead of being credited with $56; the second year 
would similarly be chargeable with $40 instead of $274; and 
the operations of the third year would be chargeable with 
$30 instead of being credited with $63.50.
The illustration is perhaps an extreme one, but it serves 
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to bring out the dangers involved in basing depreciation 
charges against operations on periodical valuations without 
further analysis.
The fairly common opinion that periodical valuations 
form the best, if not the only satisfactory, way of dealing 
with depreciation does not stand analysis. The object of a 
valuation is to determine the present depreciated value of 
property in use, and before the depreciated value can be 
ascertained it is necessary to establish the basis upon which 
the total ultimate loss from depreciation on any given unit 
shall be distributed as between the part of the term of use 
of the unit already expired and the part still lying in the 
future. Moreover, the final valuation is liable to be so 
largely affected by fluctuations in new value (which must be 
excluded from consideration in measuring depreciation from 
use and obsolescence) as to make it by itself quite incon­
clusive on this point. This is not to say that the work of the 
valuer may not be made extremely useful in considering 
the depreciation problem.
The work of inventorying and the observation of the pres­
ent condition, which are a part of the valuation, are of course 
of the utmost value in the determination of a proper charge 
to operations. The work of the valuer can, however, be use­
ful to the accountant only for the purpose of fixing charges 
against operations if the latter has an opportunity to analyze, 
the valuation and ascertain how much of the change in value 
between two dates results from factors of which the account­
ant must take cognizance in order to arrive at correct operat­
ing results, and how far it is due to mere fluctuations in new 
value which for that purpose should be entirely excluded 
from consideration.
The fact is that while the phrase “depreciation” strictly 
covers a decline in value from any conceivable cause, its use 
in accounting practice is generally in a more narrow and 
restricted sense, and many of the difficulties which the ac­
countant has to face in his efforts to secure a proper treat­
ment of the subject arise from misapprehensions as to the 
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precise meaning of the term. To those approaching the 
subject for the first time or looking at it superficially an en­
tirely wrong line of thought is suggested by the word “de­
preciation”; it immediately suggests appreciation. A manu­
facturer who is urged to provide for depreciation of his plant 
replies that it is fully offset by appreciation in his real estate, 
or other assets, and the etymological correspondence between 
the two words is so complete that he regards the offset as 
being as natural and perfect as that between debit and credit. 
If he were carrying on his books 1,000 tons of material of 
which 50 tons had been consumed and he were asked to 
write off that 50 tons he would concede the propriety of the 
request at once and his thoughts would not in the same way 
turn to the appreciation of his real estate. A little considera­
tion will show that the exhaustion in the course of manu­
facture of one year’s useful life of a plant which can only 
be expected to last twenty years is practically identical in 
its nature with the use of 50 tons of material out of a total 
stock of 1,000 tons.
Many attempts have been made to meet the terminological 
difficulty, but it is not easy to bring a new phrase into gen­
eral use or to devise one which will be both short and clear. 
“Expired outlay on productive plant” is a phrase suggested 
and used by one English authority, and whilst it is not every­
thing that could be desired in simplicity and brevity, it does 
have the merit of suggesting the real nature of what is com­
monly termed “depreciation of plant” more clearly than does 
the latter phrase. It does emphasize the fact that it is not 
merely a decline in value but a permanent exhaustion that 
is taking place; and this is the fact which needs to be em­
phasized and reiterated until it is fully recognized and ac­
cepted.
If the necessity of distinguishing between fluctuations in 
new value and actual exhaustion of useful life of a plant be 
conceded, it still remains to consider whether both should 
find expression in a company’s accounts. At first sight such 
a course may seem desirable, as it has the apparent merit of 
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keeping the books in closer accord with existing conditions; 
but upon fuller consideration it is questionable whether it 
is wise to advocate such a course in the case of a going con­
cern. In the present state of the law it seems clear that there 
is no obligation on a company to provide for a decline in 
new value of fixed assets, and the probable result of advocacy 
of the policy of adjusting fixed properties to valuations 
would be that such adjustments would be made where the 
valuations exceed the book figures but not where the tend­
ency is in the opposite direction.
The idea of writing plant values up to valuation figures 
is usually attractive to the owner of the plant. Such a course 
results in a surplus which, however incapable it may be of 
being distributed, is still a surplus. Possibly also the sug­
gestion of skill or good judgment in the original construc­
tion or acquisition of the plant implied in the adjustment 
appeals to him. The benefits are, however, largely illusory. 
Appraisals are so much a matter of individual opinion and 
temperament that men of wide business experience attach 
little weight to a surplus resulting from an appraisal; and, 
on the other hand, if the property is adjusted to higher 
values the depreciation charges to be made out of future 
operations must be correspondingly increased so that ulti­
mately the amount added in a lump to plant values, other 
than real estate and surplus, has to be wrung in annual in­
stallments out of operations.
In cases where new value is less than original cost, operat­
ing officials may urge that the valuation should be recognized 
and that the plant be charged only with depreciation based 
on the new and lower values. They may argue that it is not 
fair that their operations should be burdened with a de­
preciation charge based on prices which were paid before 
they were responsible for the operations of the plant and 
which are in excess of the price at which replacements could 
now be effected. No year’s operations of a plant are com­
plete in themselves; in innumerable ways they derive the 
benefits or inherit the burdens resulting from transactions 
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of the past, and the primary requirement is clearly to ascer­
tain the results of operations under the conditions which 
do exist and not upon the basis of imaginary conditions 
which might have existed. In judging the efficiency of the 
management by comparisons with other plants it may be 
entirely proper to make allowance for higher capital costs 
and for every other operating advantage or disadvantage at­
taching to the plant; but before and beyond all these more 
speculative calculations the essential problem is clearly to 
ascertain the results of things as they are.
A further question may possibly arise as to whether ob­
solescence should be dealt with as a separate problem. There 
is much to be said for such a course or at least for dealing 
with the question of exhaustion of life in two parts: first, 
by a carefully calculated provision based on what can rea­
sonably be foreseen; and secondly, by a more general pro­
vision for possible curtailment of life through unexpected 
developments. Thus a manufacturer may be satisfied to buy 
a machine with the expectation that apart from obsolescence 
it will do service for from twenty to thirty years and with 
a realization of the probability that apart altogether from 
wear it is to be expected that developments in the art will 
make it wise to abandon the unit in twenty years or so. 
There is, of course, always the possibility that some totally 
unexpected development may render it obsolete in three, or 
five, or ten years, and conservatism would call for some rec­
ognition of this possibility.
In these circumstances it would seem entirely reasonable 
to make provision for depreciation based on estimated life 
somewhat shorter than the maximum life apart from obso­
lescence (say, in the illustrative case mentioned, twenty years) 
and to supplement such provision by a general provision out 
of earnings against which could be charged losses resulting 
from unusually rapid obsolescence. On the cither hand, all 
provisions for exhaustion of life are uncertain, and to many 
an attempt to deal separately with the different degrees of 
uncertainty may seem an unnecessary or useless refinement.
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The question is one largely of temperament. A manu­
facturer who is willing to give the necessary time and atten­
tion to deal with the problem in detail may probably find the 
subdivision valuable; a manufacturer who is content to look 
at the matter more broadly and to aim at safely conservative 
rather than exact calculations may find it unnecessary. The 
question is not, like the distinction between exhaustion of 
life and fluctuations in value, fundamental, since all ex­
haustion of life, whether due to wear or obsolescence, must 
be provided for out of the operations before a profit can 
safely be said to have been earned.
The next subject for consideration is depreciation due to 
causes which are within human control. In establishing pro­
visions for depreciation it is usually assumed that everything 
that is practical and economical in the way of current main­
tenance will be done to prolong the life and the cost thereof 
absorbed in operations quite apart from the depreciation 
provision. There is often some difficulty in discriminating 
between maintenance charges which should be so absorbed 
and renewals which fall within the classification next to be 
considered, and on this account the course of making one 
provision to cover maintenance and depreciation has been 
advocated and is sometimes adopted; but while in some cases 
such a method may give good results, it is scarcely suited for 
general adoption.
The cost of current maintenance varies largely with the 
efficiency of the management. The work if carried out eco­
nomically at opportune times may cost far less than it would 
if less efficiently conducted. The old proverb that “a stitch 
in time saves nine” emphasizes the saving which is effected 
by making needed repairs promptly and the dangers of de­
ferment. Repairs which are made with the plant’s own 
facilities at slack times should cost less than repairs carried 
out by outside contractors at less favorable times.
To merge the question of maintenance with that of de­
preciation therefore involves adding considerably to the pos­
sibilities of error in the provision made. Another disad­
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vantage of the method is that it affords an opportunity of 
unduly relieving operating expenses by charges against the 
fixed provision set aside. If the manager of a plant knows 
that his operations are charged with a fixed sum to cover 
both depreciation and current maintenance, he will realize 
that every dollar he can charge to maintenance rather than 
to operations will result in an increase in the amount of the 
apparent profits from his operation. Another disadvantage 
is that no incentive is given to the manager to be economical 
in his maintenance work. For these reasons it is usually de­
sirable to deal with current maintenance entirely apart from 
depreciation. It should perhaps be noted that where de­
preciation has not been provided and an attempt is being 
made to restate accounts to include a proper provision there­
for, maintenance expenditures must be considered, as in such 
cases usually amounts will have been charged to maintenance 
which if a depreciation reserve had existed would properly 
have been charged against the reserve.
Turning now to the countervailing influences of renewals 
and changes, a fundamental question arises which it is es­
sential to decide when the formulation of any depreciation 
scheme is under consideration.
The problem of depreciation is often broadly stated to be 
that of distributing the cost of plant (less salvage) over its 
estimated life,* and it is not always realized that this is only 
true if the phrase “estimated life’’ is used in one of the two 
widely different senses in which it is used in different de­
preciation schemes. Estimated life may mean either maxi­
mum life of a unit extended to the uttermost by rebuilding 
and renewals or the minimum life ignoring any such pos­
sible extensions. If estimated life is used in the former 
sense renewals must clearly not be charged against the pro-
* An alternative theory is that business may be regarded as permanent and 
that the problem of depreciation is to provide the sums necessary to renew 
units as such renewal becomes necessary. The comparative merits of the 
two theories form an interesting question which is, however, beyond the 
scope of this article. The principal difference is that the sum to be pro­
vided on the renewal theory is based on probable cost of replacement rather 
than upon original cost of units. 
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visions thus created but must be absorbed as an additional 
charge to operations; and, moreover, the scheme will not dis­
tribute the loss from wear and tear equitably over the period 
of years but will result in heavy charges in those years in 
which renewal and rebuilding take place. If, however, es­
timated life is used in the alternative sense of a minimum 
life, then all renewals and rebuildings which substantially 
prolong life are property chargeable against the fund and 
the burden of wear and tear is distributed equitably as be­
tween years. Probably the majority of depreciation schemes 
are based on the last-mentioned conception of estimated life, 
but a notable example of the alternative course is the scheme 
of depreciation on railroad equipment now in force.
Another problem offering some difficulty is that of dis­
tinguishing between renewals which may be charged against 
the depreciation fund and repairs which must be charged 
against operations. Whilst this difficulty undoubtedly exists, 
it is true of all classifications that they merge one into an­
other, and in recent years marked progress has been made in 
the direction of an adequate and practicable distinction be­
tween repairs and renewals.
Summarizing the considerations affecting the various 
causes of depreciation and the relations of the accountant 
and other experts thereto, it may be said that the rise or fall 
in new values is entirely a question for the valuer and is of 
relatively little importance to the accountant, since its bear­
ing is limited to the determination of present value for spe­
cial purposes and since it should not enter into revenue ac­
counts and is not necessarily (or perhaps even preferably) 
recorded in the books of account at all. The accountant’s 
main concern with this element is to ensure that its opera­
tions are not allowed to obscure the effects of the other 
elements.
The question of the exhaustion of useful life is one of esti­
mate based on experience and checked by observation, and 
enters into the problem to an equal extent whether depre­
ciation is sought to be measured from the standpoint of valu­
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ation or of operating results. It is both difficult and impor­
tant; and operating officials, valuers and accountants can 
usefully contribute towards securing the best possible treat­
ment of if.
The question of obsolescence is one of observation so far 
as the present valuation is concerned, and one of judgment 
and conservatism from the standpoint of operating results. 
On this point the experience of the operator familiar with 
the industry and the conservatism of the accountant can 
usually be combined to reach a sound conclusion.
As to depreciation due to causes within human control, 
provisions for exhaustion are usually based on the assump­
tion that the property will be as fully maintained as possible 
out of operations. Whether the assumption in a particular 
case is valid is clearly a question which cannot be completely 
answered from the books and records only. An examination 
of maintenance accounts may indicate that the expenditures 
made have not been sufficient for the proper current main­
tenance of the plant; but even if the amounts expended are 
such as would, if well spent, suffice for that purpose, it is still 
possible that the expenditures may have been injudiciously 
made and the property allowed to fall below the proper 
standard of maintenance. On the other hand, the plant may 
have been maintained to the satisfaction of an engineer but 
the books may show that the cost has in part been excluded 
from operations. Consequently, cooperation between engi­
neer or valuer and accountant is required to deal with the 
question.
As to the countervailing influences of renewals and 
changes to restore usefulness or prolong life, their treatment 
depends on the general theory of depreciation adopted. This 
whole branch of the depreciation problem can most effec­
tively be dealt with by a careful analysis of expenditures and’ 
reports of the precise nature of any work undertaken not 
obviously in the nature of current maintenance, and falls 
therefore to the accountant. It would, of course, be possible 
for a valuer making periodical inventories and valuations 
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of the plant to ascertain the amount of such renewals by 
careful comparison of the inventories, but the accounting 
record will usually be the safer guide, though inventories 
may be useful as a check thereof.
From the foregoing brief analysis of the problem of de­
preciation, its complexities are apparent. It is also evident 
that the problem is not one with which the accountant can 
deal adequately single-handed, but that the services of skilled 
operators or engineers are required if the most accurate 
solution is to be reached. It is, however, equally clear that 
the accountant cannot be ignored in any attempt to deal to 
the best possible advantage with the problem. In many 
phases he is the primary authority, and while an engineer or 
other technically qualified person may be needed to pass 
upon other phases, the services of the accountant are again 
necessary to ensure a proper correspondence between the 
physical facts and book records.
It is recognized that the real difficulties arise after the 
problem of depreciation has been stated and when the at­
tempt has been made to reach a solution thereof in practice. 
An adequate conception of the questions involved is, how­
ever, not only essential to the accountant to whom falls this 
difficult task but extremely desirable in all those called upon 
to decide whether his recommendations shall be carried out, 
many of whom today oppose proper treatment merely 
through lack of comprehension of the problem itself.
II
ON A PROPOSED DEFINITION OF DEPRECIATION *
(1922)
The basic idea conveyed by this word is indicated by its 
derivation—de, down, and pretium, price—that is, a reduction 
in price or value.
Depreciation is loss in physical or functional value of 
physical property other than wasting assets due primarily 
and chiefly to ordinary wear and tear which has occurred 
theoretically in the past and which is not offset by adequate 
repairs and/or replacements. Obsolescence and inadequacy 
are included by regulatory bodies and taxing authorities as 
contributory causes, but it is more in accordance with fact 
to treat these two elements as separate from ordinary wear 
and tear on the ground that the loss incident thereto does 
not usually accrue and cannot be foreseen with any degree of 
accuracy. Depreciation, however determined, is at best 
only an estimate. [Cf. The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 
XXXIV (1922), p. 232.]
I think it is unfortunate to stress the derivation of the 
word “depreciation,” because the basic idea of depreciation 
as used in accounting practice is not primarily one of values 
but one of exhaustion of useful life. The word “theoreti­
cally” used in the second paragraph of the definition seems 
to me wholly out of place; it is not a question of theory but 
of fair assignment of the total loss ultimately to be liqui­
dated, as between the period already elapsed and the period 
remaining in the future. I agree that depreciation is neces­
sarily an estimate but, as Lord Justice Buckley said: “The 
ascertainment of profit is in every case necessarily a matter 
of estimate and opinion.” The provision for extraordinary 
storms, etc., referred to in the definition seems to me alto­
gether unrelated to depreciation; moreover, to my mind it
• From a letter written in 1922.
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is not only irrelevant but essentially different in character. 
Depreciation is something which must be provided before 
a profit can be said to have been made; a provision for a 
contingency which may or may not happen in the future is a 
reservation of profits.
I gather that some accountants do not agree with this 
view and that they regard a provision for depreciation as a 
reserve coming literally within the terms of the definition of 
a reserve as a segregation of profits. Such a reserve is often 
loosely spoken of as being provided out of profits, but strictly 
speaking the phrase should be “provided out of gross profits 
or earnings.” And the reserve is sometimes regarded as re­
maining a part of the undivided profits or surplus. This 
view was frequently expressed twenty-five years ago when I 
first started practice, but so far as my experience qualifies me 
to express an opinion the vast majority of bankers, business 
men and accountants, both practical and theoretical, have 
by now completely discarded it. When the Interstate Com­
merce Commission and innumerable public service com­
missions have ruled that depreciation is an operating ex­
pense, and when Congress has provided that depreciation is 
a proper deduction from gross income in determining net 
income, it seems to me idle for any accountant to take the 
stand that depreciation is a segregation of profits. It reminds 
one of the ancient remark of the fond mother as the regi­
ment passed by: “They are all out of step except our Jock.”
Depreciation undoubtedly is an extremely difficult prob­
lem and I do not know whether the most satisfactory exposi­
tion of just what it is, is not that I heard given many years 
ago by a very brilliant lawyer; I am afraid, however, it 
would not be suitable for your purpose. He said that de­
preciation always seemed to him to be like the advertisement 
of Ivory Soap: you looked at it from one angle when you 
were going up before a public service commission and all 
you could read was “9944/100 pure”; you looked at it from 
another side when you were trying to sell securities and all 
you could read was “It Floats”; and the rest of the time you 
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looked straight at it and it was just plain “Ivory Soap” and 
God knew what that was. I cannot help thinking that the 
drafter of your definition has looked at the advertisement 
too much from the first-mentioned side and that his views 
have been colored by his close association with one im­
portant industry to which it has seemed advantageous to get 
a higher capital value for rate purposes by ignoring all de­
preciation in excess of observed depreciation, even at the 
price of surrendering any claim for such depreciation as a 
part of its operating costs.
III
“A CONFUSION OF TERMS” *
(1927)
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: There are a number of points in Professor Cole’s in­
teresting article in your March number † which it would 
be interesting to discuss.
I am, for instance, less amazed at the difficulty which some 
business men find in interpreting financial statements to 
which he refers than the certitude with which others inter­
pret them and the undue significance they attribute to their 
interpretations.
Again, while I agree with Professor Cole that the sig­
nificance of a reserve for depreciation is frequently misap­
prehended, I believe that far more misapprehension arises 
in respect of the word “depreciation” than in respect of the 
word “reserve.” Professor Cole seems at times to be him­
self a victim of this misapprehension. The reserve for de­
preciation of plant in common practice is not an attempt to 
measure “overvaluation of assets.” The treatment of de­
preciation is based not on valuation, but on exhaustion. De­
preciation is frequently provided where values are in­
creasing.
My object in this letter is, however, merely to suggest a 
solution of the problem of ambiguity in the use of the word 
“reserve” different from that proposed by Professor Cole.
The use of the term “reserve” for profits withheld from 
distribution is, I think, becoming less and less frequent in 
the United States. The practice of allocating practically the 
whole of the profits of a year, which is usual in England, is 
not ordinarily followed here. Where they appropriate part
• The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLIII (1927), pp. 310-11. 
†W. M. Cole, "A Confusion of Terms,” ibid., pp. 192-98.
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of the profits for dividends and carry a further sum to “gen­
eral reserve,” leaving a small amount to be carried forward 
in undivided profits account, we should ordinarily declare 
the dividend and allow the balance automatically to fall 
into surplus. The fact that surplus is unavailable for dis­
tribution in dividends and not intended to be so used is 
sometimes emphasized by showing it as “appropriated sur­
plus.” It might be satisfactory and probably it would be 
easier to standardize the use of “appropriated surplus” in the 
sense to which Professor Cole would restrict the word “re­
serve” and limit the word “reserve” to those uses to which 
he would apply the terms “allowance” and “provision.”
I cannot agree with Professor Cole that such a use of the 
word “reserve” is incorrect. It is quite true that what he 
would call an allowance for depreciation is not a reservation 
of profits, but it is a reservation nevertheless (if not of gross 
income at least of gross proceeds from sale), and there is no 
reason why a reserve should necessarily be a reserve of 
profits. One advantage of the course I have suggested is that 
a reservation of profits is a part of surplus, not something 
distinct from surplus, and is therefore most appropriately de­
scribed by the use of the word “surplus” with a qualifying 
word or phrase which indicates in what respect it differs 
from the rest of the surplus.
This leaves the term “reserve” available for the use in the 
sense in which it is, I believe, most commonly used in this 
country—a reservation out of the gross proceeds of past busi­
ness to meet charges which will or may arise in the future 
out of that business.
From the standpoint of history, convenience, practicabil­
ity and psychology, I believe this line of distinction is pre­
ferable to the distinction suggested by Professor Cole.
Yours truly,
George O. May.
March 14, 1927.
IV
RAILROAD DEPRECIATION *
(i.c.c. no. 15100)
(1927)
The Transportation Act of 1920 requires the Interstate Com­
merce Commission to determine:
The classes of property for which depreciation charges 
may properly be included under operating expenses and the 
percentages of depreciation which shall be charged with re­
spect to each of such classes of property. (Section 20, Para­
graph 5.)
Depreciation charges into operating expenses may, I as­
sume, properly be made if they tend to produce results which 
will be superior to those derived without such charges. The 
superiority may consist in greater theoretical accuracy, a 
more equitable or more convenient distribution of burdens 
as between the carriers and the public, or greater simplicity— 
or these various considerations may be in part conflicting 
and the propriety of the system of depreciation charges may 
depend on where the balance of advantage lies, which in turn 
may depend on the importance attached to the possibly con­
flicting considerations of theory, simplicity, equity and con­
venience.
It could scarcely be held that a system which was both theo­
retically sound and equitable must be rejected on the ground 
that it involved complexities and inconvenience, though 
where equity is not involved, convenience and simplicity 
might well outweigh purely theoretical considerations.
It may, therefore, be most convenient to consider the Com-
* Memorandum submitted November 1, 1927, in relation to the Report of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission in No. 151000, set for rehearing on 
November 9, 1927. 
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mission’s scheme, primarily from the standpoints of theory 
and equity. In such an approach to the problem three major 
questions arise:
The relation of the problem to that of valuation, involv­
ing consideration of the principles of valuation to be assumed 
for the purposes of considering this relationship.
The relation of the problem to that of maintenance in 
general, involving consideration of the principles governing 
the determination of charges against operating expenses in 
respect of all forms of property exhaustion.
The relation of the problems to the practice in the past, 
involving consideration of the proper treatment of any de­
preciation which would, upon the scheme proposed, be 
deemed to have accrued in the past.
I propose to discuss these three aspects of the problem in 
turn, dealing in connection with each phase with any major 
considerations of convenience or practicability which seem 
to me to have a bearing on the question.
RELATION OF THE PROBLEM TO VALUATION
Depreciation in its broadest sense is a lessening of worth 
from any cause whatsoever; it is, however, commonly used to 
signify the lessening of worth in service due to exhaustion of 
useful life, other factors in value being left out of account. 
Depreciation charges, moreover, are frequently made on still 
another basis which does not necessarily imply any very close 
relation to the rate of lessening of value—namely, such a basis 
as will in a systematic way distribute the original value of a 
property unit (less estimated salvage, if any) over the prob­
able term of its useful life. The last is the sense in which 
the term is commonly used in industrial practice, the distri­
bution of the charge for the unit over its useful life being 
based on a variety of considerations, and bearing little rela­
tion to the course of values during that life.
The language of the Act clearly excludes the possibility 
that Congress used the word “depreciation” in Section 20 
in its broadest sense. Declines in the value of property due 
to purely external causes are not chargeable to operating ex­
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penses nor are they capable of determination on any per­
centage basis. The language of the Section is not, however, 
sufficient to determine what was intended as between the 
second and third concepts of depreciation charges above 
mentioned, and it would therefore seem that the decision 
must be governed by consideration of the general purposes 
of the Act and of other acts regulating relations between 
the carriers and the public.
One of the main purposes of the Act was to provide for 
the determination from time to time of the fair value of the 
property  of carriers, and to regulate rates and limit the re­
turns to the carriers on the basis thereof. The question arises, 
then, whether Congress contemplated that the depreciation 
charges referred to in Paragraph 5 of Section 20 above quoted 
should enter into the determination of the fair value of the 
property as well as into the determination of operating ex­
penses.
The Commission proceeds on the hypothesis that there is 
necessarily a direct and immediate connection between the 
charging of depreciation to operating expenses and the de­
termination of the rate base value; it says (Report, page 
310):
In our consideration, therefore, of the relative burdens 
imposed by the depreciation and retirement methods of 
accounting, we must start with the premise that the former 
presupposes full deduction of accrued depreciation in ascer­
taining the rate base value . . . .
If this premise be accepted it follows that the depreciation 
system must be one that not only results in a fair charge 
against operating expenses but also measures with substantial 
accuracy the lessening of worth in service due to exhaustion 
of useful life.
The approach to the question as a dual one, affecting both 
operating expense and the rate base, presents serious difficul­
ties.
While the Commission proceeds on the hypothesis that the 
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depreciation charged into operating expenses must be de­
ducted from the rate base, the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that the rate base must represent the fair present value, 
and that in determining that fair value the lessening of worth 
as compared with new value must be not wholly theoretical 
or based on percentages of general application, but primarily 
founded on observation.
There is obvious difficulty in attempting to reconcile the 
two positions. In so far as it is possible to do so at all, the 
result can be achieved only by adopting a theory of deprecia­
tion which will measure with reasonable accuracy the lessen­
ing of worth for use in the service due to exhaustion of useful 
life, on the basis of cost, and of normal maintenance, leaving 
modifications in respect of variations in new value and of 
maintenance above or below normal to be dealt with sepa­
rately. . The straight line method which the Commission pro­
poses to enforce wholly fails to meet this requirement.
THE STRAIGHT LINE METHOD OF WRITING OFF DEPRECIATION
IS DEMONSTRABLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE COMPUTATION OF 
VALUES
If property be conceived, as the Commission conceives it, 
as representing a capacity for uniform service at a uniform 
yield over a definite period of years, the new value of such a 
property is (ignoring, salvage) the present value of the an­
nual yield to be expected from the employment of such ca­
pacity during its useful life, and the value at any later date 
is similarly the value of the yield to be anticipated in the 
years of life then unexpired. Clearly the rate of lessening of 
worth in service in such a case is to be found not by straight 
proportion but by reference to annuity tables. If, for in­
stance, a unit of property is viewed as representing a capacity 
for uniform service at a uniform yield over a period of 50 
years, its service value at the end of 25 years is that fraction 
of the original value, the numerator of which is the value 
of an annuity for 25 years, and the denominator the value of 
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a like annuity for 50 years. Assuming an interest rate of 
6%, the numerator of the fraction would be 12.78336, and 
the denomination 15.76186; in other words, the lessening of 
worth due to the exhaustion of one-half of the life of the 
property would be less than one-quarter instead of one-half, 
and the true value on the Commission’s own hypotheses ac­
tually nearer to cost than to the depreciated value as com­
puted by the Commission’s method.
The incorrect results produced by the straight line method 
of depreciation may be illustrated in another way. Upon the 
Commission’s hypothesis that a given unit of property will 
yield uniform service over a specified period of time, clearly 
the charges against the traffic in respect thereof in each year 
should be uniform. The Commission says, page 353:
The principle is fair, however, that the cost resulting 
from the using up of property in service should be shared 
equally by the years which have had the benefit of the use. 
But the charges against the traffic are twofold: first, a charge 
for exhaustion; second, a charge for use, computed as a re­
turn on investment, and the truly fair principle is that the 
combined charges should be the same in each year. On the 
Commission’s method, assuming a 6% rate of return, and a 
unit costing $1,000, there would be in the first year a charge 
against the traffic of $60.00 for use of the property; and as­
suming a 50-year life, a charge of $20.00 for exhaustion of 
the property—a total of $80.00. In the 50th year the charge 
for return on investment would be only $1.20 (6% on 
$20.00) and the charge for exhaustion $20.00, as before—a 
total of $21.20, or not much more than one-quarter of the 
charge in the first year.
THE ANNUITY METHOD OF COMPUTING DEPRECIATION IS THE 
ONLY ONE CONSISTENT WITH THE COMMISSION’S HY­
POTHESES AND PURPOSES
The error in principle here disclosed would be corrected 
by the adoption of the annuity method of provision for de­
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preciation; and it seems to me a matter not of argument but 
of simple mathematical demonstration that the annuity 
method is the only one that is consistent with the Commis­
sion’s own hypotheses and upon those hypotheses reflects the 
relation between the value of a new unit arid that of a partly 
exhausted one.
This may be made clearer by assuming the case of a carrier 
offered the alternative of purchasing a new unit with a useful 
life of 50 years and a unit exactly similar one year old and 
with an unexhausted useful life of 49 years. All the carrier 
would gain by acquiring the new rather than older unit 
would be the service of the unit in the fiftieth year in the 
future and all it could prudently pay for this advantage 
would be the present value of the yield from that service to 
be received in fifty years. Assuming the annual yield (cover­
ing depreciation and return on investment) to be $1,000, and 
the rate of return to be 6% per annum, the present value of 
the yield in the fiftieth year is found from the tables to be 
$54.29.
The value of the new unit would be.................. $15,761.86
and that of the unit one year old........................ 15,707.57
the difference being, of course,.......................... $ 54.29 
as compared with $314.15 depreciation computed on the 
straight line basis. The percentage of reduction of worth in 
service due to the exhaustion of one year’s useful life out of 
a total of fifty years is thus not one-fiftieth or 2%, but just 
over one-third of one per cent; the straight line method 
overstates the lessening of worth sixfold.
In order to illustrate the importance of the point the 
following comparisons are made of the results by the annuity 
and straight line methods respectively in the case of prop­
erty units, each costing $10,000 and having assumed annual 
lives of 30, 50 and 100 years, respectively:
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Straight 6%
line Annuity
method method
Thirty-year life: 
Charge for depreciation, 1st year......................... $ 333.33 $ 126.49
Return on investment, 1st year............................. 600.00 600.00
Combined charge, 1st year............................. $ 933.00 $ 726.49
Charge for depreciation, last year......................... $ 333.33 $ 685.37
Return on investment, last year........................... 20.00 41.12
Combined charge, last year........................... $ 353.33 $ 726.49
Accrued depreciation at midlife....................... $5,000.00 $2,944.15
(End of 15 th year)  
Fifty-year life:
Charge for depreciation, 1st year......................... $ 200.00 $ 34.44
Return on investment, 1st year............................. 600.00 600.00
Combined charge, 1st year............................. $ 800.00 $ 634.44
Charge for depreciation, last year......................... $ 200.00 $ 598.53
Return on investment, last year........................... 12.00 35.91
Combined charge, last year........................... $ 212.00 $ 634.44
Accrued depreciation at midlife....................... $5,000.00 $1,889.69
(End of 25 th year)
One-hundred-year life:
Charge for depreciation, 1st year......................... $ 100.00 $ 1.77
Return on investment, 1st year............................. 600.00 600.00
Combined charge, 1st year............................. $ 700.00 $ 601.77
Charge for depreciation, last year....................... $ 100.00 $ 567.71
Return on investment, last year........................... 6.00 34.06
Combined charge, last year............................ $ 106.00 $ 601.77
Accrued depreciation at midlife....................... $5,000.00 $ 514.99
(End of 50th year)
It will be observed that at mid-life the loss in value measured 
on the annuity basis is 58.9% of the amount of “deprecia­
tion” computed by the straight line method in the case of a 
unit having a total estimated life of 30 years, 37.8% in the 
case of a unit with 50 years life and no more than 10.3% 
in the case of a unit having 100 years life.
I see no escape from the conclusion that either the annuity 
method must be substituted for the straight line method or 
all suggestion of close relationship between depreciated 
values and fair value in service abandoned.
DEPRECIATION AND THE I.C.C.
THE ANNUITY METHOD DISCUSSED
It may be noted that using the same interest rates, the sink­
ing fund and annuity methods give practically the same re­
sults. The sinking fund method, however, contemplates the 
return of the investment when the unit is retired and is 
adapted rather to retirement reserves than depreciation pro­
visions. The annuity method is consistent with the Com­
mission’s theory that the investment is returned to the in­
vestor gradually and therefore seems to be the only logical 
method for the Commission to adopt on its own hypotheses, 
the validity of which I need not for the present discuss.
The Commission does not discuss the annuity method, but 
expresses the view that the premises that underlie the 
straight line method are in accord with the principles which 
have been enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and that the method is simpler and easier to apply, 
and adds:
Nor are the practical results of the two methods very 
different ...  
The straight line method is simpler; but for the reasons I 
have given above it seems to me that the method produces re­
sults that are wholly at variance with the views enunciated by 
the Supreme Court, and the tables which have been given 
show conclusively that the results of the sinking fund (or the 
annuity) method are widely different from those produced by 
the straight line method. In the case of a property with a 
reasonably long average life the accrued depreciation on the 
sinking fund or annuity method at any given date would not 
for many years after the initiation of the enterprise be more 
than one-third of the amount computed by the straight line 
method.
It should be understood that the views expressed above 
are based on my understanding that under existing law pres­
ent value is the measure of the rate base. I am not con­
cerned with the question how the present value is to be de­
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termined; the material bearing of the law on the point here 
involved is that it seems to require that in determining the 
rate base the deduction for depreciation from year to year 
shall follow the course of value which the straight line 
method does not and is not intended to do.
I recognize that upon some different conception of the 
principles governing the determination of a rate base, upon 
which the rate base would be the result of a computation 
rather than a reflection of value, unexpended depreciation 
provisions created by charges against operating expenses 
might appropriately operate to reduce pro tanto the rate 
base. If such a concept of the rate base were adopted, how­
ever, the whole question of depreciation would require to be 
considered on a different footing. The majority of econo­
mists would, I believe, take the view that upon such theories 
the problem of depreciation does not arise.
I have not undertaken to discuss here the question why, in 
view of the objections to the straight line method which I 
have urged, that method is freely employed in industrial 
practice. That the governing considerations are materially 
different in the two cases is apparent, and whatever may be 
the merits of the straight line method as an empirical method 
of distributing the cost of property over its useful life, it is 
not properly applicable and is not applied in industrial prac­
tice to the valuation of property. A discussion of the indus­
trial problem does not seem strictly relevant to the question 
under consideration, but in case the point is regarded as of 
interest I attach in a note to this report a brief statement 
of some of the major differences between the two problems.
RELATION TO OTHER MAINTENANCE CHARGES
In considering a scheme of depreciation charges, a second 
fundamental question is whether the charges against the 
traffic in respect of property exhaustion should in any given 
case be measured by the original cost of the unit exhausted 
or by the cost of the replacing unit.
Under the regulations of the Commission now in effect, 
DEPRECIATION AND THE I.C.C. 177
operating expenses are charged with the cost of equipment 
retired through depreciation charges, with cost of structures 
retired, when retirement takes place, and with the cost of 
the renewal, when renewal takes place, in the case of track 
material.
In such circumstances, and in view of this historical aspect 
of the question, it seems to me that the Commission begs a 
vital question when it accepts as axiomatic the proposition 
that the cost of property used up in service is the proper 
measure of the charge against the traffic in respect of such 
exhaustion. It says (page 303):
There also can be no doubt that the cost of such wornout 
or abandoned property units is a part of operating expense 
to be charged against the service. The basic question is 
whether such cost should be charged in bulk at the time 
when each unit is retired, or should be anticipated by peri­
odical installments spread over its service life.
and again (page 306):
The cost of property consumed in operation is plainly a 
part of the cost of rendering service.
SHOULD THE COST OF ORIGINAL INSTALLATION OR THE COST 
OF REPLACEMENT BE CHARGED AGAINST OPERATION?
The question .whether original cost or cost of renewal 
should measure the operating charge is not of great impor­
tance so long as price levels are reasonably stable, but if price 
levels materially vary or, in other words, if there is a sub­
stantial change in the value of money, then the point be­
comes important and also, I think, the unsoundness of the 
axiom becomes apparent. This may be illustrated by con­
sidering the point in relation to the German railway system 
and the post-war currency depreciation in that country. At 
the lowest point of currency depreciation, the pre-war invest­
ment in the German railways expressed in marks would have 
had a value in stable currency of less than a dollar, and the 
annual exhaustion of property (or the retirements) in respect 
thereof computed in marks upon the cost in marks would 
178 DEPRECIATION
have been equivalent to less than a cent. This is, of course, 
an extreme case, but the same question is presented in a less 
acute form whenever there is a substantial change in the 
value of money such as the fall that occurred in the United 
States as a result of the war.
It is inherently fair that traffic that is paid for in currency 
that has depreciated should be charged with the cost of 
property used up in operation on the same scale of values. 
Suppose that in a given year property is made good to an 
extent exactly equalling the amount of property used up in 
operation (measurement being made in physical units). 
Justice to all concerned would seem to be achieved by charg­
ing the cost of making good property during the year against 
the traffic of the year. When the value of money has fallen 
there is no basic reason why the increased currency cost of 
the new property over the cost of exactly similar property 
used up in operation should be added to the capital account 
of the railroad to constitute a burden on the patrons or the 
public in later years.
The Commission dismisses as of little importance the ques­
tion of the equities as between patrons at different periods of 
time, but the question is not merely one between the patrons 
at different times but ultimately one between the patrons 
as a whole and the carriers. If a method be adopted which 
wrongfully relieves the present patrons and throws an undue 
burden upon the patrons of the future, there is a probability 
that the patrons of the future will through their representa­
tives take steps to relieve themselves of this unjust burden 
and the railroads would not be able successfully to resist 
such attempts on the ground that they constituted confisca­
tion of railroad property. For it would be easy to prove that 
any confiscation there might be was not the result of the re­
vised regulations but the result of the action of the regulating 
bodies in the past, and that the proper time for the rail­
roads to have raised the question was at the earlier date.
If the principle be accepted that the sum on which the 
carrier is entitled to a return as compensation for the use of 
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property in service is its fair present value, consistency would 
suggest that the measure of the compensation for property 
used up should also be its fair present value or, in other 
words, the current cost of replacement of what is exhausted. 
I believe also the same result is reached on the assumption 
that the rate of return is to be computed upon the amount of 
the prudent investment in the property. This theory rests 
upon the proposition that when an investment is made in 
railroad property it is a permanent investment and the in­
vestor exchanges a present command of purchasing power 
for a right to receive a reasonable return thereon in the 
future, and that thereafter fluctuations in the value or cost 
of reproduction of the property represented by his invest­
ment are of no practical significance to him. It seems to me 
a necessary corollary of this proposition that the burden of 
maintaining the property should fall on the users of the 
property and that fluctuations in the cost of its maintenance 
should be treated as at their risk and charge.
The Commission takes a somewhat different view and pro­
ceeds upon the theory that on the replacement of any prop­
erty the original investment should be regarded as having 
been returned to the investors and a fresh investment made 
by them in the replacing unit. This, however, seems to me 
not only contrary to the normal course of events but to be 
inconsistent with the basic idea of the prudent investment. 
It seems to me to be a necessary feature of the prudent in­
vestment theory that the investment should be voluntary, 
and it is only the original investment which can be said to be 
voluntary, replacement being a need which grows out of the 
voluntary act of creating the original property.
SUPPORT FOR THE REPLACEMENT BASIS IN PRACTICE
The economic arguments in favor of charging the cost of 
replacement rather than the cost of the original unit against 
operating expenses, find ample support in practice; it is the 
method that has consistently been followed in Great Britain, 
and, though methods of railroad accounting and reporting 
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there have been the subject of numerous official inquiries, 
so far as I know no suggestion has ever been made that the 
practice should be modified. It was also, I believe, the com­
mon practice of the best-managed railroads in the United 
States prior to the regulation of accounting by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission; it is the practice which has been re­
quired by the Commission under the existing regulations for 
the last twenty years in respect to important classes of prop­
erty, such as track material.
This being so, the Commission, carrying out its instruc­
tions to determine the classes of property to which deprecia­
tion charges should properly be supplied, is scarcely entitled 
to assume as established the proposition that cost is univer­
sally the proper basis for charges against operating expenses 
in respect of the maintenance or exhaustion of property.
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE DEPRECIATION CHARGES ECONOMICALLY 
WISE?
I might agree with the Commission that if the prudent in­
vestment theory of rate base were to be adopted, and if, more­
over, depreciation charges were to be set aside, then the un­
expended depreciation provisions should be deducted from 
the gross investment in arriving at the rate base. But I agree 
with those economic authorities who hold that upon this 
theory no provisions for depreciation are, upon consideration 
of the economic and practical aspects of the question, neces­
sary or desirable.
In order to consider this question dispassionately it may be 
well to look at it from the standpoint of a community in 
which a new railroad enterprise is under contemplation. Let 
us assume that it is agreed between the promoters of the 
railroad and the community that the former shall be entitled 
to a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their 
investment in the line, and that the community shall have 
the right to restrict closely the profits of the railroad to that 
fair return. Would competent economic advisers of the 
community advocate such a system of charging depreciation 
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as the Commission now proposes? It has already been shown 
that the result of this method is to throw the heaviest burden 
in respect of use and exhaustion of each unit of property 
upon the earliest years of its life. In these earliest years the 
amount of service rendered would be less than might reason­
ably be expected in the later years; consequently the charge 
in respect of the property per unit of service would be still 
more burdensome in comparison with the charge for the 
service of later years. Such a condition would seem to be 
exactly the reverse of that which would be economically de­
sirable from the standpoint of the community. Its interests 
would be served by keeping the charges in the early years 
down to the minimum consistent with maintaining the 
efficiency of the property, thus enlarging the volume of the 
commodities which could profitably be transported, and 
building up both the traffic and the community more rapidly 
than would otherwise be possible. The best interests of the 
community in such a situation would, it would seem, be 
served by a mutual agreement to ignore the depreciation on 
the property in so far as it could never be made good while 
the property was being operated—the owners of the railroad 
agreeing that this depreciation should not be treated as a 
part of cost of operation and the community agreeing on the 
other hand that in computing return no deduction should 
be made from the original investment in respect thereof.
THE REPLACEMENT PRINCIPLE SHOULD AT LEAST BE RETAINED 
IN CASES IN WHICH IT IS NOW APPLIED UNDER THE COM­
MISSION’S REGULATIONS
It cannot be denied that there is a very substantial case, 
economic, historical and practical, for the replacement prin­
ciple in general; and it seems to me that the case for the re­
tention of that principle in dealing with the classes of prop­
erty, such as track material, to which it is now applied is con­
vincing, unless real and substantial advantages from the 
change to the depreciation principle can be demonstrated. 
I can see no such advantage.
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While the application of the depreciation scheme to rails 
and ties now treated on the replacement basis is simple so 
far as the material cost is concerned, the Commission itself 
is forced to the conclusion that it is impracticable in the case 
of the labor cost. The application of the scheme to miscel­
laneous track material contemplated by the Commission pre­
sents exceptional difficulties, which can be overcome only 
by the most arbitrary rules.
The depreciation section of the Commission recommended 
that the principle be not extended to track materials, but the 
Commission rejected this recommendation, apparently in an 
effort to achieve consistency; and apart from this one con­
sideration the Commission’s discussion of the subject consti­
tutes a statement of arguments against its own conclusions 
which, though overruled, are not met.
DEPRECIATION CHARGES MIGHT WELL BE CONTINUED IN RESPECT 
OF EQUIPMENT
In the case of equipment, on the other hand, the historical 
argument runs the other way. Many who disapproved of the 
establishment of the depreciation charges in respect of 
equipment would concede that it would now be unwise to 
reverse that policy. In passing, it may be noted that the 
Commission is in error in assuming (page 304) that such a 
reversal would add the amount of the existing reserves to 
the surplus accounts of the carriers. The true alternative 
to the depreciation system is the charging of the cost of re­
placements to operating expenses. Under the existing system 
the excess of the cost of the replacements of equipment over 
that of the units replaced is capitalized, and reversion to the 
alternative method would require the charging of the excess 
which has been so capitalized to surplus as an offset to the 
credit arising from writing back the depreciation reserve. 
In view of the great increase in the cost of equipment in 
recent years the offset would clearly be very substantial.
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THE PROBLEM OF EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS
The Commission’s order contemplates a substantial change 
in the treatment of equipment depreciation, the provision 
being revised to cover not only the cost of the unit but the 
cost of extraordinary repairs during its life. The annual 
depreciation charge is to be determined by adding to original 
cost the estimated cost of extraordinary repairs before final 
retirement and deducting estimated salvage, and dividing the 
net total by the number of years expected to elapse between 
installation and retirement.
The Commission admits the “great practical difficulties” 
presented by this method, but says that inclusion of ex­
traordinary repairs is “absolutely essential to a properly 
comprehensive system of depreciation accounting.”
The proposals of the Commission for solving these diffi­
culties are put forward tentatively. The Commission ad­
mits that “somewhat arbitrary rules” have had to be made, 
but even so the provisions as they stand are clearly inade­
quate.
The question at once arises how the cost of extraordinary 
repairs is to be estimated; are the estimators to take into 
account the probable price levels at the time when the ex­
traordinary repairs will be made, or are they to assume that 
the price levels at that time will be the same as those prevail­
ing when the original unit is installed; and how are differ­
ences between the estimated cost of repairs and the actual 
costs to be dealt with? No answer to these questions is found 
in the report.
It is apparent also that the attempted distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary repairs would offer great oppor­
tunities for the manipulation of operating expenses. The 
line between the two is proposed to be and must be arbitrary; 
and it would be easy for carriers desiring either to swell 
operating expenses or to minimize them to do so by splitting 
up major repairs into a series of minor repairs which would 
be chargeable to operating expenses, or allowing minor re­
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pairs to accumulate into a major repair, which would be 
chargeable to Depreciation Reserve.
A further consideration is that to base operating expenses 
on amounts reserved for future expenditures and to charge 
current expenditures against reserves created in past years, 
tends to lessen the sense of responsibility of those in all ranks 
who are charged with the control of maintenance expendi­
tures. It may be doubted whether any system of charging 
expenditures in the first instance to operating accounts and 
adjusting these accounts to the depreciation basis by any 
subsequent transfer will be wholly effective in preventing 
this highly undesirable result.
I am prepared to agree with the Commission that extraor­
dinary repairs have an essential relation to the problem of 
depreciation, but the Commission’s attempt to deal with such 
repairs as a part of its depreciation scheme in the case of 
equipment, seems to me to introduce complexities and de­
tract from the significance of the resulting figures without 
solving the problem or producing any compensating ad­
vantages. The difficulties in the measurement of the charges 
to operating expenses on the basis proposed are serious but 
perhaps not much more so than those presented in relation 
to other classes of property. The problem of insuring that 
only so much of subsequent maintenance expenditure as has 
been allowed for in the original provision for depreciation is 
charged against the depreciation fund, presents far greater 
difficulties, and the report of the Commission fails to indicate 
how these difficulties are to be met.
DEPRECIATION ON OTHER CLASSES OF PROPERTY
There remain for consideration the accounts which at 
present are treated on the basis that the charge to operating 
expenses is based on the cost of the unit retired, but the 
charge made only when retirement occurs, and those con­
tinuous structures which are seldom retired as units.
The class of property to which a depreciation or replace­
ment scheme is most clearly applicable comprises those 
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structures, such as important bridges, which will require to be 
replaced as units and the retirement of which would seriously 
distort operating expenses if the cost of the retired unit or 
the cost of replacing it were charged into operating expenses 
when the retirement occurs. The life of such structures may 
be difficult to estimate, but the application of such a scheme 
entails less practical difficulties and possesses more obvious 
advantages than in the case of almost any other class of 
property.
If the depreciation system is to be extended, application to 
this class of property would, probably, be the most generally 
approved extension. It is also to this class of property that 
the annuity or sinking fund methods can most conveniently 
be applied, and the life of such structures being usually 
fairly long, errors in the estimate thereof would be of little 
effect in the early years and could be corrected before over- 
or under-provision would have become serious.
I see, however, no practical advantage in attempting to 
depreciate property from its installation if its useful life is 
estimated at as much as 80 or 100 years. The value of a 
unit having 50 years of useful life unexhausted is on a 6% 
basis over 94% of the value of a like unit with 100 years 
life unexhausted.
Putting the matter another way, if money is assumed to be 
worth 6% (dr even only 5%) and a unit with a useful life of 
100 years could be purchased for $100,000 but its life made 
perpetual by the expenditure of an additional $1,000, it 
would not be economical to spend the additional $1,000, 
since the investment of this sum for 100 years would pro­
duce far more than $100,000. The distinction between 
permanence and an assumed life of 100 years is therefore too 
slight to justify depreciating one asset and not the other. It 
would be quite adequate to begin to charge depreciation 
when the unexpired life falls below, say, 35 years or, at the 
outside, 50 years.
In the case of continuous structures, a detailed deprecia­
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tion scheme seems to possess very little value and to present 
almost insuperable difficulties. To determine what shall be 
charged against the reserve and to ensure that such charges 
shall correspond to those provided for by credits to the re­
serve seem to me problems almost impossible of solution 
within reasonable limits of expense. I do not desire to bur­
den this memorandum with discussion of technical questions 
of secondary importance and therefore merely observe that 
these problems do not appear to me to be solved, even in 
theory in the Commission’s plan.
PAST DEPRECIATION
The third important relationship involved in considera­
tion of any depreciation scheme for the carriers is the rela­
tionship to the operations of the past. The Commission does 
not attempt to pass finally upon the question how deprecia­
tion, which under its scheme is deemed to have accrued in 
the past, should be dealt with. It proposes that for the pres­
ent the amount should be set up on the books of the carriers 
in a suspense account; it does, however, indicate its views 
in the following language:
The theoretically correct way of meeting this situation 
would be to establish the amount of past accrued deprecia­
tion which has not been provided for, and concurrently credit 
this amount to the depreciation reserve and charge it to 
profit and loss. It is the latter account which has profited in 
the past from the failure or partial failure to accrue deprecia­
tion charges.
It seems to me that this statement of the position is in­
adequate and, as a result, unjust. The omission of depreci­
ation provisions in the past is supported too strongly by 
theoretical, economic, historical, and practical considera­
tions for such omission to be justly characterized as a failure 
on the part of the carriers. It seems to me humanly certain 
also that if a system of depreciation charges had been in­
augurated at the commencement of railroad enterprise in the 
United States, the development of the railroads would have 
DEPRECIATION AND THE I.C.C. 187
been made more difficult and the growth of the country 
greatly retarded.
Upon a broad view of the situation it seems to me quite 
impossible therefore to hold that it is the profit and loss ac­
counts of the carriers alone which have profited by the 
omission of depreciation charges in the past. The above 
considerations apply with peculiar force to depreciation on 
the classes of property such as track material, which under 
the Commission’s own regulations have been dealt with up 
to now on the basis of charging renewals into operating ex­
penses. It would probably be reasonable to treat any past 
omission to provide adequately for depreciation of equip­
ment as a failure on the part of the carriers, seeing that de­
preciation provisions have been in force now for twenty years. 
If, however, depreciation is to be set up in respect of other 
classes of property, the further question arises whether the 
amount of the depreciation deemed to have accrued at the 
date when the change becomes effective should be provided 
in the future through charges against operating expenses or 
net income before arriving at the income subject to recap­
ture.
THE NECESSITY OF DEPRECIATION CHARGES FOR THE PROTEC­
TION OF THE CARRIERS
Commissioner Woodlock in his concurring opinion ex­
pressed the view that a system of depreciation charges into 
operating expenses was necessary for the due protection of 
the carriers. If depreciation is to be deducted from valua­
tion, it is reasonable that the carriers should be given an 
opportunity to recover depreciation computed on a like basis 
through operating expenses. The question, however, is not 
one of great urgency and might well await some further de­
termination of the principles of valuation and the methods 
of computing depreciation in connection therewith. When 
this point is reached a system of depreciation in harmony 
with the principles of valuation established could be for­
mulated. It seems likely to result in confusion and not ad­
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vantage to adopt in the meantime a system of depreciation 
which is not in harmony with the existing decisions with 
regard to valuation and with the prospect of modifying it 
substantially when the principles of valuation are more fully 
established. When those principles are established better 
protection to the carriers and the public could probably be 
secured by a broad scheme for accumulating a depreciation 
reserve bearing roughly the same relation to the investment 
as the depreciation deducted in the net valuation might bear 
to the gross valuation, rather than by attempting to follow 
the history of units, often small, in meticulous detail.
It is quite clear, moreover, that no system of depreciation 
will adequately protect the investment or maintain the effi­
ciency of the property, and if this is to be the objective of 
the Commission’s efforts, then, even should its present depre­
ciation scheme be adopted, it will require to be supplemented 
by some scheme for dealing with other forms of maintenance 
charges.
SUMMARY
Summarizing my views regarding the proposed scheme, I 
recognize that it is a logical complement to the Commission’s 
theories of valuation, and if the validity of those theories 
were established, the broad outlines of the scheme would be 
established with them.
I am disposed further to agree with the Commission, that 
apart from question of law or constitutional right the prin­
ciple of the prudent investment theory would probably be as 
satisfactory as any other method of arriving at a rate base. 
I feel, however:
(1) That until legal principles are more clearly estab­
lished, the adoption of a general scheme of deprecia­
tion charges for all or nearly all property subject to 
exhaustion is unnecessary and inopportune.
(2) That the straight line method is wholly inapplicable 
to the measurement of the lessening of worth in serv­
ice due to partial exhaustion of useful life.
(3) That the Commission’s proposal fails to deal ade­
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quately with changing price levels as a factor in the 
problem.
(4) That a plan for. dealing with any depreciation at­
tributed to the past which shall be equitable, having 
regard to the past history of railroad practice and 
regulation, is an essential of any satisfactory depreci­
ation system. This the Commission’s proposals do 
not provide.
(5) That the adoption of the scheme would produce no 
gain in accuracy, but would greatly complicate ac­
counting, detract from the significance of the accounts, 
and increase rather than diminish the opportunities 
for manipulation.
(6) That the weight of argument against setting up on a 
straight line basis which does not measure the lessen­
ing of worth in service depreciation reserves which 
can in practice never be expended, is today over­
whelming.
In the Commission’s proposals there is an alternation of 
sacrifice of theory to practicability and of practicability to 
theory which produces a result neither reasonably practical 
nor substantially sound in theory.
The establishment of a system of depreciation charges is 
itself a sacrifice of practicability to theory; the distribution 
of the charge for property exhaustion on the basis of time 
without regard to use, and the acceptance of the straight 
line method are sacrifices of theory to practicability so 
sweeping as to destroy the prospects of any substantial gain 
in theoretical accuracy from such a system. Similarly, the 
inclusion of extraordinary repairs in the scope of deprecia­
tion charges is a major sacrifice of practicability to theory, 
but wholesale sacrifices of theory to practicability are, as the 
Commission’s report indicates, necessary to make this part of 
the scheme workable.
The first suggestion which I would make is that the Com­
mission should aim either at substantial theoretical accuracy 
or at greater simplicity.
If the former alternative is chosen, the annuity method 
should be substituted for the straight line method. If special 
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tables, were compiled, an easy task, the application of the 
method would not thereafter entail practical difficulties sub­
stantially greater than those involved in the straight line 
method.
The second problem involved in this alternative, that of 
including extraordinary repairs within the scope of the 
scheme, undeniably presents greater difficulties. There is 
need for elaboration and classification of the proposals of the 
Commission in regard to the charges against the reserve 
under this head and the treatment of the problem of extraor­
dinary repairs made when the price level is materially dif­
ferent from that prevailing when the unit was originally 
installed.
If the second alternative is adopted the broad policy 
should, I think, be:
(1) To limit depreciation charges to equipment and 
major units with perhaps in addition a relatively small 
general reserve to meet extraordinary retirements of 
property not covered by specific reserves.
(2) To depreciate structures on an annuity basis.
(3) To initiate depreciation charges on long-lived prop­
erty only when the unexpired life becomes less than 
forty years.
Undeniably there is much to be said for approaching the 
question from the entirely different standpoint of endeavor­
ing to make the maintenance charge for any year reflect as 
accurately as possible the exhaustion of property during the 
year converted into money on the basis of the price level 
of the year. A plan might be devised under which prudent 
investment would be the foundation of the rate base, and any 
material deficiency or excess of maintenance in any year 
would be expressed in terms of money at current values and 
charged or credited to operating, the corresponding credit 
or charge being a maintenance equalization account which 
would enter into the computation of the rate base.
The practical difficulties of such a plan would be slight 
compared to those inherent in a scheme such as the Commis­
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sion proposes, and such a plan would have obvious theoreti­
cal merits. It must be recognized, however, that at the 
present time there is no satisfactory basis in law for such a 
proposal and also that the principle involved is altogether 
different from that which the Commission has followed in 
the past, so that the Commission could not reasonably be 
expected to adopt such a plan unless it were as a part of a 
thorough revision of the principles of accounting of the 
carriers, which might well be undertaken, however, since the 
accounts are now in large measure an accounting between 
the carriers and the public.
NOTE
The problem of depreciation in industrial accounting dif­
fers from the problem of depreciation in the case of public 
utilities subject to rate regulation or recapture of earnings 
in the following, among other, respects:
(1) The value of property employed and of the property 
used up by a public utility in rendering service are 
essential and major factors in the determination of 
the charges for such service. It is mainly from this 
fact that the Commission’s concern with depreciation 
arises.
The same factors have relatively far less bearing on 
prices in the industrial field. This is true for various 
reasons. Capital assets, to begin with, constitute a 
much smaller proportion of the investment in the case 
of industrial enterprises than in that of public util­
ities. More important is the fact that in the indus­
trial field prices are determined to a far greater extent 
by considerations other than cost, such as value to the 
purchaser, competition, etc.
(2) The predominant consideration in industrial account­
ing is conservatism rather than theoretical accuracy. 
This is well illustrated in the rule for valuing inven­
tories at “cost or market, whichever is lower”—a rule 
founded obviously not on logic or theory but on 
abundant caution. The Commission is not justified 
in requiring or permitting a method which errs 
demonstrably on the side of conservatism to a material 
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extent; the result almost inevitably would be injus­
tice to the carrier or the patron.
(3) The accounting for capital assets in industrial prac­
tice does not aim at recording the course of value in 
service. This is well illustrated by the practice in 
charging depletion commonly followed and accepted 
by the Treasury. Mines are usually valued by taking 
the discounted present value of the estimated yield 
from unmined tonnage. Other things being equal, 
the value at the end of a year’s operation would be 
found by making a similar calculation in respect of 
the reduced tonnage. Depletion charges are, how­
ever, almost universally computed by dividing the 
value of the mine originally determined by the esti­
mated tonnage, and thus computing a rate per ton 
which is applied uniformly from year to year. No 
one would suggest that the deduction of the depletion 
so computed from the original cost or value of the 
mine would in any circumstances be a proper method 
of computing residual value of the mine.
(4) The distinguishing characteristic of American in­
dustry is the readiness with which property units are 
discarded when superior types become available. In 
such circumstances common prudence suggests, in the 
case of highly competitive industry, the desirability of 
writing off a large proportion of the investment over 
the early years of use, conditions during which can 
be forecast with some degree of confidence. Hence
' the straight line method is appropriate in industrial 
practice; indeed, the diminishing balance method 
which produces even greater charges in the early years 
is sometimes employed.
The Commission’s hypotheses, if they do not exclude 
the application of these considerations to railroad 
property, reduce their weight to inconsiderable pro­
portions. Upon its view, if a purchase of property is 
prudent when made, the carrier is assured of an op­
portunity to earn a return on its cost during its useful 
life. The incentive to retire the unit on account of 
obsolescence before its efficiency is seriously impaired 
is almost wholly lacking.
It may be added that the argument advanced by the Com­
mission, that the depreciation charge in respect of a unit 
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should be equal in each year of its useful life, has more 
validity in the case of an industrial enterprise than in that of 
a public utility. It is not customary in industrial practice 
to include interest in cost, so that the depreciation charge is 
the only property charge, and the point made on page 4 of 
the memorandum that it is the combined charges for de­
preciation and return, rather than one separate charge that 
should be uniform, does not arise.
V
CARRIER PROPERTY CONSUMED IN OPERATION AND 
THE REGULATION OF PROFITS 
A DISCUSSION OF THE I.C.C. REPORT ON DEPRECIATION *
(1929)
I
In determining whether a given rate structure of a carrier is 
compensatory or confiscatory, it is necessary to make two 
allowances on account of carrier property: first, an allowance 
for the use, and second, an allowance for the consumption 
of property in rendering service. Some property may be in­
destructible, so that no allowance under the second head is 
called for; other property may be consumed so rapidly that 
there is no charge under the first head on account of it. But 
in most classes of property both allowances are necessary.
It is generally agreed that the charge for use should be in 
the form of interest or return at a percentage rate upon a 
fair capital value for the property employed in rendering 
service, often called the rate base. Controversy arises over 
the questions how the capital value—the rate base—should 
be computed and upon what principles the rate of return 
thereon should be determined. In respect to the allowance 
for consumption of property the questions arise, upon what 
basis the allowance should be made in money and whether 
it should be made (in the case of property whose useful life 
extends over a considerable period) as the consumption pro­
ceeds, when it becomes complete, or when it is made good.
Now, while much has been written and conflicting views 
have been expressed by courts, commissions, economists and 
others on the questions how the rate base should be com­
puted and how the rate of return to be applied to that rate
* Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XLIII (February, 1929), pp. 193-220
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base should be determined, and also upon the question 
whether the allowance for consumption should or should 
not be made as consumption proceeds (or, as it is commonly 
phrased, upon a depreciation basis), comparatively little con­
sideration has been given to the question how the money 
value of property consumed should be computed. Some con­
sideration of it might have been expected in connection with 
the determination of the extent to which depreciation charges 
should form a part of railroad accounting, which was re­
quired of the Interstate Commerce Commission under the 
Transportation Act of 1920. The Commission instituted an 
inquiry (Case 15,100) and held extensive hearings. But in 
the decision that the Commission rendered under date of 
November 2, 1926, the question how the money value of 
property consumed should be computed was scarcely dis­
cussed. The Commission passed it over in the following 
language:
There also can be no doubt that the cost of such worn-out 
or abandoned property units is a part of operating expense 
to be charged against the service. The basic question is 
whether such cost should be charged in bulk at the time 
when each unit is retired, or should be anticipated by peri­
odical instalments spread over its service life.
But the proposition that cost is necessarily and universally 
the proper basis of the charge for property consumed is by 
no means axiomatic. On the contrary, it is far from being 
demonstrably sound in theory and equally far from being 
adopted in practice—even under the Commission’s own regu­
lations.
In the course of the decision the Commission said also:
In our consideration, therefore, of the relative burdens 
imposed by the depreciation and retirement methods of ac­
counting, we must start with the premise that the former 
presupposes full deduction of accrued depreciation in ascer­
taining the rate base value.
Since the Commission had deducted depreciation on a 
straight line basis in its valuations, it naturally adopted the 
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same basis in the decision in question. Furthermore, har­
mony with its valuation practice necessitated the application 
of depreciation to such property as miscellaneous track 
material, though the Commission’s accounting section had ad­
vised against such an application on the score of impractica­
bility. It also entailed a substantial change in the method 
of application of the straight line depreciation plan from 
that heretofore applied in the case of equipment.
Here again, however, the Commission seems to stand on 
insecure ground, for the conditions which it postulates re­
garding the deduction of depreciation in determining the 
rate base, coupled with its adherence to straight line depre­
ciation, bring its position into direct opposition to Supreme 
Court decisions on the point. Thus the Commission’s whole 
case rests heavily on an axiom and a postulate, both of which 
lack validity. The explanation is apparently that the Com­
mission, or some members of it at least, still clings to the 
hope that the Supreme Court will reverse its past rulings 
regarding the rate base and accept the line of reasoning ad­
vanced in various minority opinions, notably in the dissent­
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Company case.*
The Commission’s decision of November 2, 1926, gave 
rise to much criticism and to requests for rehearing. These 
requests were granted and the rehearing, which is now in 
progress, seems to be developing, as it rightly should, into a 
broad reconsideration of railroad accounting methods in 
general. In the circumstances a discussion of the deprecia­
tion problem seems opportune, particularly as the account­
ant’s view may differ from that of either the lawyer or the 
economist.
11
The specific questions which it is proposed to discuss are:
1. Should charges for consumption of property in ren­
dering service be based uniformly on cost: (a) for purposes
* 262 u. s., 276. 
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of rate and profit regulation; and (b) for current accounting 
purposes?
2. Should the charge for property consumed be made in 
bulk at the time when each unit is retired, or should it be 
anticipated by periodical instalments spread over its service 
life?
3. If consumption charges are to be made as consump­
tion proceeds rather than when it becomes complete, on 
what basis should the accrual be deemed to take place and 
be computed?
The relation between the basis of exhaustion charges and 
the principles of computation of the rate base is, as the 
Commission points out, direct and vital. Some economists * 
hold that if the so-called prudent investment theory is to 
prevail, depreciation provisions cannot possibly have any 
proper place in the scheme of things. It therefore seems 
desirable as a preliminary step to discuss briefly the two 
principal conflicting theories of rate base determination.
The difference between the two theories, sometimes re­
ferred to as the “present value theory” and the “prudent 
investment theory” respectively, is understood by all stu­
dents of the subject and is sufficiently indicated by two sen­
tences—one from the majority opinion and the other from 
the dissenting opinion in the Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Company case. Mr. Justice Brandeis, advancing the pru­
dent investment theory, says: “The thing devoted by the in­
vestor to the public use is not specific property, tangible 
and intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise.” 
Mr. Justice McReynolds, in the majority opinion, however, 
quotes from the decision in the Minnesota rate cases: “The 
property is held in private ownership and it is that property, 
and not the original cost of it, of which the owner may not 
be deprived without due process of law.”
Mr. Justice Brandeis supported his contentions by a force-
* No attempt is made to cite authorities for this or other economic argu­
ments herein advanced, since the writer’s knowledge of the authorities is not 
wide enough to enable him to make just attribution. His acknowledgment 
of indebtedness to economic writers must be general, not specific. 
198 DEPRECIATION
ful presentation of the economic and practical advantages 
of prudent investment as the measure of the rate base. The 
refusal of the majority to accept his conclusion does not 
necessarily imply dissent from this part of his argument. 
Their view is perhaps rather that the Court is not free to 
apply whatever rule may seem economically wisest. Ap­
parently in the majority view present value must, under the 
Constitution, be the measure of the rate base; cost is sig­
nificant only in so far as it reflects fair present value. Eco­
nomic considerations may, and indeed must, be taken into 
account in determining present value, but the Court is not 
free to adopt or approve a basis for regulation which, though 
perhaps economically wise, disregards present value. Mr. 
Justice Brandeis does suggest that cost is the only practical 
measure of present value, but in his main argument he at­
tempts to support cost as a measure of the rate base without 
linking it to present value. To a layman his failure to carry 
the Court with him in this part of his argument seems in­
evitable; but the whole discussion illustrates very clearly 
how the difficulties of the problem have been accentuated 
by the way in which we have drifted into it.
The problem comes before the courts as a conflict of con­
stitutional rights which are unequivocally recognized but not 
clearly defined. On the one side there is the right of the 
people through its representatives to regulate business af­
fected by a public interest; on the other the right of the 
carriers to protection against complete or partial confiscation 
of property. The Supreme Court, in holding that it is the 
present value of the property employed that must, under the 
Constitution, form the basis for determining whether any 
regulation is confiscatory in its effects, does not imply that in 
its judgment present value is, from the standpoint of either 
carriers or the public, the most satisfactory basis for regula­
tion of rates or profits.
Looking backwards, one might say that the acts under 
which carrier enterprises were originally undertaken should 
have recognized the constitutional rights of the carriers and 
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the public, and have laid down principles for determining 
fair compensation which would have been binding on both 
parties on the acceptance of the acts by the carriers. It may 
well be, also, that prudent investment would, in such cir­
cumstances, have been the most appropriate measure of a 
proper return and its adoption desirable in the interests of 
all parties. No such action was, however, taken. The ques­
tions may not have been anticipated or, since the economic 
gains which would result from the construction of railroads 
were obvious, all parties may have been concerned to get 
them built and disinclined to raise questions likely to delay 
action and not of immediate importance. Apparently for 
years after the initiation of the great era of railroad con­
struction, competition and similar natural economic forces 
were deemed an adequate safeguard against excessive rates. 
Conceivably those who foresaw that the question would arise 
may have been content to await the day without prior com­
mitments, and so to be free then to urge whatever theory 
might seem most advantageous to the interests with which 
they were concerned. Certain it is that the way in which 
we have drifted into the problem, with no clear principles 
laid down, but with broad constitutional rights on each side, 
makes any present-day solution far more difficult.
The approach to the problem from the standpoint of 
prudent investment offers the practical advantages which 
Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out: it recognizes the essential 
fact that, once money is invested in a railroad, the invest­
ment is valuable only for what it can produce; it has the 
merits of continuity and relative certainty. On the part of 
carriers, the main objections to prudent investment as a 
measure of the rate base are perhaps first and foremost that 
it denies the carrier any benefit from the increment in land 
values which railroad construction has created, and second, 
that it fails to produce a fair return when the currency has 
depreciated or there has been a marked rise in price levels. 
However, if the carriers are to be participators in the incre­
ment in values which they have created, it should be pos­
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sible to find a fair and more practical measure of their just 
share than the hypothetical appreciation of land which they 
own but cannot sell, if at all, without sacrificing other values. 
And similarly, if the return to carriers is to vary with 
changes in the value of the currency or of price levels, an 
adjustment on the basis of the changes in the value of cur­
rency as measured by general internal purchasing power or 
international exchange value might be simpler and fairer 
than one measured by changes in the values of the particular 
units of property that go to make up a railroad.
The question is, largely, what form of assurance of return 
is calculated to secure capital most advantageously. It is 
all very well to say that security is the first requisite, but 
what constitutes security? Is it a stable income or a stable 
capital value, and in either case is the stability to be meas­
ured in terms of money or in terms of purchasing power? 
Prior to the war, fixed money income was perhaps mainly 
sought. But the course of security and commodity prices 
during and since the war has brought home to investors the 
possibilities of loss inherent in a fixed-income investment 
when interest rates and prices both rise; and in recent years 
the importance of stability of real income and of capital 
value has been more appreciated than formerly. One mani­
festation of this trend is the increased popularity of common 
stocks among investors.
The prudent investment theory is capable of adaptation 
so that it will tend to meet whatever form of assurance is 
deemed most desirable; but when interest rates and price 
levels fluctuate, only one form of stability can be obtained 
by any one method, and the choice of any one form implies 
definite relinquishment of the three other forms of stability.
The alternatives can be summarily stated thus:
1. If the return is restricted to a fixed rate on actual in­
vestment, it is the fixed money income that is stabilized, and 
the investor assumes the. risk of fluctuations in the purchas­
ing power of this income and in the capital value of his 
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investment. This is the position under the English Gas and 
Water Company Acts.
2. If the fair return is measured by the actual investment 
and current rates of interest, it is the capital value of the 
investment in money that is stabilized. This seems to be the 
principle favored by Mr. Justice Brandeis.
3. If a stable real income is desired, the result can be ob­
tained by using a fixed rate of return but using as the rate 
base the actual investment adjusted for changes in the gen­
eral price level.
4. Finally, the capital investment measured in terms of 
purchasing power can be stabilized by adjusting the prudent 
investment in respect to the change in the general price level, 
and applying to the rate base so ascertained a rate of return 
based on current rates of interest.
The method of applying a fair current rate to a fair pres­
ent value of the property employed in rendering service, 
which has the support of the Supreme Court, differs from 
the principle last mentioned in that it takes account of 
changes in value not attributable to changes in price levels, 
and reflects variations in price of the particular commodities 
by which the investment is represented instead of changes 
in the general price level.
Theoretically there might be an alternative application of 
the present-value theory under which a fixed rate of return 
would be applied to the rate base determined on present 
values. It would, however, be illogical to determine the 
rate base with reference solely to existing conditions and 
to ignore existing conditions in fixing the rate of return. 
This being so, the alternative scarcely needs consideration. 
For the same reasons the variant (3) of the prudent invest­
ment theory, above mentioned, may be eliminated or left 
to come into existence as a part of a general scheme of 
stabilization of the purchasing power of money.
Of the other variants of the prudent-investment theory, 
the last mentioned, (4), which contemplates adjustments for 
changes in price level and interest rates, has received little 
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consideration, though the acceptance of this modification 
would go far to reconcile the theory with the basic constitu­
tional requirement that the ultimate rate base must be 
defensible as a reflection of present values. The prudent- 
investment advocates, as a rule, favor the actual money in­
vestment as the measure of the rate base.
The Supreme Court rejects this view and insists on pres­
ent value. But what is present value? The Court has said 
that actual investment, present cost of reproduction, and 
other elements are all factors in determining it. The con­
clusion reached in any case will depend on the weight as­
signed to the various factors. At the moment, however, the 
legal standard of present value seems to tend to approximate 
cost of reproduction (with some adjustment for decline in 
value due to condition).
Notwithstanding the pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission has continued 
to express its convictions in favor of prudent investment, and 
in some cases to attempt to give practical effect to those 
convictions. In the following discussion of the treat­
ment of property consumed in rendering service, both the 
prudent investment and the present value theories of com­
pensation for property use will therefore be kept in mind, 
the prudent investment theory being deemed to imply the 
use of actual investment, and the present value theory the 
use of substantially present cost of reproduction as the rate 
base. The question whether any deduction, and if so, what 
deduction, shall be made from the gross value for decline 
from new condition is reserved for consideration as the dis­
cussion proceeds.
III
We may now consider the specific questions raised above, 
and first the question, “Should charges for consumption of 
property in rendering service be based uniformly on cost 
(a) for purposes of rate and profit regulation; and (b) for 
current accounting purposes?”
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The question is subdivided into these two parts in order 
to emphasize the point that the considerations affecting the 
two aspects of the question are not identical. Nevertheless, 
while it is not in theory essential that the treatment of 
charges for consumption of property in rate cases should be 
identical with that in the current accounting of the carrier, 
obviously serious inconvenience would result if different 
methods were employed for the two purposes; indeed, it is 
scarcely too much to say that practicability requires identical 
treatment. It follows that any method prescribed by the 
Commission should be reasonably appropriate for both pur­
poses.
As has already been suggested, the assumption made by the 
Commission that the charge for property consumed should 
be based uniformly on its original cost does not find support 
either in theory or in past practice.
Where rates are being regulated there are at least two 
other bases for which theoretical arguments can be ad­
vanced: current cost of reproduction and probable cost of 
replacement. Prospective cost of replacement seems in prin­
ciple the most appropriate basis if the prudent investment 
theory of rate base is accepted; if the present value theory of 
rate base is adopted, current cost of reproduction from year 
to year seems theoretically the correct basis for the compu­
tation of the exhaustion charge.
It is inherently fair that, if traffic is paid for in currency 
which has depreciated, the charge against the traffic for prop­
erty used up in operation should be calculated upon the 
same scale of values. Suppose that in a given year property 
is made good to an extent exactly equaling the amount of 
property used up in operation (measurement being made in 
physical units): justice to all would seem to be achieved by 
charging the cost of making good property during the year 
against traffic of the year. When the value of money has 
fallen there is no valid reason why the increased currency 
cost of the replacing units over the original cost of exactly 
similar property used up in operation should be treated as 
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capital expenditure so as to constitute a burden on the 
patrons of a later time.
Further: if the principle be accepted that the sum on 
which the carrier is entitled to a return as compensation for 
the use of property in service is its fair present value, con­
sistency would suggest that the measure of the compensation 
for property used up should also be its fair present value, or, 
in other words, the current cost of replacement of what is 
exhausted. The point may be made clearer by an illustra­
tion.
Take the first year of the life of a locomotive: suppose its 
cost to be $25,000; suppose the fair rate of return for use 
(exclusive of exhaustion) to be six per cent; suppose it is 
agreed that three per cent of new value is a fair measure of 
the annual charge for exhaustion; then the charge against 
the traffic for the locomotive is nine per cent (six plus three) 
of $25,000, or $2,250. Now consider, say, the tenth year, 
when through currency depreciation the new value is $60,- 
000, and the condition of the property, as the result of ex­
haustion on the one hand and rebuilding on the other, is 
80 per cent of new value—interest rates being unchanged. 
On the present value theory the rate base for the locomotive 
is 80 per cent of $60,000, or $48,000, and the use charge six 
per cent thereon, $2,880. Is it not clear that on the 
same theory the exhaustion charge should logically be three 
per cent on $60,000, rather than three per cent on $25,000?
The practical objections to the application of this prin­
ciple are so great as perhaps to compel its rejection. If so, 
it may be argued that whichever of the other bases more 
closely approximates to the theoretically correct one should 
be chosen. But clearly actual reproduction cost would nor­
mally tend to be closer to original cost in the earlier years of 
the life of a unit, and to prospective replacement cost in the 
later years, so that there could be no preponderance in favor 
of either of these bases.
In these circumstances it may be said that the theoretical 
arguments are equally balanced, and that the choice between 
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original cost and probable replacement cost should be de­
termined by practical convenience. This would mean that 
if the charge is to be made for exhaustion as it proceeds, 
original cost would be the preferable basis, since original cost 
could be more easily ascertained or estimated than probable 
replacement cost. If, on the other hand, exhaustion is to be 
provided for in bulk when the unit is retired, the actual 
cost of replacement would be a more convenient basis for the 
charge than an actual or estimated original cost. On the 
whole it may be said that, if the present value theory of rate 
base is to govern, there is no balance of argument on the 
score of either theory or practical advantage in favor of 
either original cost or replacement cost as the basis of the 
charge to operations for property exhaustion.
Let us now consider the question on the assumption that 
the use charge is to be computed upon the prudent invest­
ment theory. This theory rests upon the proposition that 
when an investment is made in railroad property it is per­
manent, that the investor exchanges a present command of 
purchasing power for a right to receive a reasonable return 
thereon in the future, and that thereafter fluctuations in the 
value or cost of reproduction of the property represented by 
his investment are of no practical significance to him. It 
seems a legitimate corollary of this proposition that the 
burden of maintaining the property should fall on those who 
benefit from the use of the property, and that fluctuations in 
the cost of its maintenance should be treated as at their 
risk and charge. This would mean that, if the prudent 
investment theory is to control, prospective cost of replace­
ment should be the basis of the exhaustion charge, whether 
such charge is to be made as the exhaustion proceeds or in 
bulk as units are retired.
The Interstate Commerce Commission in its report on 
Case 15,100 takes a somewhat different view, and proceeds 
upon the theory that on the replacement of any property the 
original investment should be regarded as having been re­
turned to the investors and a fresh investment made by them 
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in the replacing unit. This, however, seems not only con­
trary to the normal course of events but inconsistent with the 
basic idea of the prudent investment. It seems to be an 
essential feature of the prudent investment theory that the 
investment is voluntary; and it is only the original invest­
ment that can be said to be voluntary—replacement being a 
necessity that grows out of, first, the voluntary act of creating 
the original property, and second, the use of the property 
in rendering service.
This theoretical argument in favor of charging the cost 
of replacement rather than the cost of the original unit 
against operating expenses finds ample support in practice. 
It is the method that has consistently been followed in Great 
Britain; and though methods of railroad accounting and 
reporting there have been the subject of numerous official 
inquiries, apparently no suggestion has even been made that 
the practice should be modified. Railroad accounting in 
Great Britain has always proceeded on the principle that the 
original cost is a permanent investment and that the main­
tenance of a property, including the replacement of units, 
is to be effected out of revenue. This was also, it is believed, 
the common practice of the best-managed railroads in the 
United States prior to the regulation of accounting by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission; it is the practice that has 
been required by the Commission under the existing regula­
tions during the last twenty years for important classes of 
property, such as rails, ties and other track material.
It must be remembered that the original construction of a 
railroad, particularly in a new country, often involves costs 
not entailed in the subsequent replacement of units. For 
instance, rails may have had to be hauled on mule-back over 
mountains at a cost exceeding the cost of the rails at the 
point of production, whereas when replacement becomes 
necessary they can be shipped over the railroad itself at a 
fraction of the original transportation cost. The extraor­
dinary transportation cost of the original rail can rightfully 
be regarded as attaching to the railroad as a whole, rather 
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than to the particular pieces of metal in the track, and every 
economic and financial requirement is met when the replace­
ment of the rail is provided for through operating expenses 
on a basis including a normal current transportation charge.
The answer to our first question may then be stated as 
follows:
1. If the rate base is to be computed on the present 
value theory, then the balance of argument is slightly in 
favor of original cost as the basis of the exhaustion charge if 
provision is to be made as exhaustion proceeds, and slightly 
in favor of replacement cost if the charge is to be made when 
exhaustion is complete.
2. If the rate base is to be computed on the prudent 
investment theory, then the balance of argument is decidedly 
in favor of replacement cost as the basis of the exhaustion 
charge if exhaustion is provided for as it proceeds, and still 
more decidedly if the charge is to be made only in bulk when 
the exhaustion is complete.
IV
We may now consider the second question stated on page 
197, which is in substance whether provision for consump­
tion as it takes place—or what is commonly called a depreci­
ation scheme—is or is not desirable for various classes of rail­
road property.
The reasons that have led the Commission to favor a com­
plete depreciation scheme appear to be four:
1. That existing methods do not take out of capital or 
charge into operating expenses an exhaustion of value that 
has undoubtedly taken place;
2. That the existing methods facilitate manipulation of 
operating expenses through excessive or inadequate ex­
penditure for maintenance;
3. That such a plan strengthens the financial position of 
the carrier and puts it in a position to render better service;
4. That it is necessary, as the Commission sees it, to bring 
accounting and valuation methods into harmony.
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The theoretical correctness of the first point may be con­
ceded and yet the wisdom of the suggested change, from the 
standpoint of the carrier and the public alike, still be seri­
ously questioned.
If we consider the usual history of a railroad from its 
creation as a new property, we find that, for some years, 
while wear and tear will be taking place, it will not be prac­
ticable or economical to make good this wear and tear. Con­
sequently the renewals will be light and the unexhausted 
service value of the property will diminish until a point is 
reached where any further deterioration would mean a loss 
of efficiency. At this point renewals will, begin, and every 
such renewal will tend to restore or extend the original life 
of the unit to which it is applied. The point at which such 
renewals become necessary will vary with each unit, even of 
the same kind. Once the point is reached, the group can­
not further depreciate if it is properly maintained; and 
hence, in practice, while single units may and frequently do 
run down to a point much below this average without be­
coming absolutely inefficient, a complete property, if prop­
erly maintained, arrives at a more or less stationary value and 
never reaches the theoretical scrap value. At this point 
proper maintenance will call for expenditures for renewals 
and replacements which will approximately equal the de­
preciation charge; renewals and replacements, due either to 
wear and tear or to obsolescence, all the time tending to post­
pone the date when final replacement occurs.*
This brief outline suggests a number of considerations. 
There is clearly in the case of a matured property a sub­
stantial exhaustion which will never be made good. In the 
accounting of a new company is it necessary or desirable to
* It may be of interest to mention that this paragraph is substantially a 
quotation from a communication addressed to the Interstate Commerce Com­
mission by the writer’s firm in 1908, questioning the soundness of a system 
of depreciation which merely distributed the original cost over estimated 
life as extended probably by important renewals without making any allow­
ance for the cost of those renewals. The Commission in its decision in 
Case 15,100 has attempted to meet such criticisms by a modification of the 
scheme. 
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provide out of earnings for this exhaustion? If, in the case 
of a mature company, no such provision, has in fact been 
made heretofore, should it now be made and, if so, how and 
by whom should the cost be borne? Precisely what purpose 
does such a provision serve? Is it to offset a loss of value? 
If so, what is the real loss of value? It is to provide for 
replacement? If so, is it not a fact that so long as operations 
continue there will always be substantially the same amount 
of exhaustion not made good, and that if operations cease 
no further replacements will be made?
In order to consider dispassionately the question whether 
any depreciation provision is economically desirable, it may 
be well to look at it from the standpoint of a community in 
which a new railroad enterprise is under contemplation. 
Let us assume that it is agreed between the promoters of the 
railroad and the community that the former, shall be entitled 
to a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their 
investment in the line, and that the community shall have 
the right to restrict closely to that fair return the profits 
of the railroad. Would competent economic advisers of the 
community advocate a system of depreciation charges, and, 
if so, of what type? The result of a depreciation plan is 
obviously to throw an added charge for use and exhaustion 
of property upon the earliest years of operation, years in 
which the traffic development would be in progress and in 
which consequently the charge would be more burdensome 
than in later years. Such a condition would seem to be 
exactly the reverse of that which would be economically 
desirable from the standpoint of the community. Its in­
terests would be served by keeping the charges in the early 
years down to the minimum consistent with maintaining the 
efficiency of the property, thus enlarging the volume of the 
commodities that could profitably be transported, and build­
ing up both the traffic and the community more rapidly 
than would otherwise be possible. The best interests of the 
community in such a situation would be served, it would 
seem, by a mutual agreement to ignore the depreciation on 
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the property in so far as it could never be made good while 
the property was being operated, the owners of the railroad 
agreeing that this depreciation should not be treated as a 
part of cost of operation, and the community agreeing on the 
other hand that in computing return no deduction should 
be made from the original investment therefor.
If a universal depreciation scheme was not desirable in the 
interests of the carrier or the public at the time when rail­
road enterprises were in their infancy (and none was ever 
put in force, if indeed ever seriously suggested), there is an 
even stronger case against imposing such a scheme today 
upon railroads which are now highly developed and have 
been built up under a system of accounting that contem­
plated no provision therefor. If a depreciation scheme is to 
be adopted, how is the amount of depreciation deemed to 
have arisen prior to the initiation of the scheme to be pro­
vided? If it is to be .provided at the expense of the public, 
an unnecessary burden will be imposed on the traffic; it 
could hardly in common justice be established at the expense 
of the carriers. The Commission expresses no final opinion 
on this question; it does, however, indicate its views in the 
following language (page 384 of the Report):
The theoretically correct way of meeting this situation 
would be to establish the amount of past accrued deprecia­
tion which has not been provided for, and concurrently 
credit this amount to the depreciation reserve and charge it 
to profit and loss. It is the latter account which has profited 
in the past from the failure or partial failure to accrue de­
preciation charges.
This statement of the position is inadequate and, as a 
result, seriously unjust. The omission of depreciation pro­
visions in the past is supported too strongly by economic, his­
torical and practical considerations to be justly characterized 
as a “failure on the part of the carriers.” It seems humanly 
certain also that if a system of depreciation charges had been 
inaugurated at the commencement of railroad enterprise the 
development of the railroads would have been made more 
CARRIER PROPERTY CONSUMED 211
difficult and the growth of the country greatly retarded.
Upon a broad view of the situation it is quite impossible, 
therefore, to hold that it is the profit and loss accounts of the 
carriers alone which have profited by the omission of de­
preciation charges in the past. As regards equipment, it 
might be reasonable to treat any past omission to provide 
adequately for depreciation as a failure on the part of the 
carriers, seeing that depreciation provisions therefor have 
been in force now for twenty years. But in the case of prop­
erties such as rails, where neither the Commission nor the 
practice in other jurisdictions has in the past called for 
depreciation provisions, the fact that they have not been 
made cannot reasonably be treated as a delinquency on the 
part of the carriers, nor could the surplus of the carriers 
justly be diminished by whatever amount of depreciation the 
Commission might, upon some new theory, decide to at­
tribute to the past. The only alternative is that the provi­
sion in question, if made at all, should in some way be set 
aside out of future earnings. Possibly the most equitable 
way would be to accumulate it gradually out of earnings 
after the carriers have received a fair return and before any 
recapture provisions become effective. In any event, the 
adoption of such a scheme would impose an unnecessary 
burden on someone in the future.
The economic considerations thus seem to lead clearly to 
a conclusion adverse to the proposal.
Turning to the Commission’s second point, there is the 
gravest doubt whether the opportunities for manipulation 
would be lessened by the adoption of a general depreciation 
scheme. This is a highly technical question, which cannot 
be fully dealt with here; anyone interested in it will find 
some aspects dealt with in a memorandum by the writer in­
troduced in Case 15,100, and forming a part of the record 
in that case.*
It is suggested that the results sought by the Commission 
in this direction, and also the financial strengthening con-
* See above. 
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templated in the Commission’s third point, could be secured 
at least as adequately in other ways under the Commission’s 
powers of regulation and supervision, and that there is no 
real argument under either head for a depreciation scheme. 
Some system of reserves for the equalization of maintenance 
charges, such as have been employed in the past by sound 
railroad managements here and abroad, should under the 
Commission’s supervision meet these requirements, as they 
have in the past met them without the safeguard afforded 
by that supervision. It may be added that no system of 
book charges for depreciation will by itself prove very valu­
able in maintaining the carriers’ financial integrity. This is 
particularly true if the depreciation reserve is to be regarded 
as available for financing capital additions, as the Commis­
sion contemplates. If, on the other hand, the reserve is to 
be kept invested in liquid form, the investment of the huge 
sums which would accumulate would present another grave 
problem and afford opportunities for serious abuses.
We come, then, to the fourth consideration influencing the 
Commission, namely, the relation between maintenance 
charges and valuation. In reading the report one feels that 
it is this consideration which has weighed most heavily with 
the Commission and largely determined its conclusions.
In maintaining its position upon this point the Commis­
sion labors under the difficulty that its position is completely 
at variance with the Supreme Court’s decisions. In the 
Indianapolis Water Company case * the Supreme Court 
made it clear that in valuing property for rate purposes the 
only permissible deduction for depreciation was the actual 
lessening of worth as compared with new value, and added 
that such lessening of worth must be not wholly theoretical 
nor based on percentages of general application, but pri­
marily founded on observation. Now, not only is the Com­
mission’s proposed method theoretical and based on per­
centages of general application, but the particular theory of 
depreciation which it advocates is one that clearly does not
* 272 u. s., 400.
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even approximately reflect the lessening of worth in service 
due to the partial exhaustion of useful life.
v
This brings us to a consideration of our third question: 
on what basis the accrual of depreciation or exhaustion shall 
be deemed to take place and be computed.
In practice there are perhaps four well-recognized methods 
of providing for depreciation:
1. The straight line method. This is by far the most 
common in industrial practice. It contemplates the distri­
bution of the cost of property (less salvage value) over the 
useful life in equal instalments.
2. The sinking fund method. This aims to set aside an­
nually such a sum as will, if invested, produce an amount 
equal to the cost of the property when the life thereof is 
exhausted.
3. The annuity method. This regards property as rep­
resenting capacity for service over a period of years, and its 
service value therefore as that of an annuity for a gradually 
diminishing term of years, and adjusts the valuation from 
year to year accordingly.
4. The diminishing balance method. This involves the 
application of a uniform percentage of reduction to the bal­
ance of the property account from year to year, so that the 
property will stand at its salvage value, or a nominal figure, 
when its useful life is exhausted.
It will be observed that the second and third methods are 
substantially similar. Since the sinking fund method con­
templates the return of the investment or provision for its 
replacement when the unit is retired, it is perhaps technically 
the better adapted to replacement reserves (based on esti­
mated cost of replacement), while the annuity method is 
more strictly applicable to a depreciation scheme designed 
to provide gradually for writing off the cost of the original 
unit.
The diminishing balance method is of limited applica­
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tion: to cases in which the prospects of profitable use are 
assured for a brief period only, or to accounts representing a 
mass of small units of property which it is impossible to 
account for separately.
The straight line method has the virtues of comparative 
simplicity and conservatism, but since it ignores interest and 
the time element, its adoption necessarily implies renuncia­
tion of any attempt to reflect the course of unexpired values 
in service.
The annuity method reflects the course of value in service, 
and is the only logical method to be followed if the object 
is to provide for the return to the investor of the lessening 
of worth of a property unit due to the gradual exhaustion 
of its useful life as that exhaustion takes place.
Neither the fundamental character of the differences in 
principle and purpose between the straight line method and 
the annuity (or the sinking fund) method nor the wide dif­
ference in the results reached, according as one or the other 
is employed, appears to be adequately appreciated by the 
Commission.
It has expressed the opinion that the principles underlying 
the straight line method are in accord with the principles 
enunciated by the Supreme Court—a statement which it is 
difficult to accept—and says, “Nor are the practical results of 
the two methods [that is, the sinking-fund or annuity method 
and the straight line method] very different”—a statement 
which is clearly incorrect.*
It seems to the writer a matter not of argument but of 
mathematical demonstration, that the annuity method of 
computing depreciation is the only one which is consistent 
with the Commission’s own hypotheses and which upon 
those hypotheses reflects the relation between the value of a 
new unit and that of a partly exhausted one. It follows
* A discussion of this point will be found in the memorandum by the 
writer of this article filed in Case 15,100. An illustration there given shows 
that in the case of property having an assumed life of 50 years, the value in 
service (taking money to be worth 6 per cent) at the end of 25 years is 
81.11 per cent of new value, which is also the depreciated value on the an­
nuity basis; as compared with 50 per cent on a straight line basis. 
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either that the annuity method must be substituted for the 
straight line method or that all suggestion of close relation­
ship between depreciated values and fair value in service 
must be abandoned.
If the annuity method is properly applied the depreciated 
value will be the fair value in service, subject to fluctuations 
in new value and to the effecting of normal maintenance; 
this is as near the goal of reflecting true value as percentage 
depreciation schemes can come.
The Commission’s arguments for the straight line method 
are as untenable as the argument of the carriers that there is 
no lessening of value as long as property is maintained in 
serviceable condition.
VI
Now the type of depreciation scheme that is applicable, 
if any is to be applied, has a most important bearing on the 
decision whether any should be adopted.
The difficulties of even the simplest system of depreciation 
—difficulties that lie less in establishing the amounts to be 
set aside than in determining what outlays shall be charged 
against the fund so created—are sufficiently indicated in the 
report on Case 15,100. It can scarcely be claimed that ade­
quate solutions of such problems as the treatment of extraor­
dinary repairs or depreciation of miscellaneous track ma­
terial and continuous structure are formulated or even sug­
gested in that report. But if to the inevitable complexities 
of even a straight line system of depreciation are added the 
further complications inherent in the application of the 
sinking fund or annuity principle, the resulting method 
would be, if riot beyond the limits of practicability, at least 
so close to these limits that only a compelling need could 
justify its adoption. Dispassionate consideration leads to the 
conclusion that no such compelling need exists, even if it 
were granted that a general depreciation scheme is, in the 
abstract, desirable.
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VII
The conclusions to which this discussion leads may be 
summarized as follows:
1. Unless a depreciation scheme is in force, cost of re­
placement rather than original cost is the proper basis for 
charges for property consumed in operation.
2. While depreciation schemes are an invaluable part of 
industrial accounting, a general system of depreciation 
charges for railroads is not today desirable.
3. The case for such a system would be weakened if the 
prudent investment theory of rate base were to be adopted 
as the Commission seems to think it should be.
4. The particular form of depreciation scheme put for­
ward by the Commission—the straight line method—is de­
monstrably inappropriate for the purpose sought to be 
achieved.
5. The Commission’s plan lacks one essential of any satis­
factory scheme, namely, a practicable and equitable method 
of dealing with the depreciation deemed to have accrued 
prior to the initiation of the scheme.
What, it may be asked, are the alternatives? It is sug­
gested that since a depreciation scheme for equipment has 
been in force for many years it might well be continued and 
extended to all classes of movable property, and also to any 
classes of property which are essentially in the nature of in­
dustrial plant. It might also be desirable to initiate depreci­
ation provisions computed on the annuity, or sinking fund, 
basis for the replacement of exceptionally large units re­
placeable only as a whole.
The only further provision that seems to be called for is 
a reserve for the equalization of maintenance charges based 
on the reasonable expectations for a period of, say, five or 
ten years in the future. In the management of such a reserve 
the carriers should be given fairly wide discretion, though 
the Commission should retain power to deal effectively with 
any case in which the maintenance charges might be grossly 
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inadequate or obviously excessive. Transfers to and from 
the reserve should appear as separate items in the accounts 
so that the actual maintenance expenditures would not be 
obscured. So long as the present rules governing the deter­
mination of the rate base prevail, this reserve should not in 
any event be allowed to exceed the percentage of the book 
value of the property to which it would relate, which would 
be deductible from the new value of similar property as 
“observed depreciation” in a valuation proceeding.
It is believed that a program such as is here outlined 
would accomplish all the desirable objects which the Com­
mission aims to accomplish by a depreciation system, and 
would be free from the objections to the Commission’s pro­
posals which have been set forth herein.
Upon the larger question of fixing a rate base, the best 
interests of all parties would seem to call for a settlement by 
agreement between the carriers and the Commission. For 
the moment the carriers have the advantage in the courts. 
But few suppose that the carrier groups will in practice ever 
be allowed to earn a return on the full present undepreci­
ated reproduction cost of their property, and the next turn 
of the wheel may leave them in a far less satisfactory position 
than they now occupy. They can afford to make consider­
able abatements of their claims to secure certainty. The 
Commission can scarcely hope to maintain its claim that 
straight line depreciation should be deducted from new 
value to arrive at present value in service, nor the carriers 
their claim that there is no loss of value where there is no 
observable loss of efficiency. If the parties could approach 
the question in a sincere effort to reach by agreement a 
reasonable settlement, instead of advancing extreme claims, 
a solution of a difficult and vital problem should be attain­
able that would be fair to carriers and the public alike. 
Probably new legislation would have to be enacted and ac­
cepted by the carriers to enable settlements to be made 
which would be permanently effective and binding, but the 
advantages to all parties of a fixed method of determining 
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the rate base as compared with the ill-defined and uncertain 
methods which the Supreme Court has felt compelled by the 
Constitution to prescribe, are so apparent and substantial 
that it should not be an extremely difficult task to secure the 
passage and acceptance of the necessary laws.
VI
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON DEPRECIATION AND THE 
RATE BASE *
(1930)
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Baltimore Rail­
ways case (The United Railways and Electric Company of 
Baltimore v. West et al., Public Service Commission of 
Maryland, decided on January 6, 1930) adds a new chapter to 
the legal history of the depreciation question in relation to 
rate regulation. While the decision of the question immedi­
ately at issue was one of great technical interest, the implica­
tions of the decision are perhaps of even greater importance, 
though that importance may not be so immediately ap­
parent. It is proposed to deal briefly with both points.
Depreciation enters into rate cases in two ways. Depreci­
ation attributable to a particular period is a charge against 
the earnings of that period, and the accumulated deprecia­
tion at any given date operates to reduce the rate base (that 
is, the value of the property employed in rendering service) 
at that date. In this instance it was the first only, the charge 
against earnings, that was in question; the rate base was prac­
tically agreed, and the treatment of depreciation in fixing 
that base was not before the Court.†
The problem of fixing a depreciation allowance to be re­
couped out of charges for service is, in part, one of deciding 
what exhaustion is to be provided for, and, in part, one of
* Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XLIV (August, 1930), pp. 687-97. 
†† In the present note, only those parts (much the most important) of the 
majority and minority opinions are considered which discuss the matter of 
depreciation. There was also discussion (as well as dissent) as regards the 
fair rate or percentage of return, which should be allowed on the basic 
sum—the rate base. The majority held that a return of 7.44 per cent 
sought by the Company itself, was the least that could be deemed non­
confiscatory; whereas Justices Brandeis and Holmes maintained that “a net 
return of 6.26 per cent would seem to be compensatory.” 
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expressing the exhaustion in terms of money. Under the 
first head come such questions as whether the allowance is to 
cover only wear and tear, or wear and tear and also obsoles­
cence; and whether it is to be measured by observation, or in 
some other way. Under the second head comes the question 
whether the exhaustion is to be expressed in terms of money 
on the basis of original cost, present reproduction cost, or 
probable replacement cost.
Questions under both heads had been considered by the 
Maryland Commission and the Maryland Court of Appeals, 
but only the second phase was discussed by the Supreme 
Court. The Maryland Commission, in its decision of the 
rate case, had adopted two principles: first, that the annual 
allowance for depreciation should be determined on the 
basis of original cost; and second, that the allowance should 
be. sufficient to “provide a fund out of which retirements 
may be met as they occur, and also to create a reserve out of 
which ordinary obsolescence may be cared for.”
The Court of Appeals of Maryland had approved the Com­
mission’s decision on the second point, but had held that the 
allowance should be based on present value instead of orig­
inal cost. The Commission had then recomputed the al­
lowance on that basis, the result being an increase in the 
amount for the year under review from $883,544 to 
$1,658,650.
The Supreme Court, in concluding that the order of the 
Maryland Commission was confiscatory, deducted the larger 
sum of $1,658,650 from the earnings as the necessary pro­
vision for depreciation, thus in effect upholding the decision 
of the Maryland Court of Appeals on both points. It did 
not discuss the principle that a depreciation fund should pro­
vide for retirements and ordinary obsolescence, but its ap­
proval of this principle is clearly implied in, and necessary 
to, the conclusion reached.
In the majority opinion of the United States Supreme 
Court, the discussion of the depreciation question begins as 
follows: “The allowance for annual depreciation made by 
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the Commission was based upon cost. The Court of Appeals 
held that this was erroneous and that it should have been 
based upon present value.. The Court’s view of the matter 
was plainly right.” But in spite of this clear-cut declaration, 
the effect of the decision on the question of the basis on 
which the exhaustion is to be expressed in terms of money 
is not free from doubt.
The standard sum with which the probable yield of a rate 
structure is to be compared in order to determine whether 
that structure is compensatory or confiscatory may be con­
veniently regarded as composed of three parts:
1. An amount to cover a fair return on capital invest­
ment.
2. An amount to cover exhaustion of property.
3. An amount to cover all expenses of or incidental to 
operation, except those of making good exhaustion of 
property.
The first amount is, under a long series of decisions of the 
Supreme Court, in the nature of compensation based on 
value, not on cost. The third is merely a reimbursement of 
cost. The question remains whether the second amount 
should be determined like the first, as compensation based 
on value, or like the third, as a reimbursement of cost? If 
the latter, should the measure be the original cost of the 
property exhausted or the cost of making good the ex­
haustion?
The majority opinion decides categorically that the allow­
ance for exhaustion must not be computed on the basis of 
original cost of the property exhausted. It seems to leave 
open, however, the question whether the allowance should 
be computed as a compensation based on value, or as a reim­
bursement of cost based on the actual or probable cost of re­
placing the property exhausted. For after upholding, in the 
language above cited, the use of present value in the case at 
bar, the Court entered upon a discussion which leaves a 
doubt as to whether present value was adopted as the basis 
because it was present value or because it was the most 
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practical approximation to probable cost of replacement.
After quoting the language of the Knoxville Water Com­
pany case to the effect that the utility “is entitled to see that 
from earnings the value of the property invested is kept un­
impaired, so that at the end of any given term of years the 
original investment remains as it was at the beginning,” * 
the Court adds: “This naturally calls for expenditures equal 
to the cost † of the worn-out equipment at the time of re­
placement; and this, for all practical purposes, means present 
value.”
So far, the argument would appear to lead to the conclu­
sion that in principle the allowance was to be based on actual 
or probable cost of replacement, and that for the purposes 
of the instant case, at least, present value was a reasonable 
guide to probable cost of replacement. But in the ensuing 
sentence the Court said: “It is the settled rule of this Court 
that the rate base is present value, and it would be wholly 
illogical to adopt a different rule for depreciation.” Here, 
the Court seems to adopt present value upon its own merits 
and not as a guide to replacement cost.
Mr. Justice Stone, while concurring in a dissenting 
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, added a vigorous attack of 
his own on the validity, either generally or in this particular 
case, of the assumption that replacement cost means, for all 
practical purposes, present value. His opinion concludes as 
follows:
To say that the present price level is necessarily the true 
measure of future replacement cost is to substitute for a 
relevant fact which I should have thought ought to be estab­
lished as are other facts, a rule of law which seems not to 
follow from Smyth v. Ames, and to be founded neither upon 
experience nor expert opinion and to be unworkable in 
practice. In the present case it can be applied only by dis­
regarding evidence which would seem persuasively to estab­
lish the very fact to be ascertained.
* In passing it may be remarked that this sounds like an echo of the 
prudent investment theory.
† Cost here evidently means cost of replacement, not original cost.
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Mr. Justice Stone did not discuss the argument that it 
would be illogical to adopt a rule for depreciation different 
from that adopted in determining the rate base. Mr. Justice 
Brandeis rejected the argument, on the ground that the de­
preciation charge is designed to distribute the total net ex­
pense of plant replacement over the period of use. One is 
probably justified in concluding that the Court upheld the 
present value basis as being, for all practical purposes, 
equivalent to the cost of replacement, and that the argument 
by analogy from the method of determining the rate base was 
thrown in rather as a makeweight.
Whether a depreciation scheme for a regulated utility 
should be based on original cost or probable cost of replace­
ment is, from a practical standpoint, a relatively minor con­
sideration. But it is essential, and the point is important, 
that depreciation shall be recognized as a reimbursement of 
cost and treated accordingly. Certainly there is nothing in 
the decision to preclude the Court from so interpreting it in 
any future case, and the hope may be expressed that it will 
adopt this interpretation should the question arise, as it 
probably will.
Any depreciation scheme is necessarily based to a large 
extent on estimates and assumptions. In order that it may 
operate equitably, the original estimates and assumptions 
must be reasonable, the scheme must be continuously and 
consistently carried out from year to year, and proper pro­
vision must be made for the correction (without undue dis­
turbance of the operating or financial situation) of estimates 
made in earlier years which in the light of later experience 
may prove to have been too high or too low. A further 
essential is that the theory of distribution of the cost of 
property over its useful life shall harmonize with the theory 
of valuation on which the rate base is to be determined. 
Finally it is highly desirable, if not essential, that the scheme 
shall be suitable for the current. accounting of the utility, 
as well as applicable in the determination of rates.
All these requirements can be met so long as the allow­
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ance is treated as a reimbursement of costs, actual or pros­
pective. If replacement cost is used rather than original 
cost, the basic problem is not changed, even though a new as­
sumption becomes necessary, and continuity and provision 
for adjustment become the more necessary. If, however, the 
view were to be accepted that for rate purposes the allowance 
for any year should be determined as compensation for the 
exhaustion of life occurring within the year, measured by 
observation and expressed in money in terms of current re­
production prices, the whole computation being made with­
out regard to the provision made in any other year or to 
the actual outlays for original purchase or replacement, then 
all the essentials above recited would be sacrificed and a 
method would be substituted which would be discontinu­
ous, conjectural, and utterly unsuited for any other purpose, 
if not, indeed, for the purpose contemplated.
These considerations become even more important if the 
depreciation scheme aims to provide for obsolescence as well 
as mere physical exhaustion. In the Baltimore case, the 
Commission upon the original hearing stated its position as 
follows: “In making an allowance for depreciation the Com­
mission will endeavor to provide a fund out of which retire­
ments may be made as they occur, and also to create a reserve 
out of which ordinary obsolescence may be cared for.” As 
already stated the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the 
Commission on this point.
Now, allowance for obsolescence is, to repeat, hardly prac­
ticable except under a scheme continuously and consistently 
applied, with provision for adjustment of estimates on the 
basis of experience. Accounting control and observation are 
both essential to the proper administration of such a depre­
ciation plan. The courts, whose relation to the question is 
more remote and spasmodic, are apt to stress the importance 
of the second essential, observation; but commissions, whose 
relation is closer and more continuous, perhaps realize more 
fully the importance of accounting control.
With the modern development of accounting methods, 
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book records, supplemented by such engineering reports as 
a competent accounting officer will naturally call for, will 
prove the most effective and reliable basis for computing and 
adjusting depreciation allowances. To illustrate the point 
from another field: book inventories, properly maintained 
(as they now are by most important corporations), have 
proved to be more reliable in the case of any large and com­
plex business than inventories based on physical examina­
tion, count, weight, and measurement. Much the same is 
true in the field of depreciation.
It has been mentioned above as an essential of a sound 
system of depreciation for regulated utilities that the meth­
ods and theories upon which the annual allowances are 
computed must harmonize with the methods and theories 
governing the determination of the rate base. It would 
seem inevitable that the courts must accept this principle 
when once it is clearly presented. If obsolescence is to be 
allowed for in determining the annual allowance, it must 
be allowed for in the fixing of the rate base—otherwise, the 
consumers will inevitably be subjected to a double charge. 
But the application of the principle obviously presents a 
problem of considerable difficulty.
In this problem, obsolescence may be considered in two 
parts: first, what may be called demonstrated obsolescence; 
second, potential obsolescence. At the earliest stage—say at 
the end of the first year of operation of a new plant—some 
reserve will have been set aside for obsolescence; but pre­
sumably there will be little if any demonstrable obsolescence 
to be provided for and the reserve will be applicable only 
to potential obsolescence. How is such potential obsoles­
cence to be allowed for in the determination of the rate base?
If the rate base were being determined on the basis of 
original cost, it would be a simple and equitable solution to 
treat the excess of the reserve set aside for depreciation in 
the year, over and above the observed depreciation, as being 
a reserve for potential future obsolescence, and the desired 
consistency would be secured by deducting it, as well as the 
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observed depreciation, from that cost, to arrive at the rate 
base.
Where the rate base is computed on present value, prob­
ably the only practical way of making the proposed adjust­
ment would be by use of ratios. The cost value of the prop­
erty subject to obsolescence and the reserve for obsolescence 
in respect thereof being known, the deduction for obsoles­
cence from the reproduction value might be computed at 
the same percentage as the actual reserve for obsolescence 
might be found to bear to the cost value of the property 
subject to obsolescence.
In the case of the plant of a utility which had been operat­
ing for a long period of years, there would be both demon­
strated or observable obsolescence, and potential obsoles­
cence. It would certainly be desirable, and should be 
practicable, to express the demonstrable obsolescence in 
terms of money.
Let us suppose, for instance, the case of a unit which cost 
originally $1,000 but would now cost $1,200 to replace in 
kind. Assume that it has been in service ten years and that 
from the purely physical standpoint it would be good for 
another ten years’ service. Suppose, however, that it is 
capable of being replaced with a unit of a new type which 
would cost $900, which would be estimated to have a life, 
allowing for physical exhaustion and ordinary obsolescence, 
of fifteen years, and would effect an economy .in operation 
of $36.00 per annum. Let it be assumed that the fair return 
on investment in the utility is 7 per cent, and that deprecia­
tion allowances are being computed on a sinking fund basis, 
with interest at 4 per cent.
Upon the foregoing suppositions, would it not be fair to 
hold that the value of the existing unit, depreciated for ob­
solescence, is determined by consideration of the cost of the 
new and superior type? If so, it seems clear that allowance 
for demonstrated obsolescence (even without taking into ac­
count further potential obsolescence) brings a result that is 
very close to valuation on the basis of the current cost of the 
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most effective unit that could be substituted for the existing 
unit, rather than upon the cost of reproducing the unit actu­
ally existing.*
The courts in the past have been reluctant to go into this 
question. In the Indianapolis Water Company case (272 
U. S., 400) the Supreme Court said:
There is to be ascertained the value of the plant used to 
give the service and not the estimated cost of a different 
plant. Save under exceptional circumstances, the Court is 
not required to enter upon a comparison of the merits of 
different systems. Such an inquiry would lead to collateral 
issues and investigations having only remote bearing on the 
fact to be found, viz., the value of the property devoted to 
the service of the public.
But with all respect, it would seem that the Court here 
begged the question. Why should the value of the plant 
actually used be measured by the cost of reproducing it, if 
a more efficient type of plant could be constructed at a 
materially lower cost? Even if the new value of an existing 
plant may properly be computed on the basis of reproduc­
tion cost, certainly its value as depreciated for use or ob­
solescence cannot be determined without consideration of 
the question of its relative efficiency and economy in con­
struction and operation as compared with the most efficient 
and economical substitute that could be created.
This line of thought suggests that the implicit approval 
by the Supreme Court of the recognition by the Commission 
of obsolescence as an element of depreciation in rate cases 
may be quite as important as its explicit rejection of original 
cost as the basis of the calculation of the allowance. Indeed 
it may be that further consideration of the depreciation ques-
* The calculation in detail might be as follows:
The sinking fund required to write off $900 in fifteen years at 4 per cent 
would be $44.95; the annual return on $900 at 7 per cent would be $63.00— 
together, $107.95. Deducting $36.00 from this amount for the greater econ­
omy of the newer unit leaves a balance of $71.95, which would seem to 
represent fairly the annual value in service of the existing unit. The cor­
responding capital value of the unit on the basis of ten years’ unexpired life, 
allowing a 7 per cent return and a 4 per cent sinking fund, would be $469.37. 
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tion may eventually shake the foundations of the current 
theory of present value. Even if it be granted that, in prin­
ciple, present value is a more appropriate basis for calcula­
tion of the fair return than original cost, it is obvious that 
the current theory of computation of present value is highly 
artificial and the results often lacking in reality.
The validity of the conclusions reached under the current 
theory depends on the validity of the underlying assump­
tions which must be made if a computation is to be possible. 
It is necessary to make assumptions as to the conditions im­
mediately prior to the theoretical reproduction, which, in 
the case of a really important property, such as a large rail­
road system, are highly speculative and unreal. Again, as 
already noted, in order to keep the inquiry within bounds 
the courts have felt compelled to indulge the presumption, 
frequently unwarranted, that the existing plant would be 
worth reproducing if it did not exist. For instance, the 
value of a building and the site on which it stands is assumed 
to be the aggregate of the value of the land and of the cost 
of reproduction, less depreciation, of the building; though 
the land may be taken at its value for an entirely different 
purpose, and the true aggregate value of the property may be 
the value of the land, less the probable cost of removing the 
building.
The resulting valuation is thus a conventional, not a real, 
figure. This may not be a fatal objection, but at least con­
ventions should be applied with reasonable consistency. If 
it be accepted as a convention that properties properly main­
tained do not depreciate, then it should be accepted as a 
convention that earnings are determinable without any al­
lowance for depreciation. If a convention closer to reality 
is to be adopted, that properties depreciate through age and 
obsolescence, even though well maintained, and that an al­
lowance for such depreciation must be made in determining 
earnings, then allowance for depreciation from age and ob­
solescence, and not merely for observed depreciation, should 
be made in fixing present value.
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How far afield and to what results the consistent applica­
tion of the doctrines and conventions now current would 
lead is a question of vital importance to public utilities and 
to the public. At the least, it would seriously modify ex­
isting practice in rate regulation; it might result in the break­
down of the whole present system. Discontent with that 
system is rife, and much of the discontent well-founded. It 
is perhaps a question whether regulation on the basis of fair 
return is really practicable or effective. Constitutional limi­
tations may prevent the substitution of other methods which 
have been suggested. But, if this be so, the result may be 
a drift toward something entirely different, public owner­
ship.
Taking the long view, no problem perhaps possesses more 
importance for the utilities than that of presenting some 
constructive plan for securing justice to the consumers as 
well as reasonable opportunities for profit-making for them­
selves. At the moment, however, the utility managers seem, 
in general, content to do nothing, and to rely upon the de­
cisions of the Supreme Court, and upon the fog with which 
the whole question is shrouded as a result of those decisions, 
for the maintenance of a situation which for the time is 
financially satisfactory. They are not likely to change their 
attitude until they are convinced that the protection on 
which they rely is not so complete nor so well assured as 
they have thought it to be. There is danger to them in a 
fuller recognition by the Court of the limited significance 
of cost of reproduction of existing plant and of the essential 
importance of coordination between the different parts of 
the problem of regulation and, more particularly, between 
the charges against earnings for depreciation and the deduc­
tion from the rate base on account thereof.
The Supreme Court is not committed to any rule of law 
which assures to cost of reproduction the importance which 
in practice has been given to it in some recent decisions. 
If the Court should accept—as in the end it may be com­
pelled to do—the logic of cost of production of the most 
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efficient substitute (less depreciation) as the basis of valua­
tion, while the results would still be uncertain, the uncer­
tainty would be fraught with grave danger to the utilities. 
They would be wise to recognize this danger, to admit the 
unsatisfactory state of regulation, and to devote their ex­
perience and their knowledge of the problem to finding a 
solution that would be just to the public as well as fair to 
themselves.
VII
THE UNITED RAILWAYS DECISION EXAMINED *
(1930)
The Supreme Court, in its recent decision in the case of the 
United Railways & Electric Company † of Baltimore, handed 
down as we go to press, has accepted a logical corollary to 
its former decisions. It has long been clear that in deter­
mining whether or not a given rate structure is confiscatory 
the test is to compare the probable yield thereunder with 
the aggregate of three things:
(1) The amounts necessarily expended for supplies con­
sumed, wages and salaries paid and expense incurred 
in rendering the service;
(2) Compensation for the partial exhaustion of the prop­
erty used in rendering service;
(3) A return at a reasonable rate on the value of the prop­
erty necessarily employed in rendering the service.
In previous cases the court had held consistently that the 
third element must be computed upon the present values 
of the property, and it is entirely logical that it should now 
apply the same ruling to the second element in the compu­
tation. Any doubts as to the soundness of this decision must 
be based on practical considerations. The difficulties in­
herent in such a method of determination are dwelt upon 
by Mr. Justice Brandeis in a long dissenting opinion. To 
the accountant, much of this opinion will probably seem 
persuasive, though it is lengthened and weakened by refer­
ences to industrial practices which seem irrelevant to the 
present discussion. Industrial precedents are not valid, be­
cause cost is the foundation of industrial accounting just
* An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLIX 
(February, 1930), pp. 81-83.
†Cf. 278 U. S., 567.
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as surely as present value has become the basis of rate regula­
tion through the decisions of the Court.
Viewed from the professional standpoint, the decision un­
fortunately seems to imply -a further enhancement of the 
importance of the engineer and a corresponding diminu­
tion of the part to be played by the accountant. The ques­
tion whether rates are or are not confiscatory will become 
more and more an engineering question. Up to the present, 
the practical application, of the test above-mentioned has 
been based mainly on cost of reproduction, which is com­
paratively easy of ascertainment; but the next logical step 
would seem to be to base the determination on a considera­
tion of the cost and the rate of exhaustion of an ideal plant 
capable of rendering the same service. If the value of the 
property employed or exhausted is to be the test, that value 
is no greater because the plant rendering the service is ex­
pensive and subject to rapid depreciation than it would be 
if the same service were being rendered by a different type 
of plant, cheaper to construct and subject to less deprecia­
tion. If this view is correct, the determinations of the courts 
in future cases may become more and more speculative and 
the practical outcome depend largely on the skill of the 
professional advisors to the two sides of the controversy. 
Our engineering friends are to be congratulated on the pros­
pect thus opening up, and we have no doubt the utilities, 
with their aid, will fare well in the courts. For the present, 
and until the price curve turns downward or new inventions 
render existing plants obsolete, the public may expect to 
bear not only the cost of higher compensation to the utilities 
but the higher cost of securing that compensation.
Of course, there is another side of the picture. The 
courts have always insisted that rates must be reasonable and 
may not be increased, even if they are not fully compensa­
tory, if an increase would make them unreasonable. While 
this limitation is itself difficult of enforcement, the American 
public by and large gets its service from the utilities at rea­
sonable prices. Perhaps, therefore, there will be no general
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complaint if a part of the skill and resourcefulness which is 
constantly being devoted to reducing the cost of operation 
is diverted to the task of increasing the limit of gross rev­
enues. Furthermore, a meed of praise should be accorded 
to those who presented to the Court in the Baltimore case a 
record which forced the Court to the conclusion that a return 
of 6.26 per cent certainly was not, and a return of 7.44 might 
not be, sufficient to attract capital into the street railway 
field.

PART III
VALUATION

ITHE VALUATION OF GOODWILL *
 (1912)
Question: Coming to the question of the value of the good­
will, will you please tell us how you estimated that value?
Answer: The value of the goodwill was a very difficult 
problem indeed. In the first place, I adopted the method 
that has been used in numerous cases which have come to 
my notice in the sale of goodwill, of determining the value 
solely on the basis of the earning capacity or of the past 
earnings. Some time before May 20, Mr. Ordway asked me 
a question on that subject, and I worked out the value of 
the goodwill for him on the basis of deducting from the 
earnings interest on the investment, tangible assets, and then 
capitalizing the excess on the basis of five years’ profits. 
Now, taking the profits for the five and a half years ending 
January 31, 1910, I arrived at a value of eight hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars, allowing seven per cent interest on 
tangible assets, or a million dollars allowing six per cent. 
In considering the question on May 20, I used that calcula­
tion as a starting point, and considered what seemed to me 
to be the modifying factors. First of all, the profits for the 
year 1909 had amounted to only three hundred and ten 
thousand dollars, or seventy thousand dollars less than the 
average which I had used in the earlier calculations, so that 
if the last year’s profits were taken as the basis I figured the 
result would be to reduce, the value of the goodwill by a 
sum of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Then the 
other factors which I considered were first of all as regards 
the wholesale department. There had been considerable 
discussion of a proposed sale of the wholesale department
* Excerpt from testimony, In the Matter of the Estate of E. P. Hatch, 
Deceased (Lord & Taylor), (1912).
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without any payment for goodwill, and in the course of 
discussion on that subject I learned that there was some 
doubt as to the permanency of that business, and further­
more that it was a question whether the goodwill of the 
wholesale department did not inhere to a large extent in the 
two managers who had direct charge of the business and 
who were in personal touch with the manufacturing houses 
and the trade. Then a further element that detracted from 
the value of the goodwill seemed to me to be the dissension 
amongst the management, which was undoubtedly operating 
adversely to the business. Then again, there was the fact 
that most leases of the premises expired in 1914, so that there 
was the prospect of having to move the business. Of course 
it is not possible to assign specific weights to each one of 
these considerations, but weighing all of them together—I 
do not know whether I should go any further—I think I have 
probably answered your question.
Q. Did you take into consideration the efficiency of man­
agement in the retail department?
A. Yes. Of course the retail department—the ratio of 
profit in that department had been so much reduced that at 
that actual time I should say the profits being earned in the 
retail department would not have justified any payment for 
goodwill of that business as it stood, although of course the 
established name does give the goodwill a value in strong 
hands.
Q. Did you also take into consideration the lack of work­
ing capital?
A. Well, that was a factor not so much in the valuation 
of the goodwill as in the desirability of the proposed sale as 
a whole, the lack of working capital; it was a very important 
element in that.
Q. Had you any immediate or direct knowledge with re­
gard to the inefficiency of the management of the retail de­
partment?
A. Well, I had a number of criticisms of it, but the main 
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factor to my mind was the low ratio of profit. That, it 
seemed to me, must be evidence of inefficiency somewhere.
Q. Where did you get at the figures of the ratio of profit 
in the two departments?
A. Well, various statements were prepared.
Q. Were they the result of any researches which you made 
in the books of Lord & Taylor or were they based upon re­
ports which came to you from others?
A. Do you mean that I made personally? ,
Q. Yes.
A. Or through my representatives?
Q. That you made personally.
A. Not on those that I made personally, except in part 
they were figures according to the books and in part they 
were figures made up by my subordinates.
Q. Not from the books?
A. Well, from the books with adjustments. Some of them 
were absolute book figures.
Q. When you speak of adjustments do you mean adjust­
ments in this sense, that somebody took up the accounts as 
they stood on the books, and they from time to time made, 
so to speak nunc pro tunc, reservations and deductions as 
you would have made if you had been there at the time?
A. Yes, that is what I mean by adjusted figures.
Q. Take, for instance, in 1910, you assumed a certain ad­
justment made for the year 1906, which in point of fact had 
not been made in 1906, is that the idea?
A. Yes, that is what I referred to.
Q. And so on all through the years in succession?
A. Yes, but then I also considered the unadjusted figures. 
I have here a statement.
Q. As regards the working capital, should you say to us 
the same thing that you said in regard to all those other ele­
ments of your judgment, that you attributed to it no par­
ticular value in the deductions which were to be made?
A. I think “particular” is an unfortunate term to use, 
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because saying “no particular value” might be considered as 
meaning “no material value.” I attached no specific value to 
it, although I did attach considerable importance to it.
Q. You think that “specific” in this relation might have 
a different meaning from “particular”?
A. Well, I do not think it would be so ambiguous.
Q. Have you now told us all that you are able to recollect 
with regard to the—if you do not object I shall use the same 
word again—particular value that you assigned to these dif­
ferent elements of diminution?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, lumping them all together as you have done, 
what was their aggregate value as a figure to be deducted 
from the figure at which you started?
A. Well, I did not feel it quite necessary to put an ag­
gregate value.
Q. Did you simply guess at it?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you make an accurate computation?
A. No—
Q. You did not?
A. I took—
Q. One moment. Did you make an accurate computa­
tion?
A. No, I did not.
Q. And you did not guess at it?
A. No, I did not guess at it.
Q. And you did not average it?
A. No, I did not average it.
Q. Then will you tell us precisely what you did with it?
A. Well, I took the maximum value for the stock as de­
termined by my starting point, and the value that I was asked 
to consider for the common stock, and asked myself the ques­
tion: Is the difference between those two values, those two 
figures, sufficient, in the light of all those circumstances and 
of the whole proposed arrangement, to justify you in ad­
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vising the executors not to make the proposed sale? That 
is substantially how I dealt with the question.
Q. Mr. May, in this question I do not mean to make any 
imputation at all upon your purposes, but should we not be 
quite right in understanding that when you certified the 
balance sheet as of January 31, 1910, you believed that 
balance sheet which you certified to be correct?
A. Yes, certainly. Perhaps I ought—if you will allow me, 
I will elaborate that.
Q. You say you did understand it to be correct?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q. What you said was, “We certify that the above balance 
sheet correctly sets forth the financial condition of the com­
pany at January 31, 1910.”
A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe that statement to be true?
A. I believed that to be true, yes.
Q. Do you now believe it to be true?
A. I still believe it to be true.
Q. When you signed that statement in those words were 
you making any mental or other reservations?
A. Well, I do not know quite what you mean by that. 
The way I would—
Q. Have you not heard the expression of saying a thing 
with a mental reservation?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, you know what the phrase means, don’t you?
A. Well, it has a rather sinister sense, in which sense of 
course I had no mental reservations.
Q. You do not now wish to express any mental reserva­
tion, do you?
A. No, of course a balance sheet is always a question of 
opinion.
Q. It was your opinion, was it not, that this balance sheet 
correctly sets forth the financial condition of the business?
A. Yes, it was—
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Q. Was it your opinion or not?
A. It was my opinion that—
Q. Can’t you answer my question yes or no?
A. I think not without giving rise to misunderstanding.
Q. I understand you to say that you are not able to say 
categorically either yes or no to the question I put to you, 
whether in your opinion this balance sheet correctly sets 
forth the financial condition of the company; is that so?
A. Well, of course I can say it is a correct statement, but 
I do not know that that is the whole answer. At the same 
time I do not want to inject anything.
Q. Now, Mr. May, when you make that remark are you 
not really telling us that you made that certification with 
some mental reservation?
A. No, all I mean by that: for instance that balance 
sheet might have been made up to show a surplus of two 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars less, and I would still 
have said that it showed the correct position of the company.
Q. Now, how will you explain that discrepancy? You 
have certified that when you showed a surplus of four hun­
dred and eighty-six thousand dollars that statement was cor­
rect; now you say that if you had certified to a surplus of 
two hundred and thirty-six thousand dollars, that also would 
have been correct.
A. Yes, that is—
Q. Now, they both would have been correct?
A. Well, I think they would have been both correct in 
that they would be both fair expressions of opinion; and that 
is all a balance sheet ever is.
Q. Oh, you do not regard a balance sheet then as rep­
resenting a state of fact, but as representing a state of mind, 
is that the idea?
A. Well, I would state my position exactly as Lord Jus­
tice Buckley stated it, that it is necessarily a question of 
estimate and opinion, every balance sheet.
Q. Did he say that about your opinion?
A. He did not say that about my opinion, he said that 
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about every balance sheet; and the greater of course includes 
the less.
Q. We all recognize the influential value of expressions 
of opinion by Lord Justice Buckley, we do not at all mean to 
disparage that, but of course you know, Mr. May, that the 
opinion which we are now dealing with is Mr. May’s opinion.
A. Exactly. But I did not feel that I could improve on 
the language of the Lord Justice nor did I care to plagiarize 
it without acknowledging the source.
Q. Now, then, you tell us that it would have been just as 
true to certify to a surplus of four hundred and eighty-six 
thousand dollars as it would have been to certify to a surplus 
of two hundred and thirty-six thousand dollars?
A. Both would have been certified and both would have 
been correct statements.
Q. So you might have cut off two hundred and thirty-six 
thousand dollars, might you not?
A. Yes.
Q. And leave no balance?
A. Oh, a further two hundred and thirty-six thousand?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, I do not know how far one could go, but I just 
took the figures of the two hundred and fifty thousand less 
as representing in my mind the reasonable limit of the opin­
ions.
Q. Now, if you could with propriety certify to a surplus 
of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars less than you have 
certified to, might you not with propriety have certified to 
a surplus of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars more 
than you certified to?
A. No, I am quite satisfied as to that.
Q. Then your opinion would only be justified in the de­
scending scale?
A. In the case of this particular balance sheet.
Q. Once again, if it would have been equally true to say 
that the surplus was two hundred and thirty-six thousand 
dollars as it was to say that the surplus was four hundred and 
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eighty-six thousand dollars—once again, would it not have 
been equally true to say that the surplus was nothing at all?
A. Not necessarily. No, not in fact, I think.
Q. Where would you draw the line between two hundred 
and thirty-six thousand dollars and nothing at all?
A. Well, I would not draw a hard and fast line anywhere; 
but in that balance sheet there are at least—
Q. Wait a minute. I am not talking about that. I am 
asking you to give us an answer to my question. You say 
you would not draw a fast and hard line anywhere; now, give 
us a wavy line somewhere.
A. Well, it is very hard to do.
Q. Is it too hard for you to do?
A. Well, it is too hard for me to do offhand without care­
ful consideration.
Q. You mean that in order to do it you would have to 
sit down with that large bundle of papers that you have be­
side you and work out some mathematical computations?
A. No, I would have to sit down and consider what I 
considered the limits of value—of reasonable difference of 
opinion as to value of certain assets in that balance sheet.
Q. If I follow you, that would not then be a mathematical 
computation but it would be an evolution of opinion, is that 
it?
A. That is it, purely an expression of opinion and judg­
ment.
Q. So that when we are talking about this balance sheet 
of January 31, 1910, when you certified that the correct 
financial condition of the company shows a surplus of four 
hundred and eighty-six thousand dollars, are we to under­
stand that that figure merely represents the evolution of your 
opinions up to that time?
A. No, I think that would be an erroneous impression. 
But it is our opinion that it is correctly adjusted and it is cor­
rectly stated in respect, of course, to the majority of items, in 
my opinion; but there are certain items, as I said before, that 
are of doubtful value, and in those cases, as I said before, 
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we have accepted values placed upon the properties by the 
Finance Committee or officers of the Company; and in re­
gard to those assets there is room for a certain latitude of 
opinion.
Q. Will you tell me once again what you mean by tan­
gible assets of this concern?
A. The excess of all assets, excluding goodwill and trade­
marks, over liabilities. Net tangible assets is the expression 
I would use.
Q. You have not used that word “net” heretofore when I 
asked you the questions.
A. Well, I used the same phrase, the investment in tan­
gible assets.
Q. If you leave out net, and we are talking about tangible 
assets, you would regard, wouldn’t you, the whole amount 
of merchandise as a tangible asset?
A. Yes.
Q. And all the horses and wagons as tangible assets?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. And fixtures?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you regard accounts receivable as a tangible 
asset?
A. Yes, I would include everything on the assets’ side of 
the balance sheet except the goodwill.
Q. Is it customary in your profession to call an account 
receivable a tangible asset?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the meaning of the word tangible as it is used 
in your profession?
A. Well, I think it is—unfortunately the whole termi­
nology of my profession and of finance generally is pretty 
loose, but I think its significance is best reached by saying 
that it is everything that is not intangible, and intangible 
includes goodwill, trade-marks, patents, franchises, and that 
class of property.
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Q. I infer, Mr. May, from your experience and from the 
degrees which you hold of which you have told us, that you 
know what in ordinary speech the word tangible means, 
don’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, what do you understand it to mean in ordinary 
speech?
A. Something that can be touched, I imagine.
Q. Like merchandise?
A. Yes.
Q. You can touch merchandise or horses?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you touch an account?
A. You can touch the debtor.
Q. Is that the basis on which you include the debtor’s 
debt as tangible?
A. It had not occurred to me before, but possibly it is.
II
VALUATION OF MINES *
(1916)
It is apparent that the maximum value of the mine will be 
found by valuing it on one of two theories: the first, that 
the mine would be operated until the stock should accumu­
late to a point where further accumulation would be un­
profitable (assuming that the mine would continue to yield 
for that period) and that then the mine would be closed 
down and the sulphur on hand liquidated; the second, that 
the current production of the mine would first be liquidated 
and that the accumulated stock would be sold only when 
the mine ceases to produce. Whichever method gives the 
higher capital value is properly applicable. Calculations 
show that on the basis of any probable volume of sales the 
first method gives the higher values (using the same basis, 
figures of sales, expenditures, and rate of profit) and this is 
true even if, for the purpose of the second method, the op­
erations are assumed to continue indefinitely. The first 
method is therefore applied in the calculations which follow, 
in spite of the fact that it is more complicated in application.
The present value of a sum of money to be received at 
a future date varies according to (1) the interval that will 
elapse before its receipt, and (2) the rate which is taken as 
the proper rate of return upon the present investment.
If the interval and rate of return are known or assumed, 
the present value can readily be calculated or found in in­
terest tables. In the same way if the rate of return and pres­
ent value are known, the interval can be calculated. This 
is the form in which the problem occurs in the present case. 
This problem is: How long can the company afford to carry
* Excerpt from an affidavit in the matter of appraisal under the Transfer 
Tax Law—Estate of Herman Frasch (Union Sulphur Co.), April, 1916.
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stock before selling it? If the selling price is, say, three times 
cost, the question is: How many years can the sale be de­
ferred and still leave the present value of the proceeds (at 
whatever rate of return is decided upon) more than one- 
third of the face value?
The first requirement is, therefore, to ascertain certain 
basic factors for the calculations, viz.:
(a) Probable annual sales (tonnage)
(b) Probable net selling price
(c) Probable production cost
(d) Possible rate of production (assuming operations con­
tinue)
(e) Rate of profit which anyone engaged in the venture 
would reasonably expect it to yield.
I will next deal with the reasonable expectations in regard 
to the volume and prices of sales and the volume and cost 
of production.
In forming estimates in regard to future production or 
sales the natural starting point is the experience of the past. 
It is apparent, however, that past results are not in them­
selves conclusive; the operations of a patent-owning com­
pany for a period immediately preceding the expiration of 
its patents being, for instance, useless as an indication of its 
future prospects. It is necessary, therefore, in connection 
with the results of the past to consider what changes in con­
ditions have occurred or can reasonably be foreseen which 
will be reflected in the future operations.
The accounts for the 5⅓ years ending April 30, 1914, 
which are in evidence, show that during that period the aver­
age sales amounted to 270,000 tons; and, in view of the large 
accumulation of stock, it is safe to assume that every effort 
was being made to press the sales as much as possible while 
maintaining prices. During the period, the company had 
practically no competitors in the United States, but it ap­
pears from the record that at April 30, 1914, serious compe­
tition was in sight from the Freeport Sulphur Company 
which had produced upwards of 100,000 tons, Bearing in 
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mind that within four or five years from the date of com­
mencement of its own operations the Union Sulphur Com­
pany was producing more sulphur than the market could 
absorb, the seriousness of this factor in the situation is ap­
parent. A prospective purchaser looking at the situation at 
the date of Mr. Frasch’s death would naturally assume that 
this competition would result in one or both of two things; 
either a drastic reduction in selling prices, or allowing the 
Freeport Company to take a fair proportion of the volume 
of business to be done with a corresponding reduction in the 
volume of business to be done by the Union Sulphur Com­
pany. If such reduction were calculated at one-third of the 
average business of the preceding five years of the Union Sul­
phur Company, this would leave the prospective sales of the 
Union Sulphur Company at 180,000 tons per annum. I 
think, therefore, that an estimate of 200,000 tons annual sales 
is as high as could reasonably be assumed for the future.
As to the price, it appears from the record that the net 
price of sulphur at the mine was about $16.40 per ton. 
This was arrived at by deducting from the gross price re­
alized the cost of freight and all selling expenses. It is, how­
ever, necessary to consider also for the present purpose the 
working capital required to be invested in carrying on the 
operations, because any proceeds from the sale of sulphur 
would have to yield a return on the working capital invested 
as well as on the price paid for the stock of sulphur itself. 
The net assets of the company, exclusive of the mine and 
stock of sulphur and its investments in subsidiary companies, 
have been computed at $4,317,205.54. Allowing 7% as the 
rate of return on this working capital, the rate normally 
paid on the preferred stock of industrial companies, would 
give an annual charge of over $350,000, or more than $1 a 
ton. Allowing for this item and for the fact that with a 
smaller volume of business the selling expenses would prob­
ably be relatively higher, past experience would indicate $15 
as the price per ton to be assumed for the purpose of calcu­
lating the present value of the stock of sulphur.
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In view of the fact that the sulphur price had remained 
substantially unchanged during the 5⅓ years in which the 
company had a practical monopoly, it seems reasonably clear 
that no increase in this price could be expected, especially 
having regard to the prospective competition of the Free­
port Sulphur Company and possibly other companies, to the 
large stocks which the company had accumulated, and to the 
wide margin between cost and selling prices (selling prices 
being at least three times cost). There would seem to be 
more reason to anticipate a reduction in selling prices, but in 
the absence of any measure of the probable reduction, I have 
adopted the figure of $15 and merged the hazard of reduced 
prices with the other hazards which are reflected in the rate 
of profit allowed in the computation of present values.
As to the volume of production and the costs, there are 
statements in evidence showing the production and cost by 
years. These figures are as follows:
Production
(tons) Outlays
Year 1909........................................ 270,725 $1,273,850
“ 1910........................................ 246,510 1,445,802
“ 1911........................................ 204,220 1,727,200
“ 1912........................................ 786,605 2,119,214
“ 1913........................................ 478,565 1,795,768
4 months ending April 30, 1914.. 103,080 556,319
Inasmuch as the results for the year 1911 were doubtless 
seriously affected by the expense incidental to the violent 
physical disturbances which it has been testified took place 
in that year, I think these figures should be disregarded in 
forecasting the future (except in so far as they indicate the 
financial importance of some of the hazards attaching to the 
business). The figures for the period prior to 1911 are also 
of little value inasmuch as the change of methods necessi­
tated by the disturbance in 1911 has permanently affected 
the cost of operation. Comparing the figures for 1913 with 
those for 1912 it will be observed that a decrease of 308,040 
tons in output was accompanied by a decrease of only
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$323,446 in outlays; and working out the annual equivalent 
for the figures for the four months ending April 30, 1914, a 
reduction of 169,325 tons a year in production is accom­
panied by a decrease of only $126,811 per annum in outlays. 
It is readily apparent therefore that the expenses of conduct­
ing operations are affected to only a very small extent by the 
tonnage of production; and the annual expenditures neces­
sary may be analyzed into two component parts—a fixed ex­
pense of approximately $1,350,000, and expenses fluctuating 
with the output which may be taken at about $1 per ton. 
On this basis a scale of costs according to the volume of pro­
duction can readily be computed as follows: 
Annual Cost vary­
ing with 
Production
Production
(tons) Fixed Cost Together Per Ton
200,000 $1,350,000 $200,000 $1,550,000 $7.75
250,000 1,350,000 250,000 1,600,000 6.40
300,000 1,350,000 300,000 1,650,000 5.50
350,000 1,350,000 350,000 1,700,000 4.86
400,000 1,350,000 400,000 1,750,000 4.38
450,000 1,350,000 450,000 1,800,000 4.00
500,000 1,350,000 500,000 1,850,000 3.70
550,000 1,350,000 550,000 1,900,000 3.45
600,000 1,350,000 600,000 1,950,000 3.25
650,000 1,350,000 650,000 2,000,000 3.08
700,000 1,350,000 700,000 2,050,000 2.93
750,000 1,350,000 750,000 2,100,000 2.80
In passing, it may be noted that the expenses have in-
creased appreciably, the fixed expenses being now greater 
than the total outlays for 1909. Such an increase is to be 
expected in view of the testimony as to the necessity of 
pumping out cold water from the property since 1911 and as 
to the increasing distance which material has to be moved 
to fill in on the surface of the property.
From an examination of the record it appears that the 
production averaged:
for the 5⅓ years 391,820 tons per annum 
last 3⅓ “ 471,741
“ “ 435,234
The production of 1912 must be regarded as abnormally 
high, just as that for 1911 is abnormally low. On the whole 
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a production of 450,000 tons per annum would seem to be a 
fair assumption as to tonnage. This would mean total out­
lays of $1,800,000 and a cost of $4 per ton.
From the foregoing consideration we may use as reasonable 
estimates for the future the following data:
Annual sales......................... ’. . 200,000 tons
Probable selling value (net)..............  $15 per ton
Probable production.......................... 450,000 tons
Cost of production.............................. $4.00 per ton
The period of operation is entirely uncertain and the ques­
tion of how best to deal with the uncertainty will be con­
sidered later.
A further point remaining to be considered is the ques­
tion of taxes, particularly taxes in Louisiana. It appears 
from the testimony that the mine taxes amounted to about 
214% on the assessed value of the mine. The calculation of 
the value of the property will be based on a gradually de­
clining stock of sulphur and mine value, and it is therefore 
proper to assume that the taxes will be correspondingly re­
duced. The most convenient way of allowing for this factor 
will be by adding 214% to the rate of profit determined in 
the following section in order to provide for these taxes. 
Thus if a rate of profit of 15% per annum is assumed, the 
calculations of present value must be based oh a rate of 
15% plus 214%’ or 171%%’ and so on. Next to be consid­
ered is the rate of return that is proper to be applied.
In determining the rate of profit which an investor in this 
undertaking would reasonably expect it to yield, the first re­
quirement is to consider in a general way what the invest­
ment would involve. Roughly it would mean an invest­
ment of $10,000,000 more or . less in the acquisition of a 
stock of sulphur and a mine, as to the future' production of 
which it would be- impossible to make any forecast, and there 
would be a further investment of about $4,300,000 to pro­
vide the working capital needed in the business. In the 
previous section I have assumed a rate of return of 7% on 
this working capital, so that it is necessary now to consider 
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the rate of return only as the more speculative investment.
The amount to be invested is, of course, substantial, and 
the situation is not therefore comparable to one in which an 
investor may make a relatively small investment. The differ­
ence between the wholesale and retail prices of investments 
are as real and marked as the difference between the whole­
sale and retail prices of commodities, especially where it is 
an outright investment of capital and not a loan that is 
offered.
The business and the risks attending it are unusual in 
character, which fact would eliminate the conservative type 
of investor entirely. To attract the more speculative investor 
a relatively higher rate of return is essential. The oppor­
tunities for remunerative investment in business in this 
country are greater than the funds seeking investments in 
which a speculative risk is involved. Consequently, capital 
is reluctant to go outside well understood lines of activities 
unless special inducements are offered. There is always 
and everywhere a tendency to overrate risks which are un­
familiar and to demand greater margins of safety or larger 
returns to compensate therefor.
If the reasonable expectations above referred to were 
realized, the investment would be repaid, together with the 
return assumed by instalments over a period of 9½ years. 
Taking first the investment in the stock of sulphur, any rate 
of return assumed would be seriously diminished if either 
the volume of the sales or the selling price should fall short 
of such estimates. There is far more ground for expecting a 
reduction in price than an increase; and as to the volume 
of tonnage I think it would be fair to say that the prospects 
of the actual results’ falling short of 200,000 tons sales are at 
least equal to the prospects of that volume’s being exceeded. 
The profitableness of the business depends largely on the 
practical monopoly which the company has enjoyed; and 
whilst some allowance has been made for the effect on that 
monopoly of the operations of the Freeport Sulphur Com-
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pany, it has been testified that still further competition is 
well within the bounds of possibility.
The investment would therefore clearly be one attended 
with substantial hazards, and the rate of profit should be 
determined with reference to the rate at which earning 
capacity is bought or sold rather than with reference to rates 
of interest on money borrowed or loaned. Having regard 
to my experience in purchases and sales of businesses and 
earning capacity, I am convinced that 15% is a moderate 
rate to apply to this part of the investment.
The mine and the sulphur must, however, be considered 
together for, as already pointed out, the restricted market 
for sulphur is one of the most essential features of the situa­
tion; and no one could afford to buy either the mine or the 
sulphur separately and be faced with the destructive compe­
tition which would begin immediately.
In any computations based on future tonnage, in view of 
the impossibility of foreseeing the future of the mine, a 
higher rate of profit than for the sulphur now on hand is 
clearly necessary. In the calculations which follow, the ab­
solute uncertainty as to whether the mine will continue to 
yield is not taken into account, except in the rate of return 
assumed, these calculations being made on the basis of the 
mine’s continuing to yield up to the point where further 
production would not be profitable. This method involves 
assumptions of future production of from 600,000 to 1,900,- 
000 tons (see above). To provide for the hazards involved 
in these assumptions (which include the hazards as to the 
maintenance of the volume of sales and selling prices during 
the period necessary for the realization of this stock), an 
addition of 5% to the 15% used for stock actually on hand 
is, I consider, undoubtedly a minimum. I do not feel that 
any extended discussion of this addition is needed as the 
justice of the assumption will, I think, be universally ad­
mitted.
The conditions of this particular mine are almost unique, 
and it is therefore almost impossible to find exactly analo­
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gous cases of purchase and sales. Comparisons with other 
mining properties are valueless unless all the facts as to 
ore reserves, etc., are fully known. Such instances are 
comparatively rare, but I recall one sale of a mining prop­
erty for a sum amounting to several million dollars which 
fits the case closely. The transaction was between a buyer 
and a willing seller. From the standpoint of monopoly and 
breadth of market for its output, the company was at least as 
advantageously situated as this company, and there were no 
special hazards or uncertainties attending the operations. 
There was a substantial agreement between the parties as to 
the tonnage actually in sight and the rate at which it could 
be mined and marketed. The purchase price asked yielded, 
on the basis of what was regarded by both parties as the 
minimum annual tonnage and the minimum selling value, 
a return of over 17% on the investment. On the basis of 
tonnage and selling prices which both parties regarded as 
reasonable and which were in fact more than realized, the 
yield amounted to approximately 25%. In this case the 
undeveloped ore was believed and was proved to be very 
large, but at the time of the sale was incapable of estima­
tion.
While stock exchange values are affected by such varied 
conditions that it is difficult to draw conclusions therefrom, 
it would be easy to cite many instances of companies en­
gaged in staple industries earning profits equivalent to con­
siderably more than 15% upon the average market value of 
their stock.
My firm has recently compiled from reports on examina­
tions made by it, taken at random, a statement showing the 
average percentage of profit actually realized in a large num­
ber of companies large and small, and the result of this 
compilation, which included some companies operated at a 
loss, showed that the average return on the investment for 
the 158 companies was 13.67%. These are of course reali­
zations, not anticipations.
I have frequently known of offers of businesses being re­
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jected because the earning capacity on the investment was 
not sufficient, where such earning capacity would have 
amounted to over 15%. As indicating the commercial value 
of earning capacity when attended with any hazards, I might 
cite as one of many such instances coming under my personal 
observation in the course of my practice the issue of common 
stock of the Willys-Overland Company in 1912. This com­
pany was capitalized with a common stock of $20,000,000 
and a preferred stock of $5,000,000. The earnings were 
rapidly increasing and for the last completed. year were 
equivalent to just 17% on the common stock. The esti­
mate for the then current year’s earnings (which was more 
than realized) was about 22% on the common stock. Upon 
this showing the stock was offered to investors, or at retail, 
at a price of $67.50 per share, and the market value shortly 
fell and long remained below that figure.. This is only one 
of many cases which I could cite.
Earning capacity of the most stable industrials is seldom 
valued at a higher cash value than five years’ purchase, that 
is on the basis of a 20% return. A 15% rate is equivalent 
to six and two-third years’ purchase.
It may be suggested that the stock of sulphur should be 
valued more from the standpoint of merchandise. I do not 
think this would affect the conclusion, though I do not think 
the standpoint is the correct one. A merchant buying at 
wholesale with a view to retail distribution may be satisfied 
with a profit, after deducting all expenses, of 5% on stock 
which he can turn over four or five times a year or oftener, 
but 15% would be a minimum profit on stock which could 
be turned over only once a year; and it clearly follows that 
if the stock will take more than a year to turn over, the rate 
must be 15% for each year the stock has to be held before 
sale, which is precisely in accord with the method I have 
adopted.
In this discussion I have mentioned some among the many 
considerations leading to the conclusion that a rate of 15%
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per annum as to the stock on hand and a rate of 20% as to 
any tonnage assumed to be mined in the future constitutes 
a moderate basis for the determination of the present value 
of the sums expected to be received from the business in the 
future. It is important to note also that these rates can 
be applied only to assumptions as to the future such that 
the chances of failure to realize them are at least measurably 
offset by chances of more favorable realizations.
CALCULATION OF VALUE OF THE STOCK OF SULPHUR AT THE 
MINE AND THE MINING PROPERTY
For the purpose of this calculation the following data has 
been arrived at:
Factors required
Probable volume of sales
Probable net selling price
Probable production
Probable production cost
Rate of profit which anyone 
engaging in the venture 
would reasonably expect it 
to yield
Amount to be added to rate 
of return to allow for taxes
My computations 
regarding same 
200,000 tons per annum 
$15 per ton 
450,000 tons per annum 
$4 per ton
Not less than 15% as to ton­
nage actually on hand and 
20% on any additional 
tonnage assumed to be 
mined in the future
2¼%
The ratio of selling price to cost is $15:4 or 3¾:1. The 
first step is, therefore, to ascertain how long payment of 
$3.75 may be postponed without reducing its present value 
below $ 1. Since we are dealing here not with stock actually 
on hand but with sulphur to be mined, the rate of return 
to be used must be 20% or, adding 2¼% for taxes, 22¼%. 
From interest tables the period is found to be 6 years. If 
we go beyond this period, say to 6¼ years, we find the pres­
ent value of $1 due in 6¼ years (at 5½% payable quarterly 
which for convenience I have used as the equivalent of 22¼ 
per annum) is 26.22¢, so that the present value of $3.75 is 
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98.32¢, or less than $1. The limit of accumulation is there­
fore six years stock:
6 years sales at 200,000 tons = 1,200,000 tons
The stock on hand is 867,613 “
Difference 332,387 tons
Now the quarterly output is 112,500 tons (¼ of 450,000) and 
the quarterly sales 50,000 (¼ of 200,000), so that the stock 
will increase 62,500 tons per quarter and will increase by 
332,387 tons in somewhat over 5 quarters. After that time 
further production would be unprofitable unless the volume 
of profitable sales could be increased. Any further produc­
tion would have to remain on hand more than 6 years, and 
the present value of the sales price would at 20% be less than 
the cost of production.
If the production were reduced, the cost per ton would be 
increased, and the time when the amount of stock that could 
be accumulated profitably would be lessened. If the produc­
tion could be kept at a higher figure, the period of profit­
able operations would be extended, though not very greatly, 
as will appear from later calculations.
The only hope of realizing greater values would lie in 
increasing the sales, without unduly reducing the sale price.
Returning to the calculations, the outlook on the assumed 
data is therefore: 
The stock on hand is....................................................... 867,613
which will be sold at the rate of 50,000 tons per 850,000
quarter for 17 quarters and in the 18th quarter 17,613
There can be profitably mined at the rate of 112,500
tons per quarter for 5 quarters............................... 562,500
and in the 6th quarter................................................ 69,887
Which will be sold........................................................... 32,387
in the 18th quarter and at the rate of 50,000 tons
per quarter in the 19th to 30th quarters.............  600,000
1,500,000 1,500,000
The computation is then as follows:
Amounts to Be Received and Present Value Thereof
Sales out of Stock:
850,000 tons at rate per quarter of 50,000 tons at $15 per 
ton = $750,000 per quarter for 17 quarters, or 
$12,750,000.
Present value of which per tables (15% return
plus 2¼% taxes) is .............................................. $. 8,775,412.50
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17,613 tons in the 18th quarter at $15 per ton = $264,195.
Present value per tables (15% return plus 2¼%
taxes) ....................................................................... $125,474.13
Sales out of Future Tonnage:
32,387 tons in 18th quarter at $15 per ton = $485,805.
Present value per tables (20% return plus 21¼% 
taxes) ................................................................... 185,320.03
600,000 tons at rate per quarter year of 50,000 tons at $15
per ton = $750,000 per quarter for 12 quarters, 
or $9,000,000.
Present value of which per tables (20% return
plus 21¼% taxes) is .............................................. 2,465,760.00
Together............................................................ $11,551,966.66
From which must be deducted:
Present value of expenditures to be made, viz.: 
Operating costs of producing 632,387 tons as 
follows:
562,500 tons at rate per quarter year of 112,500 tons at $4 
per ton = $450,000 per quarter for 5 quarters. 
Present value per tables (20%).$1,948,266.00
69,887 tons in 6th quarter at $4 per 
ton = $279,548.
Present value per tables (20%).......... 208,604.31 2,156,870.31
Net present value of Stock of Sulphur and
Mining Property ................. $ 9,395,096.35
A greater capital value would attach to the property if the 
volume of sales could be increased, and to a lesser extent if 
the volume of production could be increased, with a result­
ing decrease in cost per ton. As indicating the range of 
values, I have computed the capital value based on sales as 
high as 270,000 tons and production as high as 750,000 tons 
at a cost of $2.80 per ton. These results may be tabulated 
as follows: 
Limit of Capital
Assuming Profitable Value
Future of Stock
Sales Production Production of Sulphur
(tons') (tons) (tons) and Mine
200,000 per annum 450,000 at $4.00 632,387 9,395,000
200,000 " 750,000 at 2.80 882,387 10,042,000
270,000 " 450,000 at 4.00 1,832,387 11,847,000
270,000 750,000 at 2.80 1,899,887 12,800,000
It will be observed that the last two calculations involve
not only unduly optimistic hypotheses as to rate of produc­
tion and sales, but also very large assumptions as to the ton­
nage which can be secured.
In considering these two calculations it is particularly im­
portant to note:
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(1) That the sales during the 5⅓ years were evidently 
pressed to a maximum, and the sales for the last four 
months of the period were almost exactly the average 
of the entire period. Consequently, there was at 
April, 1914, practically no prospect of the tonnage 
of sales being increased, but there was . almost a cer­
tainty of the sales being reduced through the com­
petition of the Freeport Sulphur Company, which was 
then for the first time beginning to be felt.
• (2) That the price of sulphur during the period had re­
mained constant. Here again, therefore, there was 
no prospect of more favorable prices but serious 
danger of a reduction in prices, having regard to the 
wide margin between cost and selling prices, the im­
pending competition, and the enormous accumula­
tions of stock on hand.
(3) That these calculations assume a future production 
of nearly 2,000,000 tons. In this connection it is most 
important to observe that while any falling short from 
this assumed production would unfavorably affect 
the value of the property, there would be no favorable 
effect on the value if the mine should be capable of 
producing a larger tonnage, since the calculations as­
sume the production of the maximum tonnage that 
could be profitably marketed on the assumed volume 
of sales.
(4) Finally as to the rate of profit assumed, the rate of 
15% applied to the stock on hand is undoubtedly 
moderate in view of the hazards, and the rate of 20% 
would be entirely too low to be applicable to any 
calculation involving such optimistic assumptions. It 
is used here for the sake of uniformity and not on ac­
count of a belief in its applicability. In considering 
this question it must be remembered that the rates 
in question are applied only to the hazardous or 
speculative part of the investment and that for the 
assets other than the mine and stock of sulphur 
(amounting to over $4,300,000) a rate of only 7% has 
been allowed, this allowance being made in the form 
of a deduction from the gross selling value.
Combining the investment in sulphur stock capi­
talized at 15% and that in working capital at 7%, 
the average yield on the two parts would not exceed 
12%.
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On each of the four underlying assumptions, therefore, 
there is no reasonable prospect of changes which would tend 
to increase the value, but serious prospects, amounting in 
some cases to practical certainty, that less favorable results 
would be secured.
Taking all the considerations together, I am of the opinion 
that from the standpoint of scientific computation on the 
broad lines usually followed in valuing mining properties, 
with only such adaptions as are needed to meet the very 
unusual features of this case, the value of the stock of sulphur 
and the mine together could not be deemed to be more 
than $10,000,000.
The alternative method of valuation would be to regard 
 the sulphur in stock as a reserve and to value the mine and 
the stock on the assumption that the current production of 
mine will be sold first and that the reserve stock will be 
realized only as and when the current production proves in­
sufficient to meet the sales. Possibly, indeed, this is the more 
practical method. In mining operations it is customary to 
block out reserves of ore in advance of mining operations; 
and the stock of sulphur in this case seems in many respects 
analogous to such ore reserves, with the difference that the 
reserve is carried on the surface instead of in the mine, 
this difference being a necessary incident of the character 
of the mining operations.
This alternative method will, however, give lower values 
than the method I have adopted upon any reasonable as­
sumptions as to sales and using the same rates of return, and 
so will any intermediate course. As already stated, demon­
stration of this fact led me to adopt the method which I 
have outlined, in spite of its complexity.
I realize that in practice, theories, and especially theories 
the application of which involves some complicated calcula­
tions, are often regarded with distrust and are not carried 
to their logical conclusion. But this merely means that the 
maximum theoretical value will not in practice be realized, 
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some part thereof being sacrificed to a natural disposition 
to follow on more normal lines which will be regarded as 
safer, though it may be questioned whether they will prove 
so. It may well be that some deduction should be made 
from the results I have calculated to allow for these practical 
considerations, but for the purpose of taxation at any rate, 
no exception can be taken to the failure to make such a de­
duction.
Calculation of Value of Capital Stock of the Union Sulphur Company
Value of sulphur at mine and other mining property, say........ .$10,000,000
Other property in Calcasieu Parish.................................................. 379,350
Stock of sulphur other than at mine at $15 per ton..................... 582,780
Miscellaneous assets as to which no question arises (less liabilities) 3,355,074 
Investments in subsidiary companies .............................................. 885,369
$15,202,573
or say per share............................................................  $7,600
III
THE MAXIMUM SELLING PRICE OF NEWSPRINT 
PAPER *
(1918)
The annexed testimony was given before the Federal Trade 
Commission in a proceeding to determine the maximum 
selling price of newsprint paper, pursuant to an agreement 
which provided for the determination of the price by the 
Commission subject to a right of appeal to the Circuit Judges 
of the United States for the Second Circuit.
The Federal Trade Commission made no express find­
ings on the questions covered by the testimony, and fixed a 
price on newsprint paper in carload lots of $3.10 per hun­
dred pounds. Upon appeal the Circuit Court fixed the 
maximum selling price at $3.50 per hundred pounds and 
in doing so made the following specific findings:
In valuing the capital investment used in producing news­
print, prices before the present European War should be 
adopted.
In ascertaining capital investment, i.e., the present value 
of property actually used in paper production, we exclude 
timber lands whether owned or leased, also undeveloped or 
potential water power, i.e., water rights; but include mill and 
town sites, terminal facilities, and improvements on or de­
velopment of natural water powers, together with any in­
vestment by way of actual payment for power rights. The 
foregoing allowed elements of capital value are the 
“tangibles.”
A fair maximum return on said capital in a business of 
the hazards proven is 15% per annum.
The Court found the depreciated present value of 
“tangibles” at pre-war prices to be $25,000 per ton of daily 
capacity, and, adding 10% for going value and $12,000 per
* Testimony before the Federal Trade Commission (March 22, 1918).
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ton for working capital, arrived at an investment of $39,500 
per ton. They applied their findings to a plant having a 
daily capacity of 100 tons as follows:
The capital invested is 39,500 X 100 = $3,950,000
The fair annual return, 15% = 592,500
To be obtained by selling all of an 
annual production of 30,000 tons, 
or a profit per ton of 19.75
Mr. Wise. In your work as accountants do you have occa­
sion to be consulted on the question of value of properties?
Mr. May. Well, we do not go into the field of valuation of 
properties, but we have a great deal to do with questions 
of value as affected by earning capacity.
Q. Yes, and with earnings?
A. And with earnings.
Q. Upon the value of the property?
A. Yes. We have acted for a great many people contem­
plating purchasing a business or selling a business, and they 
have frequently called on us for advice as to the wisdom of 
buying or selling property.
Q. As a preliminary to that advice, I take it, you have to 
make an examination of the books of the properties to deter­
mine what is shown on those books?
A. Yes.
Q. And in this work have you made a study of the ques­
tion of the rate of return on invested capital?
A. The question of return on invested capital is a sub­
ject that I have given a great deal of consideration to for the 
last fifteen years.
Q. As to industrial businesses?
A. Yes. Perhaps I may explain that I approached the 
question from an entirely different angle from Mr. Erickson. 
I do not claim to have made an exhaustive study of the 
underlying theories that he has. My ideas are based on prac­
tical experience, and I came in from the standpoint, not
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originally of rate cases of price fixing, but from an entirely 
different angle.
Up to about ten years ago I do not think my firm was 
ever engaged in a rate or price-fixing matter, and since then 
I do not think we have been engaged in more than one or, 
perhaps, two a year; and my interest in the matter has de­
veloped originally from the fact that there was a tendency to 
value assets, particularly mining properties, on the basis of 
estimating the future earnings and then discounting those 
values at a given rate of interest.
Now, we have always been advocates of conservatism in 
accounting and finance and were satisfied that people were 
using too low rates of return in those calculations, and, un­
fortunately, some of the States were supporting them—en­
tirely for tax purposes—one of the most extreme cases being 
Minnesota, which valued on the basis of estimating the future 
return, and discounting it at 4 per cent. I was convinced 
you could never get people to put money into any business of 
that kind on a 4 per cent basis. I was originally interested 
in that subject largely for the purpose of convincing our 
clients it was not wise to establish any such theories, and later 
I became convinced that the same fallacy was being adopted 
in the regulation of rates, and I felt sure that the Commis­
sions in fixing too low rates were flying in the face of an 
economic fact and going to do more harm in the long run 
to the public than to the railroads, and that is how I became 
interested in value—from this angle.
Q. Now, in the past you have had occasion, I take it, to 
audit the books of a good many of the newsprint manufac­
turing concerns in this country?
A. Yes, we have done quite a number of them. More of 
the other paper than of newsprint, as a matter of fact.
Q. In the recent past you have had occasion to make a 
special examination into the accounts of the companies in­
volved in this particular proceeding, have you not?
A. Yes, we are doing that now.
Q. And as a result of your studies in the whole field of 
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accountancy and of your particular studies of the companies 
involved here, have you formed any opinion as to what is a 
proper rate of return upon the investment?
A. Well, to state what is a fair rate of return today is a 
little difficult question, and the immediate effect of war con­
ditions is rather difficult to estimate accurately. Of course, 
the answer depends, in some measure, on how you value your 
property. If you in valuing your property take the highest 
point of the present costs, you do not have to give the same 
liberality in return as you have if you take a lower level as 
the basis of value. Naturally the two are always linked up 
together, but I would say, based on pre-war conditions, a 
prospect of a return of 15 to 20 per cent has always been 
necessary to attract capital into a business of moderate haz­
ards. This, I would say, would certainly not be more than 
covered by those rates.
I think that property has to earn that in order to attract 
capital into the business. In saying that, I am basing it 
largely on my actual experience of cases where even that re­
turn has failed to attract purchasers. You would be sur­
prised if you had seen as many cases as I have where earnings 
which showed approximately 15 per cent had been turned 
down by people contemplating buying. I was surprised my­
self, because I approached it purely from the professional 
standpoint, earlier in my experience. I have seen so many 
now that I am convinced of the fact that that is so, and in 
recent years I have given a good deal of thought to the 
reasons.
I imagine Mr. Wise will want me to state some of the 
reasons I have for saying it, entirely from the practical stand­
point of experience.
Commissioner Murdock. Let me follow that. Supposing 
I came to you and said, “Mr. May, I wish you would go out 
here to Podunk, Indiana, and look over a mill out there I 
want to buy.” You go and look over the mill and come back 
and report to me and say, “They have got $100,000 in that
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mill supported by $10,000 earnings, but my advice is not to 
buy it.”
Mr. May. I would say that, but I do not base so much on 
my advice as on the number of cases where I reported to 
people and they refused to buy.
Within the last sixty days I had a business in New York 
that was earning $100,000 a year which had between $600,- 
000 and $700,000 of assets. Those people could not get a 
buyer for the property. Finally it was sold for $500,000. 
That is an actual case within the last sixty days. People 
who have not been through it do not realize it. That is why 
I have been concerning myself with trying to explain the 
phenomenon.
Commissioner Fort. Do you not consider that now that 
condition may be worse largely on account of the war?
Mr. May. As a matter of fact that particular plant had 
more opportunities during the war. During the war it will 
earn a great deal more than in normal conditions.
Commissioner Fort. You do not think conditions as to 
the uncertainty of business, owing to the war, had anything 
to do with it?
A. No, I. do not think so.
Commissioner Murdock. As a matter of fact, the answer 
you would return to me in that case, Mr. May, would be this: 
If the facts were verified, showing it is a sure thing that there 
is $100,000 in that mill I have looked over, and I found this 
is the maximum earning for several years, but there seems 
to be an upward tendency in the mill and I think it is going 
to earn more in a few years. That is about the way you 
would report to me.
In other words, in surveying the property for me you 
would not take merely the present into your consideration, 
but you would take a survey of the past and just as near as 
you could form a survey of the future as you were able to in 
your report to me.
Mr. May. Of course, if I could put my finger on anything 
that was earning only 10 per cent and I felt satisfied that it 
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would earn 25 per cent I would say go ahead and buy it, 
but, of course, that is a rather different question from the 
proposition of fixing a maximum rate of return you are go­
ing to allow them to earn in the future.
Commissioner Murdock. I wanted to get it just as simply 
as possible.
Mr. May. The more questions you ask the better I will 
be pleased, because I do not want to leave any point that is 
not clear in your mind if I can help it.
Mr. Wise. You say that 15 per cent return is needed to at­
tract capital into an industry of moderate hazards. What 
would you say of the paper industry? Does that come into 
the class of industrials where' the hazards are moderate?
Mr. May. I would say it was an industry of moderate 
hazards although not one of the lowest of that group.
Q. What would you regard as the hazards of the business?
A. Well, first of all, the uninsurable risks; and the second, 
which I think has regard to a large part of the industry, is the 
fact that it is engaged in a business in one country and sell­
ing its product largely in another country, and is, therefore, 
subject to the operation of the fiscal policy of the two differ­
ent countries and to the elements of government control by 
two different governments whose interests may not always 
be identical; that is a distinct hazard in the business.
Then there is another equally important hazard in it, and 
that is the fact that it takes such a large return in proportion 
to the sales. If you have a business with sales of four or five 
times the capital, you can always provide the return on capi­
tal by a reasonable percentage of the sales, and nobody would 
say that is an exorbitant return on your investment, but 
when you have to get a large percentage on your sales, people 
are always apt to say, “Why, half the selling price is profit, or 
25 per cent is profit; that must be too much.” Whereas it is 
not at all necessarily so in an industry like this where the 
capital is large in proportion to the sales, and 20 per cent 
or 25 per cent profit on sales would not be anything like as 
remunerative as 2 or 3 per cent profit is to John Wanamaker, 
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Sears, Roebuck, or Woolworth, or any of those people. 
Therefore, I always feel where they have to have a large 
investment in proportion to the sales it detracts from the 
attractiveness of the investment.
Q. Well, what is the basis of your calculation for your 
return?
A. The investment value of the property. I noticed Mr. 
Erickson discusses the question to some extent from the 
standpoint of bonds and stocks, and, therefore, I would like 
to say that in my view of the case the controlling factor is 
the investment value, that is, the total present value of the 
investment, and the question whether capitalized by bonds 
or stocks does not enter into it in my view of the case at all.
Mr. Wise. Does it make any difference to you how many 
times the turnover in that business occurs in a year?
Mr. May. How do you mean?
Q. Sales?
A. I think it does, in this way. The return must be based 
on the investment, but if the turnover is small, as I said, your 
percentage of profit to sales looks so high that there is always 
a tendency to cut it unduly; that is your hazard.
Q. Are you speaking with the idea of only one turnover 
of capital per annum in a business?
A. In this business I suppose you do not turn over your 
capital once a year. Comparing the agricultural implement 
industry and the packing industry, it is much more difficult 
for the agricultural implement industry to get a fair return 
on capital than the packers, because the same rate of return 
would constitute something like eight or nine times the per­
centage of sales in the case of the agricultural implement in­
dustry that it would in the case of the packers.
Commissioner Murdock. Mr. May is speaking of the 
gross sales as contrasted with the capital. He is talking about 
the turnover.
Mr. May. Yes, the turnover. The turnover is the rela­
tion of sales to capital investment.
Commissioner Murdock. That is, the more rapid the 
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turnover, the lower the rate of profit on the investment.
Mr. May. No, I do not say that. I say that theoretically 
they should be the same, but practically, because a given 
profit is a higher percentage of sales, you have more diffi­
culty in getting it. That is one of the hazards of the busi­
ness. That is the point I was trying to make.
Commissioner Fort. Well then, in your idea, the profit 
should be the same on every sale of a concern that has but 
one turnover per annum as the concern that has five turn­
overs per annum.
Mr. May. Percentage of investment.
Commissioner Fort. That may make quite a difference.
Mr. May. Of course the percentage of investment should 
be the same, although the percentage of sales would be 
much higher in the case of the company with a small turn­
over than the one with a big turnover.
Mr. Wise. Can you explain that any further?
Mr. May. No, I think that is all.
Q. Now you stated, Mr. May, that as a basis of the return 
you take the investment regardless of how that investment is 
placed, whether it is in stocks, in bonds, or part in stocks and 
part in bonds?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, it is no matter whether one company 
has a $50,000,000 and another a $5,000,000 outlay, they are 
entitled to the same rate of return?
A. That is my feeling.
Q. I wish you would go right ahead and explain your 
position here without my having to prompt you or question 
you at all, and testify as to your opinion for a rate of return 
on the basis that you have recited.
A. All right. I hope you will interrupt whenever you see 
fit.
In the first place, before I start to discuss reasons 
for the opinion I want to emphasize two points: first, 
I take it that what we are discussing is a maximum price 
and that there is no guarantee you are going to get that
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price, and that there is no guarantee of a minimum price. I 
think that is a point fairly agreed-upon. In the second place, 
I want to emphasize the distinction between the profits that 
a business must earn and the profits which can be distributed 
to the investors in that business.
A large part of the earnings of every successful company 
has to be reinvested in that business, or, as Mr. Schwab put 
it once, a dollar for dividends and a dollar for plant, and it 
is curious how nearly accurate that is.
In preparing a brief for the Senate Finance Committee 
on the excess profits tax payment dealing with that point, I 
took at random forty companies, railroads, public utilities 
and manufacturing companies and miscellaneous companies, 
and when we checked all the figures back that were drawn 
at random it showed over a five-year period they would actu­
ally distribute in dividends almost exactly 50 per cent, within 
1 per cent of 50 per cent of the total earnings in the five 
years. So if you happen to earn your 15 per cent or 20 per 
cent you won’t be able to distribute year in and year out 
more than half of it. That is the first point.
Commissioner Murdock. Mr. May, I do not quite get 
that in my mind. What I would like to know is what you 
are feeding that 10 per cent to. If you allow 20 per cent 
to go in the business and give 10 per cent to the stockholders, 
where does that other 10 per cent go?
Mr. May. It goes to build up the business. Of course, it 
ultimately accrues directly or indirectly to the benefit of the 
stockholder. There is no doubt about that. As long as he 
gets only half distributed in cash he feels that the other half 
is going to build up the business. It may or may not. Some 
do get it.
Commissioner Murdock. The ordinary method, as I have 
observed it, is to divert that 10 per cent which is not dis­
tributed as dividends into some reserve fund or surplus.
Mr. May. Yes, that is so, but my experience is that a 
man is attracted if he thinks he has a fair prospect of being 
able to get that 15 or 20 per cent out of the business, half 
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in cash and half in equities piling up for the future. That 
is the way he sizes it up, as far as my experience goes.
Commissioner Fort. That extra 10 per cent is not dis­
tributed in dividends and you do not care whether it is 
carried in surplus or a sinking fund or put into new ma­
chinery as long as it is carried.
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. It is a fact that it is never as such handed back 
to the stockholder. 
Mr. May. Yes, he has got to leave it in to insure he is still 
going to have a cash dividend in the future.
Q. He is simply switching his principal all the time to 
insure him of his return.
A. That is right. I have made some examination of the 
actual facts. Take the Report of the Commissioner of 
Corporations on the investigation of the Steel Industry. 
You will find that year in and year out he said that the price 
of $28 for steel rails was the fixed price and that it never 
varied for years, or that there were very slight fluctuations. 
That yielded a profit of 18 per cent on the investment to the 
steel corporation, including 18 per cent on the relative in­
vestment in ore properties and 18 per cent on the relative in­
vestment in transportation facilities, taking ore properties, 
transportation, blast furnaces, mills, working capital, all 
along the line invested in turning out a ton of steel rails, 
that the price of $28 yielded a return of 18 per cent on the 
entire capital, and yet, so far as my experience goes, nobody 
ever seriously questioned the fairness of the price of steel 
rails, and it remained for fifteen years, I suppose.
Commissioner Murdock. Of course, it has been tradi­
tional in the United States for thirty years that they sold 
cheaper abroad than at home.
Mr. May. That, I think, is one of the things that has 
often been said but has never been proved.
Then there is another report, taking the smaller com­
panies. If you will refer to the Report of the Commissioner 
of Corporations on the investigation of Independent To-
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bacco Industry at the time it was being oppressed by the 
Tobacco Trust, as the report puts it. It shows for 48 inde­
pendent companies—let me see, I have the exact figures here, 
I think—an average profit of 15.9 per cent, and it is rather 
amazing to note that the Commissioner drew attention to 
that fact as evidence of oppression because the Tobacco 
Trust itself was earning 40 per cent.
Then there was another interesting thing that developed 
in the same connection some three or four years ago. In the 
course of a study of this question my firm took at random 
a series of records at our own offices. There were all kinds 
of businesses, largely small manufacturing companies, and we 
just took them as they came. We said to a man to go and 
pick out 200 reports, to take them straight out of the files, 
leaving out all public utilities and non-industrial concerns, 
pick them out and find out their capital, and we found the 
average of those 158 companies was 13.67 per cent. Those 
were accounts where we knew a proper provision had been 
made for salaries, depreciation and everything, so that we 
were dealing with reliable data, and they were just picked 
out at random.
Commissioner Murdock. That is per cent to the 
stockholders and 6½ per cent to the business?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wise. Some of the companies made less than 6 per 
cent altogether and others made as much as 24 per cent?
Mr. May. Some of them made a loss as the actual facts 
show. Out of the 158 cases there were 70 that earned over 
15 per cent. Now these companies, as stated, were selected 
in 1913; they were not picked out but just taken at random 
in 1913. I thought that for this purpose it would be in­
teresting to take as many of those same companies as I could 
find and find out what their last report showed. I was able 
to find in our office files the corresponding records for 86 
of those 158 companies.
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Commissioner Murdock. As of what year?
Mr. May. The year ending 1916 or 1917. Those 86 com­
panies in the earlier period averaged 13.11 per cent, and the 
same companies in the later period averaged 20.37 per cent. 
I also have the percentage here of the individual companies 
showing the different ranges in the earlier period. There 
were 16 earning between 15 and 20 per cent and 24 earning 
over 20 per cent. There are 40 earning over 15 per cent to­
day and there are 7 earning between 15 and 20 per cent, 
and 39 earning over 20, making 46 out of 86 that are earning 
from 15 per cent, and about 60 per cent of those companies, 
between 50 and 60, are companies with a capital investment 
of under a million dollars. They are not big trusts, they are 
small and medium-sized corporations.
This is another light on the question, and I have prepared 
some figures which seem to me particularly illuminating in 
view of the fact many of the parties to this proceeding are 
Canadian corporations. Now, Canada’s normal source of 
supply of capital is Great Britain, and, therefore, it seems to 
me that figures showing the return in industry in Great Bri­
tain, and in countries capitalized in Great Britain, would be 
relevant. The London Economist, which is the best-known 
of the financial journals of London, gives each year a sum­
mary of the profits shown by corporations whose accounts are 
published in its columns during, that year. I have prepared 
the figures from those summaries, by industries, leaving out 
the railways, public utilities, mines and financial companies 
like banks and trust companies. I have had them prepared 
under different groups and I have worked them out to show 
the percentage of profit to the total capital, whether bor­
rowed capital or stock capital, during these years. The aver­
ages are as follows: at the end of the year June 30, 1914, the 
average of all companies is 11.25 per cent; 1915, 10.32 per 
cent. That is when they felt the adverse effect of the be 
ginning of the war; 1916, 12.65 per cent; 1917, 13.27 per cent.
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Mr. Wise. How many companies does that represent?
Mr. May. It represents about 650 companies with a total 
invested capital of about 550,000,000 pounds sterling.
Q. Good, bad and indifferent?
A. All that are published. I will draw attention to the 
breweries, which come at the top. English breweries are 
notoriously overcapitalized. They were a very, very success­
ful industry. They were capitalized on the basis of their 
earning capacity during their palmy days. Undoubtedly 
they are overcapitalized. If you leave out the breweries in 
any year it raises the average of the rest about one per cent. 
In my view they are extremely interesting and I think 
relevant as regards this proceeding.
Commissioner Murdock. That is on the aggregate of 
these industries, less the breweries, the rate would be for the 
year 1917, 14.37?
Mr. May. About that, 14.37, you leave the breweries 
out. Breweries earned only 6.7.
Then there is another significant figure, that is, the earn­
ings of our national banks. The reports of the Comptroller 
of the Currency show that the earnings of national banks in 
the last fifteen or sixteen years—it does not make much 
difference what period you take—they averaged 9.7 per cent 
on the total capital and surplus invested. Now there is a 
really attractive industry, the national bank. Your capital 
is in there and you can take it out and liquidate it if you 
do not like that kind of investment. It is entirely different 
from locking up property in bricks and mortar. They are 
not any good unless they be put to some such use as you 
build them for. That has always seemed to me a very good 
index and it seems to me is entirely in line with the general 
conclusion that you reach from studying the industrial busi­
nesses, because there cannot be any question as to the attrac­
tiveness of a national bank investment.
Commissioner Fort. Except in one respect, double liabil­
ity on stock.
Mr. May. That is true.
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Mr. Wise. What is the percentage of loss in that case?
Mr. May. I think that is the key to the explanation of the 
condition that I have been discussing, and what is the actual 
reason for that is significant. The actual losses are less than 
five-hundredths of one per cent. Yet one of the first things 
a man thinks of when he thinks of a national bank invest­
ment is the liability of it and the risks he is running, and that 
influences his judgment as to the attractiveness of that invest­
ment far beyond the mathematical value of the risk, and 
that is the clue, I think. That is the clue to the whole thing.
Take fire insurance. Every man is considered lacking in 
all business prudence if he does not insure, yet he is paying 
double the mathematical value of the risk for the insurance. 
Not more than 50 per cent of the premiums paid go to pay 
losses. I happened to be talking last week to a Mr. Graham 
Harding, who is an assessor for Lloyd’s in London. His 
firm have acted for Lloyd’s for 120 years and he was talking 
about the business that Lloyd’s do in insuring all sorts of 
extraordinary risks, and he said, of course, they make some 
spectacular losses, to be sure, but they are making all the 
time spectacular profits—because people are willing to pay 
many times the mathematical value of the risk.
I think that is the one factor more than any other that ac­
counts for the high rate of return that you have got to give 
to attract capital into industry. I do not know of any single 
factor that is more potent. Now, of course, there is a sugges­
tion that grows out of that, namely, that by our system of 
distributing securities you can spread your risks and there­
fore you do not sustain those losses. In our country there 
are two ways of financing industry, practically. One or two 
men or a group of men go in and put up all the capital and 
control the business or else shares are distributed to the pub­
lic. Now if a few men put it in they are the men who con­
trol it; and if they go in, the way they look at it is somewhat 
like this: Well, we have looked to make a certain profit and 
if we make more than that profit it will give us a little more 
income, but as we come up the value of the income is rela-
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tively less. If you have an income of $25,000 a year and 
increase it to $30,000 you have added $5,000, but you have 
not added 20 per cent to the enjoyments you get out of life. 
It is just the same as building a steamer. When you get up 
to a twenty-knot steamer its costs a lot more money to add a 
little speed. The higher you get the less in the way of addi­
tional speed you get for your money. That is the way we live, 
the more income you get the less you really get out of it for 
the additional income. On the other hand, if they should 
lose the whole thing, that is a loss that is far more felt than 
any small addition to their income, if successful. Therefore, 
only a prospect of getting a liberal return attracts them. On 
the other hand, if you are trying to distribute to small hold­
ers you come up against another factor, that is, the factor in 
the high cost of everything in this country, the high cost of 
distribution and the high profits of distributors, and that ap­
plies to securities and the selling of securities. In other 
words, it applies to the raising of money just the same as it 
does to the problem of distribution of commodities. There 
is the same difference between the prices that the farmer gets 
and the price that the consumer pays, and between the cost 
of money to the industry and the return on the investment 
to the ultimate distributees of those securities. The discrep­
ancy is almost as large in one case as in the other. And, of 
course, you have got to make things reasonably attractive to 
the individual small holder. In this case his risk is not quite 
so large. But there is another factor that operates far more 
with him than it does with the big investor. When a few 
men take hold of a business they do not worry much about 
the hazards of bad management. They are generally willing 
to admit that they can give good management, but the small 
investor has to take the risk of bad management as well as 
risks inherent in the business. He sees the possibility of losses 
from bad management. So that in the long run it does not 
make very much difference which way you go about getting 
capital into the industry, because to make it attractive you
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must give just about the same return in the one case as the 
other.
Commissioner Murdock. There must be some point, 
however, in your reasoning upon this proposition at which 
you come to the conclusion that the rate of return is unrea­
sonably high. Where does that point arise in your mind?
Mr. May. When you say rate of return unreasonably high, 
that is a somewhat difficult question to answer in connection 
with competitive business. My thought is that regulation 
and protection ought to go hand in hand. If you do not give 
any protection you are not in a position to insist on regula­
tion. If you give a minimum of protection you cannot insist 
on a maximum of regulation. If you fix a minimum return 
you can fix a maximum return. If you do not give any 
sort of protection at all it is rather difficult for me to see 
on what you may base any regulation of return other than a 
paramount public interest or something of that kind, of 
course. All I can see is that in so far as a regulative body 
can control the situation they would not do anything that 
was calculated to promote extravagantly high returns, and in 
the interest of the consumer, ultimately, just as much as of 
the producer, you have got to fix that fairly high if you are 
going to make it a maximum. Commissions may be the pri­
mary regulators but capital is the ultimate regulator, because 
the necessity of attracting capital into enterprise and keeping 
capital in enterprise is, after all, the paramount considera­
tion; and that, I think, is particularly true when you are deal­
ing with an industry that is largely outside of your own jur­
isdiction, as you are in this case. You cannot compel capital 
to stay in newsprint in Canada by any proceeding in this 
case if you fix the return so low as to discourage them from 
staying in it.
Mr. Wise. You can compel them to stay in the United 
States?
Mr. May. By a gradual extension of the powers of the 
Government which might make the return in all industries
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unattractive. I mean by that that they would rather stay 
in the frying pan than jump into the fire.
Commissioner Fort. There is another situation there. 
You say the voluntary bringing of them into another jurisdic­
tion. They may of necessity, if they wish to carry on their 
business, be compelled to bring them into another jurisdic­
tion because they have not enough demand at home.
Mr. May. If you drive him out of the industry, he can go 
out of the industry and, of course, a lot of these water power 
companies could turn their service to other uses. They may 
have to come in here if they want to stay in the newsprint 
business. If they come into the United States and it should 
regulate the return in this industry they would be no better 
off. If they should go out of the industry they would go into 
something else in Canada.
Commissioner Fort. And make a profit?
Mr. May. Yes.
Commissioner Fort. Would you consider an allowance of 
5 per cent profit on an industry with two turnovers a year 
a fair profit?
Mr. May. No, I do not. Nothing but compulsion or 
patriotism, I think, would keep capital in that industry very 
long on that basis.
Mr. Wise. Have you given any particular thought in your 
work on the question of whether or not in figuring the in­
vestment there should be any item included for what is 
known as the going value?
Mr. May. Going value or goodwill?
Q. I distinguish between goodwill and going value.
A. All right.
Q. In fixing a price do you think that the goodwill of a . 
business is to be considered?
A. Goodwill, as I see it, rests primarily on earning ca­
pacity. In determining what the earning capacity shall be 
you cannot predicate your action on the capital value of 
that earning capacity. I do not think goodwill enters into
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it at all. As to going value in the sense of the value of the 
developed industry as compared with the position of an in­
dustry that is just completed—a plant that is nothing more 
than a plant I think, within reasonable limits—that should 
be recognized as part of the investment on which a return 
should be figured.
Commissioner Murdock. Mr. May, what is your defini­
tion of going value?
Mr. May. I think, as far as going value should be recog­
nized in a case of this kind, it would simply represent the 
reasonable cost of additional value resulting from the act of 
building up the plant from the point where the plant is com­
pleted to the point where it has a successful business going. 
It is a difficult thing to measure, I admit. In an industry 
where there is a big investment like this, of course, there is 
the actual expense and loss of return during the prelimi­
nary period immediately following the completion of the 
plant. That is the best criterion of it that I think suggests 
itself.
Mr. Wise. Do you consider it to be a proper form of ac­
counting for a manufacturer, in an industry such as this, to 
set up a charge for depreciation?
Mr. May. Why, yes.
Q. How long has it been the custom with accountants in 
this country?
A. Well, it is a development. It is pretty hard to say. I 
know in the early days of my experience here I lost a great 
deal of work because I refused to sign accounts as being cor­
rect unless they had provided for depreciation. But it is a 
development, more or less general, I should say, during the 
last ten or twelve years. I would say that the Federal Trade 
Commission itself has assisted the accountants a great deal 
in spreading the recognition of it, although, to be perfectly 
honest, I think perhaps the income tax has done even more 
to stimulate the practice.
Commissioner Murdock. It is growing all the time?
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Mr. May. As the tax rate grows, you can. rely on its 
growing.
Commissioner Fort. I did not suppose there was any 
question about setting up depreciation.
Mr. May. No; I do not think there is.
Commissioner Fort. Nor is there any question either, in 
good bookkeeping, as to setting up depletion—
Mr. May. No.
Commissioner Fort. Where at the end of a specified 
period of time the industry may be depleted so that there 
is not any. Now, is there any other way to provide for the 
carrying of the repayment of the 10 per cent to the stock­
holders, if you keep on paying dividends?
Mr. May. That is the point.
Commissioner Fort. Take the coal industry. Here is a 
coal field, say ten acres square. There is a vein running 
through it. The coal company is incorporated for a hundred 
thousand dollars. I make that figure because it is small. 
The stockholders put their hundred thousand dollars in 
there, and at the end of a period of twenty years you have 
exhausted your coal, and you have paid out your money in 
dividends, and by methods of various kinds, taking care of 
your machinery, and so forth; and when you get through, 
your machinery is practically junk. Now, what are you 
going to pay your capital stock on, if you do not provide for 
depletion?
Mr. May. If you pay out all your current earnings, you 
are not, strictly speaking, paying dividends; you are paying 
out of capital, and it ought to be recognized as such.
Commissioner Fort. Then you would not get any in­
terest on your capital.
Mr. May. You should get a fair return plus depletion.
Commissioner Fort. Six per cent does not take care of 
your principal?
Mr. May. Oh, no.
Commissioner Fort. If you get six per cent, and at the 
end of a period of twenty years your coal vein is exhausted, 
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how are you going to pay your stockholders back their 
money?
Mr. May. Charge it into the cost, and set aside a fund 
for depletion.
Commissioner Fort. Depletion; yes.
Mr. Wise. And they have not all done that?
Mr. May. No.
Commissioner Fort. The result of the investigations we 
made here as to the coal industry was that 60 per cent of the 
coal mines of the United States charge neither depreciation 
nor depletion.
Mr. May. I can believe that is true.
Mr. Plante. They cannot eat the cake and have it, too.
Commissioner Fort. There is a larger percentage on de­
pletion, but I take the average as to both.
IV
CROSS EXAMINATION IN Allied Chemical & Dye Corpora­
tion v. The Steel & Tube Company of America
(1923)
This was a proceeding involving the adequacy of the price 
at which the defendant agreed to sell his assets to the Youngs­
town Sheet & Tube Company. Mr. May was a witness for 
the defendant.
The attack was based largely on the point that the price 
to be received was admittedly substantially below the valu­
ation of the assets that would be reached on a replacement 
basis less depreciation for the capital assets and the ordinary 
going concern methods of valuation for the current assets. 
In previous discussions, Mr. May had suggested to Mr. 
Joseph P. Cotton, of counsel for the defense, that it was a 
very common practice to speak of the value of the assets of 
the United States Steel Corporation as $300 a share, but that 
the market value of the stock ranged around $100 a share, 
and inquired whether there was any way in which this point 
could be brought out in direct testimony. Mr. Cotton 
decided that it could not, but said that it would be all to the 
good if counsel for the plaintiff would be led to ask a ques­
tion which would bring the point into discussion.
Leading counsel for the plaintiff very obviously declined 
to enter into this field when the opportunity offered; but 
after he had completed his cross examination, his associate 
intimated that he desired to conduct a short examination, 
and after a few preliminary questions, developed the follow­
ing cross examination.
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CROSS EXAMINATION
Q. Have you not observed in the work that you have 
done in your profession, that the market value of stocks is 
variant from the value of the assets of the Company?
A. Well, that involves determining what is the value of 
the assets of the Company, and “value” nowadays certainly 
is a term that it is almost impossible to define without some 
qualifying phrase. What is “value” is the starting place for 
a dissertation rather than something that calls for a definite 
answer.
Q. Stock values vary from day to day and sometimes 
within a very short time, they vary a very large percentage?
A. Yes, obviously at times the fluctuations are so extreme 
as to be—not representative of the permanent values.
Q. For instance, if you could imagine the stock of the 
Ford Motor Company upon the market, do you think that 
the market value of that stock would be any indication of 
the assets of the Company?
A. I think it would be bound to be some reflection of the 
assets of the Company.
Q. But it would be not very close to the—
A. I should think it would be fairly close to it. There 
would be particularly a case.
Q. How about the Durant Motor Company?
A. I do not know anything about the Durant Motor Com­
pany to hazard an opinion.
Q. How about the United States Steel?
A. Well, I think the United States Steel is fairly repre­
sentative of the value of its assets.
Q. Is it not a common understanding—well, derived from 
their published reports—that the assets behind the common 
stock of the United States Steel Corporation is in the neigh­
borhood of $300 a share?
A. Well, it depends on what you call value. I think the 
fair inference from the fact that over a long series of years 
the Steel stock has never approached those values, is an in-
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dication that the market value of the Steel Company’s assets 
is not $300 a share of the common stock.
Q. Have you considered the earnings of the Steel Cor­
poration, both those that had been distributed, and those 
that had been retained and “plowed in,” to use the expres­
sion, would the value of the assets of the Steel Company be 
in the neighborhood of $200 and $300 a share? .
A. On an earning capacity basis?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I should say decidedly not.
Q. During the existence of the United States Steel Cor­
poration in the past twenty years, it has put away among 
its assets, a great deal more than its original assets; is not that 
true?
A. I do not know whether that is true, but it has put aside 
a very large sum.
Q. Well, approximately so?
A. Yes.
Q. And yet that fact has not been reflected in the value 
of the stock?
A. It is not reflected in the earnings of the stock today.
Q. You mean by the earnings, the dividends of the Com­
pany?
A. No, what the Company earns.
Q. Today?
A. The earnings of the Company today are not com­
mensurate with the earning capacity at the formation of the 
Company together with a fair return on the amounts that 
have been put into the Company since.
Q. Do you mean literally today?
A. I do not mean for the month.
Q. 1923?
A. But I mean for a series of any—over any period long 
enough to be representative.
Q. You do not mean 1923?
A. I do not mean at the moment, because I do not attach 
much importance to the earnings of a moment.
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Q. Well, the stock of the United States Steel Corporation 
is ruling in the neighborhood of par, because it pays only to 
the holder, and has paid for the last twenty years only to the 
holder, about $5 a year?
A. That is not the sole factor. That is one of the factors.
Q. Is not that the important factor?
A. I would not say that it is the important factor, because 
you find the same sort of relation if you take Bethlehem 
Steel, for instance, which has been criticized for paying out 
too much to its stockholders. On the one hand, there is the 
Steel Corporation, which is criticized as not having paid 
enough. On the other hand, there is the Bethlehem, which 
is criticized as having paid too much, and yet the market 
value of the common stock is, I believe, somewhere about the 
same fraction of value computed in the way that you have 
spoken of, that would give the United States Steel stock a 
value of $300 a share; so that I do not think the determining 
factor can be the dividend policy. In fact, it is true of all 
Steel Companies that I know of, whatever their dividend 
policy.
By Mr. Fawsett:
Q. What is true?
A. That the market value of their stocks is only a small 
fraction of the value computed in the same way that gives 
the United States Steel stock a value of $300 a share.
V
VALUATION AND THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE *
(1924)
Doctor Adams. May I ask you a question right here?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Doctor Adams. I think you will agree that a large part 
of our difficulty comes from valuation, and that a large 
number of those valuations are concerned with capital assets, 
so called. Now, at the present time, we have a limited rate 
on gain derived from the sale of capital assets, and it is 
proposed in the House bill to limit the allowance for losses. 
In that connection, my question is this: Assuming that the 
action reported in the newspapers by the Senate Committee, 
namely, of limiting the rate to 12½ per cent of the gains, 
but allowing losses in value; assuming that that goes through, 
do you believe that the Government would gain or lose by 
eliminating the taxation on capital gains and losses alto­
gether?
Mr. May. If they would cut out the limit on losses, they 
are bound to lose.
Senator King. Surely.
Doctor Adams. Therefore, do you think that if they 
maintain that attitude toward losses, we could simplify the 
law indefinitely by abolishing all reference to capital gains 
and losses?
Mr. May. Of course, as I think you know, that is a sub­
ject that I have been very much interested in. I wrote a 
paper on that subject, which you have read, undoubtedly. 
My mind has been working toward the solution of it, in 
spite of the prima facie arguments in favor of taxing capital
* From Hearings, Senate Committee on Investigation of the Bureau of In­
ternal Revenue, 68th Congress (1924), pp. 267-270.
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gains; but from the standpoint of revenue, it would be better 
to eliminate taxation of capital gains and allowance of 
capital losses.
Senator King. It may be interesting to know that I have 
an amendment, as one member of the Committee, to strike 
out all of those provisions of capital losses and gains. I 
reached that conclusion long ago.
Mr. May. Of course, in all of these changes, you usually 
exchange one set of troubles for another.
Senator King. Yes.
Mr. May. But you find the weak points in method largely 
by experience, and you do not want to reject a method, 
when you have found out its weak spots by experience, with­
out very carefully canvassing the weak spots of any alterna­
tive that you are going to adopt. It is not difficult to sort of 
cast what is really income into the form of a capital gain.
Senator King. There is the danger.
Mr. May. Personally, I do not think that the drafting of 
provisions that would put a reasonable limit, that would stop 
a great deal of that kind of evasion, would be anything like 
as difficult as the drafting of the restrictions under the pres­
ent law.
The Chairman. But, after all, that is a question of policy 
for the taxing committee, rather than improving the methods 
of the Internal Revenue Bureau.
Mr. May. Well, it is on the question of simplification. It 
will undoubtedly be a great simplification.
The Chairman. I know; but you cannot afford to 
change the whole taxing policy in. order to simplify the 
method of calculation.
Mr. May. But I think, if well drafted, it would not in­
volve any sacrifice of revenue. That is my general impres­
sion.
Doctor Adams. May I ask you, in general, about valua­
tions? I ask that because I think that no one thing so con­
duces to delay and complexities of tax laws as the necessity 
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for valuations. I would like to know, first, if you indorse 
that general view?
Mr. May. Oh, yes; that is, a large part of it.
Doctor Adams. It would follow from that, then, that 
valuations should be omitted and eliminated wherever pos­
sible?
Mr. May. Yes; the more you can do without valuations, 
the better.
Doctor Adams. I would like to ask you if you have any 
general notion about the reasonableness, the excess or defect 
of valuations, made for the purposes of depletion?
Mr. May. Well, speaking for myself personally, I have 
always felt that valuations for tax purposes, for mineral areas, 
were too high. I mean not only for income tax purposes, 
but for local tax purposes.
Senator King. Pardon me, but you know, of course, that 
in a great many States they do not tax the property, except 
the improvements. It is a tax upon the mineral output.
Mr. May. Yes; but in Minnesota—
Senator King. Oh, yes.
Mr. May. I think the Minnesota valuation of mines has 
cost the Federal Government a lot of money, because they 
value the mines, as I recall, on a 4 per cent basis.
Doctor Adams. The Michigan valuation?
Mr. May. Michigan was 5 per cent, as I recall, and Min­
nesota at one time was on a 4 per cent assessment basis. 
They got a very high valuation for the mines. When you 
were valuing those same mines for income-tax purposes, and 
those valuations were made long before March 1, 1913, in 
Minnesota, and you were predicting the calculations on the 
assumption that local taxes on those high valuations would 
continue, it was very difficult to resist the argument of the 
taxpayer that he is entitled to at least as high a valuation 
for depletion as he is for the purpose of tax on capital. 
That, to my mind, started off depletion valuations on a high 
level.
Then, again, there is another factor that is almost impos­
290 VALUATION
sible to get out of your mind. It is almost impossible for 
a man, after a period of inflation has gone, when prices were 
high, to get his mind back in the state in which it would 
have been on the 1st of, March, 1913, and make a retrospec­
tive valuation, which absolutely ignores everything that has 
happened since. It is almost impossible to do it, and I think 
the tendency, therefore, from that cause also has been rather 
upward, on the high side. That is my general theory.
Doctor Adams. In general, if any method fair to the in 
dustry can be devised to replace the present discovery de­
pletion, which in the case of oil and gas calls for recurrent 
and continual valuation, would it not be most desirable to 
substitute a different method?
Mr. May. I should say decidedly so.
Doctor Adams. In other words, the valuation in itself is to 
be avoided if any satisfactory substitute can be secured?
Mr. May. Personally, I have always felt that it was un­
fortunate that that discovery provision got into the law.
VI
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER REORGANIZATION 
OF 1920 IN RETROSPECT *
(1927)
Q. Something has been said here about reserves being 
set up there as being, as it proved to be, inadequate, because 
some nine or ten million dollars had to be taken out of 
operating profits or at least absorbed to pay for some of these 
unfortunate commitments for future delivery: will you 
elaborate that a little?
A. That, if I may say so, is rather a different question. 
That question arises on the balance sheet of February 28th 
before you attempt to give effect to the plan.
Q. Yes, that is true.
A. Giving effect to the plan merely substitutes for a com­
mitment that will ultimately be payable in cash, an obliga­
tion on the part of the commitment creditor to take prior 
preference stock to a certain extent in lieu of cash: that all 
arises after—I think it will serve to make things clear if I 
make that distinction at the outset.
Q. Fine.
A. Before giving effect to the plan at all we had decided 
that a reserve of approximately $24,000,000 was needed to 
provide for the excess cost of fabric under these commit­
ment contracts over any fair market value as of that date, as 
at the date of the balance sheet.
We felt that that was a material factor in the financial 
position of the company which ought to be reflected in its 
balance sheet.
The amount of that reserve was a matter partly of knowl­
edge and partly of judgment.
* From testimony in S. C. Tomlinson, et al. v. Clarence Dillon, et al., 
#61,971 Court of Common Pleas, Summit County, Ohio (1927).
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Mr. Thompson. Mr. May, I hope it is not discour­
teous to you to ask if in the October 31 statement you 
did not under your certificate estimate $19,000,000?
The Witness. $19,000,000 at that time.
Mr. Thompson. And by February 28 that had grown 
to $24,000,000; is that it?
The Witness. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I just wanted to con­
nect the two events.
Q. But your October 31 statement was not giving effect 
at all to a big, comprehensive scheme of refinancing?
A. I do not think that really bears on it, Mr. Buckner.
Q. I mean Mr. Thompson is wondering if you are wish­
ing to say that that item for instance was only $5,000,000 
worse as a mere actual fact, quite apart from the prospects 
of the company?
A. In the balance sheet of October we merely referred to 
it in our certificate. The company was not prepared to rec­
ognize it on its books. Mr. Seiberling at that time, par­
ticularly, thought that it was merely an accountant’s idea. 
I think he did not take it very seriously.
Q. I am anxious to get at the $24,000,000.
A. But the $24,000,000 is comparable to the $19,000,000. 
Mr. Thompson. That is the point I wanted to get. 
The Witness. Undoubtedly. But as I recall it the 
situation had in some respects become worse and the 
efforts to get consents and things like that had developed 
the existence of more commitments than we previously 
had knowledge of. That is what I think accounts for 
its being $24,000,000 instead of $19,000,000. Mr. Jack- 
son could tell you more of that than I could. Shall I 
resume where I was?
Q. I wish you would.
A. That $24,000,000 was arrived at on a certain basis, 
which was the result of a conference amongst our people, a 
conference with officers of the company and some of the mer­
chandise creditors themselves, I remember myself mention-
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ing it to Mr. Myron Taylor: some views were expressed that 
that reserve ought to be larger and other views were ex­
pressed that we were going to ruin the company for a hypo­
thetical adjustment, the prices might come right back and 
there was no need for so much reserve, and if that reserve 
were put in the balance sheet it would be impossible to 
finance the company at all; certainly if it were made any 
larger it would become increasingly difficult if not impos­
sible to finance it.
My associates who were engaged on the work put that 
question up to me and said that I must make the decision 
and assume the responsibility for the firm.
As I say, I talked to Mr. Taylor and I talked to some other 
people and discussed it with our people, and it seemed to me 
that on the whole $24,000,000 was a pretty fair figure; it 
seemed to me that it was reasonably fair to the people who 
were being invited to come in to buy bonds on the basis of 
this balance sheet; and it seemed to me reasonably fair to the. 
people who were trying to save their interest in the business.
If we had had a little more margin to play with I would 
have been glad to have seen it some millions larger, but it 
seemed to me a reasonable figure, and Mr. Jackson told me 
that, using it as a basis, it seemed to him that the company 
ought to be able to make some money in the subsequent 
operations.
After a fairly extended discussion of it I said I thought 
I would assume the responsibility of a balance sheet in which 
$24,000,000 was inserted to provide for that element of vital 
importance in the financial position of the company.
Q. Did you assume, in finally fixing that $24,000,000 as 
a deficit to take care of losses on delivery under contracts at 
higher prices, that the company would not have some grief 
and would be in 100 per cent condition, or did you have 
something else in mind?
A. I realized that probably if they were entirely footloose 
they could make new contracts on an even better basis than 
that; but that seemed to me to be a reasonably practical view
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of the situation, which left something to be worked out but 
did not leave an undue burden on the company.
Q. Do you recall, for instance, whether you included in 
that reserve anything at all for carrying charges on deferred 
deliveries of rubber and fabric when the company would 
ask a man—
A. No, we left that to be cared for as it cropped up.
Q. That would be a very substantial item, of course, 
would it not?
A. These general expressions like “substantially” are a 
little dangerous, because the figures vary so much here; but 
I mean it is a matter of perhaps three or four millions, pos­
sibly.
Q. Yes, of course.
A. Which in general one would say were substantial, but 
in proportion to some of the figures here involved looks rela­
tively small.
Q. For example, in proportion to the deficit as of Feb­
ruary 28, 1921, if you had not given effect to the whole 
plan of reorganization you say the deficit would have been 
$75,000,000?
A. Yes; in proportion to that it is relatively small.
Q. It would be relatively small?
A. Yes.
Q. In fixing this reserve then you were not attempting to 
put this company in a condition better than all the other 
rubber companies, for instance, under the same conditions?
A. I did not know enough about the other rubber com­
panies, but it was just what I say: a reasonable exercise of 
business judgment is what I meant to accomplish.
Q. Then that is one item of what you might colloquially 
call “grief” that the company out of its operating expenses 
would have to take care of. Was there any other item that 
might bring some grief to the company that they would have 
to take care of as they went along on their way after re­
organization that you now remember?
A. You mean in connection with those commitments?
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Q. Yes.
A. I remember it was suggested that in addition to—we 
wrote down only the cotton element in the specified commit­
ments; we did not attempt to write down the conversion cost.
Q. Although there were a lot of commitments for—
A. Those conversion costs were higher than the conver­
sion costs that we agreed on about that same time in respect 
to the unspecified commitments.
Q. You knew that there would be some grief there that 
the company would have to absorb?
A. Yes, there was some grief; of course no rubber com­
pany was going to come into this situation without some 
hangovers of that kind.
Q. I understand.
A. And that seemed to us to put them on a reasonably 
competitive condition as far as that is concerned, and also 
it would be reasonable from the standpoint—provide reason­
able protection for the new security holders who were in­
vited to come in.
Q. But was that item of conversion something that might 
well run into a few million dollars, or do you remember?
A. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact the company, after paying 
those conversion costs for a time, as I remember effected 
some reductions and ultimately also paid some sums to 
cancel the contracts.
Q. In setting up reserves for inventory, what was the basis 
of fixing the reserves for the write-down on inventories, 
since the value of tires of course had dropped precipitately?
A. We wrote the inventories down; we wrote down rub­
ber to a base of 20 cents, which as I recall was approximately 
the market at the time that we did it, although before the 
actual transaction was consummated it sagged off, the nom­
inal market at least sagged off lower, I fancy it was about 
17 cents; and the finished goods, the inventory, the cost was 
above the selling value; so that we merely reduced them to 
the net selling value, on which basis we assumed that the 
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company would not make either any profit or a loss on 
liquidating those inventories.
Q. When you say they would not make a loss, suppose you 
took all the finished goods that were ready for delivery and 
you marked them down or you set up a reserve rather, to 
account for current market prices: did you allow anything 
• at all for the large overhead, the administrative expenses, 
etc.?
A. Not the general administration, only the direct selling 
costs.
Q. So that whatever the general administration expenses 
were, chargeable to selling that inventory, which was then 
marked down, that would be another item at least which 
would have to be absorbed?
A. Yes, in that colloquial sense.
Mr. Hostetler. In writing a balance sheet like this 
of February 28, in April, take for instance on a material 
like crude rubber, that fluctuates rapidly, do you use the 
market price aS of February 28 or as of the date that 
you make it?
The Witness. You ordinarily use it as of February 
28.
Mr. Hostetler. In other words, while it is on the 
books—
The Witness. But in making a balance sheet for this 
purpose, in making a reserve for a future situation, if 
there were any substantial fall between the date of the 
balance and the date when you gave effect to a new 
transaction, you would have to reflect that in some way 
in the balance sheet.
Mr. Hostetler. In other words, in these values of in­
ventories, raw material and completed, you gave the 
best of your judgment in April when you made the 
sheet, rather than as of February 28?
The Witness. Yes, that would be so. We did not 
attempt to— I mean the markets were to some extent
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nominal; you had to exercise some judgment all the way 
around.
Q. Do you remember what market you took for cotton? 
You told us you took about twenty cents for rubber, al­
though it dropped a little.
A. As I remember it, they used a special grade of cotton, 
as I remember it was a thirty-cent base for a certain long 
staple cotton, which was their main grade that they used.
Q. In the petition in this case and during the taking of 
these depositions the statement has been very frequently 
made that the reorganization plan provided an excessive 
amount of cash for the company, at least that is my impres­
sion. Whether that is true or not, will you give us your 
views—it is stated in the petition that the amount of cash far 
exceeded the reasonable requirements of the business. From 
your connection with this matter, will you give us your view 
as to whether or not this plan provided an excessive amount 
of cash, that is, the proceeds of the bonds, the proceeds of all 
this money that the bankers had to put up, or any other 
available source of revenue; whether the amount of cash 
was excessive in view of the circumstances that confronted 
you in April, 1921: give us your view on that from your 
experience and from your special knowledge of this situa­
tion.
A. It did not seem to me so at the time and it does not 
seem to me so now.
I should think it would be improbable that it would be so, 
because there was a lot of work over this plan, with people 
having different interests, and some of them very shrewd men 
like Mr. Myron Taylor and Mr. Jenckes, to get out of the 
banking field; but the fact which has seemed to me to be 
most persuasive on that question, a fact which I think com­
paratively few people have recognized, that this plan did 
nothing more than replace the loss of working capital that 
had taken place since August 31, 1920.
Q. How much in round numbers was the—
A. I picked August 31, 1920—
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Q. Give us the amount of cash?
A. —because that was the first balance sheet that we 
were invited to consider when we were called into the matter 
with a view to arranging the financing.
If you take a comparison of the situation then and the 
situation when the plan was issued, you will find that the 
plan, leaving out the funded debt altogether, the net work­
ing capital under this plan, after the issue of the bonds and 
the prior preference stock, is less than the net working 
capital shown by the balance sheet of August 31, 1920, after 
deducting the bank loans and everything else from that 
working capital, although at that time the company had no 
funded debt.
You can check up in various ways. The balance sheet of 
August 31—
Mr. Thompson. Have you got that with you? We 
haven’t heard of that.
The Witness. I haven’t got it with me. That is the 
company’s balance sheet of that date.
I am mentioning this only because this is the way it oc­
curred to me, because that was the starting point as far as we 
were concerned: it does not make a particle of difference 
whether you take October 31 or August 31, excepting 
the reserves for inventories are made first in the October 
balance sheet and none was in the balance sheet of August.
Q. Take it in your own way.
A. But the balance sheet of August 31 showed a surplus 
of some $9,000,000; there were certain liabilities like taxes 
that were never put on the books until paid, it ought to be 
taken off in order to make any kind of a fair comparison: 
that would have brought the surplus down to $5,000,000.
When we came to the balance sheet of February 28, the 
deficit after providing for inventory reserves and commit­
ments had grown to somewhere around $75,000,000.
Now the new plan provided for the payment of debt or 
the provision of new capital to the extent of between $74,- 
000,000 and $75,000,000.
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I can give you roughly the compensation of that deficit 
which will show how the events have happened. The books 
of the company before adjusting for inventories showed a 
loss for September and October of approximately $8,000,000 
—I am including the subsidiaries.
Q. Yes.
A. Now some part of that possibly would on an accurate 
accounting be thrown back of August 31, but it would 
not be relatively very important. The books showed an 
operating loss including subsidiaries of roughly $13,000,000 
for the four months ending February 28. The books 
showed a loss for March and April of $5,000,000. So that 
over the period of eight months there was a loss of between 
$25,000,000 and $26,000,000.
Q. You mean just an operating loss?
A. An operating loss, including the financing charges, of 
course: there was a loss of we will say twenty-five—it is be­
tween twenty-five and twenty-six million, without providing 
for write downs or inventories or commitments.
Mr. Thompson. That is from August 31 to May 1? 
The Witness. To May 1, yes.
The inventory adjustments were $18,000,000, and the re­
serve for commitments was $24,000,000. Then in our cal­
culations we took roughly $4,000,000, the officers’ accounts 
which at any rate were frozen, out of working capital, with­
out going any further than that, and approximately $2,600,- 
000 that was paid out in dividends in September and Octo­
ber, 1920.
If you add those up you get $75,000,000—I get it $75,- 
400,000, which is roughly the amount of new cash that was 
provided under the plan. When I say new cash—either in 
the form of cash or the extension of liability.
Now of course the position of a company that has a 
funded debt of $57,500,000—the position of such a company 
in regard to lack of capital is very different from that of a 
company which has no funded debt; and this company had 
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to operate, as I see it, without any general credit until a new 
credit could be built up after the reorganization.
It has never been clear to me how it could seriously be 
argued that a reorganization which did nothing more than 
replace the working capital that had disappeared in the 
period of eight months could be regarded as grossly over­
providing working capital.
Q. Just putting back the working capital of eight months 
before, is that right?
A. There is another factor that should be taken into ac­
count: you see, it was uncertain what capital would be 
needed to clean up the capital situation, plants and so on: 
during, as I recall, the period from October, 1919, to Feb­
ruary, 1921, under the old management some $20,000,000 
had been spent on capital account in the way of plants, ex­
tensions and so on, while there was no—of course there was 
no provision of working capital then to finance any further 
capital expenditures than the mere replacement of the work­
ing capital.
I want to be entirely fair of course in presenting this, and 
therefore I would point out that naturally with falling prices 
and the shooting to pieces of the volume of business which 
had occurred during the period of or between late in 1920 
and early in 1921, the immediate requirements of working 
capital were reduced; but clearly the company could not go 
on, could not legitimately put out a scheme of this kind 
unless it looked forward to regaining something of the posi­
tion in the rubber industry that it had occupied—not its 
whole position, but some position in the rubber industry for 
the new company—and whenever that happened they would 
need a greatly increased working capital over their immedi­
ate requirements at the time the plan was issued; and of 
course, although the prices were low then, if prices subse­
quently increased, there would again be a demand for fur­
ther working capital.
Q. You mean that the facts here looked forward to an 
achievement of success rather than a conservation of failure?
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A. Yes. I think they had to, if they were going to have 
any moral justification for putting forward the plan at all.
Q. Exactly. What was the feeling of all of these people, 
these merchandise creditors and bankers’ creditors, Dillon, 
Read & Company, all the bankers, yourself, Price, Water­
house, as to whether or not there would be an opportunity 
of an encore here if there was a second collapse?
A. I cannot speak for them, but it is perfectly obvious in 
a situation of this kind it is no good trying to make two 
bites of a cherry: you have to clean it up once for all. I 
think on that everybody will agree.
Q. You did not feel that a second collapse would meet 
with such applause that you would all be called upon to 
respond to an encore?
A. No, I did not think so.
By Mr. Buckner:
Q. Mr. May, before passing to a new topic I want to 
revert to the subject you were discussing just as we ad­
journed yesterday. You called our attention to the fact that 
the new capital, new money rather, provided by the reor­
ganization plan either in cold cash or the cancellation of 
obligations, I believe, was something in round numbers like 
$75,000,000.
A. Yes.
Q. You pointed out that that $75,000,000 so provided 
was no more than the amount of working capital which had 
been lost by the company within, roughly speaking, the pre­
ceding eight or nine months. Remembering that none of 
us is an accountant, will you elaborate a little bit on what 
you mean by the phrase “working capital”?
A. By working capital I mean substantially the sum of 
money that is sometimes termed net current assets, that is 
the excess of current assets over current liabilities.
Q. Current assets?
A. By current assets I mean such items as inventories, 
accounts receivable, temporary investments, if any, and cash; 
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and by current liabilities I mean items as accounts payable 
and payrolls, current taxes and any bank debts or loans or 
any short term obligations of that character.
I distinguish between current assets on the one side and 
fixed assets, and between current liabilities and funded lia­
bilities on the other.
Q. Take a brick building, would that be working capital? 
A. A brick building used in the operation of the plant? 
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Take $1,000,000 in Liberty bonds held by the com­
pany, would that be working capital?
A. Yes, that would be part of the working capital.
Q. Take $10,000,000 cash in the bank, would that be 
working capital?
A. Yes.
Q. Take your finished product on hand ready to be sold, 
would that be working capital?
A. Yes.
Q. I suppose that capital would not work unless it could 
be sold?
A. Of course every balance sheet of a going concern is 
predicated upon the assumption that it is going to continue 
to go.
Q. Oh, I see. So that the assumption at least is, if you 
got some beautiful tires all ready to sell, especially if they 
were Goodyear tires, that they will be sold?
A. Yes.
Q. And accounts payable?
A. Accounts payable, yes.
Q. Predicated upon the theory that people will pay their 
debts within the customary time?
A. Yes; with of course due provision for any cases where 
that does not appear to be a reasonable presumption.
Q. The percentage of reluctant or discouraged debtors is 
usually taken care of by some arbitrary reserve set up, isn’t 
it?
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A. Some reserve more or less arbitrary, according to cir­
cumstances.
Q. So that as we would understand it, working capital is 
either cash or a very near relative?
A. Yes.
Q. Which could easily be put in the place of cash, is that 
it?
A. Less the things that have to be paid out of cash in the 
near future.
Q. Less the things that have to be paid out of it, of 
course. The evidence shows here that the first mortgage 
bonds, for example, bore an 8 per cent coupon and that 
every year for 20 years there would be a percentage of those 
bonds drawn by lot and redeemed at 120 over the 20 years; 
the evidence shows that the debentures I think carried a 
coupon of 8 per cent. The prior preference stock carried 8 
per cent interest; that the debentures which were sold to the 
bankers in place of their debt carried with them stock war­
rants, the bankers being required to put up $100 of new 
money for every $100 that they were already in for; and, 
generally speaking, the plan has been said to be from time 
to time drastic or expensive. What was the alternative to a 
reorganization on these lines, under all the circumstances 
existing in the spring of 1921?
Mr. Thompson. Objected to as leading.
Mr. Buckner. What was the alternative? There is 
nothing leading about that.
The Witness. Do you want me to answer?
Mr. Buckner. Yes, what was the alternative?
A. My judgment is that if permanent financing had not 
been accomplished just about the time that this was accom­
plished, a receivership would have been practically inev­
itable.
- Q. Have you any judgment—I do not know exactly how 
close you were to what might be called the banking situa­
tion: have you any judgment as to whether or not this re­
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organization could possibly have been put through on any 
other terms than this term, in a broad, general way?
A. I do not think I could say that I was close enough to 
answer that question in that specific form.
Q. We are getting that from the bankers but I do not 
know how you—
A. I was in general touch and I might have an opinion, 
but it would not be a sufficiently well-informed opinion 
based upon my own knowledge to justify me in answering 
that specific question.
Q. You will stick right to the Price, Waterhouse boun­
daries?
A. I want to talk about things that I know about.
Mr. Thompson. Some have not done that, Mr. May. 
Mr. Hostetler. No; the lawyers have been very lax. 
Mr. Thompson. We will accept it if you will. [Dis­
cussion off the record.]
Q. Let us look at the situation after the reorganization: 
whatever happened to the bank debts of Goodyear?
A. They were retired under the plan of reorganization 
through the operation of the debenture issue.
Q. What had happened to all the obligations that were 
owed to the merchandise creditors who had sold cotton and 
fabric and machinery and rubber, etc.?
A. In the main, they had been provided for by issues of 
prior preference stock.
Q. What was the result of that so far as cash or its 
equivalent now in the possession of Goodyear after reor­
ganization with which to do business and as to its quick 
assets: that is, the net result of that reorganization in that 
way?
A. The company started off—I cannot give you the exact 
figure except on the footing of the balance sheet that we 
used and which I can say that it would have started off at 
January 28 if the plan had been consummated at that time, 
instead of actually at April, because it is impossible to get 
the actual financial position actually at the time the plan
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went into effect, so that I have to make any answers subject 
to that modification; the plan will show, but as I recall it 
started the company off with approximately $54,000,000 of 
net working capital and somewhere around ten or eleven 
million dollars in cash.
Q. That is a matter of record, of course.
A. Yes.
Q. Were the terms of this reorganization, the terms of 
the refinancing, due to Dillon, Read; Goldman, Sachs; Na­
tional City Company; Chase Securities Company and three 
other names read by Mr. Thompson yesterday: was it due 
to these bankers or was it due to the financial condition of 
Goodyear?
A. Well, the major factor in determining the basis on 
which finance can be accomplished is clearly the financial 
situation of the company that is seeking it.
Q. You spent a lot of time studying, either at first hand 
or with your other partners, the conditions in the Goodyear 
Company, did you not, before Dillon, Read were in it at all?
A. Yes. I will not say before Dillon, Read were in it at 
all. I do not know when they went in. At any rate, when 
they went into any specific commitment.
Q. And so far as you know when they were in it at all? 
A. Yes. I don’t know when they went into it.
Q. Did you find any evidence out there in Akron that 
Dillon, Read had gotten this company in a condition where 
on February 28 their balance sheet would have shown a 
$75,ooo,ooo deficit?
A. No, I do not say that.
Q. Whose party was that, I mean what had brought about 
conditions where a balance sheet without reorganization 
would have shown a deficit of $7.5,000,000: what had brought 
that about?
A. Fundamentally, of course, it was the general condition 
that supervened in 1920 when the general deflation took 
place; that is the primary cause. And I think the reason why 
it was so severe in the case of Goodyear was that, first of all
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I think that industry was one of the industries that was rela­
tively hard hit by the deflation and Goodyear was certainly 
the hardest hit so far as I could judge of any of the com­
panies in the industry, because apparently it was overex­
tended.
Q. That is just what I want to know, why was the Good­
year harder hit than the other tire companies?
A. Because it had such an extended commitment posi­
tion, that is fundamental, that is the particular manifesta­
tion, and if you want to go back of that to more general 
causes I can do it, but I want to stick to—that is the impor­
tant situation. •
Q. You can use your own judgment in any way—
Q. —in any way that you feel is a proper way to answer 
the question.
A. Well, based on my examination of the situation at 
that time the real trouble seemed to me to be that Goodyear 
was well organized on the manufacturing side, the selling 
side and the general development of the business, and there­
fore it was able to take full advantage of favorable condi­
tions; but it was weak as I see it on the side of control of 
purchases, control of finance and general control of accounts. 
Those are the weaknesses that become vital and fatal when 
you strike real adversity. They were unfortunate in being 
weak on that side when they struck a period of exceptional 
adversity which hit their particular industry particularly 
hard. To put it in a nut shell, I think probably in the 
organization, in addition to the manufacturing personnel, 
that if there had been a good hard-headed Scotchman that 
we would have—
Mr. Thompson. An Englishman would not have 
done?
The Witness. No, a Scotchman; a good hard-headed 
Scotchman to watch the finances, we none of us would 
have been here today.
Q. You have some Scotch partners, have you not?
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A. Yes.
Q. We had one of them here, Jackson: I wanted to ask 
him if Price, Waterhouse selected him as treasurer because 
he was a Scotchman, but I was afraid he might not enjoy 
the comedy. What do you mean by being well equipped for 
everything except adversity: what do you mean, why is that 
important in a large industry? After all this thing had 
grown up into an enormous company, had it not?
A. Yes. But unless you are well equipped for success you 
will never make a big success and, on the other hand, if you 
are not equipped for adversity you may make a very big 
failure. That is really two sides of the picture as I see it.
Q. The Goodyear Company was a fair weather sailor, is 
that it, from your examination of the books and the situa­
tion: as long as everything went all right they went all right?
A. Yes. I do not think they would listen to the advice 
of Horace about taking half your canvas in when more than 
a propitious gale fills your sail. I think that is probably 
their real trouble.
Q. Was the canvas all out when you went out?
A. I think they were carrying on a bit longer than most 
of us would in a race.
Q. And the wind was then blowing, was it?
A. Very strong.
Q. I read you from paragraph 45 of the petition as fol­
lows [reading]:
Owing to the large earning power of the Company and 
the inherent soundness of its financial condition, within 
three months its former debts to banks were funded; its for­
mer obligations for merchandise paid in stock; its quick 
assets exceeded its current debts by more than ten to one; 
it possessed no banking indebtedness, and had over twenty- 
three million dollars ($23,000,000) in cash, bankers’ accept­
ances and securities of the United States of America.
Without regard at the moment to the precise accuracy or 
otherwise of the amount of cash and ratio of quick assets to 
 current debts, I want to ask you if the condition described in 
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that paragraph, after three months from reorganization, was 
due to the large earning power of the company and the in­
herent soundness of its financial condition, or was it due to 
what the reorganization had brought about in the way you 
have described?
A. I should say that it was due to the substantial sound­
ness of its financial position after the reorganization had 
been effected, and that the effecting of that reorganization 
was of course only rendered possible by the belief that the 
company had under fairly normal conditions an earning 
capacity; but apart from the reorganization, obviously the 
company had no inherent financial soundness.
Q. Exactly; of course it would not be reorganized if they 
did not believe that the company would pull out if reor­
ganized, naturally.
Q. Now will you put your mind on the month of No­
vember, 1921, after the reorganization in May, 1921, and 
from your knowledge of the situation and from your experi­
ence will you tell me whether in November, 1921, the Good­
year Company could properly have retired all or any sub­
stantial part of its debentures which had been held by the 
Blair-Hallgarten syndicate and which were sold in Novem­
ber to a syndicate headed by Dillon, Read?
Mr. Thompson. Objected to as leading.
Mr. C. Crawford. I object to it on the ground that 
the witness is without jurisdiction to decide the issues 
of this case.
Mr. Thompson. I object to it as leading, too.
Mr. Buckner. Answer the question, Mr. May.
A. My judgment, not of course as a legal conclusion, but 
as a business man, is that they could not have done so from 
a business standpoint, nor do I see how they could have done 
so from a moral standpoint: I will exclude the legal stand­
point altogether.
Q. Take up first the business standpoint and then take 
up the moral standpoint and tell us what you mean by that.
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A. I would rather take them in the other order, if I may.
Q. The other order, all right.
A. These debentures had been issued as a part of a gen­
eral plan and for the reorganization of the company which 
had been agreed to by a large number of persons in interest, 
and through the sale of first mortgage bonds new money had 
been brought into the company on the faith of that plan. 
Now between the date of the plan and September 30 noth­
ing had happened of a favorable nature to the company, as 
I see it, that was not contemplated in the plan. The earn­
ings had been no greater than those on which the plan had 
been predicated. In those circumstances it seems to me that 
the company could not well have applied any of the money 
that was raised under that plan to the retirement of securities 
which were junior to the first mortgage bonds which had 
recently been subscribed for on the faith of that plan and 
the representations made in pursuance of that plan.
Turning to the—
Mr. Thompson. Now that is the moral side.
The Witness. That is the broad moral side. From 
a business standpoint it seems to me that the company 
had just had an extremely narrow escape from a busi­
ness failure due substantially to a lack of proper pru­
dence in finance. Its general credit had been injured, 
and one of the first requisites to its future success was 
that its general credit should be rehabilitated, and for 
that reason more than customary financial prudence 
seemed to me to be called for at that time.
In the third place, while the company at that time 
had a large amount of cash and securities on hand, its 
business had been greatly injured by the unfortunate 
events of the previous year, and if it was to be a finan­
cial success it had to restore its volume of business, 
which would entail an increase in the amount of work­
ing capital in the form of accounts receivable and so on, 
even though there were a diminution of the amount of 
working capital in the form of cash and securities.
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Furthermore, the company’s business rests on raw 
materials, which are subject to very wide fluctuations. 
They had been through a serious situation caused by 
concurrent declines in the prices of rubber and fabric. 
If within one or two years they should have struck a 
situation where there were concurrent high prices for 
rubber and fabric, they might have needed very much 
more working capital to conduct their business, even 
than they had then had.
Then the company had a lot of troubles that were 
not entirely straightened out; that was in the nature of 
things; the major troubles were connected with the re­
organization, but inevitably there were a lot of things 
still to be cleared up. The unspecified commitment 
situation was one of some difficulty and uncertainty. 
The industry had been going through something of a 
change; the type of common tire had altered; the future 
of the business—the industry as a whole was in a very 
interesting condition, and looking at it from that stand­
point it seemed to me that at that time the position of 
the cash resources, the potential resource that could be 
drawn in at any point where there seemed to be an 
advantage to use it, was from the standpoint of all the 
security holders of the company far more important 
than any saving of interest charges that might result 
from the retirement of debts. I know that our people 
always felt that a concurrent serious movement in either 
direction of the basic raw materials of the industry at 
any time within two or three years after the reorganiza­
tion might be a source of serious embarrassment to the 
company, and they were very fortunate in the fact that 
no such concurrent movement took place during 1921, 
1922, and 1923. When the fabric situation was a bit 
unfavorable the rubber situation helped us out, and 
vice versa; but it seemed to me you always had to be 
prepared, particularly at that time, for a concurrent
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movement of the raw materials which might have been 
very embarrassing.
For all these reasons, in my mind it was perfectly clear 
that from any standpoint of either moral obligation or 
practical common sense it would not have been an ap­
propriate thing for the company to apply its cash re­
sources to the retirement of the debentures. Personally 
I think they were wise in keeping cash resources, but if 
they wanted to apply them to the retirement of debt it 
seems to me the only proper use would have been to 
retire first mortgage bonds.
Q. As a matter of fact did not the very thing that you 
are saying might be on the cards any year actually happen 
in 1925 when rubber jumped up like a thermometer, or do 
you know about that?
A. Yes, I know something about that, yes; it did happen, 
yes.
Q. The company actually had to issue still more securities 
in 1925, did it, or do you remember?
A. Yes, it had to issue $15,000,000 of notes, as I re­
member.
Q. Do you recall, too, whether or not the fall of the year 
is the time when anybody in the tire business accumulates 
more cash than it has in the spring of the year, let us say?
A. Yes.
Q. And is this cash a curve or wave, rather, in the tire 
business?
A. The fall of the year is the low point of the require­
ments for the working capital other than cash, and therefore 
you have to have more cash at that time if you are going to 
have adequate working capital for the spring season, when 
the other demands are greater.
Q. What is the justification, if any, for any industrial 
company to have bank deposits drawing banking interest at 
3 per cent at a time when they may have outstanding bonds 
and debentures drawing 8 per cent?
A. Well, of course, every company must have some cash 
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resources at all times. But my experience has been that a 
substantial cash reserve over and above the bare require­
ments is a real source of strength to any company. You will 
find, of course, the Steel Corporation is one of the conspicu­
ous illustrations of a company that has always carried very 
large cash balances, and the value of it is measured by the 
potential uses of the cash as well as the actual uses of the 
cash, just as in naval affairs, in Admiral Mahan’s expression, 
a fleet in being has a great value quite apart from the ex­
istence of its influence on the immediate area in which it is 
located.
Q. Let us get down to the spring of 1923, the early part 
of 1923. I have in mind, say, the last week in January. I 
may say that at that time the company was offered by a 
syndicate headed by Dillon, Read & Company the privilege 
of buying all or any part of all of the outstanding prior pref­
erence stock which in round numbers was about $33,000,000 
par value. They were offered the privilege of buying that at 
$85.60, which is just what it had cost the Dillon, Read syndi­
cate. They actually did purchase $13,000,000 par value at 
that discount. I would like to have your views in the same 
way as you have given in the debentures as to the propriety 
of the company either from a business standpoint or a moral 
standpoint, if they are both involved, in purchasing any or 
all of that outstanding block of prior preference stock at that 
time when they were given the opportunity at that price. 
That is about the last week in January, 1923, a little less 
than two years after the reorganization.
A. Well, that is a little further away from the date when 
I was making a more intensive study of Goodyear, and 
therefore I do not feel so well equipped to discuss all the 
business aspects of the situation; but I did know about 
that incident at the time, and it seemed to me then a very 
grave question whether, having in mind the spirit of the 
plan of reorganization and not merely its letter, the company 
was justified in buying as much prior preference stock as it 
did. The first mortgage bonds and debentures were secured
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by agreements which contained various restrictive covenants. 
One of those, as I recall, was that no dividends should be 
paid on the prior preference stock or any stocks, in fact, to 
the extent of more than two-thirds of the surplus accumu­
lated subsequent to May 1, 1921. The balance sheet of 
December 31, 1922, showed a surplus, as I recall, of very 
close to $8,000,000, and two-thirds of that would be some­
where under five and a half million, and I have always had 
difficulty in seeing how the directors felt justified in retiring 
more than could be purchased with five and a half million 
dollars from the standpoint of the spirit of the arrangement. 
Clearly, retiring prior preference stock, so far as any effect 
on the debentures was concerned, was precisely the same as 
paying the money out in dividends on the prior preference 
stock.  I do not know anything about the legal aspects of the 
question, but if I had been a director I should have hesitated 
a great deal about going further than that in retiring the 
prior preference stock. As a matter of fact, I do not think it 
injured the debenture holder—
Q. The way it worked out?
A. [Continuing] —as it worked out, and it proved bene­
ficial to the junior stockholders undoubtedly and to the rest 
of the prior preference stock, so that from that standpoint 
you may say that I should have to admit that the directors 
took a risk I would not have taken, but that it worked out 
very well for everybody concerned.
Q. That is, after the event?
A. After the event.
Q. When you said a while ago that the Seiberling man­
agement needed a Scotchman, did you have in mind a 
Scotchman that would look ahead or a Scotchman that would 
look back after the event?
A. Scotchmen are generally regarded as being good at 
looking forward.
Q. A forward-looking Scotchman, as we would say?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, from your thirty years’ experience with appar-
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ently pretty large industries and institutions, do you attach 
any importance to the element of management of an indus­
trial company?
A. Well, it seems to me obviously the vitally important 
element.
Q. Why?
A. Provided of course that you are in a business where 
there are some possibilities of success. Why?
Q. Yes. Why is it so important in an industrial concern 
or any concern?
A. Well, because when you really get down to essentials 
the value of a business depends ultimately on its earning 
capacity, and its earning capacity is largely determined by 
the character of the management.
Q. [Reading]:
That the accounts of the Goodyear Company were in 
such a state of confusion as to require months of work by 
certified public accountants to arrive at even a reasonable 
approximation of the correct situation.
Was that statement true or not?
A. Well, my information is not very detailed about that, 
but the position that was reported to me was that the general 
detailed accounting of the company was good.
Q. Yes.
A. But there was not any adequate general control, and 
the records on some material—essentials perhaps I had better 
say—on some essential features, such as commitments, were 
quite inadequate. There was no place in the organization 
where you could go and either be given or directed to a 
source of information which would be comprehensive. That 
was our fundamental difficulty, as I see it. But I would like 
to make it quite clear that the general accounting, the detail 
accounting, was quite satisfactory.  
Q. I understand that.
A. I did not want to reflect oh anybody unjustly.
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Q. I understand that. The point is that the ledger ac­
count as to how much the Main Street Garage owed for tires 
was accurate, but you seem to refer to something higher?
A. Yes; there was no one that was really on top of the 
whole situation from the financial side and had a picture 
of it all.
Q. Exactly.
A. This, as I think, was the fatal defect of the organiza­
tion. If there had been, I think there would have been an 
entirely different result.
Re-cross Examination by Mr. Thompson:
Q. Mr. May, United States Rubber and Goodrich were 
much older companies than Goodyear, were they not?
A. I do not know the actual age of Goodyear, but as sub­
stantial competitors they certainly were.
Q. The growth of Goodyear in volume of business was 
very rapid up to 1920, was it not?
A. It was.
Q. And the real, serious trouble, as you have depicted it 
to us, was a failure to, have the seer’s vision and to prepare 
for the bad days that perhaps a Scotchman would have fore­
seen: that is one of the outstanding things, isn’t it?
A. Well, I do not think you needed to be a seer, exactly. 
I think my statement would rather be that there had been 
undue concentration on development and inadequate con­
sideration of the dangers of the business: too much realiza­
tion of the opportunities and not enough realization of the 
pitfalls.
Q. In other words, the chief executive appears to you to 
have been a man with vision and energy in building up a 
business, but not possessed of those hard-headed qualities of 
a cold-blooded financier?
A. Yes, I think that is true, that he needed—it is very dif­
ficult to get that combination of qualities in one man.
Q. He had not equipped himself with the right type of 
treasurer: that is what you mean, do you not?
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A. I should think that a strong financial vice-president 
would have been what was needed for that business.
Q. And what had happened was that, with too much op­
timism probably due at least in part to the rapidity of the 
growth of the business, they had committed themselves for 
rubber and fabric at prices that turned out to be very un­
wise: now that is the real situation, isn’t it?
A. That is the vitally important element in the situation, 
undoubtedly.
Q. And as you have very accurately described, that really 
was the crux of the trouble that the company was confronted 
with in the fall of 1920?
A. Yes.
VII
THE BETHLEHEM-YOUNGSTOWN MERGER SUIT *
(1930)
Q. Why is it these physical valuations, physical appraisals, 
to your mind are of so little value regarding the real worth 
of properties, the real relative worth of properties, the real 
relative worth of two business institutions?
A. Well, in the case of steel industries, the big steel plants 
of the country have grown up in locations that were de­
termined on the basis of conditions existing a number of 
years ago because once you have made your choice of location, 
you are more or less committed to it even if it appears years 
later the place you would have chosen is another spot. Now, 
discussing values, they come under two heads, one the physi­
cal valuation and the other the commercial valuation.
Q. Before you proceed suppose you define what you mean 
by physical valuation. Possibly we all mean the same thing, 
but let us make certain.
A. I think that will appear more clearly as I explain what 
seems to me involved.
Court. Involved in the place of the physical structure?
A. Yes, on the so-called physical question I have given a 
great deal of time in connection with the railroad rate regu­
lation problem, on which I have studied and written. The 
physical valuation theory starts on the premise that if the 
property did not exist it would be economically wise to re­
produce it where it is and as it is.
Q. In kind?
A. Yes. In regard to a very large part of the steel in­
dustry such a premise is totally unwarranted. I think every­
one will agree there are large parts of the steel industry
* From testimony in Wick & International Shares Inc. v. Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. and Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
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which if they didn’t exist would not be reproduced where 
they are located or as they are. Take an extreme illustra­
tion: the physical reproduction theory would assign greater 
value to a steel plant at the North Pole than one on Lake 
Michigan because it would cost more to build it there. But 
in a reasonable way there is no doubt that the value of a 
steel plant is very largely affected by its location and type 
of construction, and it is quite unsafe to assume as a measure 
of value that they would be reproduced as they are and where 
they are. In this particular case it certainly appears that 
the Coatesville plant, for instance, and some of the Mahoning 
Valley properties—
Court. Excuse me. You use the illustration of a hypo­
thetical plant at the North Pole and one somewhere near 
here. Would there be such a disparity if they were both 
valued as to their purely physical valuation by one’s advan­
tageously comparing it with the other?
A. It depends upon what you mean by their purely physi­
cal valuation. If you assume physical cost of reproduction— 
Court. I do not, I do not mean that at all.
A. Then your physical valuation is very much what I 
would call the commercial physical valuation. The physical 
valuation that takes into account the location and advantages 
and disadvantages—
Court. I merely mean that taking a plant, physical struc­
ture here and one at the North Pole, considering their con­
dition of depreciation, that is, their obsolescence, etc., and 
their condition as productive physical properties designed 
to produce the product for which they were intended—com­
paring one with the other regardless of location—
Witness. Regardless of location? The value would be 
the same if the buildings were the same and depreciation 
conditions were the same?
Court. Yes.
Witness. That being so, that seems to me necessarily 
would be a very unsafe guide to property value.
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Court. It is, however, one element that enters into an ap­
praisal?
Witness. It is one element that may enter into it, it does 
enter into the ordinary physical appraisal.
Court. There are, however, other considerations I under­
stand you classify under the heading of commercial?
A. Yes.
Q. So in the understanding of this question of equality 
of reproduction costs designed to illustrate there are two 
things, first the replacement values: it is higher at the North 
Pole than in the Mahoning Valley because it would cost 
more to get the material up there to build it. Secondly, 
built at the North Pole it would be susceptible of less use 
than in the Mahoning Valley and consequently would be 
worth less.
A. That is the second part of my view that I hadn’t 
reached yet.
Q. Well now, proceed.
A. Now, coming to the question of commercial valuation. 
It is perfectly obvious that if you have two identical plants 
and one is better located than the other—
Q. Now, if I may interrupt—I don’t want to seem to lead 
you—assuming these two plants you speak of having identical 
valuations, is that your assumption?
A. That is the assumption, that if they were identical and 
in the same state of observed depreciation, or whatever you 
would call it, they would still not be of the same commercial 
value if one were much more advantageously located than the 
other.
Court. To location of raw materials?
A. Yes. Therefore, those factors would have to be taken 
into account in what I call commercial valuation. As I see 
it there are two approaches to the commercial valuation, the 
one is to take the physical value of an ideally located and 
constructed plant and then measure the value of a less fa­
vorably constructed and located plant by deducting from the 
value of the ideal plant an estimate of the capital sum equiv­
320 VALUATION
alent to the disadvantages of the less favorably located plant. 
Perhaps I can make it clear by the use of figures. If, for 
instance, the necessary investment in a steel plant of a given 
type would run to, say, $100 per ton on the annual produc­
tion, and let us say $12 would be the amount necessary to 
provide depreciation and a fair return on the cost, then if 
you have two plants and one is at a disadvantage to the other 
to the extent of more than $12 that second plant is prac­
tically worthless. It would be cheaper to scrap it and build 
somewhere else than to do anything with it. On the other 
hand, if the disadvantage of the second plant as compared 
with the first is, let us say, two or three dollars a ton, it is by 
no means worthless but is worth less than a more favorably 
located plant, one might say 75% of the more favorably 
located plant. In my mind that is one way of approaching 
a commercial value of some reality for the purposes of the 
business man.
Court. For the purposes of comparison?
A. Yes, sir, the disadvantage of that is that it involves a 
great many speculations, hypotheses and differences of opin­
ion. The other method of approach, as I see it, is to take 
What the properties are actually earning if you can assume 
the present operation is fairly reflective of their relative 
normal earning ability, and capitalize that earning capacity 
in the two cases at the same rates, making allowances in that 
capitalization both for what would be needed for return on 
investment and for what would be needed to be set aside 
by the purchaser for depreciation on the price he paid for 
the property.
Court. But on that basis would you consider it better, 
would you consider these elements of physical valuation or 
commercial valuation that would be included in the term 
appraisal—do they have any bearing on it?
A. If I may use a homely expression, it seems to me most 
of these appraisals are like going around Robin Hood’s barn 
to get to a place where you can get to directly with less un­
certainty. I think the most outstanding development of the 
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financial history of this country is the growing recognition 
of the truth which the economists have recognized—that com­
mercial value depends upon the probable yield in the fu­
ture. The cost of reproduction is only a limiting factor on 
value. I think the true definition of value, if I may go into 
theoretical and economical definitions, is that the value of 
industrial plant is determined by the prospective earning 
capacity, with the physical cost of reproduction as the upper 
limit. It can’t be worth more than it would cost to repro­
duce it. Neither can it be worth less than its salvage value 
if it were destroyed. Its actual value is determined by its 
prospective earning capacity, and that prospective earning 
capacity can best be judged on its actual earning capacity. 
I think that truth has become more and more recognized in 
all financial practice in the United States in recent years. 
I think if you will follow the literature you will see that an 
increasing stress on earnings and a diminishing stress on 
physical values is by far the most conspicuous feature in 
recent development.
Court. Pardon me, yet regardless of its immediate past 
earning record the commercial valuation enters into the 
appraisal by reason of its probable obsolescence—I am not so 
good at these terms as you.
A. I get your point quite clearly.
Court. Or does immediate wiping out of the value by 
changes in the arts enter into it?
A. Unquestionably.
Court. Then how when you are making a comparison on 
the basis of earnings immediately past, how do you take that 
factor of commercial value, which may entirely remove any 
earning power for consideration? Am I clear to you?
A. Yes, entirely. I think that is one factor that has to be 
taken into account. In any approach I have made to com­
mercial valuations along the lines I have indicated I have 
always left that to the parties concerned to be dealt with.
Court. Then that is not included in your advice?
A. It is not, it cannot be; that is a question for the people 
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who are thoroughly familiar with the industry, essentially. 
The point is absolutely sound, there is no question about 
that.
Q. And not to anticipate or to lead, but I think it has- 
already been testified that you called that factor to the at­
tention of the parties at the time you made the oral recom­
mendation on the thirteenth of February?
A. I did very pointedly.
Court. But did it enter into the basis of your suggested 
relative values of trading of stock or whatever you might 
call it?
A. No, what I said to these gentlemen was: This is the 
recommendation I would make from the studies of the re­
cent past and from what you may call the accounting and 
statistical approach. There are certain things you will have 
to pass on for consideration, and most important is your re­
spective views of the future of the steel industry, and that 
is particularly important in this case because you are engaged 
in different branches of the industry and there may be a very 
marked difference between the prospects in the different 
branches of the industry; that is a question on which I would 
not undertake to pass.
Court: One more question if you will pardon me? Mr. 
Wood?
Mr. Wood. Yes.
Court. So that in your recommendation of 1.2—
A. I prefer to call it one and one-fifth because it was not 
made with the decimal accuracy of 1.2.
Court. We will take the vulgar fraction. Your recom­
mendation of one and one-fifth to one left for the considera­
tion of those using your figures as a partial basis—it was un­
derstood it was only a partial basis in your recommendation. 
This element or those elements of both physical and com­
mercial valuation—
A. It left it to this extent, it left to them the question 
how far the prospective developments they could see would
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vitiate a conclusion that was based on the recent past. That 
was essentially the point I put up to them.
Court. From your experience in all these mergers you 
have detailed, was that wholly a matter for the determina­
tion of those in charge of the policies and general operation 
of the plants to determine or would it require experts in 
the determination of the physical and commercial values 
ordinarily known as appraisals?
A. I think that varied according to the number of com­
panies concerned and their relative importance. If you have 
a group of 15 or 20 companies it is very often helpful to 
have somebody from the outside to reconcile the differences. 
In my experience where you have one or two or three large 
companies they have been able to reach a conclusion with­
out outside assistance. That basic question arises in every 
merger of importance.
Court. Assuming, however, there were two companies, 
that each one had had some thorough examination of the 
physical properties and locations of the others—
A. I don’t think really the physical examination of the 
properties is so important. A man who has lived in the 
industry and had to make his money in the industry, that 
is, the successful man, is much better able in my experience 
to forecast the future than a looker-on.
Court. And arrive at the obsolescence?
A. The prospective obsolescence.
Court. I mean that.
A. Of course, there is really a difference between a present 
obsolescence and a thing which is in danger of obsolescence. 
You were looking to the future, Your Honor?
Court. Yes, thank you.
A. Yes, my whole method of approach to problems of this 
kind is to try to get someone to approach it from the stand­
point of detail and someone else to approach it from the 
standpoint of a broad consideration, and it is a matter which 
as a senior partner I would rather reserve to myself because
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it involves more mental and less physical work than the 
details—
Court. Sometimes we who work mentally would like to 
trade with the other fellow.
A. At times, but broadly speaking I think we prefer the 
mental exercise, and I was considering the problem from that 
standpoint all the time, and by so doing I think I can fairly 
say with a fairly broad background in regard not only to 
these companies but as to the steel industry as a whole. Do 
you want me to—
I would just like to have you go on and state in your 
own way.
A. It seemed to me that there were three or four major 
points. After all, steel company accounting is among the 
relatively simple of the industrial accounting problems. It 
is not complex like that of many other industries. There 
are only comparatively few problems in it.
Mr. Wood. I hope I don’t have to go into another one.
Court. Everything certainly is relative.
A. I think that is true. You don’t, broadly speaking, in 
the steel industry have many difficult inventory problems or 
bad debts or problems of that kind. They narrow down 
substantially to the general problem, the maintenance and 
depreciation problem. That is the only big problem in 
every steel comparison or steel audit. Apart from that the 
differences between the two companies were largely the dif­
ferences in financial structure, which are not so difficult from 
a financial man’s point of view.
Q. In comparing the liquid assets of a corporation it 
might be important to know something about their current 
liabilities, might it not?
A. Yes.
Q. The fact that you had a lot of money in the bank 
oughtn’t to make a firm rich if you have a lot of bills you 
haven’t paid?
A. That is quite true.
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Q. Now, isn’t it a common thing in examining into the 
financial state of a company to regard the current assets as 
being more or less applicable to the current liabilities and 
the fixed assets to the capital liabilities?
A. That is a common practice.
Q. There may have to be adjustments in specific cases?
A. Yes.
Q. It is true, isn’t it, that the ratio of Youngstown’s cur­
rent assets to its current liabilities is higher than Bethle­
hem’s at the end of December 31, 1929, notwithstanding 
this $50,000,000 of cash?
A. I am not sure about that, but of course Youngstown 
is a business that involves a great deal of money locked up 
in inventories and consignments and stocks of that kind 
which are not in the same category as these Government 
securities so far as they are available to meet the debts.
Q. That is a factor to consider, is it not, Mr. May, in de­
termining on the value to Youngstown of Bethlehem’s liquid 
assets—its need of assets?
A. Youngstown’s need for liquid assets makes this attrac­
tive, yes; Youngstown’s need for liquid assets makes this 
merger attractive.
Q. Isn’t it true that Youngstown’s current asset position 
is and always has been in the last three years stronger than 
Bethlehem’s?
A. I don’t think so; it depends somewhat on what you 
mean by strength.
Q. The ratio of current assets to current liabilities is 
larger in the case of Youngstown?
A. That may have been so; to me that doesn’t demon­
strate strength. . . . The point is . . . the excess in the case 
of Youngstown is in the form of inventories, which to my 
mind is a weakness rather than an element of strength.
Q. And Youngstown has never been in the last six or 
eight years embarrassed for lack of cash?
A. No, I mean a comparison of the current assets which 
includes inventories is not an index of the relative cash 
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position of the two companies because the nature of Youngs­
town’s business, particularly through Continental Supply and 
the oil field business, involves a lockup of a great amount 
in inventories in the field; that is a source, as I see it, of weak­
ness rather than strength in the case of Youngstown.
Q. You don’t think Youngstown would have any diffi­
culty in any circumstances that are now visible in getting 
any cash it might need?
A. No, I am addressing myself to the question of what 
constitutes strength and weakness in current assets.
Q. You don’t think Youngstown in a merger ought to pay 
any premiums besides for liquid assets?
A. I think the excess liquid assets of Bethlehem are a 
factor which they are entitled to have considered.
Q. To the extent that Youngstown—how should they 
be considered?
A. If you take the value of a business, the earnings of a 
business are the earnings on the property that is necessary 
to the business, which include not only the plant which 
produces the goods but the inventories which it is necessary 
to have on hand and accounts receivable arising from the 
business less the accounts payable. When you get a big block 
of government securities like Bethlehem has, that is not 
necessary to the earnings of the business, the earnings upon 
that are not business earnings and are not capitalizable in 
the same way as business earnings. That is one of the ele­
ments, one which we took into account.
Q. Now, Mr. May, suppose you had a company that was 
embarrassed financially, that proposed to merge with Beth­
lehem, and that they had bond interest coming due and no 
way to meet it, and everybody was standing around wait­
ing to see whether the sheriff was going to get them or not 
and they would like to have Bethlehem’s cash position, that 
matter would be extremely valuable and an inducement, a 
strong inducement for them to merge, would it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. A company of that sort could afford to pay Bethlehem
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a substantial premium for relief, for its cash assistance which 
would afford the merging company a financial position?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now the premium value of the cash naturally dimin­
ishes as applied to a company whose credit position is strong, 
does it not?
A. That is true.
Q. And when you get a company which has paid divi­
dends for 25 years and which has largely built or rebuilt 
its plant out of earnings, whose credit is good and whose 
bonds are selling at five per cent, its cash is worth its face 
value, isn’t it?
A. Exactly, and that is all the weight I wish to give to it, 
and that is all of the weight I have given it.
Q. Well, when you come to figure out the savings on 
bond interest that will be effected when the bonds are lifted 
in February, 1930, you are going into the future, are you 
not?
A. No, I think not; I think you are giving retrospective 
effect to something that has occurred.
Q. Well, giving retrospective effect to something that has 
occurred, is about the same thing as looking forward from 
the time of occurrence to the future events; it is the differ­
ence in the way you state it, isn’t it?
A. I don’t look at it quite that way.
Q. Very well. Now prior to the issue of the Bethlehem— 
the 800,000 shares of Bethlehem common stock in October, 
1929, it had outstanding 2,400,000 shares of stock, did it not?
A. Yes.
Q. The number of shares outstanding were increased by 
this 800,600 issue just one-third?
A. Yes.
Q. The earnings were affected by that, as you give retro­
spective effect to it here by $4,565,702, were they not?
A. That is the effect that is given to it, here.
Q. Yes,' well, whatever the proper figure is; now the ef-
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feet of that issue of 800,000 shares of common stock so far 
as the earnings per share of the corporation were concerned 
was to reduce the earnings per share, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And so if you were computing the effect on Bethle­
hem—the value of Bethlehem common stock of that issue of 
800,000 shares and the application of it to the retirement 
of funded debt upon a purely earnings basis—you would 
reach a conclusion, would you not, that the total value of the 
Bethlehem common stock had not been increased $86,000,- 
000 by the issue of the stock and the application made of the 
proceeds?
A. I don’t think so; obviously, if you reach such a con­
clusion, there must be some fallacy in it.
Q. Well, the fallacy, if there is a fallacy, or the cause of 
the conclusion is, is it not, that we are now considering the 
value of the outstanding Bethlehem stock on a purely earn­
ings basis?
A. Yes, but if you consider it on an earnings basis you 
must consider what the nature of the earnings is, as I said 
before; earnings that represent a prior charge can’t be capi­
talized at the same rate as earnings that represent a small 
equity and the greater the equity the lower the rate of capi­
talization that is properly applicable.
Q. Of course, Mr. May, when the corporation issues 
800,000 shares of stock and receives $86,000,000 for it and 
applies that to the retirement of funded debt, it is getting 
value wholly apart from any effect on earnings, is it not?
A. I don’t understand the question.
Q. Well, when a corporation issues common stock and 
applies the proceeds to the reduction of its bonded debt, it 
is improving its financial structure in the direction of sta­
bility, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And that improvement in financial structure gives a 
value to the common stock wholly apart from the effect of 
the transaction on earnings per share, does it not?
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A. Oh, I see, yes, you are right.
Q. Yes.
A. Your point is, as I understand it, that the value de­
rived from the issue of the capital stock to retire bonds is 
not measured by the mere interest saving it produces.
Q. Exactly.
A. That is right.
Q. And it isn’t reflected by the effect it has on the earn­
ings per share of the common stock because it is giving the 
common stock value in other directions; that is correct, is 
it not?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. But if you take that transaction and consider it purely 
on the effect it has on earnings per share, that effect is ma­
terially to reduce the earnings per share of the entire 
3,200,000 shares?
A. That is true.
Q. So that again confining our consideration to value as 
affected by earnings and not—dismissing for the moment 
value as reflected in other directions by greater stability and 
certainty of yield and so forth—the $86,000,000 added to the 
corporation by the sale of this stock is not reflected in the 
value of the total outstanding shares on a purely earnings 
basis, is it?
A. Well, when you say a purely earnings basis, I don’t 
want to quibble with you, that is the last thing in the world. 
I want to do, but as I say, when you limit it to an earnings 
basis, the earnings basis you have got to employ must vary 
according to the character of your earnings and by using a 
lower rate of capitalization on the new figure you should get 
substantially the same result as you got before, but if you 
add to your question “on the basis of capitalizing earning 
capacity at a fixed rate” your point is quite correct.
Q. And as long as you understand that you are limiting 
your consideration to the effect on earnings, there is no 
mathematical absurdity involved in that at all, is there?
A. Well, I don’t think—you mean if you leave out an es­
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sential element of the proposition you say there is no mathe­
matical absurdity; but the thing that is absurd to me is leav­
ing out the essential element of the computation.
Q. All right, the essential element of Basis K is a com­
parison of earnings for the year 1929 as adjusted, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. It is not a comparison of capital structure, is it?
A. The question of capital structure is implicit in it; ob­
viously, you could not make a relative computation at the 
same rate of capitalization if in one case the stock repre­
sented a small equity, and in the other case the entire in­
vestment is subject to no prior charge; so that you must be 
satisfied that, broadly speaking, there is a relatively fair capi­
tal structure before you are justified in making any computa­
tion.
Q. Exactly, but there is a difference, a radical difference, 
 in the capital structure of Bethlehem before the 800,000 
shares were issued and its proceeds earmarked for debt re­
tirement?
A. There is, yes.
Q. Now, the only interest we have in the effect upon 
Bethlehem of that financial operation is its effect on earn­
ings per share, is it not, on this page?
A. Yes.
Q. That is correct?
A. Yes.
Q. On Basis K. Nobody is interested at the time of this 
merger in a comparison between the present Bethlehem and 
the Bethlehem prior to October?
A. Well, you have to take that into account if you are 
going to base it on earnings for a period which extends back 
of October.
Q. Yes, but. you have to give effect to it as earnings?
A. You have to give effect to it as earnings in an intelli­
gent way.
Q. And the effect of it on earnings is substantially to re­
duce earnings per share?
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A. That is true.
Q. Now, as you have said in your direct examination, it 
would have been most unfair to have compared Bethlehem’s 
earnings on the 1,800,000 share basis with those of Youngs­
town, that would have been unfair, would it not?
A. That would have been unfair.
Q. That is why you rejected one of these calculations?
A. That is true.
Q. And it would have been unfair until this new common 
stock was issued and the proceeds received to put Bethle­
hem’s capital structure on a basis which would make a com­
parison of earnings relevant?
A. That I think is substantially what I said in my testi­
mony.
Q. And that is of course perfectly true?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you arrive in the first column of Basis K at the 
figure $39,948,031 as being the adjusted earnings for Beth­
lehem in the year 1929?
A. Yes.
Q. You then divide that $39,948,031 by the 2,500,000 
shares and reach an earning per share on 2,500,000 shares— 
that is, after the elimination of 700,000 shares—of $15.98 per 
share?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, up to this date you are dealing with a purely 
hypothetical Bethlehem Steel Corporation of 2,500,000 
shares of common stock, are you not?
A. Yes.
Q. There is not and never has been such a corporation?
A. That is true.
Court. It was the only corporation that would be com­
parable, however, for the basis of comparison with Youngs­
town?
A. This was, as Mr. Crawford says, this was sort of a hypo­
thetical presentation of the situation, which I adopted to 
arrive at the result that seemed to be fair.
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Q. Now the actual Bethlehem that was going into this 
merger was a Bethlehem with 3,200,000 shares?
A. That is true.
Q. 700,000 shares more?
A. Yes.
Q. Now for the actual Bethlehem to have earnings of 
$15.98 a share it would have to earn some $51,000,000, would 
it not?
A. Yes, I think that seems about right.
Q. It would have to earn $11,186,000 more than $39,- 
948,031?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, to arrive at a figure, a ratio of 1 to 1.203 for the 
actual Bethlehem and the actual Youngstown on an earnings 
basis, you would have to assume earnings of $11,186,000, if 
that is the correct figure, on 700,000 shares, would you not?
A. On an earnings basis, yes.
Q. Did you arrive at the ratio of one and a fifth to one 
on an earnings basis?
A. I did up to the point of the 2,500,000 shares and then 
I dealt with the 700,000 shares as I stated in my direct testi­
mony.
Q. You arrived at a ratio on the basis of earnings?
A. I mean in Basis K, you are still talking about Basis K?
Q. Yes, you arrived at the ratio on a basis of earnings so 
far as 2,500,000 shares were concerned, and upon some other 
basis or bases for the other 700,000 shares?
A. Yes.
Q. And as I understand you the basis which you used 
with reference to the 700,000 shares was not even an esti­
mate of future earnings on the amount of capital that you 
allocated to the 700,000 shares?
A. That is true.
Q. Now, would you tell me, Mr. May, just what was the 
basis that you used with reference to the 700,000 shares?
A. Well, the way I dealt with the 700,000 shares was to 
put the question whether Bethlehem stock would have been
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worth materially more or materially less if it had had 
2,500,000 shares outstanding and $70,000,000 less cash than 
it was worth having 3,200,000 shares outstanding and 
$70,000,000 additional cash—and the conclusion that I 
reached was that the actual intrinsic value of Bethlehem 
was not far away from $100 a share and therefore the 
value would neither be greatly increased nor greatly dimin­
ished by the change in the situation which I have just re­
cited. Now, that is the way I approached it in my own 
mind and that is the way in which I presented the question 
to the principals at the meeting of February 13.
Q. What I perhaps did not ask for is what I want to get 
at and intended to ask for: What were the considerations that 
led your mind to the conclusion that the value was not sub­
stantially affected by either the presence or absence of the 
700,000 shares and the $70,000,000?
A. Because I did not think Bethlehem was worth intrin­
sically or statistically or by comparison with other similar 
stocks materially more or less than $100 a share.
Q. Well, now you are saying you did not think it worth 
materially or intrinsically—you mean by that, Mr. May, do 
you mean worth from an asset basis or an earnings basis or 
what sort of a basis?
A. Whether you take the elements of value either statisti­
cally or marketwise or in comparison with other stocks like 
the United States Steel Corporation, for instance, or any of 
them.
Q. Well, one way of determining the worth of a corporate 
stock, or one factor in determining the worth of corporate 
stock, I take it, is security of the investment, the judgment or 
estimate of security?
A. Yes.
Q. Another is the rate of return?
A. Yes.
Q. And you give, in considering the rate of return you 
give the effect of past earnings, and from the past earnings 
try to arrive at an estimate of future earnings?
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A. Yes.
Q. The condition of the industry in which the company 
is engaged is another factor?
A. Yes.
Q. Its competitive position?
A. Yes.
Q. And the character of its management?
A. Yes.
Q. It is often materially affected by the position and 
standing and connection of the people that have invested 
heavily in its stock, those things may affect the value?
A. May affect, yes.
Q. There are a great many considerations. Now from 
which of these considerations did you arrive at the con­
clusion?
A. Well, I arrived at them as a matter of judgment from 
the basis of some statistical comparison with other companies 
in the same industry and the market prices and so on; it was 
a personal judgment, and I so expressed it to the principals 
and suggested that they should also form their personal 
judgments.
Q. Well, now the problem that you had as to the $70,000,- 
000 was one of determining what its value to Youngstown 
was in this merger?
A. I do not think so.
Q. The fact there was $70,000,000 excess cash as you con­
sidered it?
A. I do not think that is the viewpoint at all. I was not 
acting for Youngstown; I was acting for Youngstown and 
Bethlehem.
Q. I mean the point of view as to what was the weight to 
be given in this merger to the fact that there was $70,000,000 
excess cash there that you regarded as uninvested?
A. Yes.
Q. Now it is a common financial problem, is it not, Mr. 
May, to deal with the effect upon the value of a corporation’s
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security of the presence of uninvested cash resulting from 
the sale of stock or securities?
A. It is a question that arises in various negotiations in 
financial matters.
Q. For instance, suppose a corporation that has been run­
ning along for a number of years wants to raise additional 
capital and issues some preferred stock—the people who buy 
that preferred stock are interested in the security of the divi­
dend, are they not?
A. Yes.
Q. And for that purpose they look at the past earnings 
of the corporation, do they not?
A. Among other things, yes, very largely.
Q. And then they give effect in earnings to the presence 
of this uninvested capital cash by adding interest at a conven­
tional, or earnings at a conventional, rate for that new 
capital?
A. Well, without identifying them I don’t know whether 
I can say what they do.
Q. It is a common thing for banking houses?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Ordinarily to do?
A. Yes.
Q. That is, for instance—
A. But you would not suggest that was analogous to this 
case.
Q. Well, let us see what they do: first they are interested 
for the purpose of determining the security of their divi­
dends, in determining what the future earnings of that com­
pany will be, are they not?
A. Yes.
Q. So they take its past earnings—
A. Yes.
Q. —and figure what the past earnings will yield on the 
new security, the new stock that is going out?
A. Yes.
Q. And then they take the proceeds of the sale and per-
336 VALUATION
haps use six per cent, add that to the annual earnings, so 
that the earnings, on this basis—the company’s earnings as 
adjusted for the new capital—are three times the dividend, 
or something of that sort?
A. That is a common form of bankers’ representation to 
potential investors.
Q. And that is the same thing—the Youngstown stock­
holders are being asked to invest in Bethlehem common 
stock, to the extent of all the assets, the net assets of the 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube, are they not?
A. Yes.
Q. And wouldn’t you think that a reasonable basis for de­
termining the value to them on this $70,000,000 of unin­
vested cash that are the proceeds of a recent stock issue would 
be to add to Bethlehem’s past earnings some reasonable con­
ventional figure—I am not trying to commit you to any 
particular figure—as a return on that cash?
A. I do not think so at all.
Q. You do not think so?
A. No, I think that would be quite a mistaken point of 
view.
Q.  You think the way to do it is simply by resorting to 
statistical information about steel companies generally and 
coming to the conclusion that on the whole, taking one thing 
with another and this and that together, a Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation with 2,500,000 shares of common stock and 
some $39,000,000 of earnings is worth about as much as one 
with 3,200,000 shares of stock and $51,000,000, is that right?
A. That is not involved at all, Mr. Crawford.
Q. Well, the fact is that you were commissioned to recom­
mend a basis for this merger, or a ratio for this merger, on the 
basis of 1929 earnings, were you not?
A. No, I was commissioned to recommend a basis that 
would be fair in my judgment and I was instructed—it was 
agreed—that 1929 earnings were a fair measure of the relative 
earning capacity of the two companies.
VIII
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK ON JULY 10, 1929 *
(1933)
Q. What in your opinion was the fair market value of 
Continental stock and Fidelity-Phenix stock on July 10, 
1929?
A. I would say that the fair market value of Continental 
stock was in the neighborhood of $55 a share, and I would 
take that as the figure that I would regard as most represent­
ative of the fair market value. In the case of Fidelity- 
Phenix I would say $65 a share.
Q. Now, will you, in your own words, state the reasons 
which lead you to assign these two figures as the fair market 
values of the two stocks?
A. The first stage is to consider what method one should 
adopt in arriving at a fair market value. I have taken the 
view that in doing so you should give weight to both the 
word “fair” and the word “market,” and the most practical 
way of doing so seemed to me to deal with the matter in two 
stages: first to consider what would be a fair value computed 
by methods usually employed, if there were no market; sec­
ondly, to consider the quoted market prices, and from those 
two deduce a figure which may be regarded as a fair market 
value. In the final stage, one would have to determine how 
much weight to apply to the two elements in the calculation, 
which in turn involves considering what margins of differ­
ence or error there might be in computing value, and also 
what is the character of the market by which one has to be 
guided as to quoted market values. The quoted market 
Value being readily ascertainable, I think it is useful and
* Testimony in Strong v. Rogers, United States District Court for the Dis­
trict of New Jersey (November 8, 1933).
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simplest to present the other elements of value first and then 
compare them with the market value.
Q. May I interrupt by a suggestion, that you state to the 
Court the current market prices on the New York Stock Ex­
change on July 10, 1929?
A. The current market price, as I recall, was approxi­
mately $90 for the Continental and $106 for the Fidelity- 
Phenix. That was merely a matter of taking it off the rec­
ord. In arriving at a fair value, if there is no market, 
you have to consider what a share of stock represents, what 
elements of value it possesses. I think it is generally recog­
nized that those elements of value are the assets back of it 
and the earning capacity which it possesses or may be ex­
pected to possess in the future. Of the two, undoubtedly 
the earning capacity is theoretically, and practically, the more 
important. You will find, for instance, in the present market 
[1933] a number of cases in which securities are selling below 
the asset value or liquidating value, as it is sometimes called, 
 based on current quotations of the assets owned by the com­
pany, the reason being in part that there is no way in which 
this liquidating value can be realized by the shareholders; 
they are merely stockholders in the company, and unless and 
until dissolution proceedings take place they don’t them­
selves realize the liquidating value.
Now, the question of earning capacity of the stock may be 
looked at again from two standpoints: first, there is the cur­
rent yield, the current dividend. In this case, both Conti­
nental and Fidelity-Phenix were paying dividends at the rate 
of $2 a year. If you assume that a stock of that kind should 
yield 5 per cent, that would represent a capital value of $40, 
and therefore if you said 414 per cent it would be $44 a 
share; if you said 4 per cent it would be $50 a share. So that 
on the basis of yield there is nothing to suggest that the 
value is as high as the figure at which I arrived for the fair 
market value, and of course it is very much less than the 
quoted market value. However, in all financial companies 
it is well recognized that the accumulation of earnings within 
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the company are perhaps as important to stockholders as the 
distributions. Financial stocks are very largely held by 
people who are not dependent on them for current necessi­
ties, and they are largely people who are content to have the 
companies reinvest a part of the earnings instead of receiving 
them as dividends, paying a tax on them and reinvesting 
them themselves. So that one has to look behind the divi­
dends and see what the earning capacity of the business is. 
. . . Now, when you come to the earning capacity, the value 
of the stock based on its earning capacity, you have to be 
guided by the past, but you have to bear in mind that the 
past is relevant only in so far as it affords a fair indication 
of what may reasonably be expected in the future. Past 
figures have not an absolute significance. Their significance 
is wholly dependent upon their being a reasonable indica­
tion of the probable future.
Now, in the case of an insurance company, its income is 
of two fundamentally different kinds, although the two 
sources of income are naturally very closely related. There 
is the underwriting income and the investment income.
Q. What do you mean by the underwriting income and 
the investment income?
A. The underwriting income is the profit that is made 
from the actual profit or loss as it may be that is made from 
writing insurance, paying expenses, paying issues out of the 
premiums, and there is either an underwriting profit or loss 
when the business is concluded.
Q. And an investment income?
A. An investment income is really the major item in the 
insurance companies, because the main source of profit in an 
insurance company is the fact that it collects its premiums 
in advance and pays its losses after the event. So that from 
the underwriting business, as from its own capital, it derives 
a substantial sum which it can invest and derive income 
during the period that it holds it.
Now, the two classes of income stand on different footing. 
I think for the purpose of estimating the future from the 
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past, so far as investment income is concerned, if the income 
is steady or steadily received, latest figures are probably the 
best index of what may be expected in the immediate fu­
ture, unless you anticipate and provide in advance for some 
revulsion such as actually occurred in the fall of 1929, which 
for this purpose I do not propose to do.
On the other hand, the underwriting business, the insur­
ance business, is essentially a business of averages, and in 
order to estimate the reasonable expectation for the future, 
you must take an experience over a period of years. Now, 
proceeding on that basis, I find from the experience of the 
Continental Insurance Company over a period ... of ten 
years including 1929 (1929 carries past the critical date and 
therefore perhaps should be left out for this purpose), the 
profits of the underwriting department are, including ’29, 
which was a good year, a little over about 31½ per cent on 
the gross premium income; over a five-year period ending 
with 1928 the figure is about 3.8; over a nine-year period 
it will be less than 3.8. I have thought it fair to estimate 
the underwriting profit capacity of this company year in and 
year out at roughly 4 per cent on the current premium in­
come—on the premium income of ’28—or, say, a million dol­
lars a year.
By the Court:
Q. Why did you think 4 per cent fair?
A. The experience over ten years is 3½; the experience 
over five years is 3.8; 1928 and 1929 were both good years. 
So I thought it was fair to take the little higher figure than 
either the five-year or ten-year experience.
Q. Why?
A. Give a little extra weight to the later years when the 
experience was high.
Q. It never had reached four?
A. Oh, yes. In ’28 it was considerably more than four 
for that single year.
Q. It was? How much was it?
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A. In 1928 it was 10 per cent. It is a very fluctuating 
business.
Q. But the average is 3.8?
A. The average is 3.8 over a period of five years, and 
slightly less for a period of ten years including ’29. I thought 
four was a reasonable figure to take under all the circum­
stances, and on that basis I got a million dollars as the earn­
ing capacity represented by the underwriting business. Then 
the second element—
Q. That is the net?
A. That is the net after losses and expenses.
Q. Expenses are deducted?
A. Yes. The net investment income for 1928, the last 
year prior to the merger, prior to the critical date, I think 
was about $3,100,000; it was on a rising scale, and I think it 
would be fair to take three and a quarter millions for this 
purpose as the investment income, which would make four 
and a quarter millions for the direct earning capacity of 
these companies. However, these companies own interests in 
the other companies here, the Fire Buildings and the Ameri­
can Eagle Insurance. Those companies were not paying out 
to the parent companies the full amount of their earnings by 
any means. I think it is a somewhat liberal view to take as 
the measure of the earnings of those companies, not reflected 
in the figures I have already used, the actual figures shown 
by this last exhibit which you handed me. . . . That would 
be approximately $750,000 a year. I say that is liberal be­
cause it gives the full weight to the exceptionally good un­
derwriting experience of the American Eagle Fire Insurance 
Company in 1928, but I think that is fair and certainly not 
understating a reasonable estimate of the earning capacity 
represented by this stock at July, 1929.
Now, adding the three items together, a million for the 
direct underwriting, three and a quarter millions for invest­
ment income and seven hundred and fifty thousand for earn­
ings of subsidiary companies not distributed to the parent, I 
get the figure of, say, five million dollars, somewhere between 
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four million eight to five million dollars is about the right 
figure, I should say. On a million and a half shares of stock, 
that is equivalent to—five million dollars would be equiva­
lent to $3.33⅓—three dollars thirty-three cents a share.
By Mr. Angell:
Q. You are discussing the Continental now?
A. I am still talking of the Continental. Then the ques­
tion is: What is a fair capital value to assign to such an earn­
ing capacity? There may be room for some difference of 
opinion on that. If you say that such a stock should earn, 
whether distributed or not, 8 per cent, you would get a value 
of about $48 a share. If you say 6 per cent you would get a 
value of about $55 a share, which is figured at—I wouldn’t 
say it was my final index of the value of the stock—I think 6 
per cent by itself would be too low a rate and therefore $55 
on this criterion alone would be too high a figure.
But I pass on next to the consideration of the assets. The 
assets of this company consist mainly of its portfolio, its 
buildings, and its business. I have had calculated what 
may be called a “breakdown value” of the assets of the Con­
tinental Company. By “breakdown” I mean valuing the 
assets behind the stock, on the basis of the current market 
quotations for those assets which, as I will point out, brings 
in the market at that point in another phase.
Q. I show you a document, Mr. May, captioned “The 
Continental Insurance Company, Fidelity-Phenix Fire In­
surance Company, Computation of Valuation of the Capi­
tal Stocks of the Companies Based on Market Prices of Un­
derlying Securities as at July 10, 1929,” and ask you whether 
this is the computation to which you have referred?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you explain this document briefly, Mr. May?
A. This document starts from the capital and surplus 
of the company at July 1, as shown by its published state­
ments. Its capital and surplus together with the reserve for 
market fluctuations, which is only another form of surplus, 
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are added together, those being what is sometimes called 
the book value of the stock. Then, in the next section of 
it, there is an adjustment made for changes in the value of 
the portfolio directly owned during the period from July 
1 to July 10. That is merely to bring it up to date, from' 
July 1 to July 10. Then there are adjustments resulting 
from substituting the values of June 10 for the book 
values—
Q. July 10?
A. July 10, I mean to say, for the portfolio. Then there 
are adjustments of the values of the subsidiary companies, 
and some adjustments for proportions of earnings applying 
to the ten days; and finally there is brought into account— 
there is an amount described which is 40 per cent of the 
company’s reserve for unearned premiums on July 1, 1929, 
and their proportionate share of the unearned premiums 
of the underlying companies. That is the figure which I put 
in to represent what may be called the “intangible values” of 
the company, in addition to its portfolio, buildings, and so 
on. That I would like to amplify a little later.
For the convenience of the Court I have prepared a 
further statement which, instead of merely showing the pro­
cedure by which this figure is built up, shows the result of 
the figure, how much of the value is represented by portfolio, 
how much by buildings, and so on.
Q. What are the ultimate figures, valuation figures, a 
share, Continental and Fidelity-Phenix, as disclosed by these 
statements?
A. Well, this figure gives $55.92 for the Continental and 
$69.06 for the Fidelity-Phenix. ... I brought in items 
which aggregate ultimately twelve and a half millions in the 
case of Continental and ten million eight hundred thousand 
in the case of Fidelity-Phenix, under the title of 40 per 
cent of underlying premiums to represent the intangible as­
sets of the company. . . . The question of those intangible 
values may be considered from various angles. One way is 
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to take a percentage of the unearned premiums. That is a 
method that is common to insurance companies, according 
to my experience, because it is peculiar to that business. 
The more common way is to take the earnings of the busi­
ness and capitalize them, or else to take the earnings and 
deduct a fair return on the tangible assets, and capitalize the 
excess as representing intangible values. I think that the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue has approved of both the second 
and third methods.
As a result of tests which I have made, and on the basis 
of the figures of earning capacity which I have already out­
lined in the case of Continental, I do not think any reason­
able method of appraising the intangible values would give 
a figure substantially in excess of the figure that I have 
taken up as unearned premium. So that in my judgment, 
the statement of the $56 represents a full valuation of the 
assets and liabilities of the Continental Company, both tan­
gible and intangible.
I might mention two or three technical points, just so that 
it may not be thought they have been overlooked. Theo­
retically, in the Continental there is a large portfolio; it has 
a large excess value over its original cost, so that if the 
company attempted to realize that value, it would incur very 
considerable income taxes as well as other expenses in real­
izing those values. I have thrown off that figure. I have 
not brought it into account, although it wouldn’t be incon­
siderable; it might be two or three million dollars.
Another factor is that the calculations which I have given 
are based on the situation immediately before the acquisition 
of the Niagara and the Fidelity-Casualty. It will perhaps be 
more logical to take the figure mentioned after those acquisi­
tions.
Q. Have you those figures, Mr. May?
A. Calculations which I have made show that the effect 
would be to reduce both the breakdown value and the earn­
ing capacity a share; so that if there were any error in tak­
ing the figures prior to the merger, it would tend to produce 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK 345
a higher valuation than would be produced if the figures 
after the merger were used. The differences are not very 
substantial, and it would make the matter much more com­
plicated to take the post-merger figures.
I would like now to turn to the Fidelity-Phenix. The 
statement of underwriting income for that company shows 
that its underwriting experience had been much less favor­
able than that of the Continental; for the whole ten years 
including 1929 its underwriting profits had averaged only 
$350,000 a year, and if the exceptionally good year of 1929 
were left out the average would be reduced to about $160,- 
000 a year. So that I think the fair estimate of the earning 
capacity of Fidelity in respect of its underwriting could not 
be put higher than $250,000 or $300,000 a year—$350,000 
perhaps at the outside. Its underwriting income—put it at 
$350,000 a year. Then its investment income, net invest­
ment income, for 1928 is $2,475,000, and allowing for some 
increase for the future it might be reasonable to take $2,750,- 
000 for that. Then we have $750,000 from the subsidiary 
companies, the same figure as in the case of Continental, each 
company having the same interest in the subsidiary com­
panies, and that gives us a figure of $3,950,000 or, say, $4,000,- 
000 as roughly the earning capacity represented by the stock 
of the Fidelity-Phenix Company, or we will say $4 a share 
on the million shares of stock outstanding before the merger. 
That, again, on an 8 per cent basis would represent a value 
of $50 a share; on a 7 per cent basis it would represent a 
value of $57 a share; on a 6 per cent basis it would give a 
value of $66 a share. I have already said that the breakdown 
value of the Fidelity-Phenix before the merger works out at 
$69 on those figures—I regard $65 as a fair value to attach 
to that stock in round figures.
In that case I may say, if you use the post-merger figures, 
the effect on the Fidelity-Phenix would be rather more ad­
verse than in the case of the Continental.
Q. That is, it would tend to reduce them?
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A. Tend to reduce the figures more in the case of Fidel­
ity-Phenix than in the case of Continental.
The Court. You have fixed it in this analysis at how 
much?
The Witness. My final figure is $55 for the one and $65 
for the other. The breakdown value is $56 and $69.
The Court. Not $65?
The Witness. No, $65 is what I used; taking into account 
all the factors, I think $65 is a fair figure. I haven’t changed 
that figure—that is a computation based on assets; but I was 
taking into account assets and earning power and every­
thing.
The Court. You have not now reduced that by the other 
elements that you have taken into account?
The Witness. I would say on an asset basis $69, before the 
merger; $63¼ would be the asset value after the merger.
The Court. Well, then, where does the figure $65 come 
in?
The Witness. That is the composite figure that I finally 
arrived at after taking into account assets, earning capacity 
and other elements of value.
Q. I handed you and asked that you assume as correct 
tabulations which were entitled “Investment Profits and 
Rents, Dividends, Interest.” How much weight do the fig­
ures set forth in that statement have with you in reaching 
your conclusions of the fair market value of the stocks?
A. They play this, they have just this weight: that if com­
putations were based on the published figures of the Con­
tinental and the Fidelity, without taking into account the 
hidden equities of the subsidiary companies, you would get 
an undervaluation of the securities; and by placing in those 
figures, I have avoided that undervaluation which would 
otherwise result.
Q. In other words, a consideration of these figures would 
tend to increase rather than decrease your value?
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK 347
A. Oh, yes, it would increase it, legitimately, undoubt­
edly. If you took the quoted figures without regard to them, 
you might underestimate the value of the stock.
Q. But you wouldn’t overestimate it?
A. No, it couldn’t have that effect.
Q. You have testified, Mr. May, that in your opinion the 
fair market value on July 10, 1929, of the Continental stock 
was $55 and the fair market value of Fidelity-Phenix $65. I 
think you also referred to the fact that the current market 
quotations on the New York Stock Exchange on that date 
were approximately $90 a share for the Continental and 
$106 a share for the Fidelity-Phenix. Why do you feel 
justified in departing from the market prices to this extent 
in fixing the fair market value of the stock?
A. Well, that opinion that the difference is appropriate 
in determining a fair market value is based mainly on a 
consideration of the character of the market in 1929. In 
considering the character of the market we have first of all 
to consider its breadth. I would hardly say that the market 
in these stocks was broad enough to form an entirely satis­
factory basis for determining the sale value of a block of 
stock of the size involved in these transactions. It is, how­
ever, only fair to say that these stocks being listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange had a broader market than in­
surance stocks in general. So that I don’t lay so much stress 
on the question of the breadth of the market as I do on the 
character of the market. Now, I was told that I might 
assume that in certain circumstances it might be appropriate 
to go beyond the current market quotations to determine 
a fair market value. Now, that has been done so far as I 
know on a number of occasions in other connections. In 
the insurance field it has been done at least three times in the 
last thirty years: in the depression of 1907, during the war, 
and in the current depression. The Insurance Commission­
ers expressly authorized insurance companies to take as the 
fair market value of their securities prices in excess of the 
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quoted market prices in the periods of depression. Now, it 
would seem to me that that rule might fairly be deemed to 
work in both directions, and if ever there was an occasion 
in which the market might be said to be not fairly represent­
ative, because it was too high, I should say it was the market 
that immediately preceded the events in the early fall of 
1929. Now, I don’t by that mean to say that you can entirely 
ignore the market of that period.
Q. You mean in July, 1929?
A. 1929. And carrying the matter a little further, I think 
that in the period that culminated in the summer of 1929 
there was a steady and, in my judgment then, and I think 
events have since proved, probably an excessive appreciation 
in the values of securities based on earning capacity. That I 
think was true, generally speaking, of companies of almost 
every kind. It was, however, much more pronounced in the 
case of the group of finance and holding companies than it 
was in the case of what you may call primary companies 
which were producing income. The extreme examples are 
found in some of the investment trusts and in some of the 
utility holding companies, such as the Insull group, where 
the appreciation in the market value of the holding com­
panies far exceeded the appreciation in the values of the 
properties which those stocks represented. That, I think, 
was true of holding companies; it was true of practically all 
kinds of financial companies in some degree, and you can see 
it, for instance, in some of the banks, like the Chase and 
National City Bank and other big New York banks; and you 
can see it, I think, in the insurance companies, particularly 
in the insurance companies Whose investments consisted to a 
substantial extent of common stocks. Now, in my approach 
to the question I have felt that when I gave pretty full weight 
to the market appreciation of the underlying assets owned 
by these companies, I had given reasonable weight to the cur­
rent market, and that the excess of the market value of these 
stocks over what I conceived to be the fair market value of 
the underlying assets is not in any economic sense certainly 
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a fair value, and once you go beyond quotations I don’t see 
what you can have as a test of a fair market value except 
whether it is within the reasonable range of economic valua­
tion. It may be a high economic valuation and still be rea­
sonable. But if it gets beyond any reasonable limits, I think 
that would be a test that a market was not fair, because it 
was too high, just as when securities fell to values that were 
only a fraction of the intrinsic values behind them, the In­
surance Commissioners and the Comptroller of the Cur­
rency and people in offices of that kind felt warranted in 
authorizing institutions under their charge to treat as the 
fair market value of their securities figures based on some­
thing other than market quotations, on the ground that those 
market quotations were too low to constitute a fair market 
value. I have had considerable experience in dealing with 
questions of this kind with the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
in connection with income and inheritance tax cases, and on 
more than one occasion the Bureau has gone behind market 
quotations, even where they were in fair volume, to arrive at 
a fair market value. That was true certainly in regard to 
transactions in the early part of 1921 when we had a sudden 
fall in prices.
Mr. Hanson. Of course, we object to this, Your Honor, as 
not binding on the Government or on the defendant in this 
case.
The Court. As I understand it, this testimony of the wit­
ness is being produced—he is an expert—as disclosing the 
manner and method by which he has arrived at the conclu­
sions which he has heretofore testified to. Am I correct?
Mr. Angell. That is correct, Your Honor.
The Court. You, of course, will have a full opportunity 
to cross examine.
Defendant’s counsel prays an exception, which is 
hereby allowed and sealed accordingly.
A. [Continuing.] And that, I may say, was before the Act 
of 1924 was passed which expressly required the Commis­
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sioner to have regard to the assets of the company as well as 
the market quotations for its securities in determining the 
March 1, 1913 value, which in any such transaction as this is 
the other end of the yardstick. As a matter of fact, as consult­
ant for the Treasury and also a member of the Advisory Com­
mittee of the Joint Congressional Committee, I participated 
in a great many discussions on this question at different times, 
and I know the changes of feeling that have been adduced by 
different cases on this question of fair market value. Of 
course, it is easy to say that the recipient of this stock could 
have gone out and sold it. In all such cases where there is a 
large block handed out to a number of stockholders, a certain 
number of shareholders could have done that successfully 
without affecting the market, but probably not the whole or 
a substantial part of the whole could have done so without 
affecting the market. ... I can’t conceive of any economic 
theory on which the market values of these securities could 
reasonably have been given a fair value so large as the 
market quotations of July, 1929; and in my own mind, I 
feel that the situation is largely accounted for by this new 
enthusiasm for investment trusts, and corporations of that 
kind, which resulted in attributing to holding companies, 
security holding companies, values on the market for the 
time being greatly in excess of the value of the properties on 
which those stocks in fact rested. So that I feel no difficulty, 
if I am allowed to exercise any judgment, in saying that in 
my judgment the market quotations of July, 1929, for these 
securities were not a fair market value, because I can’t in my 
own mind discover any process of reasoning which on a fair 
analysis of the facts would reach figures approximating the 
market values.
Now, in my Exhibit, I have taken forty per cent of the un­
earned premiums. Well, now, if you went to an extreme and 
took a hundred per cent of the unearned premiums, you 
would still be twenty points below the market; and that be­
ing so, as I say, if I have any right to go behind the market, 
I have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion in my own 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK 351
mind that that market was not a fair reflection of the values 
represented by these stocks.
Q. In your opinion, Mr. May, why was it that market 
quotations in July, 1929, went up so substantially above what 
you, having considered the underlying facts of the case, con­
sider the fair market value of the two stocks?
A. Well, that is a fairly large question. Do you want me 
to limit it to this particular class of stock or do you want 
me to discuss the market in general?
Q. No, limit it to this particular class of stock.
A. Well, I think the outstanding factor, as I see it— 
Mr. Hanson. What class of stock is he talking about?
The Witness. Well, I will define the class of stocks to 
which I think this belongs.
A. [Continuing.] The class of stocks whose assets consists 
largely of securities of other companies. That falls mainly 
in that group, although it isn’t the outstanding example. 
The outstanding examples are the investment trusts and the 
purely holding companies.
Q. You are referring to the Continental and the Fidelity- 
Phenix?
A. The Continental and Fidelity-Phenix. To my mind 
one of the main features was a failure to distinguish between 
real income and capital changes in determining earnings, the 
capital value of which represents or is a measure of the se­
curity value.
Perhaps I can best illustrate it by taking a simple illustra­
tion. If you had a company, we will say, that in 1924 was 
earning $10,000 a year, in some ordinary business, and from 
1924 to 1929 its business steadily improved so that in 1929, 
instead of earning $10,000 it was earning $15,000—well, quite 
apart from anything else, if that seemed to be a permanent 
trend, and, of course, that is a question of opinion on which 
the market must decide, it would be reasonable to say that 
the value of that stock had appreciated, let us say, from ten 
times ten thousand, that would be a hundred thousand, at 
VALUATION352
the beginning, to a hundred and fifty thousand in 1929. Now, 
during that period there was an influence at work which 
tended steadily to reduce the yields on securities of that 
kind; or, in other words, to increase the capital value rela­
tive to earnings.
In examining the portfolio of this company, I noticed 
cases of large blocks of stocks on which the yield had di­
minished from about five and a half per cent to three and 
a half per cent. Now, in those circumstances, take our com­
pany A, whose earnings have increased from ten thousand to 
fifteen thousand; the value of its stock would increase be­
cause of its increased earnings. It would also increase be­
cause of the higher rate of capitalization applied to earnings 
in 1929 as compared with 1924. So that that stock might 
appreciate from—not from a hundred to a hundred and fifty 
thousand, but from a hundred thousand to two hundred 
thousand, or a hundred per cent.'
Now, let’s take a company that owns twenty per cent of 
the stock of that company. Its holding was worth $20,000 in 
1924, and in 1929 its holding was worth at market value, let 
us say, $40,000. There was a tendency to treat that increase 
of $20,000 as an income of that company which itself could 
be capitalized in order to arrive at the capital value of that 
company. So that you were getting a sort of a squaring of 
the appreciation, instead of an appreciation in direct rela­
tion to the earnings; it tended to vary, you may say, as the 
square of the increase of earnings. And that is why I think 
the general range of stock values of that class of company 
was particularly out of line. I want to be entirely fair and 
say I don’t regard the insurance companies as an extreme 
example of that kind. Of course, if you take some of these 
extreme cases, like, well, some of the Insull companies and 
companies like the American & Foreign Power, you get a 
much more exaggerated rise, but still I think that such a con­
dition did affect to a very marked extent securities of the 
kind of Continental and Fidelity-Phenix stocks.
Q. Now, in Exhibit P-22, which is the analysis of shares 
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and so-called “breakdown value” in the case of Continental, 
the portfolio taken at market is $66.79 a share, and the 
market prices on the Stock Exchange were around 90?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that divergence between the value of the port­
folio and the market quotations indicate in your opinion 
the situation which you have just outlined as existing in the 
case of the market quotation of the stock of the Continental 
and the Fidelity-Phenix?
A. That fact in conjunction with the facts as to earnings, 
which I have already recited, led me to that conclusion.
Cross Examination by Mr. Hanson:
Q. And in round figures I believe you used an earning 
capacity for the Continental of $5,000,000?
A. $5,000,000.
Q. As representing the average earnings which you sought 
to capitalize?
A. Yes.
Q. And those were capitalized by you, I believe, at various 
rates?
A. Various rates.
Q. The final rate being used was 6 per cent, was it not?
A. That was the lowest rate, that wasn’t the final rate.
Q. What was your final rate?
A. The way one does things of that kind is to assemble 
figures on different bases and then reach a conclusion on the 
picture as a whole; that was the method that I proceeded on.
Q. That is, you didn’t select your rate until you knew 
what the answer was?
A. If you care to put it that way. I think that is merely 
an attack on my intellectual honesty, that’s all.
Q. No, indeed. I am inquiring as to your method of 
procedure.
A. I have explained my method of procedure.
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Q. Notwithstanding the fact that this company made $3,- 
000,000, in excess of $3,000,000, on the sale of securities in 
1928 and notwithstanding the fact that they had made gains 
on the sales of securities in practically all other years since 
their organization, you did not include in the earning capac­
ity of this company for the year 1928 any amount because of 
similar gains?
A. No.
Q. You did not include in the earning capacity of the 
Continental any gain carried on the books of account and 
records of the Continental or gain reported during the year 
1928 to the Insurance Commissioner of the State of New 
York because of the appreciation in the value of the assets 
which had been purchased in prior years and which were 
held throughout the year 1928?
A. That is true.
Q. I invite your attention here in Exhibit M over the 
five-year period from, or over the period commencing in 1922 
and ending with 1928; I invite your attention to the sales of 
securities made during that period of time.
A. Yes.
Q. During that period of time the volume of sales was 
almost equal to the entire portfolio of the company, isn’t 
that a fact—to the entire portfolio of the company as of 1928?
A. I haven’t checked it—that is broadly true, I should say; 
if you take in ’29 it would be true.
Q. During that period of time the profits actually were 
realized?
A. Yes—well, substantial profits were realized.
Q. Now, assuming, Mr. May, that the item of $3,220,000, 
which you say is the profit which was realized in the year 
1928 upon the sale of securities, should be actually included 
in the earning capacity of the Continental for the year 1928. 
Gan you then compute at the rates previously employed by 
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you the valuation of the stocks through capitalization of 
earnings?
A. No.
Q. You cannot do it?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. I can make a mathematical calculation, of course, a 
mere matter of arithmetic.
Q. That is all I ask you to do.
A. But I couldn’t say the definite result in a value, I mean, 
if you take one assumption and apply to it figures based on an 
entirely different assumption, the combination of the two 
won’t produce a homogeneous result; it will be a meaning­
less figure.
Q. You can make the computation, however?
A. Obviously, as a matter of arithmetic.
Q. Will you do so before the court, please?
The Court. How would you establish the rate which he is 
going to capitalize this sum at?
Mr. Hanson. I am asking him to use his own rate, Your 
Honor.
The Court. Let’s find out what his rate will be.
The Witness. If I used the method at all, I should use 
an entirely different rate, but I should not use the method 
at all.
The Court. It is a mere mathematical calculation; you 
consider the capitalization of appreciation of securities is un­
sound?
The Witness. Capitalizing appreciation in valuation of se­
curities even if realized as earnings is unsound in principle, 
in my mind, so I wouldn’t be prepared to say what rate I 
should adopt if I were forced to adopt a principle that I re­
garded as unsound.
By Mr. Hanson:
Q. Now, would you say that that method of procedure 
would be unsound with reference to a company engaged 
solely in buying and selling securities?
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A. Yes, I would think that you would have to value its 
stock on an entirely different basis.
Q. Under your computation you gave no effect whatso­
ever to the earning capacity obtained through or realized by 
the sale of securities—isn’t that right?
A. I don’t regard that as earning capacity that should be 
capitalized.
Q. It was a gain, however?
A. It was a gain, yes; a capital gain, to my mind.
Q. A capital gain?
A. A capital gain, economically.
The Court. And what do you mean by that, Doctor?
The Witness. Well, I am trying to restrict myself to an­
swering the question.
The Court. Yes, yes.
The Witness. So that I may make my position entirely 
clear. If you would like me to—
The Court. But what do you mean by the expression 
“economically”?
The Witness. Well, that is the point that I made just now, 
that what was going on during these periods was a steady 
lowering of the rate of yield on securities. Now, if you take 
advantage of that by selling out securities, it doesn’t repre­
sent any permanent earning capacity for the future. On the 
contrary, the fact that securities are steadily going up during 
that period creates a probability that there will be a fall in 
the later period, and, as a matter of fact, the insurance com­
panies in 1929—I think these and others probably—were carry­
ing reserves to provide for that contingency which they fore­
saw. The underlying assumption in this method which Mr. 
Hanson puts to me is that the rise in securities that was 
going on from 1924 to 1929 was going on continuously up 
and up. To my mind that is economically—well, I would 
say, impossible; certainly, highly improbable. And therefore, 
in forming a reasonable estimate of the future, I wouldn’t 
predicate any calculation on the assumption that that would 
continue indefinitely.
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By Mr. Hanson:
Q. Might it not maintain an even level?
A. But you—
Q. Will you answer that question, please?
Mr. Angell: Let him answer in his own fashion.
A. It might not—you say, it might not what—maintain 
an even level?
Q. The earnings resulting from or through a sale of se­
curities.
A. Not unless there was a continuous fall in the rate of 
yield on securities.
Q. Well, there had been a fall for some time, had there 
not?
A. Yes, and I think that created the presumption that the 
longer it lasted, the more likely it was to come to an end. 
I mean if you get a barometer rising steadily, for a time, it is 
evident that you are going to have good weather, but when 
you get it up, right up to set fair, you are pretty sure that 
the next change is going to be a fall in the barometer, not a 
further rise.
Q. This factor, which you have given no consideration 
in your computation, what part did it play in the growth of 
the company?
A. It played some part, a substantial part, in increasing 
the assets value of the portfolio.
Q. Well, isn’t it a fact that with only a paid-in capital 
of $2,000,000 in 1928, there was a surplus of something over 
$30,000,000, just because of this very factor which you have 
eliminated in your computation?
A. Well, I have given them credit for the increase in the 
assets that they produced, but I say that it doesn’t represent 
a permanent earning capacity, in my judgment. In 1929, no 
one making a forecast for the future would—
Q. Notwithstanding the fact that there had been earnings 
each year since the organization of the company, because of 
that very fact?
358 VALUATION
A. The earnings had increased so rapidly from that source 
in recent years that I think there was every reason to expect 
a reversal of the trend rather than a continuation of it. 
Q. But over a long period of time, the experience of the 
company indicated that substantial earnings were to be real­
ized from that source?
A. That is true. I mean I don’t want to accept—I take 
exception to the word “earnings”: I don’t want to accept that.
Q. Substantial gains?
A. Gains, yes.
Q. And that was actual realized profit?
A. It was an actual realized profit, yes.
Q. Notwithstanding the fact that you are of the opinion 
that the gains realized from sales of securities are not prop­
erly includable in the earnings of the Continental, such gains 
are a really important element in computing the value of that 
stock, are they not?
A. I think that if I were attaching any weight—if I were 
trying to measure the weight to attach to them—I would, I 
think, in 1929, endeavoring to put myself back in that posi­
tion, have said that there was more reason to anticipate a re­
versal of the trend in the subsequent years, and that there­
fore I was giving a full valuation by ignoring the question 
altogether.
The Court. In your study of these figures, Mr. May, would 
or would it not be proper and logical to take into account 
any item based upon fluctuation in the value of money itself?
The Witness. Well, that is really what underlies this ques­
tion of gain, Your Honor.
The Court. Well, now, will you clear that up for me? I 
think you can do that, so that I will understand these conclu­
sions of yours better—if you will explain how the fluctuation 
in the value of the dollar has affected this problem we are 
dealing with.
The Witness. I don’t think the fluctuation in the value 
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of the dollar had very much to do with it at this time. As I 
remember, the value of the dollar measured by the cost of 
living indices or anything of that kind did not change very 
much between, say, 1925 or 1926 and 1928 or 1929. It was a 
rather different phenomenon, which, however, operated in 
very much the same way; let me discuss fluctuation in value 
due to an absolute change in the value of the dollar. It seems 
to me that as regards earning capacity, you would have to 
leave out, in arriving at the value based on earning capacity 
in a period when the value of the dollar was violently chang­
ing, you would have to exclude gains or losses in dollars that 
were due merely to the realization of securities on the basis, 
we will say, of a depreciated dollar as compared with the 
purchase price before the dollar had begun to depreciate. If 
the dollar had depreciated, however, it might be reasonable 
to assume that over a period of years the real earning capac­
ity measured by current actual production of income would 
increase because all units of value would rise and therefore 
sales would increase in price—in this case premiums would 
increase in amount, losses would increase in amount, and 
it would all be stepped up; so that if we had an earning ca­
pacity of $5,000,000, to take these figures, and realized gains 
due to depreciation of the dollar of three and a half million 
dollars, it would not, in my judgment, be correct to add 
those two together and make a calculation. The right thing 
would be to say, well, the three million and a half has got 
nothing to do with the question, but the five million dollars, 
now that the dollar is worth, we will say, sixty cents, will 
probably increase in the ratio of one hundred to sixty, be­
cause over a term the value of property will increase in terms 
of the depreciated dollar, the insurance written on it will in­
crease, the losses will increase, the expense will increase, and 
no necessity of earning $5,000,000 in future, we will have 
earned a larger sum than five, and it will have to be a con­
version of the regular current income and have nothing what­
ever to do with the purely incidental profits derived in the 
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particular period from the conversion of assets which have 
been bought on one level of the dollar compared with the 
period when the dollar had an entirely different value. I 
don’t know as that helps Your Honor.
The Court. Yes, it has.
IX
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK IN 1930 *
(1934)
Mr. Green. Mr. May, I am going to ask your opinion as to 
the fair market value on June 12, 1930, of a block of 1,825,- 
000 shares of common stock of Pacific Gas and Electric. You 
have seen the two stipulations that are in this case?
Mr. May. Yes.
Q. And also the additional data read into the record at 
the beginning of the trial, namely, the statement of P. G. & E. 
stock outstanding at various dates, a New York Stock Ex­
change Bulletin and Chart showing the price range of P. G. 
& E. common on the New York and San Francisco Exchanges, 
and a schedule bringing down through 1933 the figures con­
tained in paragraph 25 of the main stipulation.
In addition to that, assume that the P. G. & E. took its 
depreciation on the sinking fund basis, and not the straight 
line basis; and that if it had taken depreciation on the 
straight line basis with the same factors, the amount of its 
depreciation would have exceeded that actually taken by ap­
proximately $3,681,000 for 1927; $4,484,000 for 1928; and 
$3,838,000 for 1929.
Also assume that P. G. & E. charged to construction the 
following amounts for general and administrative expense, 
and had the following amounts of gross construction:
* Excerpt from testimony in Western Power Corporation v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue (1934). Determination of the fair value in June, 1930, 
of a block of 1,825,000 shares of Pacific Gas & Electric Company, being ap­
proximately 32% of the outstanding stock.
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General and 
administrative 
Gross expense charged
Year construction to construction
...................... $25,824,923 $1,627,633
1928 ...................... 20,942,156 1,512,864
1929 ...................... 41,888,366 1,593,105
1930...................... 44,894,383 1,928,329
1931 ...................... 23,513,945 1,617,257
1932 ...................... 9,007,406 1,188,559
1933 ...................... 4,431,783 778,783
And that in 1929 about 40 per cent of the general and ad­
ministrative expense charged to construction existed and 
would have been incurred regardless of construction; and 
that this percentage of the total would tend to rise as the 
amount of construction decreased.
Assume further that the plants and properties carried on 
the consolidated balance sheet of P. G. & E. at December 31, 
1929, in the gross sum of approximately $407,000,000 had a 
rate base value, in accordance with the practices of the Cali­
fornia Railroad Commission, of about $372,000,000; that in 
computing the company’s rate base, there would also have 
been included its materials and supplies, and other net cur­
rent assets only to the extent of two months’ operating ex­
pense.
Also assume that in January and February, 1930, the Cali­
fornia Railroad Commission entered orders decreasing the 
rates for electricity, effective as of March 1, 1930, which re­
duction in rates would amount to an annual reduction of 
$3,000,000 for P. G. & E. and Great Western together.
Also assume that Pacific Gas and Electric Company during 
the years 1929 and 1930 went into the natural gas business.
I now ask what, in your opinion, was the fair market value 
on June 12, 1930, of a block of 1,825,000 shares of common 
stock of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company?
Mr. May. In my judgment, the fair market value of such a 
block of stock on the facts cited here and assumed, and the 
evidence contained in the stipulations, would be in the neigh­
borhood of $35 a share, and perhaps somewhat less. [Quota­
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tion on New York Stock Exchange, June 12, 1930, was 
61¼-63½.]
Q. Can you give a minimum and a maximum?
A. I should say a fair range would be between, say, $30 
and $40 a share.
Q. Will you give us the reasons that lead you to that 
result?
A. The way that I approach a question of that kind is that 
if you are trying to determine the fair market value, the first 
requirement is to determine the market which is available. 
The New York Stock Exchange, which is perhaps the first to 
suggest itself, is a market in which stocks such as this are 
dealt in at retail, and in regard to this particular stock, it 
was clearly not broad enough to constitute a market for a 
block of anything like this magnitude.  
Therefore, I should say that the New York Stock Exchange 
quotations have no direct bearing on the fair market value 
of a block of this size.
The markets that would be available in normal times 
would be what may be called the wholesale distributing 
markets, of the large corporate investment markets; corpora­
tions which buy large blocks of stocks of public utilities or 
other classes of companies, with the idea of holding them as 
long term investments.
The wholesale distributing market is, of course, based in­
directly on the retail market, allowing for the costs of dis­
tribution and the compensation and the risks assumed in 
undertaking such an operation; and therefore must bear 
some relation to the New York Stock Exchange prices or 
to San Francisco Stock Exchange prices.
In June, 1930, the demand by wholesale distributors for 
securities for distribution was very limited. They were not 
undertaking the hazard of such distribution at all freely.
Our business in that field was almost at a standstill. I 
question very much whether the stock could have been sold 
advantageously in that particular market. My own judg­
ment would be that the large corporate investor would be 
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more likely to give a price for a block this size at that time. 
Such purchaser is not, I think, in my experience, greatly in­
fluenced by current market quotations. The price that he is 
willing to pay is determined, rather, by the basic elements of 
value, and the inherent merits of the security, so that he 
would look at it from the standpoint mainly of prospective 
earning capacity.
In the case of a public utility, that involves a number of 
questions: There is the question of the rate base. I should 
say that the relation between the rate base and the book 
values of the property were such that that would not be a 
major element in the determination of the price.
Then there is the question of prior charges. They, of 
course, tend to increase the earnings in periods of prosperity 
on the equity stock to the extent that the earnings on the 
money invested exceed the rate of return that has to be paid 
to the holders of private securities. In time of adversity, 
they operate in the opposite direction.
The Pacific Gas and Electric was, of course, a strong finan­
cial company at that date. Then we come to the question 
of earnings, which is the critical consideration.
After the purchase of the Western Power Company prop­
erties, the earnings of the properties included in the P. G. 
& E. System for the three years ending 1927, 1928 and 1929, 
would be equivalent to about $2.80 a share on the amount 
of the stock that would have been outstanding if the purchase 
of the Western Power properties had taken effect at the be­
ginning of that three-year period.
Those earnings are computed on the basis of the Cali­
fornia Railroad Commission classification, and all who are 
experienced in these matters know that such classifications 
tend to give higher earnings than the ordinary reasonably 
conservative, industrial accounting, largely by reason of the 
two points mentioned in your hypothetical question, that 
the depreciation is calculated on the sinking fund basis, or 
on a relatively low basis—in this case, on the sinking fund 
basis which tends to give a low charge during the early years 
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of the life of the property and the higher charge as the prop­
erty approaches maturity. That is a very important factor, 
particularly in property that is expanding, and particularly 
if the expansion is likely to be checked; because during the 
period of expansion, the depreciation charge is bound to be 
relatively low, and it is bound to be relatively high as the 
new property in the total becomes smaller. The deprecia­
tion charge of Pacific Gas & Electric was to my mind dis­
tinctly low.
In the second place, the public utility accounting calls for 
capitalizing large amounts of administrative expense which 
will be equally incurred, whether there are capital expendi­
tures in progress or not; but the general rule in industrial 
accounting is to capitalize only such administrative expense 
as would not have been incurred had the capital expenditure 
not been undertaken.
t
Taking those elements into consideration, I think one may 
say that the excess of earnings of $2.80 over a dividend rate 
of $2.00 a share, was mainly traceable to those two causes; 
and if the accounts were restated on what you may call an 
industrial basis, there would be little, if any, margin during 
those three years over the $2.00 dividend rate.
In 1930, the reductions of rate had been put into effect, 
and quite apart from that, a person of the type managing 
the large investing corporation would assume that conditions 
in the near future were not likely to be so satisfactory as dur­
ing the three years 1927, 1928, and 1929. That was a period 
of marked prosperity, which had been definitely broken in 
June, 1930.
I do not think that anybody in June, 1930, would have 
apprehended the depth of the depression which has since de­
veloped; but I think reasonably prudent men would have 
foreseen a substantial recession and would have counted upon 
reduction in earnings and probably in dividends.
In such circumstances, it seems to me that a vendor trying 
to sell a block of this stock would have to be forced to ac­
cept a price of $35 a share on which the dividend would be 
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slightly less than 6 per cent, and might well have had to take 
a lower figure.
That, in a broad line, is the basis of my opinion.
Q. I take it, then, that when you give a range of 30 to 35, 
you are allowing for various factors here, are you not?
A. Yes. It is a little difficult to explain exactly. I would 
like to make my exact position clear. I am trying as best 
I can to judge what a person of that type would have been 
willing to pay. In doing so, frankly I have taken into ac­
count the fact that public utility securities had, I find at that 
time, generally, a value higher than, I think, pure reasoning 
would have attributed to them; and that is reflected in the 
range of prices I have given. It is not an attempt to estimate 
what I would consider the fair market value ought to be, but 
what I think the fair market value would have been.
Q. I take it that your own opinion as to what the fair 
market value ought to have been would be the lower?
A. Somewhat on the lower side.
On cross examination, a great deal of emphasis was placed 
by the opposing attorney on the Stock Exchange quotation, 
in an attempt to get Mr. May to admit that these quotations 
had some value. However, Mr. May insisted that the quota­
tions would be a fair index for small blocks of stock, which 
could readily be marketed in ordinary course on the Ex­
change, and that the difference was essentially one of the re­
tail market as distinct from what might be termed the whole­
sale market; and that in a block of the size involved the 
quoted market price has no appreciable bearing on the actual 
fair value. Moreover, he made the point that “the fair 
market value is the value that one could expect to realize 
in the market in which the sale would have to be effected.”
After certain other witnesses had testified, quoting a Su­
preme Court decision in which a definition of fair value is 
given as that which a willing buyer would give to a willing 
seller, and both parties being equally informed as to the 
merits of the property, Mr. May was again put on the stand
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and asked whether in view of this definition the quotations 
on the Stock Exchange would have significance, and Mr. 
May answered, “Most emphatically not,” and went on to 
say:
I think that they represented the fair market value for 
small blocks of stock, on the basis of my definition of fair 
market value as being the price which might reasonably be 
expected to be realized in the market in which the property 
would naturally be sold.
On that basis, I think, for small blocks of stock, and except 
in very unusual circumstances, the New York Stock Ex­
change prices could be regarded as fair market value; and 
that is obviously a rule of practical convenience; but if you 
once import into the definition of fair market value the as­
sumption that the parties to the transaction are both rea­
sonably informed, adequately informed as to the value of the 
property, then I would say that the New York Stock Ex­
change market quotations do not represent a fair market 
value under such a definition, but merely a market value, 
eliminating the word “fair”; and for this reason: In the first 
place, the amount of information available is quite inade­
quate to form the basis for a determination of the true value 
of securities; the value of a security depends on the future.
Now, some isolated facts in regard to the past are avail­
able, and what inferences may be drawn from those facts as 
to the future, is purely a question of judgment; and only 
those so intimately associated with the operations or with 
the business are in a position to form such judgments.
In the second place, a very large percentage of the operat­
ors on the New York Stock Exchange do not take advantage 
of the information that is available, so that in the large per­
centage of the transactions, one, at least, of the parties in the 
transaction is not in possession of even such information as 
is available.
In the third place, the large amount of operations on the 
Stock Exchange are based on market hunches and tips, and 
beliefs in what they are going to do—“they” being a mys­
terious group of supposed market leaders which may or may 
not exist, but whose actual or supposed transactions has a 
very large effect on market quotations.
I, of course, in my business, see a great deal of the inside 
of large corporations, and it is a very common experience
368 VALUATION
with me to find corporation executives concerned with the 
prices at which their stocks are selling, knowing that they 
cannot be worth those prices; so that on the basis of the 
definition of fair market value, which assumes adequate in­
formation on the part of both parties to the transaction, I 
would say that the New York Stock Exchange transactions do 
not conform to that requirement, and are not therefore in­
dicative of fair market value.
On cross examination the opposing attorney tried to show 
that there was inconsistency in this view with the treatment 
given in balance sheets which were certified. The market 
value might be different for balance sheet purposes from that 
used for income tax purposes, but as regards Stock Exchange 
houses they were dealing on the Stock Exchange and that 
would logically be their market.
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PART III (Continued) 
VALUATION

TESTIMONY IN State of Minnesota v. Republic Steel 
Corporation
(1934)
Q. Are you familiar with the terms on which businesses 
of various kinds are bought and sold?
A. I have seen different plans, arrangements, and various 
bases on which businesses have been attempted to be sold, 
and I have sat in on the negotiations in a great many cases.
Q. I will ask you to say whether or not you are familiar 
with the method of valuation employed by the Minnesota 
Tax Commission? *
A. Yes, I have read that several times.
Q. You have been familiar with that method ever since 
its adoption?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, Mr. May, from your experience would you say 
that the method of valuation so employed by the Minnesota 
Tax Commission is such as to produce a figure which fairly 
may be regarded as indicative of a price at which an iron 
property of Minnesota would sell at a voluntary sale, for 
cash, on any particular valuation date?
A. I don’t want to go into detail—but the general method 
is one which is quite familiar in the valuation of any par­
ticular property, and I think it does afford a guide to what a 
buyer would expect or could afford to pay, or a seller could 
expect to get for a property.. Of course the factors would 
have to be determined carefully.
Q. Are there any exceptions to the method to which you 
would like to call attention?
A. You mean to this precise method?
* See Report of the Minnesota Tax Commission (1932), pp. 46-7.
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Q. Yes.
A. Well, as to the precise method, I would like to make 
some criticisms and some reservations.
Q. Yes.
A. I think the method is open to criticism in that it at­
tributes the whole profit of mining that is anticipated to the 
ore, whereas some part of that profit will be required to 
provide a return on the working capital employed in operat­
ing and some part will be required to provide a return on 
the future expenditures necessary for plant and property, 
from the time the expenditures are made until the time 
when, under the plan, they are to be recovered from opera­
tions. That is, I think, a criticism which is proper. I think, 
also, it is probably a little defective in the treatment of 
taxes, and it won’t, I think, allow adequately for the taxes 
which will have to be paid in the future if the same 
general method of assessment and the same general meth­
ods of taxation procure into the future. I am speaking 
now of the taxes for the later period. That might not 
be such an important factor because the amount of taxes 
which will accrue thirty years hence will be not of such 
great present value. As regards the method in general, I 
think it can only be used with the reservation that it does 
not indicate value unless conditions—the general conditions— 
as of the time at which a valuation is being made are sub­
stantially similar to the conditions existing during the basic 
period on which the valuation is predicated. That is true 
of all valuations, of course. Take an extreme example: It 
would obviously have been improper to value—let us say the 
brewery industry, immediately after the prohibition amend­
ment became effective, at the figure which might be shown 
to be the valuation based on a five-year period immediately 
prior to the coming of prohibition. That is an extreme case, 
but I think this same point has a bearing on this particular 
case because I do not think that anyone would say that 
conditions generally, either on May 1, 1932—which I 
understand is the basic date here—or at any time since then
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have been substantially similar to those in the period from 
1927 to 1931, the five years immediately prior to May, 1932. 
Those are, generally, the questionable things involved, in my 
view.
Q. Have you, in connection with the work you have men­
tioned, given any special attention to the rate required in 
order to attract capital into an industry or make the pur­
chase of any particular business attractive?
A. Yes, my firm and I have given particular study to that 
kind of business for very many years.
Q. What in your opinion is the proper method of deter­
mination of value and rate of return for an investment in 
an iron property in Minnesota on May 1, 1932?
A. Well, as I have indicated, if you narrow it to May 1, 
1932, I think any sales made on that date would be made 
only on a sacrifice basis, so you cannot approach that on the 
line you have in mind; but if, as I take it, what you have 
in mind is the appropriate rate, assuming restoration of fairly 
normal conditions?
Q. Yes.
A. So I can assume a normal and not a sacrificial basis?
Q. Yes, that is true, I used the date of May 1, 1932, 
because that is the valuation date involved here,
A. Yes, I just wanted to make myself clear on the basis 
of my opinion. I would say, in my opinion, that ten per 
cent was a minimum rate.
Q. You think that ten per cent would be necessary in 
order to attract capital into the industry?
A. That would be my judgment.
Q. Now, Mr. May, will you tell us upon what you base 
that conclusion?
A. Well, it is really based upon my whole experience of 
the last thirty-five or forty years. I am not familiar with a 
very large number of cases in which sales of iron ore proper­
ties have been made, particularly since the depression, which 
to my mind has substantially changed our whole industrial 
situation—so I cannot speak specifically of iron ore prop-
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erties from recent experience—but my view, and my ex­
perience also, is that generally speaking, business men regard 
ten per cent as practically the minimum rate for an invest­
ment which involves the hazards of business. One would 
have to make an exception to that statement in respect to the 
period from 1927 to 1929, when, as the Senate Committee 
on the investigation of stock exchanges stated in its recent 
report, “the whole country was swept by a fever of specula­
tion from which not even the financial leaders were im­
mune.” Leaving out of consideration a situation like that, 
I think that business men would generally regard ten per 
cent as the minimum rate of return subject to business haz­
ards. Prior to the depression, I think steel men and engineers 
in the steel profession, and many others were disposed to 
attach higher values to ore property than would be arrived 
at on that basis, and in our negotiations which have involved 
doing business with the steel business and the banks, I fre­
quently observed a tendency on the part of steel men to at­
tach greatly exaggerated value to iron property, and, gen­
erally, the bankers have discounted considerably the values 
attached to the properties. I think the position as to over­
rating of ore properties was in part due to over-stressing the 
consideration that mining on the Lake Superior Ranges is 
comparatively free from what you may call mining hazards, 
as compared with other types of mining industry, but hazards 
are of at least three general kinds. There are the hazards 
incident to production, which in this case are relatively 
small.
Q. You refer to those as mining hazards?
A. Yes, that refers to mining hazards. Then hazards in­
cidental to the sale and disposition of the product, and then 
there are what you might call the general economic and so­
cial hazards, the hazards of changes in social policy involving 
such questions as regulation, taxation, tariff policies, and 
monetary policies. Different businesses are affected to dif­
ferent degrees by different classes of hazards, but the sec­
ond and third classes are always present.
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In my experience, business men generally discount valua­
tions made by engineers—almost invariably. I think that 
is true because engineers are apt to consider only the hazards 
that they think they can reasonably foresee, and business men 
realize that the hazards which they cannot account for and 
readily foresee constitute important factors for their con­
sideration. Perhaps I could make a little clearer what I am 
trying to say by illustrating from specific cases that have 
come under my notice.
Mr. Blu. That is perfectly proper.
A. One striking case that I had in mind is that a few 
years ago I had to go down to Chile on business and visit 
nitrate plants down there. Now, the nitrate rock lies close 
to the surface and the available supply can be estimated ac­
curately just as I understand you can estimate, with reason­
able accuracy, the available ore on the Mesabi Range. For­
merly in England the shares of nitrate companies were quite 
a popular investment, and in some other countries also. 
When I was down in Chile, which was just before the de­
pression had started, they were trying to do something to 
save the nitrate industry in Chile. Today it is, I should 
say, almost ruined. I noticed the other day the bonds of 
one of the companies, six per cent bonds of the Lautaro 
Nitrate Company, were selling on the New York Stock 
Exchange at 10. Now, that ruin was brought about by 
two things, broadly. The first thing that affected the indus­
try seriously was the steady increase in the export taxes levied 
by the Chilean government, which, ultimately, became larger 
than all the costs of operation put together. But the more 
important thing was that during the war, Germany was 
unable to get a supply of nitrate which was essential in the 
production of explosives, and was forced to turn its atten­
tion to some way of supplying or getting nitrogen out of the 
air; and the nitrates produced in that way are practically 
ruining the natural Chilean industry.
Q. Have you other similar examples that you can cover 
briefly?
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A. Take the radio, that completely ruined the makers 
of pianos, pianolas and victrolas, and seriously affected the 
whole music industry. The discovery of a process for mak­
ing a substitute for silk out of wood pulp had a very serious 
effect upon the silk industry. The copper industry has been 
very seriously affected, and it is now in a serious condition as 
the result of the development of new low-cost supplies partly 
in Chile but more particularly in Africa. It is much easier 
to conceive of changes in either metallurgical methods, or 
monetary conditions, or tariff policies, or things of that kind, 
which might seriously affect the steel industry than it was to 
conceive that the nitrate industry would be ruined by the 
discovery of methods of getting nitrates out of the air, or the 
piano industry would be ruined by the discovery of inven­
tions such as the radio.
I remember some years ago, in a railroad case, the claim 
of some allowance for risk in the return to railroads was met 
by the statement that the railroads were a basic industry, or 
a basic enterprise, the prosperity of which was essential to the 
country; it could never be dispensed with. Certainly, at that 
time, no one foresaw the effect of automobiles and aviation 
on the condition of the railroads. Those are the sort of 
things that I have in mind that every business man knows are 
inherent in any business investment. He cannot say pre­
cisely what form they are going to take, but he needs some 
compensation for that risk in the rate of return which he 
uses to compute the value that he can afford to pay for a 
property.
Q. And it is considerations of the kind you mentioned 
upon which you base your opinion that a ten per cent rate 
of return is appropriate in the case of iron ore property?
A. Strictly speaking, I have gone only sb far up to now— 
I have covered only the point as to why some considerable 
excess over what you may call the safe rate on money is 
necessary to induce people to assume business hazards. How 
much that excess should be is the next question, which is a 
part of the problem that you have to solve before you can
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fix any particular rate. On that point there are some con­
siderations that I think are very important. I have given a 
lot of thought to the philosophy of the problems of the risk, 
the compensation for risk, and that leads me to the conclu­
sion, which observation confirms, that the allowance you 
have to make for risk is bound to be substantially greater 
than what you may call the purely mathematical value of the 
risk.
If you take insurance—we all know that for every dollar 
we pay for fire insurance, roughly 50 cents is absorbed in 
expenses and the profit of the insurance companies, and only 
50 cents is necessary to compensate for the purely mathe­
matical value of the risk. Now, that sort of consideration 
applies when you ask an investor to take a risk. He wants 
something more than the mathematical value of the risk. 
How much more is something that depends upon a whole 
lot of circumstances; but I should say that he usually ex­
pects, like the insurance companies, something like twice the 
mathematical value of the risk, and that, I think, has always 
been so; and I think as our country becomes more settled 
arid less of a pioneer country, that consideration will rather 
grow in importance. I think it was Mr. Morgan who said, 
“The growth of the country corrects all but the worst mis­
takes.” It was true in the earlier years, and there were 
prospects of results far exceeding a reasonable estimate which 
went a long way to offset the prospects of losses. But as you 
get further and further from the earlier stages of develop­
ment of the country, that consideration tends to lose force. 
I think also the whole system of graduated income tax, for 
instance, and taxation of capital gains, and things of that 
kind have operated in the same direction. I don’t mean I 
disapprove of the policies. On the whole, I approve of them, 
but they do have that effect; so that I think today you have 
got to give substantially more than the mathematical value 
of the risk to an investor to assume a hazard. As I say, those 
considerations were rather lost sight of, perhaps, in the days 
of 1927 and 1928 and 1929. But the depression has brought
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them back to mind with a vengeance, and I don’t think 
people are going to ignore them for a good many years to 
come. To my mind, the really important effect of the de­
pression on industry—I mean upon the value of investments 
generally—is not the current operating losses—those have 
been very considerable in a number of cases—but I have a 
feeling that people have now come to realize that values, 
prior to 1929, were exaggerated, and they are going to take a 
very much more conservative view as to what they can afford 
to pay for property, and be more conservative in the return 
that they ask, if they are going to assume new risks.
Q. Is that all you care to say on that subject?
A. I could talk for a long time, and I have tried to give 
the general idea.
Q. Can you tell us, in a general way, how you consider 
the percentage should be determined which must be added 
to the rate on reasonably secured loans to cover the extra 
hazards involved in outside investment, say, in a mine in 
Minnesota?
A. Well, perhaps I have pretty well covered that in my 
answer to the last question. It comes, ultimately, to a ques­
tion of judgment and the position we have. But my own 
opinion is that in present-day conditions ten per cent is cer­
tainly not a high rate. I should hesitate a great deal to 
advise any person to buy an iron ore mine on a prospect 
of ten per cent return. But I realize an iron ore mine is not 
an individual investment in an ordinary way. I would not 
advise any client to figure less than ten per cent in deter­
mining the price they can afford to pay for iron ore prop­
erties.
Q. Mr. May, can you recall any specific cases of mine val­
uations which you think are fairly comparable to the pur­
chase of an iron ore property on the Mesabi Range?
A. I don’t remember very many actual sales of mines 
in my experience that I consider comparable. Curiously 
enough, the only two I can think of as reasonably pertinent 
happen to be the first I ever had experience with, and the 
STATE OF MINNESOTA V. REPUBLIC STEEL 11
last. The first one in which I was actively concerned was 
the sale of the copper mine at Copper Cliff, Ontario, to the 
International Nickel Company in 1902. That was a cash 
purchase. I worked out the yield on the assumed factors 
myself and I remember it worked out just about ten per cent, 
on the basis of the proven ore, the current price for nickel 
and copper, and current cost of production, and, I think, at 
the time there were reasonable grounds to expect that the 
price could be increased, the cost probably reduced and a 
large additional tonnage would be developed. That was an 
important consideration in the case, because the life assumed 
was not very many years, so that if additional tonnage were 
developed and brought in it would have a considerable 
present value.
Q. How did those matters turn out in that immediate 
case, Mr. May?
A. All three were realized—the International Nickel got 
a very handsome thing out of the investment, although, in­
cidentally, I remember that the vendors thought they had 
gotten an extremely good price for their property. That was 
a case where everybody was satisfied.
The other one is the experience I had in connection with 
the Kreuger interests. One of the estates of the Kreuger 
group had a large interest in the Boliden gold mine in 
Sweden. Our committee made an effort to get the Swedish 
government to buy that mine at a generous price as a sort 
of relief to the foreign investors who suffered so badly. The 
government undertook to give the matter consideration and 
appointed a commission. The liquidators appointed experts 
to examine the mine. They made a report and gave a valu­
ation based, as I recall, on the current price of gold, the 
estimation that costs in the future would tend to increase 
by about ten per cent which they allowed, and that the 
proven ore could be mined out over a period of fifteen years; 
applying a discount factor of six per cent, they arrived at 
certain figures, and the liquidators offered an option on the 
mine at that price to the government commission. The 
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chairman of the commission took the view that the offer 
indicated that the liquidators had no real desire to sell. 
The matter came before our committee and I found that the 
two bankers who were associated with me—Mr. Hugh Kind­
ersley of London and Mr. Wallenberg, a Swedish banker— 
both agreed that if we could get a purchaser who would 
accept the experts’ conclusion, except for the substitution 
of ten per cent for six per cent, it would be a very advan­
tageous arrangement for everybody to effect the sale; and 
since I returned from Sweden I have learned that a sale has 
been effected on substantially that basis.
Q. How recently is that?
A. Within the last month.
Q. Mr. May, is ten per cent higher or lower than the rate 
you would normally use in the case of an industrial prop­
erty?
A. Lower, unquestionably. As a matter of fact, in this 
same Kreuger matter, I was asked to value a large number 
of manufacturing properties of the group in various coun­
tries including the United States and countries like Sweden, 
Norway, and Denmark, where conditions as to investment 
are fairly comparable to the United States, as well as other 
countries where conditions may be different, like Czecho­
slovakia and Hungary, where values are definitely more 
speculative. But in the valuations which I am making I 
am not using any rate lower than twelve and a half per cent, 
and after consultation with the other members of the com­
mittee I find that they share my views.
Q. You are familiar, I take it, with what is generally 
known as the analytical appraisal method in arriving at the 
valuation of iron ore and other properties?
A. Yes. That is the method that is in general outlined 
in the commission’s report.
Q. Would you consider this ten per cent rate that you 
mentioned appropriate to use in the computation of the 
present worth of profits estimated to be derived from an 
iron mine in Minnesota?
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A. That would depend to some extent on the way in 
which the factors in the calculation were determined. If the 
factors were chosen allowing for all reasonably probable con­
tingencies but not making any special discounts for unfore­
seen hazards and that sort of thing, I should say that ten 
per cent would generally be, perhaps, about the sort of rate, 
the minimum rate, but before I expressed a conclusion on a 
specific problem I would want to examine the factors in some 
detail myself. 
Q. Now, you have not heard the testimony that has been 
given here or all the assumptions that have been made by 
expert engineers. I might tell you that in computing pres­
ent worth in this case an exhaustion period of forty years 
from May 1, 1932, has been used for iron ore properties on 
the Mesabi Range.
A. That is an engineering question on which I would 
have no opinion.
Q. Another assumption that has been made is an as­
sumed selling price for iron ore based upon the average 
Lower Lakes price of iron ore for a statistical period from 
1927 to 1931, both years inclusive; what would you say as 
to that assumption?
A. That seems to me to raise perhaps two points; the first 
is whether the five-year average is a fair basis; it is not an 
unfair method in general and would be applicable, I should 
say, and be as good a guide as you could get if you are 
basing your assumption on the resumption of normal con­
ditions, as I said before. The other question is as to whether 
the Lake Erie price is a proper figure to take, and no doubt 
there may be a question raised on that on the ground that a 
large, the larger part, by far, of the tonnage is what you may 
call consumer-owned, and therefore the Lake Erie price is 
not exactly the same as a price in a market in which the con­
sumer and the vendor are unrelated; that question might 
arise—I am not an expert on the steel industry—that is, the 
tonnage and sales of the steel industry; all I can say on that 
is that Lake Erie prices have always been used as the basis of 
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valuations that has been employed in merger negotiations 
and that kind of thing, and I think in the past they were 
accepted by all the parties concerned even though the dif­
ferent parties had unbalanced ore positions. But, of course, 
few of those mergers went through in their original form, 
and in no case were any final prices determined on the basis 
of specific valuations of the ore property. Where anything 
went through it was the result of a horse trade so that the 
only bearing, I suppose, that it has is that they had chosen 
that basis, and that they used that as a suitable starting point 
even though they had unbalanced positions.
Q. Another assumption that was made here was mining 
costs based on this same statistical period.
A. Well, if you assume the sales price within that period, 
it is almost inevitable that you assume the costs unless you 
have some definite reason for assuming or foreseeing some 
change in the costs, because the spread is probably as good a 
guide as your sales of ores, that is, as to cost.
Q. If the factors I have mentioned are assumed, would 
you consider the rate of discount or rate of return you men­
tioned appropriate to apply to the computation of present 
worth of the future income from these iron ore properties 
in Minnesota?
A. I should think it was appropriate, yes, an appropriate 
rate to use for such a purpose.
Q. Mr. May, you are familiar with the so-called Hoskold 
formula?
A. Yes.
Q. In applying that formula to the computation of the 
present worth of income from iron ore properties here, what 
have you to say about the rate of discount to cover the risk 
and the rate the sinking fund accumulation should bear?
A. Well, I think engineers generally have used a some­
what lower rate of return; in fact, sometimes a considerably 
lower rate of return than the ten per cent that I have men­
tioned, and have included with it a sinking fund at a rate 
assumed for a safe reinvestment of, say, four per cent. I 
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would say that certainly if you used a return rate of less than 
ten per cent you would have to couple it with a reinvestment 
sinking fund rate at a substantially lower figure in order to 
get at a basis that would be at all attractive to the average 
investor, or to a likely purchaser.
Q. If a ten per cent risk rate or an eight per cent risk rate 
were used, what would you consider the appropriate rate 
for the sinking fund?
A. Well, if an eight per cent rate be used, the common 
thing, I think, and the one being very frequently used by 
the treasury, I think, is eight and four. In fact, I think 
four per cent is almost invariably used as a sinking fund rate 
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, according to my experi­
ence.
Q. Would you think, then, that a ten-four combination 
or an eight-four combination would be appropriate to use in 
discounting the present worth of profits on these iron ore 
properties?
A. Well, if I were making a recommendation I might not 
insist on the four per cent if the return rate were as high 
as ten, but if it were less than ten I should certainly expect 
the sinking fund rate to be coupled with it. As a matter of 
fact, I think in theory the sinking fund method is perfectly 
sound; but—well, in a tax case in which I was interested 
one of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, in deciding that a 
method of computing of tax including the result of algebra 
was not intended by Congress, said that algebra is not lightly 
to be imputed to legislators, and I think in the same way 
higher mathematics is not lightly to be imputed to business 
men. They take calculations from the engineers and ex­
perts in whom they have confidence on the basis that those 
men consider sound in principle, and then they apply to 
them pragmatic tests to see how it is going to work out to 
them, and that is what they base their final conclusions on. 
I think that is the actual machinery of it. As a rule, they 
reach a lower valuation by that method almost invariably.
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Q. I did not understand the last part of your statement; 
what did you say?
A. As a rule they reach a lower valuation as the result on 
that.
Q. Who reach lower values?
A. The investors.
Q. That is all, Mr. May; you may cross examine, Mr. 
Ryan.
CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. Ryan:
Q. Mr. May, do these hazard factors which you speak of 
always work one way?
A. No, they don’t.
Q. Do you make any allowance for the possibility that 
conditions, general economic and social conditions, may im­
prove?
A. Well, I think that carries one off into another some­
what philosophic angle of the question. If you want me to 
discuss it I will be glad to. That is, the benefit that an in­
vestor derives if results are better than his expectation are 
not so valuable to him as the injury to him if the results 
fall short of his expectation. That is a phase of the question 
of the diminishing value of wealth. At every stage, as you 
grow more prosperous, each accretion to your prosperity is 
of comparatively less value than the amount you had before, 
so the accretions, the prospect of accretions from the invest­
ment standpoint, are not an offset to the prospects of de­
crease or falling off. That, of course, is accentuated very 
much by the system of graduated income taxes and taxation 
of capital gains, particularly from the standpoint of the large 
investor. You take the large investor, which is the one 
question—you really have two problems in this question, as 
I see it. You can consider the large investment, that is one 
problem, the large investor. If results are more favorable 
than he anticipates, the excess profits, the higher profits are 
.taxed at a continually growing rate and capital gains are 
taxed without corresponding relief in the case that he has
STATE OF MINNESOTA v. REPUBLIC STEEL 17 
capital losses, so that he does not consider that a prospect of 
the return being more favorable offsets with him the pros­
pect of the results never being attained by an equal amount.
Of course, if you take the small investor and assume a 
distribution of your investment so that the risk is spread, you 
have a somewhat different problem. There the risk element 
is not quite the same, is not so pronounced as it is in the 
case of the large investor, but then you come to the high 
cost of distribution, which applies not only to commodities 
but to securities, so if you try to finance a purchase by dis­
tribution among small investors what you save in the risk 
element you lose on the higher cost of distribution. That is 
the philosophy of it, as I see it.
Q. Your answer has had a relationship to the risk factor 
as between gain and loss; as applied to an individual, stated 
in dollars, would the same answer be true?
A. No. I would say that the social hazards are distinctly 
in the direction of reduced profits, and the social hazards are 
more likely—changes in social conditions, broadly speaking- 
are more likely to reduce profits than to increase them. I 
think that is true.
Q. Well, the answer is that in your judgment social and 
economic changes are likely, more likely to reduce profits 
over those you assume than they are to increase profits over 
those that you estimate?
A. I think that is particularly true, particularly in what 
you may call basic industries.
Q. And why is that?
A. Well, because the tendency is almost constantly toward 
increasing taxation; the public spends, and the burden of 
taxation is increasing, and also when you get into the basic 
industries you are faced with problems of regulation and 
additional taxation the moment you begin to show increase 
of profit, without any corresponding expectation of relief 
if your profits fall off. The more essential an industry is to 
the life of the nation the less chance there is of substantial 
increase of profit as a cyclical trend, I would say.
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Q. In other words, in the broad, general proposition, it 
is your belief that the tendency in the future is that profits 
of large industries will be reduced rather than increased?
A. I think that is the general trend one must expect. 
Especially in basic industries, I would add to that.
Q. Doesn’t that lead to the view that the expected return 
on invested capital will also tend to decrease?
A. Not necessarily, I think. It may to some extent, but 
I think that newer enterprises will be more profitable, and 
that is where the opportunities for investment will be. And 
you are indulging in rather general speculation, but I look 
for the movement of capital, of intelligent capital out of the 
more basic, what would be regarded as the more basic, in­
dustries into the newer industries. That is the trend of in­
vestment, I would say.
Q. Capital will go looking for these hazards, will it?
A. What?
Q. Capital will go looking for these hazards, will it?
A. No. It will rather choose to go where the prospects 
of gain will offset the hazards that attach to all business.
Q. To what?
A. To all business.
Q. Would you not say that, generally speaking, the new 
business, as you describe it, was more speculative and more 
hazardous than an established, settled business or a business 
with extensive operations behind it?
A. Well, the course of the value of business is something 
like the life of man, I think. In the early days it is haz­
ardous, and then it comes to the prime of life, and then it 
passes out into an older age, and what investment seeks are 
industries in the prime of life.
Q. Is that true of basic industries?
• A. Well, I think in industries there is nothing that is 
permanently basic, but we come to regard them as basic.
Q. Well, you say that there is no basic industry. You 
spoke of the hazards which should be taken up in your ten 
per cent return as a hazard incident to sale of the com-
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modity in which your capital is embarked. May not that 
hazard work as well in favor of the owner as against him?
A. You mean in the case of the steel industry?
Q. No, generally, I am speaking now, and ask for your 
answer in dollars, not the relative value of a dollar to a man 
who has a million and the man who is out on the street beg­
ging—the dollar?
A. Well, that is a thing that you could not generalize on. 
I mean, you would have to consider each industry on its 
merits, I would say, in that case.
Q. Well, I understood that generally you calculate these 
hazards, and generally in dealing with all business, and that 
generally you regard one of those elements of hazards that is 
incident to the sale of your product; isn’t that right?
A. Yes, that you may lose your market.
Q. What?
A. The hazard that you may lose your market through 
one cause or another.
Q. Yes. Is not a hazard incident to sale, isn’t it likewise 
true that there is some likelihood, at least, of an unexpected 
gain through increase of prices?
A. Theoretically it exists, but certainly in the steel in­
dustry I should think that the probabilities are rather the 
other way.
Q. I am talking generally now without reference to the 
steel industry.
A. That is a fairly large question. Of course, you cannot 
say that any particular rate is generally appropriate without 
stating the facts of the particular situation, but if I might put 
it in sort of legal terms, I think the average business man 
thinks that the burden of proof is heavily on anybody that 
undertakes to convince him that he should make an invest­
ment on less than a ten per cent return.
Q. Oh, no, no. We are examining into that ten per cent 
return; we want to find what it is made up of. It is made up, 
as I understood you to say, of these hazards, and the hazards
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are all, in the implication at least, against the investor; now, 
is that true?
A. That is not the point. I do not think that to be ac­
curate. What influences the decision is not the actual prob­
ability as to the hazards, but what the contemplating in­
vestor thinks the hazards are going to be. Value is largely 
a matter of psychology of the purchaser.
Q. There you are taking one end of the problem exactly 
as you do on these hazards. Doesn’t what the seller thinks 
have something to do with the transaction?
A. Maybe.
Q. So that the psychology has to include the psychology 
of both buyer and seller?
A. Yes, that is true.
Q. And the seller does not think of any of these factors, 
does he, of hazard?
A. I think he does, yes. He probably thinks of them 
somewhat differently.
Q. He thinks of them from quite an opposite viewpoint?
A. Yes, maybe; to some extent undoubtedly, yes.
Q. If we go off this method of determining values and 
steel in psychology we have got to get in to the seller as well 
as the buyer?
A. Well, the real problem in industry is to find a buyer.
Q. Is that true with the enormous amount of money seek­
ing investment as there is today?
A. Yes, it is true today, distinctly true, today.
Q. It is true?
A. I think capital is less disposed to assume hazards at this 
precise moment than it has been for a long time. When I 
say “a long time” I mean the period from 1929 down to date. 
Business is very reluctant to assume hazards.
Q. Well, business is reluctant to assume hazards?
A. What?
Q. Business is reluctant to assume hazards?
A. Capital. Capital is the word. I say, capital seeking 
investment. Capital is reluctant to assume hazards; that is 
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why there is so much surplus capital in the country that is 
not being employed.
Q. That is due to the existing depression when people 
figure there is nothing in sight; isn’t that correct?
A. Yes, they think the future holds more hazards in sight 
than it did, we will say, ten years ago.
 Q. Will not the state be reached, just how soon nobody 
knows, at which this capital now idle in enormous quantities 
will seek investment?
A. Yes, it is bound to find some sort of investment ul­
timately.
Q. And isn’t this broad proposition true, that doesn’t the 
condition of depression and the large amount of idle capital 
tend to reduce the returns which an investor can get on his 
capital?
A. That may be true on safe investments.
Q. Well, broadly, over any investment?
A. It is curious, but if you take the period of depression 
you will find that the spread between the safe return and the 
speculative return widens.
Q. Yes, but the safe investment, the absolutely safe in­
vestment—
A. Of course, there is no absolutely safe investment.
Q. But between that and the speculative investment there 
is competition in some degree?
A. Not always.
Q. In some degree?
A. In some degree.
Q. Not always, but you say there is an increasing spread 
due to various factors?
A. Yes.
Q. But they are all dollars, and all dollars are in com­
petition so far as investment goes?
A. Well, they are not necessarily in dollars.
Q. What?
A. You mean in the United States?
Q. Yes.
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A. This money that is seeking it is all dollars, yes.
Q. Now, does the relationship of consumer-ownership 
have any effect upon the hazards incident to the sale of the 
product involved in the particular transaction?
A. I think that takes us off. You can see each one of these 
questions would form the starting point for a half hour’s 
talk, I think, really, and I do not want to carry the point 
too far.
Q. I would suggest that we are talking in generalities all 
the way through here, and may we not have a general answer 
as to this tendency?
A. Well, I think myself that that brings in another ques­
tion to which I have given very considerable thought. I 
think the result of this depression is going to be a reversal of 
the trend toward integration. I think that this consumer­
ownership idea is pretty well demonstrated—I won’t say 
“demonstrated,” but I think there is a strong feeling coming 
that it has been proved to be fallacious and an unwise policy. 
As a matter of fact, I think the length and severity of the 
depression is partly due to integration of industry. On this 
question,—I do not know whether you want me to follow 
it any further or not. I want to answer your question, but 
I do not want to start a philosophical discussion,—well, what 
is your question?
Q. The question was: Does the relationship of consumer­
ownership tend to decrease the risk factor involved in mak­
ing sales of the product involved?
A. I don’t think so. To state the thing broadly, I think 
the steel companies would be better off if they did not own 
the ore properties, and had relatively less investment.
Q. Would a separate corporate ownership, the ones own­
ing the mines, be better off if they were divorced from the 
consuming steel company?.
A. I do not think so.
Q. Then I take it that the summary is that there is an 
element of risk as to price calculated by you as a hazard
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which is not reduced when the buyer of the product has a 
fixed, complete market for his product?
A. May I hear that question again?
[Question read.]
A. I didn’t make any specific calculation of hazards, and 
I assumed that the whole problem was one of valuation of 
property without relationship to its ownership. I didn’t at­
tempt to go into the effect on the value of property of its 
being owned by “A” rather than “B.”
Q. That is the way we want it gone into.
A. What?  
Q. Since we mixed theory with condition, I would sug­
gest that we mix them at that point, too.
A. Would you like me to discuss that?
Q. Yes, as to whether or not, generally speaking, where 
the relationship of consumer-ownership exists, does not that 
fact broadly and generally tend to reduce or limit, reduce 
the price hazard in respect to that property?
A. Well, in that case the price hazard is transferred to his 
ultimate product. I think the basic thing about the iron 
ore industry today is that it is the raw material of a relatively 
unprosperous industry.
Q. Mr. May, you say that the steel industry is a relatively 
unprosperous industry; do you know about what the rate of 
return on capital in the industry is?
A. Well, I base that statement partly on general knowl­
edge and partly on some figures that came to my attention 
recently as a director of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Some years ago we induced the Department of 
Commerce to accept the view that it was very desirable to get 
some figures on profits of industry, and the Department of 
Commerce took on its staff Professor Epstein and arranged 
for him to have access to the income tax returns and he got 
out a lot of figures for a fairly representative sample which 
were published as what he called a source book, and from 
that material he is preparing a book, and the manuscript was 
submitted to the directors of the National Bureau of Eco-
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nomic Research in accordance with the requirements of 
that Bureau that every manuscript shall be submitted to the 
directors before publication, and, as I recall, his figures cover 
a period of 1924 to 1928. During that period the average 
earnings of, I think it was 2,046 companies, manufacturing 
companies, which represented, as he said, nearly 50 per 
cent of the total business of the country in manufacturing, 
and those figures showed an average for the five years, 1924 
to 1928, on capitalization, including bonded capitalization 
and the profits earned before interest, of approximately 10.2 
per cent. For the same five years, by way of comparison, 
I think the United States Steel Corporation, for instance, 
showed an average of somewhere about 7 per cent.
Q. Do you know whether or not those averages would 
depart from that appreciably if they were for the period 
1920 to 1931, inclusive?
A. I have not got any figures covering the later period, 
but my impression is from such figures as were available— 
for instance, the National City Bank gets out some figures 
which are not strictly comparable to these, for, I think, about 
1,300 companies, something of that sort, and their profits, 
after interest charges (which makes it not comparable to the 
earlier ones); and as I recall it those figures were for 1929, 
1930, and 1931, and the relation of the Steel Corporation to 
the total of the group was less favorable than for the period 
from 1924 to 1928.
Q. Was that true of the other groups?
A. I said the relation. Of course, 1929 was no doubt 
better than 1928, and 1930 and 1931 were less favorable than 
the average of the five years, but the point I was making is 
that the Steel Corporation figures fell off in comparison with 
the previous period to a greater extent than the other in­
dustries.
Q. I see. Did that change of relationship, in your judg­
ment, make such difference? Did that change which you say 
for the years 1929, 1930, and 1931 make enough difference 
to discredit this figure which I quote from the magazine Steel
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to the effect that, “The weighted average 1920 to 1931 net 
profit on invested capital of the United States Steel Corpora­
tion was 5.16 per cent.”
Mr. Blu. 5.16?
Mr. Ryan. 5.16.
Mr. Hartley. What years?
Mr. Ryan. 1920 to 1931, inclusive.
A. Well, that comparison is a little bit difficult to make. 
I may not understand a part of the difference. I know a 
good deal about the Steel Corporation naturally, being the 
auditor, and in the calculation which I made the Steel Cor­
poration gradually and some time in 1928 wrote off excessive 
capitalization, or whatever you may care to call it, in an 
amount of $508,000,000. Now, I should imagine that the 
Steel magazine figures are before making an adjustment 
for that $508,000,000, whereas that capitalization of the Steel 
Corporation now being reduced by that $508,000,000, I am 
making my calculations on the reduced capitalization.
The Court. Will you read the question, Mr. Re­
porter?
The Witness. Perhaps I could restate it, if Your 
Honor would like, a little clearer. It is probably not so 
clear as it should be.
[Answer read.]
Q. What, in your judgment,—
Mr. Hartley. Has the witness finished his answer? 
He seems to be looking at some paper.
The Witness. If Your Honor would like to see the 
figure I am referring to, it shows up in the annual re­
port.
The Court. If it is important it will probably be in­
troduced in evidence.
Q. What I wanted to get at, Mr. May, was—in answer to 
this question you stated that the steel industry was an in­
dustry, as a whole, with a relatively low rate of return and I 
asked what figure you were using to express its rate of return.
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A. Well, you asked me to explain the difference between 
the two figures.
Q. Yes, this is another question.
Mr. Blu. Just read it to him, Mr. La Baw, please. 
[Question read.]
A. The first figure I had.in mind was that 7 per cent for 
the steel industry, as illustrated by the Steel Corporation, 
was relatively low.
Q. The figure that you have mentioned as being rela­
tively low is 7 per cent?
A. Yes, under normal conditions.
Q. Yes.
A. I don’t mean under depression conditions. We have 
always got to be clear, I think, whether we are talking about 
today’s conditions or normal conditions.
Mr. Blu. Is that for the period you stated, Mr. May? 
The Witness. The 7 per cent is what you might call 
fairly normal, perhaps a little high, for the period from 
1924 to 1928. It leaves out the recent peak of 1929 and 
leaves out the depression years.
Q. And the rate to be arrived at varies with whether or 
not you let the statement of capitalization stand at one figure 
or whether you write it off and use another figure?
A. Yes. Oh, of course it does.
Q. On what theory or basis was this $508,000,000, if that 
is the figure,—
The Court. That is right, Mr. Ryan.
Q. $508,000,000 written off?
A. Well, the report describes it in these words: “From 
this surplus there has been appropriated to amortize costs to 
the United States Steel Corporation of stocks of subsidiary 
companies in excess of their investment in tangible prop­
erty.”
Mr. Blu. What report, Mr. May?
The Witness. Well, this is in any report. I have 
before me the report for December, 1931, page 20.
Mr. Blu. Of the United States Steel Corporation?
STATE OF MINNESOTA v. REPUBLIC STEEL 27
The Witness. Of the United States Steel Corpora­
tion.
Q. What does that mean in language that is understand­
able to a person like me, for instance?
A. Well, I think probably it is intelligible to you as it 
stands, but what it really means is that the Steel Corporation 
paid more for the subsidiaries than the value of the tangible 
property those subsidiaries had, and until these entries had 
been made, that excess was a part of the capitalization of the 
Steel Corporation. They have now eliminated that amount 
from their capitalization so that their capitalization now is 
based on tangible assets of the corporation without any ad­
dition for the excess price paid by the Steel Corporation for 
the stocks of the subsidiary companies, shares of the subsidi­
ary companies which represent those assets.
Q. Does that report indicate that they have now written 
off all those excess values?
A. The language implies that.
The Court. What did it leave the capitalization of 
the United States Steel Corporation at the present time, 
Mr. May?
The Witness. You mean the total invested capital? 
The Court. What they carry.
The Witness. When I say “invested capital,” it is, 
of course, the capital stock, the bonds and the surplus. 
That amounts now, I think, to,—I can tell you, some­
thing over two billion dollars.
The Court. What is the capital stock?
The Witness. The capital stock is $868,000,000 of 
common and $360,000,000 of preferred, as I recall.
Mr. Ryan. I want to say I have not had an oppor­
tunity to look at this but I have no doubt counsel will 
be willing to have the report in evidence.
Mr. Blu. Yes.
Mr. Ryan. Then we will offer that in evidence.
Mr. Blu. You mean the whole report in evidence? 
Mr. Ryan. Yes.
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Mr. Blu. I thought you meant that statement that 
he was testifying about. I do not think that whole 
report of the United States Steel Corporation for any 
year, Your Honor, bears on the value of iron ore prop­
erty in Minnesota on May 1, 1932.
Mr. Ryan. Of course, I would not want to make it 
a part of the record that subsequently would have to be 
printed, but I would like to offer it in evidence, with 
the view and privilege of referring to any part of it that 
might be material and having the Court, in a sense, 
take judicial notice of it.
Mr. Blu. Well, I don’t believe that is something the 
Court would take judicial notice of.
Mr. Ryan. It will not take judicial notice of it, but 
I suggest, to avoid encumbering the record, that it be 
admitted in evidence for counsel on either side to refer 
to any part of it which they may deem relevant to the 
issues in this case.
Mr. Blu. We want to object to that, Your Honor. 
We have no objection to cross examination of this wit­
ness on the part of the report that is brought out here 
on cross examination. Counsel can develop anything 
further along the line he is talking about without having 
that whole report in evidence.
The Court. The evidence of the witness, and other 
witnesses have been produced for the same purpose, has 
gone along the line of profit to be made on investment. 
I suppose in cross examination anything in the report 
that bears on that question may be put in evidence.
Mr. Blu. Well, what part of the report do you think 
is material?
Mr. Ryan. I don’t know.
Mr. Blu. I think it should be developed by cross 
examination.
Mr. Ryan. I am offering it with a view that we may 
refer to any part of it which may seem to us to be 
material, with the like privilege on your part.
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The Court. Well, of course, without knowing what 
is in the document, if the whole exhibit were received 
some of it might not be pertinent to any point in the 
case.
Mr. Blu. That is my point.
The Court. I take it you may go through it. later, 
Mr. Ryan, when you have time, and re-offer the part 
that you wish to have introduced.
Mr. Ryan. That is perfectly satisfactory. The point 
is we cannot stop now and go through this report.
The Court. No; the offer may be made later when 
you are advised as to what part you want to offer.
Q. Do you know at what rate of interest the steel in­
dustry, as represented by the companies of the steel industry, 
can borrow money in normal times?
A. No, I could not answer that question. I do not think, 
generally speaking, that steel companies are current bor­
rowers. They make bond issues from time to time. They 
are not currently in the borrowing market.
Q. Do you regard selling and issuing bonds as borrowing 
money?
A. Yes, but those are special transactions; we should as­
semble the transactions and try to get an average on it. I 
could not offhand give an answer to the question.
Q. Could you give us a percentage rate which would 
fairly indicate the rate at which the United States Steel Com­
pany can borrow money through the sale of bonds?
A. I don’t think the United States Steel Corporation has 
sold any bonds for a long, long time.
Q. Have they paid off bonds recently?
A. They have paid off bonds, yes.
Q. Do you know what rate of interest those bonds bore?
A. I think most of them were 5 per cent bonds, but I 
don’t think most of them were sold. They were issued 
originally as a part of the consideration, a great part of 
them, I believe.
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Q. Do you know whether or not any of the steel com­
panies have recently issued bonds or paid off bonds?
A. I do not recall any specific figures at the moment.
Q. Is it your impression that all of the bonds which have 
been paid for by the steel companies represent bonds issued 
in purchase of property?
A. Not all of them, perhaps. I think, as I remember, 
there was an issue of bonds by the Steel Corporation early in 
its career, about 1903 or ’04, something of that sort, but I 
don’t recall. I would not undertake to say, without refresh­
ing my memory, what happened.
Q. How long have you been auditor for the United 
States Steel Corporation?
A. Ever since it was formed.
Q. From your knowledge of the affairs of that company 
can you express an opinion at what rate the company can 
borrow money?
A. I would not undertake to express an opinion without 
giving serious thought to it. It depends to some extent on 
the amount of money. I mean, if they wanted to borrow, 
say, up to half their investment in the property, that would 
be one rate; if they wanted to borrow up to 25 per cent that 
would be another rate; if they wanted to borrow up to 75 per 
cent that would be another, if they could do it at all.
Q. You haven’t an opinion as to what any of those rates 
would be?
A. I would not offhand say.
Mr. Blu. Do you mean at the present time, Mr. 
Ryan, or what period?
Mr. Ryan. Any time.
Mr. Blu. Any time back to 1902?
Mr. Ryan. Any time in normal conditions.
The Witness. That involves too many uncertainties 
for me to express an opinion.
Q. I have assumed that a problem of that kind involved 
a great many uncertainties. Any values you might put on an 
ore body would involve a great many uncertainties.
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A. You asked me how much,—at what rate the corpora­
tion could borrow, without any indication as to time or 
amount or terms, the length of the loan or anything. That 
is entirely a speculative proposition.
Q. I suggest you supply your own qualifications and give 
us figures with any qualifications you choose to add to them.
A. For instance, if I say that the Steel Corporation might 
have borrowed money in 1924, we will say, you get a dif­
ferent factor in ’24; and ’29 and ’34, you get quite different 
factors.
Q. Let us say normal?
A. What is normal?
Q. What forms the basis for the calculation which you 
have in mind, just individual judgment?
A. No; my judgment as to how investors feel about these 
things, and what they know. It isn’t an attempt to deter­
mine what investors ought to think; but what I think is the 
practical problem of inducing an investor to invest.
Q. You assume, I take it, you expect an investor will 
want a rate of return,—the investor in an iron mine will 
want a rate of return reflected in a 10 and 4 combination 
of interest, meaning a 10 per cent return on his investment 
after the payment of all forms of taxes, including his income 
tax; is that right?
A. I didn’t say a 10 and 4, if I remember rightly. I said 
if you used a rate lower than 10 you would put a sinking 
fund, you would combine a sinking fund method with it. 
I am just correcting the statement of my position, in your 
question, in that answer. I said, if you went below 10, for 
instance to 8 per cent—if an investor considered 8 per cent 
he would want a sinking fund tacked onto it. But I said 
if you got 10 or over you might get him to take it on a 
straight basis.
Q. A straight rate of 10 per cent?
A. Yes, without the sinking fund, which you get up to 
that.
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Q. Isn’t it a fact that your sinking fund—don’t you in that 
calculation increase your rate of return as compared with 
any rate lower than the one you used for a sinking fund?
A. I did not contemplate a sinking fund in connection 
with the 10 per cent at all.
Q. You just took it Straight 10 per cent return?
A. Straight 10 per cent return; but if you went below 
10, then I would say at least you would have to give the 
investor the benefit of the sinking fund accompanied with 
any lower rate; for instance, I said 8 and 4; that is the rate 
that the Bureau of Internal Revenue uses.
Q. Which would give you the higher rate of return on 
your investment, a straight 10 or a 10 and 4?
The Court (Judge Freeman). Eight and four? 
Mr. Ryan. No; a straight 10 or a 10 and 4.
A. If all your expectations worked out, 10 and 4 would 
give you the higher rate. You would get more money out 
of it in the end that way.
Q. The sinking fund factor is a charge against the in­
vestor, isn’t it?
A. What?
Q. The sinking fund factor is a charge against the in­
vestor, isn’t it?
A. Yes, but the straight 10 per cent method implies a 
charge against the investor, 10 per cent on what he is getting
back.
Q. You mean 10 and 10?
A. Ten and ten.
Q. Using the same term?
A. Yes.
Q. In that computation there?
A. Yes.
Q. You say reduced; you would not reduce correspond­
ingly the two rates if you want, say, an 8 per cent investment 
return; you would not think an 8 per cent sinking fund rate 
would be proper?
A. As I say, I think the investor takes a more pragmatic
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and simple view of the situation than that. Let me illus­
trate that. Perhaps this will illustrate it. This is the way 
I visualize the investor looking at it. Let’s suppose a simple 
case that is fairly analogous to this case, reduced to simpler 
terms rather than complicated figures. Suppose the investor 
were asked to buy a mine that was supposed to contain 40 
million tons that could be mined a million tons a year, with 
a dollar a ton profit; that makes it a nice simple calculation. 
Now an engineer recommends that, we will say, as a good 
purchase, on a straight 8 per cent basis, 8 and 8 as you call it. 
That means he would ask him to pay $11,921,000 for that 
property. The way the business man looks at it is, “Well, 
how am I going to get that investment back?. On an 8 per 
cent basis, if the mine were to last forever it would be worth 
only $12,500,000. So all you are going to give me towards 
getting back my capital at that amount in addition to the 8 
per cent return is 8 per cent on $579,000 a year.” Now, that 
isn’t good enough. That is really the way they do things. 
That is the way the Internal Revenue Bureau figures it. I 
got this wrong, I think, perhaps. I have got some tables 
here that I worked out that will show it. Here is one 
worked on the 7½ per cent basis, which is what I under­
stand usually the State Tax Commission has used on the 
40-year life. That gives a cost of roughly $12,450,000. Now, 
if that is going to be mined with equal tonnage, the 40 
millions, that represents 31 cents a ton. So that the first 
year the man gets a million dollars. He gets a million 
dollars; he sets aside $328,000. The way it is computed 
for depletion on the straight loan basis he carries $671,000 
to his income account; that gives him an immediate profit 
of 5.57 per tent. That is the way it works out in practice. 
The way the investor looks at it is that it isn’t until 20 years 
have elapsed that he has got an average rate of 8 per cent 
on the money that he has had invested in the property. 
Now, investors take a view of investments something like 
that the insurance companies take of lives. You can foresee 
something for the future, but the farther ahead you attempt
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to see, the less clearly can you anticipate what is going to 
happen. Therefore, what sways the investor largely is the 
amount he is going to get in the first few years. Certainly in 
the case of a 40-year life what he is going to get in the first 
20 years of the life is the thing that is vitally important to 
him.
Q. That would be the dominating thought of the ordi­
nary investor, the mythical investor?
A. I just take that because that is the way the Internal 
Revenue Bureau figures his income, and through that that 
has become a very customary way of looking at it.
Q. Suppose this mythical investor, bringing it down some­
what nearer to earth—supposing the mythical investor has 
an enormous investment in steel plant, the value of which 
would wholly disappear if his mines were exhausted: Would 
the factor of extended future realization of his return weigh 
against his disposition to acquire a property with long life?
A. Well, I should say that is perhaps the most important 
result of the depression, that the delusion which lies at the 
basis of your question has been shattered. This idea of the 
necessity of manufacturing companies’ owning their own re­
serves of raw materials for indefinite periods in the future 
is what has made a great many industries unprosperous and 
they are now, I think—I don’t refer solely to the steel in­
dustry-recognizing the folly of it and trying to get them­
selves out of a position where they are what we used to call 
“land poor.”
Q. Am I right in saying that that conjecture is based 
upon the theory that reserves which carry longer than ap­
proximately 40 years in the future are of no value and 
should not be bought?
A. Well,. I think corporations largely are coming to 
realize that the attempt to supply their needs even for 40 
years in the future is a mistaken policy, that they would be 
better off to have reasonably short reserves and rely on the 
general market, because what they save on carrying the in-
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vestment in those properties would compensate them for any 
likely rises in prices.
Q. But your answer in that respect is influenced by your 
judgment that the past policies of the steel owners has been 
a mistaken one?
A. Oh, no, I wouldn’t assume that far. It is based on my 
reading of the trend of opinion, not only in the steel in­
dustry but in other industries. I think there is no doubt—I 
don’t mean only business men—but we have discussed this 
in purely academic discussions with the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, and there is a very interesting publica­
tion by Dr. Mills of the staff of that organization in which he 
expressed the opinion that one of the main contributing 
factors, or one of the important contributing factors, I should 
say, to the severity and the length of the present depression 
was that through this system of integration and labor-saving 
machinery so large a part of the cost of goods had come to 
be represented by money that was already spent anyhow. So 
that people were willing to sell at uneconomic prices if they 
could get back their new costs plus something towards the 
money they had already spent; and that, I think, as a result 
of all the discussions with the economists and others that I 
had, is one of the central facts of the present situation; and 
I think it has brought about a general reconsideration of this 
whole policy of large reserve for indefinite periods in the 
future and the attempt to keep anybody else from owning 
potential sources of raw material and all that sort of thing, 
and it is not limited to the steel industry.
Q. In part, at any rate, your views as they bear upon this 
case are influenced by your belief that the practice in the 
future, at least, will be different from what it has been in 
the past as respects the acquisition of ore reserves?
A. Yes, with the addition that my belief is based, not just 
on a process of reasoning, but based on knowledge of the 
trend of thought which I get in my business and other con­
tacts.
Q. It is true, is it not, that considering what the buyer 
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would pay and the seller would sell for—mythical people— 
that there is more or less of a problem to find buyers—that 
the pressure is to sell rather than to buy—is that right?
A. Yes. Selling is regarded as the difficult end of the 
job, usually.
Q. Doesn’t that relative position between buyer and seller 
change from time to time?
A. You mean in regard to the usual property invest­
ments? Of course, it changes to some extent, but a buyer’s 
market, broadly speaking, in commodities, is more common. 
The selling problem is harder more of the time, you see. 
That is why salesmen get more than purchasing agents.
Q. That is true as to the specific transactions, but gen­
erally speaking doesn’t that relative position of buyer and 
seller change with the general economic changes?
A. Yes, undoubtedly.
Q. So that in one year you will have a buyer’s market 
and another year you will have a seller’s market?
A. Yes.
Q. Pressure to buy will operate in one year and pressure 
to sell in another?
A. Yes. It would, I think, be more accurately stated that 
the pressure to buy will operate in one year and the pressure 
to sell will operate in n years, n being greater than unity.
Q. The depression indicates that. Aren’t our views 
somewhat darkly colored by the recent few years?
A. No; I think that merely leads us to attribute a higher 
value to n, if I may put it that way.
Q. You say that a buyer will not acquire—normally—ore 
properties unless he can get a rate of return of 10 per cent 
after all his taxes connected with the investment, his income 
in all respects, are paid. Would you say that it is also true 
that a seller would be willing to dispose of his property at 
a price which would give the buyer a 10 per cent return on 
his investment after paying all taxes?
A. I don’t recall that I said that a buyer expected a return 
of 10 per cent after all his taxes.
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Q. What is your statement?
A. I said that the existence of taxes led him to expect a 
return of 10. I am not deducting his personal income 
taxes—oh, no.
Q. What?
A. I am not contemplating deducting his personal income 
taxes in arriving at the sum to be capitalized at 10 per cent.
Q. Your calculation does not involve, the payment of the 
Federal income tax in addition to that return?
A. Not to the individual, no, if you are still talking of an 
individual.
Q. May I state the question this way: Is it true that the 
vendor, the seller, will be willing to sell to a buyer at such 
a price as will enable the buyer to make 10 per cent net 
return on his investment after paying all the taxes assessed 
upon the property in which the investment is made?
A. All the taxes?
Q. Assessed upon the property in which the investment 
is made.
A. All those taxes and any other taxes that are incidental 
to carrying on the business, differentiating from the taxes 
which apply to the individual purchaser.
Q. Then, as opposed to excluding income taxes, you in­
clude all other taxes?
A. Yes, I would include among the deductions from the 
gross income all other taxes.
Q. And you would think that ordinarily a seller would 
be willing to dispose of his property at such a price as would 
give to the buyer a net return of 10 per cent on this class of 
property over and above the taxes on that property?
A. An expectation of 10 per cent; not an assurance of 10 
per cent. That is the whole question, the difference be­
tween expectation and realization.
Take the steel industry: An addition to a steel plant is 
contemplated. No executive, as a rule, will authorize the 
expenditure unless an engineers’ report shows that it may 
be expected to produce a saving or a gain equal to 15 to 20 
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or more per cent on the expenditure. That is because ex­
pectation and realization are two different things, and gen­
erally speaking, from the variety of circumstances, realiza­
tion falls short of expectation.
Q. In other words, these engineers employed by the steel 
company guess that badly?
A. Not only by the steel corporation but all industry, 
because conditions change in the situation from day to day. 
You take an illustration: People spent money in 1929, ex­
pecting it to produce a certain return. They ran into a 
period of depression, during which their sales were small, 
which has lasted for five years. During those five years im­
portant new inventions in the field are developed so that if 
they were making the expenditure today they would buy 
something entirely different from what they bought in 1929; 
yet, because of the depression, they have got little or no re­
turn out of that expenditure between 1929 and today. 
Those are the things that bring about a difference between 
expectation and realization.
Q. And have the engineers so badly miscalculated those 
factors that when they suggest that a property can be pur­
chased at a 10 per cent return the ordinary business man 
says that they are normally wrong, so that they won’t pur­
chase unless the engineers’ estimate runs up to what—30 per 
cent?
A. In plant extensions, I think 15 to 20 per cent is what 
they figure on. Of course, that is more hazardous than an 
investment in iron mines because you may not make, as I 
say and as I showed in my illustration, your expenditure at 
the right time.
Q. Of course, in plant extension or any other expansion 
your engineer will at least attempt to calculate obsolescence, 
depreciation, and the like, will he not?
A. Yes, but this return would be over and above that.
Q. But I take it that your opinion is based upon knowl­
edge of the facts that the ordinary level-headed person deal­
ing with that problem, whether he will make that expendi-
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ture or not, will act upon the opinion that the engineer is 
so far wrong that he won’t act upon an estimate of the 
engineer but will change his calculation to the extent of 
doubling their return factor?
A. Well, he expects more than 10 per cent net, of course, 
so it is not a question of doubling but of business men dis­
counting engineers’ estimates. There is no doubt about 
that, and it is not only in business. I remember when I 
was in Washington during the war—perhaps this is not rele­
vant—the Vice-Chairman of the War Industries Board at­
tributed the failure to make proper progress in one of the 
important departments to the fact that it was run by en­
gineers who didn’t figure on the difficulties which every  
business man allowed for after he got his engineering es­
timates.
Q. Do you know whether in the books of the Steel Corpo­
ration or in any of their reports there is set up the value of 
their ore reserves?
A. I don’t think it has ever been set up in the reports and 
I couldn’t answer as to the books. I imagine naturally the 
books of the iron mines must show some investment figure, 
but I don’t imagine it represents the present value. It is 
probably some historical figure.
Q. Is there nowhere in their books a showing as to what 
their ore reserves consist of?
A. There must be in their records somewhere.
Q. Their records show what they consist of but you be­
lieve they do not set up any valuation upon them?
A. Ordinary accounting does not call for valuation of 
assets on the books of a corporation. They are carried at 
what they cost less amortization to write them off. That 
is the normal way. There may be adjustments from time 
to time but there is no attempt to reflect the value from 
year to year by changes in the figures which they carry on 
the books in any business.
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Blu:
Q. Mr. May, in answer to some question by Mr. Ryan, 
you stated that social hazards were tending or tended to in­
crease. Can you give an illustration of what you meant by 
that?
A. Well, I would say that a good illustration is the tax 
hazard in Minnesota. For instance, if we put ourselves back 
in the position of anyone making an analytical appraisal in­
say, 1905—he would figure taxes on the basis of the amount 
then being paid in the State of Minnesota. He would not 
look for the fact that in 1907 a new system of taxation would 
be initiated under which assessments of mineral property 
would be substantially increased. Again, if he were doing 
it in 1911 or 1912—and I had occasion to look into it at that 
time—he would have made his calculations on the basis of 
the taxes being paid in the period of, say, 1907 to 1911, dur­
ing which substantial increase over the earlier periods had 
arisen, but he would not have allowed for the enormous 
increase in public .expenditures that would occur in the 
next ten or twelve years and the enormous increase in taxes. 
As I recall the figures, roughly, local taxes from 1907 to 
1911—about that period—absorbed from about 12 to 15 per 
cent of the earnings of ore mines, as I remember the figures 
which I then used; and in the last five years I think, judging 
from the Commission’s report, they must have averaged 
nearer 40 per cent of the earnings for local taxes. That was 
one of the things I had in mind in talking of social hazards, 
because that is one of the results of social changes.
And it has always seemed to me that the ore industry is 
in an adverse position by reason of the fact that it is neces­
sary to send the ore out of the State in order to convert it, 
so that the operations and the ultimate conversion are car­
ried out in different tax jurisdictions. If nature had only 
been kind enough to do for Minnesota what it did for 
Alabama, and had deposited coal and limestone so that the 
iron could have been manufactured within the State of
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Minnesota, I think that the tax hazard would have been 
reduced as the interest of the State would have been in the 
whole steel industry, whereas, as it is, the State’s interest is 
limited to the ore end of the business.
Q. I was not quite sure as to what your answers were to 
some other questions relative to deduction of Federal in­
come taxes; is it your opinion, Mr. May, that Federal in­
come taxes should not be deducted at all in computing costs?
A. Well, that is a question over which there is a good 
deal of discussion. I have discussed that, very often, with 
Professor Adams.
Q. Who is Professor Adams?
A. He was formerly of the Wisconsin State Tax Com­
mission, and, subsequently, professor at Yale, and principal 
advisor of Congress on taxation for a great many years. Dis­
cussions of the effect of income taxes and the proper treat­
ment of them—that question came up many times. I think 
there is a variation of opinion among the tax experts; but 
I think my views and Professor Adams’ are the same. To 
the extent that any tax is a true income tax you should not 
treat it as a cost in calculation. That would cover the 
English income tax which, if it is imposed on the corpora­
tion in the first instance, is deducted by the corporation from 
anything that is paid out—rents, dividends, or anything of 
that kind. But, as I look at the question, the corporation 
income tax is not a true income tax. It is something of a 
hybrid; to the extent of the amount of normal tax of indi­
viduals it is a true income tax, because if a corporation pays 
that tax and then pays the dividend, the taxpayer gets cor­
responding relief; and, personally, I would not treat that 
part of the income tax as a cost, although some people might.
As regards the balance, it is not a true income tax. It is 
merely an excise tax for the privilege of carrying on business 
as a corporation, and as such it is a part of the cost of doing 
business.
Q. Mr. Ryan attempted to show that if the property ac­
count of the United States Steel Corporation was overstated,
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that the rate of return would or should have been lower. 
Have you any reason to believe that the property account 
of the Steel Corporation is overstated, or is in excess of the 
true valuation?
A. No, I don’t think there is any—I should say what gen­
eral test you can apply rather indicates the contrary.
Q. Now, it seemed to me by reason of some of Mr. Ryan’s 
questions that there was some confusion over the rate of 
return of bonds issued against a Mesabi Range iron ore 
property, and the rate of return that would be expected on 
the iron mining business. What is the distinction between 
those two things, Mr. May?
A. The distinction is that obviously the hazard of the 
person who takes a charge on the business is less substantial 
—less than that of a man who takes the whole risk of the 
business. In rate cases, for instance, there is a very sub­
stantial spread between the rate that is regarded by the regu­
lating body as appropriate to the investment as a whole, or 
the business as a whole, and the rate at which the utility can 
sell its bonds. For instance, as I recall, your Commission 
here in Minnesota has fixed 7½per cent as a rate for some 
utilities. That is not based on the assumption that utilities 
can sell their bonds only at 7½ per cent.
Q. Now, you mentioned public utilities; are you familiar 
with the rate of return of public utilities, generally?
A. No, I would not say that; I have studied the decisions 
as to reasonable rate of return.
Q. Having made such study, what do you consider a rea­
sonable rate of return for a public utility company?
A. I don’t think you can say on public utilities. They 
vary to some extent—the location and the nature of the 
business, and so on. For instance, in Minnesota I think 7½ 
per cent is allowed, and I suppose that is representative of 
conditions in public utilities in Minnesota.
Q. Well, what, generally, are the conditions as far as the 
public utility is concerned, compared with the conditions
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surrounding the mining of an iron ore property in Minne­
sota?
A. Regulation and a certain measure of protection go 
hand in hand, and it is the modern theory of regulation of 
utility corporations that they are protected against unrea­
sonable competition, and on that basis the return that they 
can receive is restricted so that the rate should tend to be 
lower than in an industry that is not similarly protected 
from competition.
Q. Then, as I understand it from your last statement, 
you would consider the rate of return should be higher for 
iron ore property than for a utility company?
A. Certainly.
Q. For the reasons you have just stated?
A. Yes.
Q. This morning, I think you were attempting to make 
some comparison between a return of capital on a straight 
rate and a combination risk rate and sinking fund rate when 
you were interrupted with some question: I would like to 
have you go into that a little further and explain just what 
you were trying to show at that time?
A. Well, what I was starting out to discuss was the point 
of view of the ordinary business man toward the engineer­
ing calculations and other methods of approach to the ques­
tion, and I was starting to take the illustrative case of an 
investment in a mine that is going to produce 1,000,000 tons 
a year, for 40 years. If an investor bought the mine on 
a 7½ per cent basis, that is 7½ and 7½, he would pay 
$12,594,000 for it. Now, the first year his receipts would 
be $1,000,000. The business man says: “Well, now, if I am 
expecting a 7½ per cent return, 7½ per cent on what I 
invested, it will absorb $944,550. That really leaves me 
$55,000 to set aside towards replacing my capital.” The 
engineer replies: “That is true; but if you invest the $55,000 
at 7½ per cent you will get your money back at the end of 
40 years.”
Q. Seven and one-half per cent or four per cent?
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A. It is the 7½ and 7½. So the business man says: 
“I am not going to take the chance. I am not going to take 
the chance that I am going to be able to invest money at 7½ 
per cent, compound interest, continuously, for the next 
40 years; 1 can see a few years into the future, I think, but 
I cannot see 40 years and I am not going to make a purchase 
that is dependent almost entirely, for the return of my money, 
on my being able to get 7½ per cent compound interest 
30 or 40 years hence.” Now, let me look at it my way: that 
is the income tax way—what I would have to pay income 
tax on—if I pay $12,594,000 for that mine, my depletion 
charge for the first year will be 1/40 of that amount, which 
is $314,000. If I deduct that from my million dollars, all 
I haye got left for interest is $685,000, which is less than 5½ 
per cent on my money. And the engineer says, “Oh, yes, 
but you will make that up through compound interest be­
tween 30 and 40 years hence.” And he says, “Nothing 
doing.” That is the position in regard to the method, as 
I see it. Now, I have made some calculations comparing 
different methods, and they show this: that if you assume 
4 per cent sinking fund at the end of, say, 32 years, 80 per 
cent of the ore will have been mined, assuming equal pro­
portions over 40 years; if you deduct your sinking fund from 
your investment, you will still have a net investment of 34 
per cent on your original investment, as against 20 per cent 
on the ore still to be mined. If you buy on the 7½ per 
cent and 7½ per cent basis at the same date, you will still 
have 20 per cent of your ore to mine, but you will have 46 
per cent of your investment still to get back. Now, business 
men are not going to take chances on what is going to hap­
pen 30 or 40 years hence, to that extent, and that is why, 
when you get down below a rate of 10 to a rate of 8 or 7 
or 6 per cent, you have got to attach to it a sinking fund 
provision that won’t make the investor depend upon getting 
a return of 7½ per cent or 8 per cent or whatever it is on 
the reinvestment of what money is returned on his capital. 
And, of course, when he says, “I expect a rate; I won’t buy,
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unless I can see an expectation of a certain rate,” what is 
in his mind if he does not say it in so many words is what 
I said this morning—if I buy a more or less hazardous in­
vestment on the reasonable chance of getting more than the 
safe rate, I know that I shall not get that excess in every 
case; but if I am reasonably clever in making my selection, 
and reasonably prudent in changing my investments from 
time to time, I may be able on an average to get 6 per cent 
instead of getting 4 per cent, on a safe investment, assuming 
that I start out with something that seems to hold a fair 
prospect of producing 8 per cent. That is what is really in 
the mind of the investor, so if you say that because he ex­
pects a prospect of 8 per cent it is reasonable to assume that 
he can reinvest his return of capital so as to produce 8 per 
cent, you are going contrary to the whole basic assumption 
upon which the action is based. I think what I have said 
would be made clearer by some tables which could easily be 
prepared.
Q. You have not prepared any such tables?
A. I have not got them. I am sure it is difficult for any­
one to follow the argument without tables.
Q. You stated this morning that profits, in your opinion, 
were likely to be reduced in the basic industries in the fu­
ture. Now, if that is true, what effect would that have upon 
the rate of return which capital would and should demand 
to cover the risks involved?
A. It won’t mean that the rate of return sought by an 
investor will be reduced. It means that the capital value 
of the industry will diminish,

PART IV
REGULATION OF SECURITIES

I
MEMORANDUM REGARDING SECURITIES BILL— 
H R 4314
(1933)
I am in favor of a substantial extension through the medium 
of a Federal statute of the protection afforded to investors 
in securities. I, however, recognize great practical difficulties 
and I am not disposed to rate too highly the results that will 
be immediately attained.
It is in the general social interest that new enterprises 
should be undertaken and it is not, therefore, in the public 
interest to make the provision of capital for such new en­
terprises unduly difficult.
It is an inevitable result of competition and the progress 
of invention that many enterprises new and old should be­
come unsuccessful. Indeed, if an attempt were made to 
preserve the values of enterprises whose products have been 
superseded and at the same time the new and superseding 
enterprises were earning a fair return, the result would be 
that the burden on the fruits of industry of the contribu­
tion paid to those whose claims rest on past savings and in­
vestment would become greater than the community would 
be willing to bear. For either the total burden on con­
sumers would become too great or the share of the fruits 
left for those making a current contribution to production 
in the form of labor, etc., would become inadequate.
The Congress must face the fact that a substantial per­
centage of industrial investment will in any event be lost. 
This seems to me (1) to make it the more incumbent on 
the Congress to see that investors have the opportunity to 
make their investments on the basis of reasonable informa­
tion, but at the same time (2) to make it in the highest 
degree undesirable for the Congress to assume the responsi­
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bility of requiring any governmental agency to decide either 
what is the true value of any investment security or even 
that the information available to the investor is all that is 
necessary to enable him to make a wise decision.
Indeed, while it is desirable that such protection as is 
practicable shall be given to those who invest in securities 
whose value is dependent on the profits earned by the maker 
thereof, it is in my judgment even more important to fa­
cilitate and encourage investment of small savings in gov­
ernment securities and other forms of holdings fraught with 
less risks and requiring less financial knowledge and less 
constant watchfulness than are necessary to even moderately 
successful commercial investments.
As I have indicated, I do not think the immediate prac­
tical results of the proposed legislation will be very con­
siderable. A large proportion of the buyers of industrial 
securities are not investors, though they may think they are. 
They are not greatly swayed by the information given them, 
but are, I think, more generally influenced either by sales­
manship or by general reputation either of the maker of the 
security or of the banking house issuing it. I am, however, 
hopeful that gradually the dissemination of better informa­
tion will bring about an improvement in investment prac­
tice.
The problems to be solved in formulating legislation seem 
to me to be:
First, to determine the scope of the legislation;
Second, so to define the liability of directors and others 
as to impose penalties for fraud or culpable negligence with­
out making the burdens so heavy that responsible persons 
will refuse to assume them and the business will pass into 
the hands of less responsible persons;
Third, to formulate requirements for proper disclosure 
by distributors of securities in respect of their compensation 
for and interests in the issue;
Fourth, to devise adequate but not unduly burdensome 
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provisions for the disclosure of information relative to en­
terprises upon which securities are based.
With regard to the scope of legislation, I strongly favor 
limiting it, at least in the first instance, to original offerings 
of securities, though I see no objection to including in the 
provisions regarding such new securities requirements for 
proper periodical reports subsequent to the issue. I believe 
that the Act should contain exemptions so as to exclude 
from it transactions which are not offerings to the public. 
Such exemptions require very careful study and I do not 
feel that I have any special competence for recommending 
what they should be.
The formulation of provisions which will impose proper 
penalties on directors and others responsible for an issue 
without deterring responsible persons from accepting di­
rectorships is a delicate one. It seems to me to be clear that 
provisions such as those contained in the original House 
Bill under which directors would be responsible for errors 
in statements of fact of which they had no knowledge nor 
any reasonable means of knowledge would defeat the ulti­
mate purpose of the law.
The problem of proper disclosure of interest does not seem 
to offer very great difficulty, but this, again, is a feature in 
regard to which I do not feel competent to make specific 
suggestions.
The disclosure of information is a problem, however, 
which presents very great practical difficulties. Among the 
most important information is that which is of an account­
ing nature, and it is particularly with this branch of the 
question that I feel my experience gives me some qualifica­
tion to express opinions as to what is essential and prac­
ticable and what is not.
The first difficulty that I see in the problem of formulat­
ing requirements for information is the impossibility of de­
termining what facts are most essential in each case. The 
second is, that much which is loosely regarded as matters 
of fact is in reality matters of opinion. The third is, that 
52 REGULATION OF SECURITIES
the inferences drawn from facts and the opinions based on 
them are usually more important than the bare facts them­
selves.
In so far as accounting information is concerned, it seems 
to me fundamentally important to recognize that the ac­
counts of a modern business are not entirely statements of 
fact, but are, to a large extent, expressions of opinion based 
partly on accounting conventions, partly on assumptions, 
explicit or implicit, and partly on judgment. As an English 
judge said many years ago when business was far less com­
plex than it is today, “The ascertainment of profit is in 
every case necessarily a matter of estimate and opinion.”
The most vitally important single factor in the value of 
a business enterprise is usually its future earning capacity. 
Such earning capacity may be estimated if someone is will­
ing to prophesy, but usually the experience of the past is 
accepted as the best guide. What income is to be attributed 
to an accounting period of the past depends partly on ac­
counting methods and partly on estimates. There is no 
escape from the use of conventions, because the income at­
tributed to any period is not the fruit solely of actions and 
transactions within that period, but is affected by actions 
and transactions of the period prior thereto and the proba­
bilities in respect of transactions in later periods. It is 
equally clear that estimates must be made and that they 
may prove incorrect even though made in the best of faith 
by the most competent persons. For instance, in order to 
arrive at the income for a given year it is necessary to esti­
mate how long machinery in use will last and to place a 
value on unsold merchandise. But machinery capable of 
use for years may be rendered obsolete by new inventions 
perfected by others, the sale price of merchandise may be 
suddenly and vitally affected by, for example, a change in 
fashion, a revision of tariffs, development of cheaper meth­
ods of production, excessive production, distress selling by 
others.
I would, therefore, stress the paramount importance of 
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avoiding in the law anything likely to perpetuate the com­
mon misunderstanding that balance sheets and income ac­
counts are statements of fact, and of doing whatever is pos­
sible to bring home to the investor that in formulating all 
such accounts conventions and opinions necessarily play an 
important part, and that their value depends on the compe­
tence and integrity of those exercising the necessary judg­
ment. To this end, I should like to see either in the report 
accompanying the Bill or in the Bill -itself a declaration of 
the purpose of the Bill in so far as accounts are concerned 
which should be to insure: (1) that, in balance sheets,, the 
assets and liabilities shall be fairly classified; that the bases * 
on which the values are determined at which the assets are 
carried shall be fairly disclosed, and that a responsible person 
or persons shall have expressed an informed opinion that 
the balance sheet is fairly presented on the bases indicated 
and in accordance with acceptable accounting practice; and
(2) that any statement of income shall be so framed, as in 
the opinion of competent and responsible persons, to con­
stitute the best reflection reasonably obtainable of the earn­
ing capacity of the business under the conditions existing 
during the period to which it relates.
Since past earnings are significant to the investor only in 
so far as they are a guide to the future, it is desirable to do 
what can be done to safeguard the investor against state­
ments of past earnings being put forward as evidence of the 
value of a security, unless those putting them forward dis­
close all knowledge which they may have of changes of con­
ditions which have already taken place that would make 
such past earnings wholly unreliable as a guide to the pros­
pective future earnings. It is perhaps impossible to pro­
vide complete safeguards on this point, but I believe that 
something can be done in this direction.
The accounting information which should be required 
by the statute should, I suggest, include:
* E.g., cost, reproduction cost less depreciation, estimated going concern 
value, cost or market, whichever is lower, or liquidating value as of a speci­
fied date.
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(1) A brief description of the general principles or meth­
ods of accounting regularly employed by the issuer in keep­
ing its books and accounts and determining its income and 
financial position.
(2) A balance sheet or statement of assets and liabilities 
and capital of the issuer of the securities.
(3) A statement of income covering not less than three 
years, if the issuer has been so long in business.
(4) A declaration by the chief accounting officer of the 
issuer, or by an independent public accountant, that the 
balance sheet and statement of income are, in his opinion, 
properly prepared on the basis of a fair and consistent ap­
plication of the methods of accounting regularly employed 
by the company as described under subdivision (1).
(5) Special provisions to cover the case of companies op­
erating through subsidiary corporations.
Such requirements would be substantially in accord with 
the recommendations of a committee of the American In­
stitute of Accountants to the New York Stock Exchange 
which was favorably regarded by the Exchange and put in 
evidence by the Chairman of the Committee on Stock List 
in the course of his testimony before the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency on January 12, 1933. They would 
constitute a distinct advance in practice.
Specific suggestions for provisions to be inserted in the 
Bill in order to meet these requirements, which I had pre­
pared, came to the attention of the Investment Bankers 
Association of America and have, I am advised, been em­
bodied, substantially as proposed, in amendments which have 
already been suggested to the Committees of Congress con­
sidering the Bill, as follows (the notes are mine):
Suggested Subdivision of Section 5 Covering Accounting 
Requirements
(5) A brief statement of the general principles or methods 
of accounting regularly employed by the issuer in keeping 
its books and determining its financial position and income.
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NOTE
This requirement contemplates not a detailed explana­
tion of the technical accounting methods, such as is em­
bodied in what is commonly known as a “classification” or 
“card of accounts,” but a statement of the broad accounting 
principles followed by the issuer.
In the absence of some such statement of principles there 
is nothing to which a declaration such as is contemplated 
in the fourth suggestion regarding the correctness of the 
accounts submitted can be related.
The Revenue Acts since 1918 have uniformly laid down 
as the general basis for determining income that it shall be 
computed “in accordance with the method of accounting 
regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer.”
The general nature of the information to be given under 
this head is indicated in Exhibit II of the report of the com­
mittee of the American Institute of Accountants to the New 
York Stock Exchange previously mentioned. Some of the 
more important points to be covered are the following:
(a) Upon what classes of property, on what basis and at 
what rates provision is made for, or in lieu of, de­
preciation;
(b) Upon what basis inventories are valued—whether at 
cost or market, whichever is lower, or on some other 
basis;
(c) What classes of expenditures are deferred instead of 
being charged directly to income account, and what 
procedure is followed in regard to the gradual amor­
tization thereof; etc.
(6) A balance sheet showing a classified statement of the 
assets, liabilities and capital of the issuer at the latest prac­
ticable date prior to the filing of the registration statement, 
showing on what basis of valuation the several classes of 
assets are stated. If the balance sheet is not in accordance 
with the general books of the issuer, or with any previously 
published balance sheet of the issuer, as of the same date, 
information shall be given showing in what respects it dif­
fers from said books or such previously published balance 
sheet.
56 REGULATION OF SECURITIES
NOTE
While the basis of valuation of assets will be ascertainable 
from the statement of accounting methods, it seems desir­
able that the basis of valuation should be indicated on the 
face of the balance sheet so that the information will be as 
readily available to investors as possible.
No reference is made in this subdivision to contingent 
liabilities and obligations which may in effect constitute a 
liability which seriously affects the financial position. I have 
not found it possible to draw a specific provision which would 
meet all the possible situations satisfactorily, and I think it 
preferable to leave the point to be covered by the declaration 
that the balance sheet fairly presents the financial position, 
which declaration could not properly be given unless items 
of this kind were adequately disclosed in the balance sheet.
(7) A statement with respect to the income of the issuer 
for the latest fiscal year for which such statement shall be 
available and for the two preceding fiscal years, or, if the 
issuer has been in business for a lesser number of fiscal years, 
then for the longest practicable period during which the 
issuer has been in business; and, if the date of filing of the 
registration statement shall be more than six months after 
the close of the last fiscal year for which such statement shall 
be available, a statement of the income from such closing 
date to the latest practicable date.
Such statement with respect to the income of the issuer 
shall show the income fairly attributable to each fiscal period 
covered thereby. The following items shall be shown sep­
arately: operating income; non-operating income; interest 
charges; income taxes, and other fixed charges. Items of 
income or expense which are of an exceptional character 
and are not likely to recur shall, if they affect to a material 
extent the net income reported, be shown separately.
If the statement of income has not been prepared in ac­
cordance with the general books of accounts of the issuer, 
or with any previously published statement of income of 
the issuer for the same period or periods, information shall 
be given showing in what respects the statement of income 
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differs from such books of accounts or such previously pub­
lished statement of income.
NOTE
This subdivision and the succeeding one require, I think, 
to be amplified to cover the case in which the business to be 
carried on by the issuer was, during a part of the preceding 
three years, carried on by a predecessor organization or or­
ganizations. In such cases, statements of income and changes 
of surplus of the predecessor organization or organizations 
should be required.
(8) A statement showing the changes in the surplus of the 
issuer during the period covered by the statement of income 
required under subdivision (7).
(9) A declaration by the Treasurer or one of the principal 
accounting officers of the issuer, or by an independent public 
accountant or by independent public accountants that the 
balance sheet and the statement of income are, in his or their 
opinion, correctly prepared on the basis of a fair and con­
sistent application of the methods of accounting regularly 
employed by the issuer in keeping its books, and fairly re­
flect its financial position as of the date of said balance sheet 
and its income for the respective periods covered by said 
statements of income, except as may be stated in said, decla­
ration; and a declaration similarly signed, dated not more 
than ten days before the date of the filing of the registration 
statement that, as of such date, the signer had no knowledge 
of any change since the date of said balance sheet, except 
in the ordinary and regular course of business, in the char­
acter of the assets or the financial condition of the issuer, 
which might adversely affect the securities proposed to be 
issued, except as may be stated in said declaration.
(10) Whenever the value of the security is dependent to 
a material extent upon the financial position or income of 
a corporation or corporations in which the issuer has a con­
trolling interest, through stock ownership or otherwise, the 
registration statement shall include the same information 
regarding the assets, liabilities, capital and income of such
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controlled corporation or corporations (either separately or 
collectively) as is required in respect of the issuer by this 
subsection, or in lieu of or in addition to such information 
in respect of the issuer, consolidated statements (containing 
like information) of the assets, liabilities, capital and income 
of the issuer and of any or all such controlled corporations 
as may be proper in the circumstances of the case.
NOTE
This provision is made flexible so as to meet all the varied 
conditions that are encountered, including the cases not only 
of controlled companies that are substantially wholly owned, 
but also of controlled companies in which there are sub­
stantial outside minority interests.
As I have already indicated, I think the Bill might well 
contain provisions for periodical accounting reports subse­
quent to the issue. I suggest the following:
1. Whenever, while an issue of securities to which this 
Act applies shall be outstanding, the issuer shall change the 
general principles of accounting employed by it or shall 
change in any material way the manner in which practical 
application is given to such principles, a full statement of 
the change shall be filed with the Commission within sixty 
days of the date on which such change becomes effective.
2. Any issuer of securities to which this Act applies shall, 
so long as the securities shall be outstanding, file annually 
with the Commission within ninety days from the close of 
its fiscal year statements in respect of its financial position 
at the close of such fiscal year and its income for the year, 
in such detail and form as the Commission shall prescribe, 
provided that the Commission may in its discretion extend 
the time for filing such statements in any case in which it 
shall be satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for the 
issuer to file the required statements within the time pre­
scribed by this Act; and provided, also, that the Commission 
shall not be empowered to require under this section any 
information which it would not be empowered to require 
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in respect of a new offering of securities under Section 5 
of this Act.
The adoption of provisions such as I have suggested 
would, I believe, bring the requirements into accord with 
the best current practice, and all that would be necessary to 
meet the varied conditions that will arise would be to pro­
vide for the making of such detailed rules and regulations 
as might be necessary to give full effect to these provisions.
II
THE PROSPECTUS AND THE INVESTOR *
(1933)
The Securities Act and such discussion of it as is contained 
in Professor Frankfurter’s article in Fortune seem to me 
quite unrealistic. Professor Frankfurter’s article, by the way, 
if regarded as a prospectus under the Act, could readily be 
shown to be characterized by misstatements and omissions 
such as would make the author of the prospectus liable to the 
full penalties of the Act.
The investor who actually relies on specific statements in 
a prospectus is a comparatively rare bird. Subscriptions to 
new securities from such sources would not supply a frac­
tion of the needs of the country. The great bulk of the sub­
scriptions come from persons who rely on more general 
considerations, such as their belief in the issuer or in the 
underwriter. The underlying assumptions of the Act, how­
ever, are that every investor relies on the specific statements 
made to him, and that if any material statement proves to be 
incorrect and he sustains loss, the doctrine of post hoc, ergo 
propter hoc, shall be applied and his loss shall be conclu­
sively presumed to be due to the misstatement even though 
the contrary could readily be demonstrated.
It seems to me that we are embarking on an extremely 
dangerous course when we deliberately predicate legisla­
tion on assumptions which we know to be contrary to fact. 
However, in the present temper it is unlikely that this prin­
ciple will be revised in any new legislation, though I am 
convinced that it will have to be revised sooner or later— 
either by new laws or by the courts. At present, we must 
content ourselves with seeking the closest approximation to
* From a letter to the late Colonel M. C. Rorty, October 28, 1933.
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justice which is obtainable without complete abandonment 
of this underlying theory.
The form which this theory takes is that the Act is based 
on the principle of rescission, and it should not, therefore, 
be too much to hope that the Act can be amended so that 
liability will not extend beyond the point that can be reached 
by a reasonable application of the doctrine of rescission. Ob­
viously, the doctrine of rescission cannot fairly be applied to 
sub-underwriters and dealers except to the extent of the se­
curities distributed by them. Nor has it any conceivable 
application to experts. It seems to me that the most impor­
tant amendment to the Act, therefore, is to limit the applica­
tion of the principle of rescission so that: (a) only the issuer 
and any issuing house which has put its name on the pro­
spectus shall be liable in respect of the full issue; (b) sub­
underwriters shall be liable only in respect of securities sold 
by them, either directly or through agents; (c) make these 
persons liable only to those who purchase directly from them 
or to others who purchased within a limited time after the 
prospectus was issued; (d) limit the liability of directors 
and experts to damages shown to have been due to acts or 
default on their part.
III
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: ITS PEDIGREE *
(1934)
In bringing about a recovery from the depression, the British 
nation, so far as I can judge, has not followed methods in all 
respects identical with those which we have adopted in an 
effort to achieve the same result. While the old economic 
order has received a rude shock there, it is not entirely dis­
credited. They have not felt that a method of recovery was 
outmoded because it has been successfully employed before; 
they have not even reached the point of recognizing that only 
the young are wise.
Sir George may be interested and possibly gratified to 
know that in spite of the general discarding of precedents and 
experience, the exponents of the New Deal in their advocacy 
of the Securities Act have clung tenaciously to their argu­
ment that it was substantially the British law. This has 
seemed to me a strange thing—strange that they should re­
gard that as a recommendation, stranger still that they should 
think its substantial inaccuracy could escape detection. I 
have been reminded of a song that was popular about the 
turn of the century, when the Anglo-maniac was a favorite 
butt for ridicule, which ran somewhat as follows:
If they saw it on the Strand,
They wouldn’t understand, • 
But it’s English as you see it on Broadway.
Now, I am quite sure that if in the law courts which domi­
nate the Strand, counsel should be so venturesome as to 
cite the Securities Act, or a decision thereunder, as relevant 
on the ground that that Act was substantially the English
* Excerpt from introductory remarks at a dinner given by the Council on 
Foreign Relations for Sir George Paish on April 4, 1934.
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law, the court would fail to recognize the identity. I be­
lieve, also, that the English bar and the English legislature 
would be quick to disclaim paternity. I entertain the hope 
that the enlightenment on this point may reach in Oxford 
the distinguished professor who was so largely responsible 
for the Securities Act, and may modify the views which he 
entertained at the time when he discussed that law in For­
tune last August.
IV
LETTER TO THE HON. JAMES M. LANDIS
(1933)
My dear Mr. Landis:
I read your address before the New York Society of Certi­
fied Public Accountants with great interest.
I was particularly pleased to note your recognition of the 
undoubted fact that accounts are expressions of opinion. 
This seems to me to be the only sound starting point for any 
regulations relating to accounts or accountants. I agree with 
you that, in the past, efforts have frequently been made to 
represent accounts as being statements of fact to a greater 
extent than they can possibly be, and no doubt accountants 
must assume a part of the responsibility. However, some 
accountants, including myself, have for years been very in­
sistent on the opposite view, and I think that academic au­
thorities have had more influence than accountants. Pro­
fessor Ripley, with whom I joined issue on the question in 
1926, Professor Rorem, and others all have some responsibil­
ity for the tendency to regard accounts as statements of fact. 
However, the main cause no doubt is what Newton D. Baker 
once in conversation with me referred to as “the human 
craving for certainty.”
I do not know if you are familiar with the report which 
the Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges of the 
American Institute of Accountants made to the New York 
Stock Exchange in September, 1932, but I enclose a copy, 
from which you will see that the limitations on the sig­
nificance of accounts was the first point to be emphasized 
therein.
Incidentally, while comparisons with the British system 
are frequently made, to the disadvantage of our system here, 
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I think that so far as the disclosure of accounting informa­
tion in prospectuses is concerned, the practice on this side 
has for many years been superior to the British practice. Un­
doubtedly the gravest abuse here has been in connection 
with the employment of high-pressure salesmen, some of 
whom made representations not warranted either by the 
prospectus or by the facts.
I have myself been asked to make an address upon the 
Act before an accounting body; and though I am so con­
vinced of the desirability of Federal legislation on the sub­
ject that I am reluctant to appear in a position adverse to 
any provisions of the law, I confess that I have had a diffi­
culty, which your address does not remove, in reconciling 
the provisions relating to the liability of experts with any 
of the general concepts of law I have had, or in convincing 
myself that we, as a firm, can afford to accept the possibility 
of ruinous liability involved. It does not seem to me that 
the liability can fairly be said to be founded in either the 
law of negligence or the doctrine of rescission.
I realize that it is the function of the Commission to ad­
minister the law rather than to change it, but I realize, also, 
that by wise regulation the Commission can do much to re­
duce the risks, and I should very much like at some time to 
have an opportunity to discuss with you the general 
principle.
Looking at the matter quite objectively, my own feeling 
is that the provision is not in the public interest. In dis­
cussions of the debt situation, one meets the argument that, 
after all, as long as the debt is internal, what is a liability 
to one person is an asset to another, so that the net effect 
of the existence of the debt cannot be seriously adverse 
to the country as a whole. This, however, overlooks the fact 
that a bad debt remains a liability of the debtor after it has 
ceased to be an asset of the creditor. In the same way, the 
seriousness of an indefinite liability to a responsible obligor 
is far greater than its value to the obligee or obligees.
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I expect to be in Washington shortly and hope then to 
have the pleasure of meeting you and discussing some of 
these matters with you.
Yours very truly,
George O. May
November 2, 1933.
V
THE POSITION OF ACCOUNTANTS UNDER THE 
SECURITIES ACT *
(1933)
Before I pass to the subject set for discussion tonight, may 
I say a word about a great citizen who belonged to your city 
and who was laid away this afternoon. During the War I 
was privileged to work closely with him and came to know 
him well. He was not an accountant, but his qualities were 
those which make men great in any sphere. He had that 
devotion to the interests he was called upon to represent 
without regard to self that marks the truly professional man. 
He had the insight and judgment which enabled him to 
penetrate to the heart of a problem, however beclouded it 
might be by sophistries or confused by side issues, and to 
recognize the worth of men of the most varied types, in the 
most diverse walks of life. He had the courage, force and 
character that enabled him to follow the course dictated by 
his convictions without being greatly elated by praise or 
affected by abuse. And above all, he had a great simplicity, 
a broad humanity and a generous sympathy which inspired 
loyalty and affection and enabled him to elicit from those 
associated with him the very best of which they were capable. 
We may differ in our ideas about future existence; but there 
is a kind of immortality which great men must enjoy through 
the influence which they exercise on the lives of those 
around them and they, in turn, on others. As one who has 
benefited from his influence, I am glad of the opportunity 
to pay here and today a tribute to Alexander Legge.
I have been asked to discuss tonight the Securities Act of
* An address before the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants at 
Chicago, Illinois, on December 6, 1933. Cf. The Journal of Accountancy, 
Vol. XLVII (January, 1934). The initial paragraph being extemporaneous 
does not appear in the prepared manuscript as heretofore published.
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1933 from the point of view of the accountant. Few, if any, 
measures have ever been passed possessing so much impor­
tance to the profession, and it is not possible within the 
limits of a single address to consider all the questions of 
interest to us which it raises. I propose to limit my discus­
sion mainly to two points: the liability arising under Section 
11 of the Act, and the powers to define accounting terms 
and make regulations granted to the Federal Trade Commis­
sion by Section 19 of the Act. As I shall point out later, 
Section 19 may afford a means of mitigating to some extent 
the harshness of Section 11.
No one who has watched closely the developments of the 
past ten years can wonder that a securities law should be 
enacted, or even be greatly surprised at the form which it has 
taken. Nor would it occasion surprise if more recent revela­
tions should prove to have made it difficult to bring about 
modifications in the Act, or perhaps have created a demand 
for still more drastic measures. But to say that legislation 
was natural, and perhaps inevitable, is not to approve all its 
provisions; and while the Act possesses many merits, the 
wisdom of some of its provisions (notably those provisions re­
lating to the liability of underwriters, directors, officers and 
experts) is open to serious question in the minds, of those 
genuinely interested in the protection of investors.
It is a commonplace that extreme measures defeat their 
own purpose; but people are seldom willing to give practical 
effect to this commonplace. Fifteen years ago, we adopted 
a constitutional amendment designed to put an end to ad­
mittedly great evils. When legislation enacted in pursuance 
of that amendment proved ineffective, we passed more se­
vere measures; but as the law became more drastic, its 
enforcement became more and more impossible. Yesterday, 
we took the final step to reverse the well-intentioned but un­
wise action of fifteen years ago. We all realize, however, that 
it will take years to eradicate the evils which that unwise 
action brought into existence. Surely there is a lesson 
here for those who seek to regulate the issue of securities.
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Many who originally supported the prohibition move­
ment, including, as I particularly recall, a bishop of the 
church, finally became convinced that it should be repealed 
on the simple ground that it placed the distribution of liquor 
in the worst possible hands. In the same way, a too drastic 
securities law will place the distribution of securities in the 
worst possible hands.
I cannot believe that a law is just, or can long be main­
tained in effect, which deliberately contemplates the possibil­
ity that a purchaser may recover from a person from whom 
he has not bought, in respect of a statement which at the time 
of his purchase he had not read, contained in a document 
which he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not to 
be measured by injury resulting from falsity in such state­
ment. Yet, under the Securities Act as it stands, once a ma­
terial misstatement or omission is proved, it is no defense to 
show that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the statement 
in question or of the document in which it was contained, 
or that the fall in the value of the security which he has 
purchased is due, not to the misstatement or omission com­
plained of, but to quite different causes, such as the natural 
progress of invention, or even fire or earthquake. The Se­
curities Act not only abandons the old rule that the burden 
of proof is on the plaintiff, but the doctrine of contributory 
negligence and the seemingly sound theory that there should 
be some relation between the injury caused and the sum to 
be recovered.
It is frequently suggested that the Act follows closely the 
English law; but as one who has followed the development of 
the English law for nearly forty years I am bound to say that 
whether this statement be regarded as praise or censure, it is 
unfounded. None of the departures from ordinary legal 
principles to which I have referred finds its counterpart in 
the English law. The right of rescission is enforceable only 
against the issuer, and before the purchaser can recover 
from a director or other person concerned in the issue he 
must show that he relied on the prospectus, and then can 
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recover only for injury due to the untrue statement which 
he proves.
• Finally, as indicating the difference in temper of the Eng­
lish law, let me read a section which deals not with this 
specific question, but with the liability of directors and 
officers to the corporation for negligence or breach of trust:
If in any proceeding for negligence, default, breach of 
duty, or breach of trust against a person to whom this section 
applies it appears to the court hearing the case that that 
person is or may be liable in respect of the negligence, de­
fault, breach of duty or breach of trust, but that he has acted 
honestly and reasonably, and that, having regard to. all the 
circumstances of the case, including those connected with his 
appointment, he ought fairly to be excused for the negli­
gence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, that court 
may relieve him, either wholly or partly, from his liability 
on such terms as the court may think fit.*
The answer of Congress to those who urged that the Eng­
lish law should not be followed because it was too severe 
and tended to check the flow of capital into industry, was 
that of the son of Solomon, who, refusing to listen to the 
elders, and following the advice of the young men, said: “My 
father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you 
with scorpions.” And you will remember that the answer 
was, “What portion have we in David? ... to your tents, 
O Israel,” and the biblical narrative concludes with the state­
ment, “So Israel rebelled from the house of David unto this 
day.” So, too, there is reason to fear that responsible people 
will refuse to accept the unfair liability imposed on them by 
Congress under this Act, and will continue to refuse until 
juster provisions are enacted. If they do so, their action can 
be regarded only as the course dictated by common pru­
dence, and not as indicating factious opposition to the main 
purpose of the Act.
If we limit our consideration of the liability provisions 
of the Act to their effect on accountants, their punitive char­
acter becomes even more apparent. As between an innocent
* Companies Act, Sec. 372 (1).
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but negligent vendor and an innocent but negligent pur­
chaser, there may be some consideration of public policy in 
favor of requiring the vendor to return what he has received 
if his representations are proved to be false in fact although 
he believed them to be true. This consideration may be 
particularly applicable where the purchaser is a small in­
vestor who has neither the ability nor the resources for de­
termining the truth which are at the command of the 
vendor. It is difficult to see, however, upon what principle 
of justice the accountant or other expert whose good faith 
is not challenged, but who is held to have failed to live up 
to the high standard of care required of him, can fairly be 
called upon to do more than make good the injury attribut­
able to such failure for the benefit of a purchaser who per­
haps did not even know of his existence at the time of the 
purchase, and took no pains whatever to investigate the se­
curity he purchased.
But even though we feel the provisions to be unjust, we 
cannot expect them to be modified merely because they are 
unacceptable to accountants. The hope of securing amend­
ment lies in demonstrating that they are not in the interest 
of the general public, or of the investing public in particu­
lar; and this seems to me to be so clearly the case that there 
should not be any great difficulty in demonstrating it to open- 
minded people possessing some general familiarity with busi­
ness. I believe anyone who will take the trouble to consider 
carefully the work of the accountant in connection with new 
issues, and the practical consequences of these new provisions, 
will be forced to the conclusion that in the public interest 
these provisions should be substantially modified.
The services of the accountant in connection with a new 
issue, are, broadly, to report upon statements relating to the 
financial position and operations of the issuer. The first im­
portant point to be noted is, that while the statements in 
question rest on a basis of fact, the facts in the case of any 
considerable business enterprise are both complex and in­
complete, so that any report upon them is predominantly
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an expression of judgment and opinion. To illustrate—the 
most important single figure will usually be the profits for a 
particular year. Only the slightest consideration is necessary 
to bring realization of the fact, that the transactions of the 
year are inextricably interrelated with those of earlier and 
subsequent years, and that how much profit is fairly attribut­
able to a particular year is ultimately a matter of conven­
tion and judgment.
The function of the accountant, therefore, is to express an 
honest and informed judgment regarding the financial posi­
tion and operating results of the issuer according to some 
acceptable standard of accounting conventions. It is not 
merely a fact-finding function.
We may now consider how this function is in practice dis­
charged. While the work of accountants today involves the 
use of a large staff, it is obviously impracticable for the ac­
countant even with a large staff to examine all the transac­
tions of even a moderate-sized corporation. His procedure is, 
therefore, a varied one—in some cases, he will make a fairly 
complete independent check; in other cases, he will make 
tests; in still other cases, he must rely on the records of the 
corporation, satisfying himself that they are so kept and 
checked as to justify such reliance as a reasonable business 
procedure.
In considering, therefore, what degree of responsibility 
may wisely and rightfully be imposed on the accountant, one 
must start from the premises that: (a) his work is in part in 
the nature of confirmation of facts, and in part an expres­
sion of judgment; (b) his procedure is necessarily to a large 
extent one of testing—he cannot scrutinize every transaction; 
(c) his work is necessarily carried on largely through sub­
ordinates.
It is clear that the accountant may incur liability under 
the Act without being guilty of either moral culpability or 
recklessness, if a court holds that either: (a) facts within his 
knowledge were presented in such a way as to mislead; or 
(b) the tests which he made were not sufficiently extensive
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to justify him in forming a belief; or (c) he was not justified 
in forming a belief on the evidence which he examined with­
out probing deeper. Furthermore, he will presumably be 
liable for any misstatement which may be attributable to the 
failure of his assistants to take steps which they should have 
taken, even though he instructed them to take such steps and 
believed, and had a right to believe, that they had done so.
Surely, if any liability is to be so founded, it should at 
least be restricted to the damage shown to have been caused 
by the default proved against him or his assistants.
It is unnecessary for me to spend much time in pointing 
out how far beyond such a standard of liability the Act goes. 
The point has already been fully discussed in the pamphlet 
entitled “Accountants and the Securities Act,” which has 
been circulated to its members by the American Institute 
of Accountants, and in addresses to accounting bodies made 
by the Chief of the Securities Division of the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Honorable Baldwin B. Bane, on September 
19, and on October 30, by Commissioner James M. Landis. 
The discussion of the question by the former concluded 
with the statement:
Thus both theoretically and practically there is no prob­
ability of one’s liability exceeding the aggregate amount at 
which the securities were offered to the public.
Commissioner Landis, taking what he seemed to regard as 
a more hopeful view, said:
It should be observed that each person whose liability 
on the registration statement has been established is respon­
sible in damages to any purchaser of the security, whether 
such person shall have purchased from him or from some 
other person. Theoretically this means that each person so 
liable can be held to a liability equivalent to that of the total 
offering price of the issue. Practically, of course, no such 
large liability exists. Several factors will operate to keep the 
liability within much smaller bounds. For one thing, the 
value of a carefully floated issue can hardly be assumed to 
reach zero. For another, every purchaser would hardly be 
likely to bring suit. Again, the issue of liability—generally, 
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a complicated question of fact—would be retriable in every 
suit, and it beggars the imagination to assume that every 
jury faced with such an issue would come to the same con­
clusion. Furthermore, each person liable has a right of con­
tribution against every other person liable, unless the one 
suing is guilty of fraud and the other is not. So that even 
eliminating the other practical factors that I have mentioned, 
it would be necessary for every other person liable on the 
registration statement to be insolvent, in order that one of 
them would be affixed with the large theoretical responsi­
bility.
These being the views entertained by persons who sought to 
reassure us so far as they honestly could, it is quite unneces­
sary to consider what has been said by those who sought to 
excite our fears. The liability is obviously one that no pru­
dent business man would be justified in assuming. And 
certainly accountants have no right to be guiding investors 
if they are not practical business men as well as technically 
qualified accountants.
Let me emphasize again that in order to be subjected to 
such a liability it is not necessary that the accountant should 
have been fraudulent, or even reckless or incompetent. He 
may be held liable merely because of an error of judgment 
regarding the extent of the examination which he ought to 
make, or through honest error or oversight on the part of a 
competent and ordinarily reliable subordinate. And if he 
is held liable in an important case, the cost to him may easily 
equal the savings of his whole professional career.
I believe that in the case of most accountants—certainly it 
is true in that of my own firm—the amount of fees received 
from work connected with new financing is a relatively small 
percentage of their total annual fees. Why should they 
jeopardize not only the earnings from their entire business, 
but their savings, in order to undertake work which brings in 
perhaps five or ten per cent of their total income?
Every reputable accountant should be perfectly willing to 
assume a reasonable liability in respect of injury which can 
be shown to be attributable to acts or default on his part, and 
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no one would quarrel with the imposition of a liability of a 
punitive character in cases of fraud; but only the clearest 
and most urgent requirements of public policy could justify 
making accountants or other experts liable for damages 
which bear no relation either to the injuries they have caused 
or the compensation they have received. I am convinced 
that no such requirement exists—on the contrary, I believe 
that a wise regard for the public interest would rather limit 
the financial responsibility of professional men for errors of 
professional judgment. This, incidentally, is the policy 
embodied in the new legislation on the question of auditors 
in Germany,* under which the liability of the accountant 
cannot exceed a fixed sum unless fraud is shown.
It is not easy to see upon what theory of law the provision 
of the Act is based. Clearly, it is not founded in the ordinary 
law of negligence; nor can it be brought within the doctrine 
of rescission. It seems to me to be justifiable only on the 
theory that any issue of securities in connection with which 
a material misstatement is found to exist is a conspiracy, even 
though the misstatement is due to oversight or even honest 
error. There is nothing in the history of accounting in re­
cent years to warrant such an attitude towards the profes­
sion or that provision which puts on the accountant the 
burden of proving his innocence whenever a disgruntled pur­
chaser of securities or striker makes charges against him.
In my judgment, it is always wise to use restraint in im­
posing financial liabilities upon professional men for errors 
of professional judgment. Such errors, particularly where 
they become publicly known, result in serious injury to the 
professional reputation of the persons making them, and it 
is quite unnecessary to add a personal liability in order to 
impress the professional man with the necessity of care and 
thoroughness in forming his professional judgments. The 
effect of imposing a pecuniary liability out of all proportion 
to the compensation paid for the opinion will inevitably be
* Cf. Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code), (1931).
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that those best qualified to express opinions will refuse to 
assume the risks involved in doing so.
In the present instance, the risks are multiplied by the 
vagueness and uncertainties of the obligations imposed. The 
Act makes the accountant liable if the part of the registration 
statement for which he is responsible “contained an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material, fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state­
ments therein not misleading, . . .” and in providing that 
it shall be a valid defense that the accountant “had reason­
able ground to believe and did believe, . . . that the state­
ments therein were true and that there was no omission 
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces­
sary to make the statements therein not misleading, . . .” 
it prescribes that the standard of reasonableness “shall be 
that required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship.”
What explanations are going to be necessary in order to 
comply with these requirements? Let me take a simple case. 
The insurance commissioners have on several occasions pre­
scribed valuations for securities which were far in excess of 
current quoted prices therefor. If one were consulted by 
someone to whom one had a fiduciary relationship regarding 
a proposed investment in an insurance company, certainly he 
would not be content to explain that the securities were 
valued in accordance with the schedules of the Insurance 
Commissioners without pointing out that these valuations 
were substantially higher than those currently realizable on 
the market. Suppose, however, that in a balance sheet form­
ing part of a registration statement securities were taken on 
the basis of the Commissioner’s valuations—would it be suffi­
cient to state that fact, or would the accountant be guilty of 
omission of a material fact if he failed to make any statement 
regarding the relation between such valuation and the quoted 
market prices? Again, many public utilities provide for 
depreciation on bases approved by state commissions, which 
many accountants regard as quite inadequate. Is the ac­
countant safe if he states on what basis the depreciation
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provision has been made, without expressing his own con­
victions regarding the inadequacy of the provision?
In each of these cases it would seem that the accountant 
must be safe on the ground that he is entitled to rely on 
legal authority whether his own judgment coincides with the 
view of the authorities or not. In many instances, however, 
the authority for the practice followed will be accepted cus­
tom, rather than specific authorization from a governmental 
body; and what is to be the position when the accountant dis­
agrees with the custom?
Here let me draw attention to a point which perhaps has 
escaped your attention—that the position of the accountant 
under the Act differs from that of any other expert. Others 
may “report” and be liable only for the truth of the state­
ments contained in their report; the accountant is called 
upon to certify, and is liable for the truth of the statements 
certified, not merely for the truth of the statements con­
tained in his certificate. Under a strict interpretation of the 
law, the accountant would seem to be liable if part of a 
statement covered by his certificate is held to be untrue or 
misleading, even though he, in his certificate, disclaimed re­
sponsibility for that particular part of the statement. It 
may be said that such an interpretation would be unreason­
able; but it is certainly no more unreasonable than the ex­
plicit provision that his liability is not to be measured by 
the injury caused by his act or default. Further, it may be 
merely the reflection of the not infrequent view that an 
auditor should give no certificate whatever unless he can 
vouch for the complete truthfulness of the statement certi­
fied.
The fallacious view is quite widely held that the work of 
the accountant is purely a fact-finding function, and that 
when his work is completed he is in a position (if it has been 
properly performed) to make findings of definite and in­
controvertible facts. The Special Committee on Coopera­
tion with Stock Exchanges of the American Institute of Ac­
countants, whose membership has included partners in sev­
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eral of the largest firms in the country, became convinced of 
the extreme importance of correcting this too common mis­
apprehension, and in a report which it made to the New York 
Stock Exchange in September, 1932, it stressed this point as 
the first on which the Stock Exchange should concentrate in 
its effort to bring about more enlightened investment. It 
began its report with the following statements:
It [the Committee] believes that there are two major 
tasks to be accomplished—one is to educate the public in re­
gard to the significance of accounts, their value and their 
unavoidable limitations, and the other is to make the ac­
counts published by corporations more informative and au­
thoritative.
The nature of a balance sheet or of an income account is 
quite generally misunderstood, even by writers on financial 
and accounting subjects. Professor William Z. Ripley has 
spoken of a balance sheet as an instantaneous photograph of 
the condition of a company oh a given date. Such language 
is apt to prove doubly misleading to the average investor- 
first, because of the implication that the balance sheet is 
wholly photographic in nature, whereas it is largely histori­
cal; and, secondly, because of the suggestion that it is pos­
sible to achieve something approaching photographic accur­
acy in a balance sheet which, in fact, is necessarily the reflec­
tion of opinions subject to a (possibly wide) margin of error. 
It then proceeded to discuss the problem in some detail; and 
in concluding the report and making certain recommenda­
tions, it offered this comment:
. . . But even when all has been done that can be done, 
the limitations on the significance of even the best of ac­
counts must be recognized, and the shorter the period covered 
by them the more pronounced usually are these limitations. 
Accounts are essentially continuous historical records; and as 
is true of history in general, correct interpretations and 
sound forecasts for the future cannot be reached upon a hur­
ried survey of temporary conditions, but only by longer re­
trospect and a careful distinction between permanent tend­
encies and transitory influences.
I was extremely glad to note that Commissioner Landis, 
in his address to which I have referred, recognized the point 
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which I have been trying to emphasize, in the following para­
graph:
Much also depends upon the method of expression, for 
what should appropriately be expressed as inferences or de­
ductions from facts and hence as opinions, are too often ex­
pressed as facts themselves and hence for the purposes of 
legal liability, whether at common law or under the Act, be­
come facts. It has been said, and very rightly in my humble 
opinion, that most of accounting is after all a matter of 
opinion. But though this may be true, I have still to see 
the case of a prospective investor being offered a balance 
sheet and having it carefully explained to him that this or 
that item is merely an opinion or deduction from a series of 
other opinions mixed in with a few acknowledged facts. Ac­
counting, as distinguished from law, has generally been por­
trayed as an exact science, and its representations have been 
proffered to the unlearned as representations of fact and not 
of opinion. If it insists upon such fact representations, it is, 
of course, fair that it should be burdened with the responsi­
bility attendant upon such a portrayal of its results.
I have read the entire paragraph because it seems to me 
to have a double importance. In the first place, it indicates 
an appreciation on the part of a member of the Commission 
of the point that accounts are not statements of fact; and 
such recognition is fundamental to the development of any 
sound regulations relating to accounts and accountants. In 
the second place, it emphasizes the danger which accountants 
run in putting forward as facts what are really expressions 
of opinion.
That the danger is not exaggerated by the Commissioner 
is apparent from a consideration of the Ultramares case. 
That case would apparently have been finally decided in favor 
of the accountants by the Court of Appeals of New York 
if the accountants concerned had not stated as a fact that 
the balance sheet which they certified was in accord with the 
books of the Company. Doubtless they thought this was a 
fact, and doubtless it was a fact in the sense in which they 
meant the language to be interpreted, that the balance sheet 
was in accord with the general books. But Chief Justice 
80 REGULATION OF SECURITIES
Cardozo decided that a court might properly regard the lan­
guage as implying an agreement between the balance sheet 
and the books as a whole, and there were books which con­
tradicted the general books. Obviously, upon such an inter­
pretation, whether a balance sheet agreed with the books 
must always be in reality a matter of opinion (if for no other 
reason because no accountant can be sure that he has seen all 
the books that exist), and obviously even if the statement 
were made as one of fact, no one was injured by it, for no 
one would lend a nickel on the faith of a statement that a 
balance sheet agrees with the books. Nevertheless, such is 
the mysterious nature of the law, this point was sufficient to 
result in an order for retrial.
In the last sentence which I quoted from Commissioner 
Landis, he seemed to imply, although he did not specifically 
say, that the portrayal of accounts as statements of fact had 
been made by accountants. I am not sure that this is so. Ac­
countants may be subject to some blame for not having done 
so much as they might have done to resist the tendency of 
other people to regard accounts as exact statements of fact, 
but I think that they themselves have almost invariably put 
forth their reports as expressions of opinion. Both here and 
in England, the words “in our opinion” have for years been a 
standard phrase in accountants’ certificates. As long ago as 
1913, Dickinson, in his Accounting Practice and Procedure, 
commented on the phrase at length. His comment began 
with the statement: “Every balance sheet must be largely 
a matter of opinion,” and ended with the sentence:
So far from weakening the certificate, they [i.e., the words 
“in our opinion”] may rather be considered as strengthening 
it, in that they imply that the signer has given his certificate, 
not with foolhardy assurance, but with a realization of the 
inherent impossibility of saying, absolutely, that one balance 
sheet is correct and any other incorrect.*
And while very little testimony was given on behalf of ac­
countants before the committees which considered the Securi-
* Arthur Lowes Dickinson, op. cit., pp. 236-37.
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ties Act, the little which was given included this colloquy 
between the members of the Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency and Colonel A. H. Carter, who was, I be­
lieve, the only accounting witness:
Mr. Carter. I mean that that statement itself should have 
been the subject of an examination and audit by an inde­
pendent accountant.
Senator Gore. Before filing?
Mr. Carter. Before filing.
Senator Gore. Is that patterned after the English system?
Mr. Carter. Yes, sir.
Senator Reynolds. Together with an opinion.
Mr. Carter. That is all they can give; that is all they can 
give. That is all anyone can give as to a balance sheet.
Senator Wagner. Well, basically, are not these facts that 
have got to be alleged rather than an opinion?
Mr. Carter. Under the terms of the bill it has to be given 
under oath. I do not see that anyone can certify under oath 
that a balance sheet giving many millions of dollars of assets 
is as a matter of fact correct. He can state his opinion based 
upon a thorough investigation.
But whatever they have been represented or supposed to be, 
accounts are not mere statements of fact, but represent the 
application to facts of judgment and accounting principles. 
Truth in accounts is not, therefore, a simple matter of cor­
respondence between fact and statement—accounts are true if 
they result from the application to the relevant facts of 
honest judgment and reasonable accounting principles. The 
question that should really be put to the accountant is not 
whether the balance sheet is true, but whether it is fair 
—fair in the accounting principles on which it is based; fair 
in the way in which those principles are applied to the facts; 
and fair in the way in which the results are presented. These 
are matters of opinion.
The Act stresses the obligation to state every material 
fact necessary to make the registration statement not mis­
leading, and among the material facts in relation to any ac­
counts none is more material than the fact that the accounts 
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themselves and the certificate required from the accountant 
in relation to those accounts are, and must of necessity be, 
expressions of opinion. Indeed, the Act, in speaking of 
truth in accounts without some such qualification is itself apt 
to mislead investors, in the same way as was Professor Ripley’s 
reference to a balance sheet as an “instantaneous photo­
graph.”
At this point, I should like to suggest that Section 19 can 
be used to clarify and modify the provisions of Section 11. 
Clearly, only action by Congress can remove the fundamental 
and, as I feel, insuperable obstacles to the free acceptance by 
accountants of appointments under the Act; obstacles which 
have been created by the imposition of a liability bearing no 
relation either to the injury caused by the accountant or the 
compensation received by him. If, however, this major 
difficulty could be removed, the remaining problem could 
probably be solved by judicious use by the Commission of 
the powers conferred on it under Section 19.
Under that Section, the Commission has power for the 
purposes of the Act to define accounting terms used therein 
and to prescribe the method to be followed in the prepara­
tion of accounts. It seems to me highly desirable that under 
the provisions of this section the Commission should define 
what constitutes a “true” balance sheet or a “true” profit and 
loss statement. Such definition would, I think, necessarily 
follow the general line that I have indicated. Accounts 
would be held to be true if they represented the application 
of honest judgment and acceptable methods of accounting 
to all the relevant facts which were known or ought to have 
been known to the person preparing or certifying them at 
the time of preparation or certification. I suggest, also, 
that the Commission should supplement the definition by 
indicating that accounting principles would be deemed ac­
ceptable which are either (a) prescribed or approved by gov­
ernmental authorities to which the issuer is subject; or 
(b) sanctioned by common practice, it being recognized that 
in many instances alternative methods are sanctioned; or 
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(c) are inherently fair and appropriate. It should be empha­
sized that principles will not be regarded as reasonable un­
less they are mutually consistent and are consistently applied.
The point may be urged that what must be shown in order 
to avert liability is not that the balance sheet or profit and 
loss account as a whole is true, but that the statements of 
fact contained in it are true. Balance sheets and profit and 
loss accounts are not, of course, couched in the form of state­
ments of fact; but a description with an amount set opposite 
it is fairly capable of being judged as a statement of fact. 
The common heading: “Land, buildings, plant and ma­
chinery, at cost,” with a figure set opposite, seems at first 
blush to be a simple statement of fact; but in practice, what 
is fairly to be regarded as cost will often be a difficult matter 
of opinion, and always the question remains whether any, 
and if so, what amplification of the heading is necessary to 
make the statement not misleading.
You may think that I am being technical; but may I re­
mind you that our own accumulated savings may be at stake 
in this matter, and also that the highest court of Massachu­
setts held not many years ago that a statement was false, 
and that its falsity gave rise to liability on the part of those 
signing it, on the sole ground that a reserve for depreciation 
had been shown under the heading “Reserves” on one side 
of the balance sheet instead of being deducted from the assets 
on the other. It was only after this decision that the law of 
Massachusetts was amended by the insertion of this proviso: 
“. . . provided, that if a report of condition as a whole states 
the condition of the corporation with substantial accuracy, 
in accordance with usual methods of keeping accounts, it 
shall not be deemed to be false.”
I am convinced that to make the Act practicable in its 
working it is essential that some general ruling, of the tenor 
I have suggested, as to what constitutes truth in accounts 
shall be put forward by the Commission. As I have indi­
cated, such a statement would serve the double purpose: first, 
of tending to prevent the investing public from attaching 
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undue significance to accounts; and, secondly, of preventing 
accountants from being harassed or penalized through un­
duly technical interpretations of the provisions of the law.
I would not have you think that in this discussion I have 
exhausted the points in the Act which are of interest and 
importance to the profession. I should have liked to discuss 
at length the provision by which the burden of proof is 
thrown upon the defendant; the opportunities that the Act 
offers to blackmailers; the absence of any provision by which 
those unwarrantably attacked can recover the costs of their 
defense; and other features which seem to me to require 
amendment if a just balance is to be struck.
In conclusion, I desire to say that I am in full sympathy 
with the general purposes of the Act, and that the criticisms 
which I have offered of some of its provisions are not merely 
inspired by a narrow self-interest, but rest upon the pro­
found conviction which I expressed at the beginning of this 
address, that unduly drastic measures defeat their own pur­
pose and are not in the ultimate interest of those whom it 
is sought to protect. I should be extremely sorry if the effect 
of the Securities Act should be to place the distribution of 
securities and all the work attendant on such distribution in 
the least responsible hands.
I think, also, that in any discussion of the Act, we as ac­
countants owe a duty to small investors to point out that the 
ordinary vicissitudes of business make commercial securities 
necessarily hazardous and unsuitable for the investment of 
small savings, and that even if a securities act diminishes the 
hazards in some respects, it cannot change their essential 
character. A realistic view would recognize the necessity for 
some governmentally fostered system for the safe investment 
of small savings; a broad market, subject to requirements for 
frank disclosure with penalties not unduly drastic attaching 
thereto, for what may be termed “business investments”; and 
some medium, entirely divorced from the idea of invest­
ment, for the gratification of the seemingly ineradicable in­
stinct for gambling.
VI
THE OPPOSITION TO ANY AMENDMENT OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT *
(1934)
It is, surely, as important that legislation should be based on 
adequate and reliable information as that investment should 
be so based; and those who undertake to present information 
in support of legislation are chargeable with a fiduciary stand­
ard of care as justly as those who present information in order 
to sell securities. A survey of articles in support of the Se­
curities Act and against any change therein reveals more 
than one which fails to live up to this standard—indeed, one 
might say that if such articles were prospectuses coming 
within the provisions of the Act, many of the authors would 
incur serious liabilities. No doubt all these authors are 
perfectly honest in their purpose (though this is a more 
charitable view than they appear to take of those who are 
opposed to them), and the question that I raise is, whether 
their articles are free from misstatements or omissions of ma­
terial facts which by the exercise of a fiduciary standard of 
care they could have avoided.
I distinguish between those parts of such articles as are 
frankly argumentative and those which purport to be state­
ments of fact. Partial statements in argument indicate only 
that the writer is an advocate and not a disinterested witness.
In discussing the provision which relieves the purchaser 
from proving reliance on the prospectus, it is not unreason­
able to argue that the purchaser relies indirectly, if not di­
rectly, on the prospectus or registration statement if his pur­
chase takes place shortly after the issue is made. But surely 
it is a material fact that the Act will indulge the same
* A letter to the New York Times (January 28, 1934).
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presumption even though the transaction takes place long 
afterwards when the presumption has become wholly un­
reasonable. Again, in discussing the provision of the Act 
which permits recovery of the purchase price of the security 
and absolves the plaintiff from the burden of distinguishing 
between injury due to material misstatement and injury due 
to quite unrelated causes, it is true to say that the burden 
of separation would often be difficult for the plaintiff to sus­
tain. But here again it would seem to be a material fact 
that under the Act the defendant’s liability remains even if 
he is willing to assume the burden and is able to prove con­
clusively that the injury sustained had nothing whatever to 
do with the material misstatement complained of. However, 
incomplete statements on such points merely indicate how 
difficult it is for a partisan to avoid omissions of material 
facts which tell against the cause in which he wholeheartedly 
believes.
The points with which I am principally concerned are 
those which relate to the English Companies Act. No argu­
ment in favor of the Securities Act has been more stressed, or 
probably carried more weight, than the argument that the 
Act is substantially the English Companies Act modified to 
suit American conditions. To the impartial student the 
differences between the two Acts must, I believe, seem more 
significant than the points of resemblance; and when those 
opposed to any revision of the Securities Act talk about 
differences in conditions which justify its greater harshness, 
they seldom mention the very material difference in condi­
tions that in England the successful defendant can recover 
compensatory costs and, where necessary, obtain security 
therefor, before the suit against him is proceeded with. 
While recommending innovations alleged to be based on 
English practice, and imposing burdens and liabilities 
hitherto unknown to the law of any country, the framers of 
the Act might well have introduced this measure of pro­
tection.
Most of all do the two laws differ in spirit. The difference 
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in spirit is implicitly admitted in an article which was read 
into the Congressional Record of January 12 in the state­
ment, “In substance, the Securities Act is the English Com­
panies Act, modified to come within the constitutional power 
of the federal legislature to regulate interstate commerce, 
and to recognize the fact that in England, except for a very 
unusual Hatry or Kylsant, the distribution of securities is a 
decorous, traditional business, offering its wares only to in­
stitutions and wary family solicitors, while in the United 
States it has been a high-pressure racket that jangled every 
housewife’s doorbell.” Is this really so?
The limitations on the federal legislative power are no 
doubt sufficient to account for some of the differences be­
tween the two laws, but perhaps the most striking instance 
of the kind is that the English law does, arid the American 
law does not, attempt to deal with the evil of “jangling the 
housewife’s doorbell.” Section 356 of the Companies Act of 
1929, which begins: “It shall not be lawful for any person to 
go from house to house offering shares for subscription or 
purchase” completely negatives any suggestion that the Eng­
lish law was designed to meet a situation in which securities 
were bought only by institutions and family solicitors—a 
suggestion, incidentally, which no one who had read the 
Greene or the Macmillan report, or even had been present 
in an average English household when the morning mail 
arrived, would have dreamed of putting forward. The whole 
argument of the writer quoted and of others who have ad­
vanced the same contentions rests upon a statement as fact 
which a mere perusal of the English Act would have proved 
to be incorrect. In England, as here, the major evil has been 
this “jangling of the housewife’s doorbell”—not the inade­
quate or misleading prospectus.
Indeed, it is the undue concentration on the prospectus, 
and the fact that Congress whether through inability or by 
design did not deal with the evil of high-pressure salesman­
ship or make any provision for publicity in respect of the af­
fairs of the issuer subsequent to the issue, that form the 
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broadest ground for criticism of the existing law. Of course, 
if provision had been made for subsequent publicity, it 
would have been impossible to maintain the legal fiction 
that the purchaser of a security relies on the prospectus even 
though he buys long after the prospectus has ceased to have 
any real bearing on the current value of the security; and 
this fiction is an essential part of the scheme whereby the 
liability of those concerned in an issue is continued for ten 
full years.
Among the principal provisions of the Securities Act 
which are criticized are those which deal with the burden of 
proof; those which permit rescission on account of mis­
statement or omission in the registration statement in cases 
in which the assumption that the purchaser relied either 
directly or indirectly on the prospectus or registration state­
ment is obviously contrary to fact, and also in cases in which 
his loss is due to circumstances in no way related to any such 
misstatement or omission; and those provisions which make 
experts and others liable for sums entirely out of all propor­
tion to any injury caused by acts or omissions on their part. 
None of these provisions can be justified either by English 
precedents or by any difference in conditions between Eng­
land and the United States.
One of the most noteworthy differences between conditions 
in the two countries is that the strike action which disfigures 
our system is comparatively rate in England. This is due 
to a variety of causes, of which the fact already mentioned 
that in England a successful litigant recovers compensatory 
costs from the unsuccessful party is one. To protect honest 
issuers so far as practicable against such suits is as much a 
part of the problem of just legislation as is the protection 
of the investor against the dishonest or negligent issuer. 
But the framers of the Securities Act seem to have ignored 
this phase of the problem. The inordinate expansion of the 
content of the registration statement, any material misstate­
ment in which gives rise to a cause of action; the vagueness 
of some of the vitally important provisions; the conferring of 
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concurrent jurisdiction on federal and state courts; the ab­
sence of any provision for the recovery of compensatory costs 
by the successful defendant; the creation of conclusive pre­
sumptions in favor of the purchaser, which will often be con­
trary to demonstrable fact; and the imposition of liabilities 
bearing no relation to injury caused, combine to constitute 
an invitation to those who bring suits in the hope of being 
bought off, which no one who is invited to assume responsi­
bilities under the Act can afford to ignore.
The appeal to British experience inevitably includes refer-. 
ences to Hatry and Lord Kylsant, but it is seldom explained 
that neither was charged under the Companies Act. The 
writer to whom I have referred speaks of the interpretation 
of the British Act “in the celebrated Lord Kylsant case.” 
The facts are that Hatry pleaded guilty to forgery and con­
spiracy to defraud, and the charges against Lord Kylsant were 
brought under the Larceny Act of 1861, which antedated 
not only all the laws for the protection of investors, but even 
the first effective general limited liability company law—that 
of 1862. The Royal Mail Company was not formed under 
the Companies Act. In the interests of historical accuracy 
it may be added that the basis of Lord Kylsant’s conviction 
is incorrectly stated in the same article.
It is interesting to note that an article (anonymous) ap­
peared in the London Economist of January 6, much of 
the argument in which is identical with that of the article 
read into the Congressional Record. Needless to say, how­
ever, it did not contain the incorrect statements regarding 
things English to which I have drawn attention.
Now, these are errors and omissions which, it would seem, 
could have been avoided by a fiduciary—or even a reasonable 
—standard of care, and they are made by experts in dealing 
with a relatively simple matter. Is it unreasonable, then, 
that other experts, conscious that they might unwittingly be 
betrayed into error in dealing with the far more complex 
affairs of large corporations, should be reluctant to accept the 
liabilities, bearing no relation to any injury attributable to 
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their errors, which the Act would impose upon them? The 
contention sometimes advanced that such reluctance is in­
spired by unworthy motives, or is part of a conspiracy, has 
a familiar, unconvincing ring.
Are we likely in the long run to do better by continuing 
the extreme measure enacted under great provocation and 
even more certain to produce hardship and injustice than 
to accomplish its beneficent purposes, than by limiting the 
law in the first instance to provisions which are clearly just 
and endeavoring to cope with further problems which arise 
in ways that will be consonant with justice? The answers 
to this question will differ according to the views taken of 
the Act. Those who see in it a medium for the punishment 
of bankers, or a step towards the goal of financing industry 
by Government, will answer “Yes.” Those who regard the 
purpose of the Act as purely remedial and constructive will 
be bound to answer “No.”
Amendment of the Act is opposed by some on the ground 
that to admit publicly any defect in a part of the Adminis­
tration’s program would invite attack on the whole of it. 
This attitude is strangely at variance with that of the Presi­
dent himself in the announcement that he was going to try 
new measures and would be ready to retrace his steps or 
change his course whenever he might be convinced that he 
had gone too far or was heading in the wrong direction. 
It is to be hoped that this more courageous policy will pre­
vail, and that modifications of the Securities Act may be ef­
fected which, without weakening of the provisions relating 
to fraud or wilful misstatement, will afford some protection 
against blackmail and will at least limit the liability for 
honest error to the damage fairly attributable thereto.
VII
TESTIMONY ON THE NATIONAL SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE BILL *
(1934)
Mr. May. I do not wish to deal with the strictly stock­
exchange regulation features of the Bill. That is outside 
my province. I. wish to limit myself to a subsidiary but still 
important part of the Bill, the provisions regarding accounts 
and reports. That is principally Sections 12, 17 and 18 (b).
Practically my whole point of view is based on the fact 
that accounts are necessarily the result of the application of 
accounting conventions and judgments to facts and are not 
pure statements of fact, and I think any sound legislation on 
these points must give more weight to those considerations.
The Chairman. Do you favor the idea of providing for a 
uniform system of accounting?
Mr. May. I do not, Senator, as I will come to later. Not 
at the present time, certainly.
The point that I wanted to bring home to the Committee, 
or emphasize to the Committee, is that accounts for a short 
period, while they are useful to people who deal in securities, 
may easily be given an exaggerated importance and thereby 
result in more harm than good to the small man, with whom 
I imagine you are particularly concerned.
My feeling on this question, I think, must be very much 
that which the Committee feels in regard to the larger sub­
ject. You want to do everything that you can to make buy­
ing and selling securities, particularly by the small man, 
safer and surrounded with more information. But you must 
realize that all you can do will not reduce the risks that he
* “Stock Exchange Practices,” Hearings, Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency, 73rd Congress, Part 15, pp. 7175-83.
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is bound to run very greatly, and there is always the danger 
that by legislating you create a feeling of confidence in the 
securities that are offered which legislation cannot possibly 
impart to them.
Now, that is the thought that is in my mind. I attach 
great importance to accounts, but I think there is always 
a danger that people will attach too much importance to
them, and I think undoubtedly a large part of the stock 
markets of 1929, the outrageous prices that were reached
then, was attributable to the basing of values on large earn­
ings for short periods of time, which were not representa­
tive of the permanent earning capacity of the business. 
Whilst I think, therefore, that you should do what you can 
to give investors ample information, you should not do it in 
a way that can possibly encourage them to attach more im­
portance to accounts than they properly deserve.
The specific suggestions that grow out of that, first of all, 
are in Section 12, which provides for audited quarterly 
statements. Personally I have never favored the sugges­
tion that has been made that the Stock Exchange should uni­
formly require quarterly statements. In a great many cases 
they are helpful. In some cases they are more apt to be mis­
leading than helpful. That is particularly true in the case 
of companies where inventories play a very large part in a 
determination of their results. The difference in the inven­
tory valuation at the beginning or the end of a quarter may 
make all the difference between a profit and a loss. That is 
true, for instance, of packing houses and leather companies 
and the like.
So that I would suggest that a provision should be left in 
the bill so that the regulating body could dispense with the 
quarterly statements in any case where they thought that the 
publication would not be in the public interest.
Senator Townsend. Would you suggest semi-annual state­
ments or yearly statements?
Mr. May. Personally, I was going to suggest the second 
point, Senator; if I may go on—I would strongly oppose 
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audited quarterly statements, although it may seem to be 
against my interest as an accountant to take that position. 
But my opposition is not because of the expense, although 
that would be considerable. It is not because it would 
delay the publication of the quarterly statements—and if 
they are to be published at all they ought to be published 
promptly. It is because of the thing that I have just been 
emphasizing, that if you certify them people will think that 
they are something absolute and accurate, that they can rely 
on implicitly; whereas, being for a short period, they must 
necessarily be arbitrary and estimates.
Therefore, my suggestions on that would be to eliminate 
the provisions for quarterly audits and to provide a power 
in the regulating body to dispense with quarterly statements, 
particularly in any case in which they might think it was ex­
pedient.
Now, I think myself, as far as audits are concerned, that an 
audited statement once a year ought to be sufficient. But 
there is one very practical consideration which I would like 
to bring to your attention. I think the Committee has an 
opportunity. to do a very useful thing by a very simple 
measure, quite apart from the general purposes of the Bill.
If the amount of auditing required were expanded as this 
Bill would necessitate, it would tax the resources of the ac­
counting profession. The great difficulty of the present 
position is that nearly all companies end their year at De­
cember 31, and if the amount of work to be done at Decem­
ber 31 were so enormously increased as this Bill would 
increase it, then I do not think it would be within the 
capacity of the accounting profession, by any reasonable ex­
pansion, to take Care of that work within a reasonable period 
after the end of the year.
And to meet that situation, I would like to suggest that 
there should be a discretionary power so that not all audit­
ing statements Would have to be at the end of the calendar 
year. I suppose convenience for tax purposes and so on has 
led a lot of companies that used to close their year at other 
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periods to turn to the calendar year. A few still stick to some 
other period. The large packing houses close their accounts 
at the end of October. Well, September and October would 
be a much more natural time for the automobile companies 
and the tire companies to close than December 31. The 
railroads all used to close at June 30. Now they have all 
shifted to December 31; June 30 is a much more natural 
time.
I would like to see introduced into the Bill a provision 
which would help to distribute the work of auditing over 
the year. I think it would enormously increase the value 
of the audit to the investor. It would increase the effi­
ciency of the audit. It would reduce the cost, and it would 
be infinitely more convenient to all the regulating bodies 
and statistical people who have to study audited accounts 
when they come in, and under present conditions get them 
all in a bunch at the end of the first two or three months of 
the calendar year.
That is a very small and noncontentious suggestion, which 
I think would have very great practical consequences for 
good.
Senator Kean. Would not it be just as well to have them 
all come in on the first of July as June 30?
Mr. May. If you could get them distributed. Of course, 
the ideal thing would be to have a quarter on the 31st of 
March, a quarter on the 30th of June, but you never could 
get that. But I think if you left some flexible provision in 
so that the regulating body could work it out as might seem 
to the general interest, that would be a very helpful measure 
which would have a general advantage quite apart from the 
provisions of this particular Bill.
Mr. Saperstein. As the Section now stands, Mr. May, 
there is no date fixed for the filing of those statements, and 
that matter is left to the discretion of the Commission.
Mr. May. I understood that it was fixed as far as quar­
terly audited statements were concerned.
Mr. Saperstein. It does not indicate upon what day. It 
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says simply that they shall file with the Exchange or the Com­
mission in accordance with rules and regulations to be pre­
scribed by the Commission and in such form and in such 
degree as the Commission may by rules and regulations pre­
scribe in the public interest. That more or less leaves it for 
the Commission to indicate upon what dates these shall be 
filed, does it not?
Mr. May. Of course, if you require quarterly statements 
subject to the reservation that I have suggested before, and 
provided that once in each year, under regulations of the 
Commission, quarterly statements should be audited, that 
would satisfy us. I want only to suggest the idea. The exact 
form you take is a matter that is a simple matter of drafts­
manship. That is the point I had on Section 12.
My point on Section 17 is on exactly the same ground. 
Quarterly statements, particularly, are very largely matters of 
judgment. If the investor is to get the benefit of that at all, 
he should get the reports promptly; and, that being so, I 
think it is not right or wise to impose a penalty for errors, 
either of judgment or of fact, in statements prepared under 
those conditions.
I would like to see the provisions of Section 17 limited to 
misrepresentation in statements. I think, as a broad ques­
tion of public policy, it is not wise to impose liabilities on 
the basis of errors of judgment or of fact, where the facts 
are not definitely known and where judgment necessarily 
has to be exercised in order to reach a conclusion. That is 
the suggestion that I have on Section 17.
The Chairman. Most of these corporations make at least 
annual reports for their own benefit, do they not?
Mr. May. There should be an annual report, of course, 
sir. But I think, as a matter of fact, if I am not going too 
far afield, that a quarterly statement really is a part of what 
I may call the “paraphernalia of speculation” rather than 
the machinery of investment. It is a very striking thing. I 
do not think that there is any doubt that in Europe there are 
relatively more investors in securities and fewer speculators, 
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The speculators do their speculating on the race track, and 
they have lotteries to a greater extent. It is a very sig­
nificant thing that statements more frequent than annual 
are practically unknown in Europe.
When this question came up I cabled to my associates in 
London on this question and asked them how far quarterly 
statements were known in London. They said they did not 
know of any company that ever published a quarterly state­
ment. One or two published half-yearly statements, but the 
great majority published them only annually.
I cabled to my associates on the continent of Europe and 
they said, “Neither we nor any of our friends whom we have 
consulted know of any corporations on the continent that 
publish statements more often than annually.”
I do not think that is a mere coincidence. I think, as a 
matter of fact, a quarterly statement serves a useful purpose 
to the intelligent investors, and it is useful to the person who 
is stirring up speculation. I think, particularly, if you had 
audited quarterly statements you would be imposing a very 
heavy financial burden. The cost would be quite consider­
able. It would be practically on the investors in corpora­
tions for the benefit of speculators in securities, if it bene­
fited anybody at all—which I do not imagine is quite the line 
that you are endeavoring to follow.
Mr. Saperstein. It was suggested by the previous witness 
that one of the dangers inherent in Section 12 was that the 
information contained in these statements might be appro­
priated by competitors in this country or in foreign coun­
tries. Is there anything in your experience that would lend 
color to that suggestion?
Mr. May. Of course there is a certain weight in that 
always, but I think, generally speaking, that a little too much 
weight is attached to that. That has been a ground of 
opposition in England to the publication of any results. I 
think business men are naturally secretive. Of course the 
point has merit. I do not think you should require informa­
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tion in too great detail. I would not attach very great im­
portance to it, and I do think that when a corporation tries 
to get the benefit of greater liquidity for its securities by 
creating a market for them, it has got to pay some price for 
it; and reasonable publicity is part of the price.
The Chairman. What are your objections to a uniform 
system of accounting?
Mr. May. That is a subject that I have given a great deal 
of thought to. The fact of the matter is that accounting, 
especially industrial accounting, is essentially a matter of 
judgment, and you cannot put judgment in strait-jackets.
In the second place, uniformity, if I may say so, is illusory; 
it does not exist. Take the railroads and regulated corpora­
tions generally, and you will see a manual an inch thick, con­
taining detailed specifications as to where everything from 
a toothpick to a locomotive shall be charged; but then you 
will find that the large maintenance accounts and the large 
loss and damage accounts, and so on, are distributed over the 
year or more than a year on the basis of a budget estimate, 
and they do not represent actual expenditures at all. So that 
you do not get the uniformity and you do not get the de­
tailed accuracy that you think you do.
Take a large matter like depreciation. The variation in 
practice under a uniform classification is notoriously wide. 
The only safe thing is this: You have got to rely on judg­
ment, and judgment ought to be attended by responsibility 
for the consequences that ensue. If you have uniform ac­
counting it has got to be prescribed by somebody on the 
basis of general principles, and without any knowledge of 
the specific cases to which it will be applied. Rules are laid 
down by people who have no responsibility for the conse­
quences that ensue, either legal or moral. That is one of 
my great objections to it. My other objection is that uni­
formity means a uniformly low standard. That is neces­
sarily so. You cannot compel anybody to be conservative. 
Laws can lay down only minimum standards. It requires 
recognition of moral and ethical responsibilities to get any­
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thing higher than that; and I have no doubt in the world 
that the result of the regulation of railroads and public 
utilities has been to make their accounting less conservative 
than that of business corporations generally. I think any 
accountant who has studied the subject would agree with 
that view. Certainly that is true in my own experience 
with railroad accounts and business corporations which I 
audit. I think it is bound to be so. You would get a super­
ficial uniformity which is not real. People are misled; the 
general public are misled into thinking that accounts are 
uniform and that the accounts of different companies are in 
fact strictly comparable when, as a matter of fact, they are 
not.
The Chairman. I would like to have you illustrate that.. 
I can get your general view, but if you will illustrate it, it 
will make it a little clearer. I do not think I quite under­
stand it unless you can illustrate it.
Mr. May. When I first started in the practice of account­
ing in New York, nearly 40 years ago, nearly all the rail­
roads, when they laid down heavier rails in the place of 
lighter ones, charged the whole cost of the rails into operat­
ing expenses. Now they are required to show the excess 
weight of the old rails over the previous rails in capital. 
That is theoretically defensible, but it is practically unwise, 
in my judgment. All the way through the distinction of 
what shall be charged to capital and what shall be charged 
to expenses, which is the fundamental question of all ac­
counting, the whole tendency of regulated accounting has 
been to throw things into capital instead of throwing them 
into expenses.
Senator Kean. Would you not think that charging the 
difference between a light rail and a heavy rail to capital, 
since the rates of the railroads are based on their capital, is 
against the public interest?
Mr. May. You touch the point. In the case of regulating 
bodies, of course, it ties into the whole question of regula­
tion, and I agree with you, Senator, that it is an indispen­
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sable adjunct of the system of regulation, but nevertheless 
that particular effect of it I think is unfortunate, even if it 
is inevitable. When you get into general business you do 
not have the same considerations of rates based on capital 
structure, and I think only the unfortunate consequences 
would persist and the benefits would not be derived. That 
is my view of it. I have given the subject a great many years 
of thought.
Senator Kean. In other words, the piling up of capital 
in public utilities and in the railroads makes the capital so 
high that they can go to the commissions and demand higher 
rates than they otherwise would be able to charge?
Mr. May. That is one phase of it, Senator. But of course 
the elements on which the rates are based are: (1) return on 
capital, and (2) the actual expenses incurred. At the same 
time it increases the amount they get by way of return on 
capital, it decreases the amount they get as operating ex­
penses.
I think it is getting rather far afield, but I would be glad 
to pursue it, if it would be of interest.
Senator Kean. I think it would be interesting.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. May. The system of regulation has inevitably tended 
to bring about that result, coupled with the theory of valua­
tion which has practically prevailed in the Supreme Court 
decisions. The position has been like this. When a public 
utility or a railroad, or whatever it might be, put in its claim 
for its rate base, it added a whole lot of expenses like over­
head expenses, which in ordinary practice are charged off 
into expenses, and it took off only what was called “observed 
depreciation.” Now, regulating bodies were in the position 
of being forced to accept that by the Supreme Court de­
cisions; if they at the same time allowed these companies to 
charge the same kind of expense into operating expenses 
and to charge off larger depreciation, they would be making 
the public pay twice, and therefore, as they could not pre­
vent them from going into capital, because of the Supreme 
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Court’s decisions, they said, “All right, you must take it out 
of expenses”—which was the only alternative left to them, 
and the result has been, as I say quite confidently, that the 
accounting of public utilities and regulated corporations 
generally is less conservative than that of business corpora­
tions; and it is because I am not convinced of the benefit of 
regulation. Uniform accounting would bring everybody 
down to the standard of the lowest, which is the standard 
which can be logically established to be the minimum—the 
fear of that is why I am opposed to uniform accounting. Of 
course it would make things much simpler for us.
Senator Kean. If they charge it off in operating expenses, 
that is one charge-off for that year. When they put it into 
capital account it goes on forever?
Mr. May. That is true.
Senator Kean. Therefore it is a continual charge against 
the public?
Mr. May. That is true.
The Chairman. Are you discussing Section 18?
Mr. May. That is the section that gives the power to pre­
scribe uniform accounting. That is what I was coming to 
next.
I think those are the points that I wished to deal with, 
and I wanted to come down rather than to make a pre­
pared statement, because this is a subject that is much better 
developed by questions, and I thought if there were any 
questions that you wished to ask I would like to answer 
them, because my only object is to be helpful. I am not 
here in the interest of anybody. So far as the accounting 
profession is concerned, your Bill would apparently create 
a lot of additional work, so I would not be popular in the 
profession if I came down here and opposed it too strongly, 
perhaps. But I have tried to look at the public interest.
Mr. Saperstein. Is it your suggestion that Section 18 (b) 
be eliminated altogether?
Mr. May. I think so. As I understand, the Department 
of Commerce is at this time, through a very able committee, 
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studying the whole question of uniform accounting. It is 
a very large subject, and it does not seem to me to be directly 
relevant to the main purpose of this Bill. I think it is a 
subject that would be better studied on its merits and dealt 
with, if at all, in that way, on the basis of the results of a 
study such as the Department of Commerce is now making. 
That would be my view of the matter.
The Chairman. If we had a uniform system, it would be 
much simpler for the accountants, would it not?
Mr. May. Yes; but the real value of accounting is a 
matter of informed and independent objective judgment. 
If you are going to just follow mechanical rules you can get 
into very, very disastrous situations by doing so. I think 
anybody who has had any practical experience will say that.
Senator Kean. It would be physically impossible, almost, 
would it not, with many of these large companies dealing all 
over the world, to make inventories every quarter?
Mr. May. In the case of some of these companies it would 
be absolutely prohibitive.
Senator Kean. For instance, take the Bell Telephone Co. 
I think you audit them, do you not?
Mr. May. No; we do not.
Senator Kean. Do you audit the Steel Company?
Mr. May. That is not so difficult. We happen to be 
discussing the question with the Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey just now in regard to what an annual audit might cost.
Senator. Kean. What kind of a figure did you give them, 
if I may ask?
Mr. May. I told them it was so enormous that we could 
not make any commitment. But I should say an annual 
audit of the Standard Oil of New Jersey would probably cost, 
with all its several hundred companies included, certainly a 
quarter of a million, possibly more.
Senator Kean. A quarter of a million each time?
Mr. May. Yes. That would be doing it the quickest pos­
sible way. It would be doing it at the end of the year and 
not working on it all the way through. I should say the 
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cost of quarterly audits would probably be at least three 
times that of an annual audit. I think $750,000 for the 
Standard of New Jersey would be a very low figure for quar­
terly audits. The consequence would be that of course the 
interval required after the statements are prepared by the 
company, for the completion of the audit, would make the 
quarterly statements almost out of date. They would be 
merely able to get the June statement out unaudited by the 
time they could get the March statement out audited.
Senator Kean. That is one of the things I wanted to get 
at, that with many of these companies a public audit would 
probably not be finished much before the next audit began.
Mr. May. There is an old Latin statement which applies 
very well to quarterly statements. A quarterly statement 
that comes out promptly is valuable, but if they come out 
too late—
The Chairman. If it is convenient to you, the Committee 
would be very glad to have you submit a memorandum on 
this subject.
Mr. May. I would be very glad to do so, Mr. Chairman. 
The Chairman. We will put it into the record.
VIII
THE NATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE BILL *
SENATE 2693
MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON BANKING AND CURRENCY
(1934)
In response to the request of the Chairman made at the con­
clusion of my testimony before the Committee on March 8, 
I submit a memorandum regarding the suggestions which I 
then respectfully offered. These suggestions were briefly as 
follows:
section 12:
(a) Insert a provision enabling the regulating body to dis­
pense with the filing of quarterly statements in any case or 
class of cases in which it might deem such statement likely to 
be misleading or the filing thereof undesirable for any other 
cause.
(b) Limit the requirement of certified statements to. the 
filing annually of one balance sheet and one statement of 
income and profit and loss for a full year.
(c) Make the provision regarding certified statements suffi­
ciently flexible to permit of the distribution of the auditing 
required so far as possible over the year in such way as may 
be most desirable in the general interest.
section 17:
Limit the liability under this section to cases in which the 
issue of false or misleading statements is shown to have been 
wilful.
Note: The provisions in this section regarding the measure of damage seem 
open to criticism, but if the liability is limited to wilful misstatement this 
point becomes of minor importance.
* Cf. Testimony, Hearings, “Stock Exchange Practices,” op. cit., pp. 7183-88.
103
104 REGULATION OF SECURITIES
SECTION 18:
Strike out Section 18 (b), or amend it so as to limit the 
authority of the Commission to the power to prescribe what 
information shall be set forth in balance sheets and earnings 
statements.
Of these suggestions, that looking to the distribution of 
audit work more evenly over the year is put forward because 
on the basis of a long and wide experience I am convinced 
that the adoption of this simple proposal would add very 
greatly to the efficiency of audits and enable them to be con­
ducted at lower cost and prove generally convenient to all 
those who are concerned with the study of audited accounts 
after they have been issued. All the other suggestions are 
inspired by a profound conviction of the importance of rec­
ognizing in any such legislation that accounts are not state­
ments of fact, but necessarily represent the results of the 
application of accounting principles and judgment to facts.
The misconceptions on this point have been so widespread 
that it may be worth while to present an illustration which 
will emphasize the point I have made. I take one from the 
field of motion pictures, which has now become an impor­
tant branch of industry. The income of a motion picture 
producer is, of course, derived mainly from rentals, and is 
largely dependent on the cost of the picture and the length 
of its run. In connection with the production of the picture 
many stage properties are required which may or may not be 
useful in other productions, so that the cost may or may not 
be chargeable in total against the picture for use in which 
they are purchased in the first instance. The studio will 
naturally have large overhead expenses which must be appor­
tioned between the pictures which have been or are expected 
to be produced during the year. Some principles have to be 
adopted for apportioning this overhead expense, and there 
is need for the exercise of a considerable amount of judg­
ment in applying the principles and dealing with such ex­
penditures as those for stage properties. Supposing the cost 
of the picture to be satisfactorily determined—what propor­
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tion of this cost is to be charged against each dollar of rental 
received?
In the early days, the simple rule was adopted that all 
rentals were applied against the cost until the cost was re­
covered, and thereafter all rentals were profits. Obviously, 
such a result was conservative but quite unscientific. If the 
picture as a whole produced a profit, some part of each 
dollar of rental received should be deemed to be profit. 
After careful research it was discovered that the. earnings of 
the ordinary picture followed a more or less well-defined 
curve, being naturally greatest in the early days of presenta­
tion and gradually tapering off to zero at the end of, perhaps, 
two years. Consequently the practice became general (and 
has been recognized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue) of 
computing the income on the basis of writing off the cost of 
the picture against the rentals on the basis of such curves. 
Clearly, however, there is even greater need for the exercise 
of judgment in determining the precise shape of the curves 
to be used, and naturally when this has been done the ex­
perience of every picture will not conform to any such curve, 
so that constant watchfulness and the exercise of constant 
judgment is necessary to insure proper statements of income.
The need for judgment in selecting and applying account­
ing principles or conventions which I have shown to be 
necessary in this case is necessary in greater or less degree in 
almost every business—certainly in every case in which either 
the exhaustion of fixed property or the carrying of inven­
tories is an incident of the business. It is not true of only 
complex businesses. I chose for illustration on another occa­
sion the case of one of the unemployed who engaged in the 
business of selling apples on the street corner and continued 
in it for only four days, and showed that the same situation 
(of course, on a small scale) existed in that case.
There is no dispensing with judgment in the preparation 
of accounts. Obviously, those most intimately associated 
with the business possess in the highest degree the knowledge 
which is necessary for the exercise of judgment. But they 
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are not disinterested. The method of audited accounts 
which involves in the first instance the preparation of ac­
. counts by the officers of the company who are most familiar 
with its operations, and the examination thereof by qualified 
independent accountants possessing a wide general knowl­
edge of business and able to take a disinterested and objec­
tive view of the position is, I believe, now generally recog­
nized as the best combination that has been evolved for pro­
ducing satisfactory accounts.
In so far as principles of accounting are necessary for the 
purpose, I think corporations should be allowed to exercise 
judgment provided that they recognize certain fundamental 
principles which are so well established that they may fairly 
be given general application, and provided, also, that these 
principles are definitely laid down and consistently fol­
lowed. This method of dealing with the problem, I note, 
has recently been recommended by the Twentieth Century 
Fund as a result of its survey of the Stock Market (Stock 
Market Control by Evans Clark and others, page 174). 
Care must, however, be taken to limit the requirements of 
auditing so as to avoid making them unduly burdensome on 
the corporations and the investors therein.
With these general observations, I will proceed to a dis­
cussion of the specific suggestions which I have made.
section 12:
It follows from what I have said that there is room 
for error or difference of opinion in regard to the earn­
ings of a business corporation for any period, and, broadly 
speaking, the shorter the period the greater relatively be­
comes the possible margin of error. The extent thereof will 
vary with different businesses; it will be wide in any case 
in which inventories are large in proportion to profits, par­
ticularly if the inventory consists mainly of commodities 
which fluctuate in value. Thus monthly or quarterly state­
ments of earnings of a packing house or a leather company 
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are of little value and probably as likely as not to be mis­
leading unless accompanied by very full explanations.
It is sometimes urged that such statements are at least 
valuable because comparison with the corresponding period 
of a preceding year can usefully be made. But unless much 
more than the bare results are published, this will not neces­
sarily be true. Innumerable illustrations could be cited to 
demonstrate this point. I will take only one—a comparison 
of the earnings of a corporation engaged in the sale at retail 
of winter clothing for quarters ending in December and 
March, respectively, with the corresponding figures for the 
preceding year may be quite misleading if in one year winter 
has come early and in the other, late, so that in one case 
business was delayed until after January 1 which in the other 
case matured in December.
I have always been opposed to the suggestion that the 
New York Stock Exchange should make the publication of 
quarterly statements a uniform requirement for listing, and 
therefore I urge that power at least should be given to the 
regulating body to waive such a requirement in any case 
in which it believes that to do so would best serve the public 
interest.
If quarterly statements are to be published, I feel strongly 
that it is the duty of those who are seeking to help the public 
to emphasize the fact that while such statements may have 
value, that value is distinctly limited. This, for two reasons 
—first, that as I have already pointed out, allocations of 
profits to short periods of time can only be approximate and 
arbitrary; and, secondly, that the value of securities depends 
on the future, and that statements of past results are valuable 
mainly as they afford an indication of the reasonable expec­
tations for the future, and profits for a quarter or other 
short period are an entirely unsafe basis on which to rest 
an estimate for the future.
The Committee is naturally anxious to do what it can to 
put those possessing inside information and the members of 
the general public as nearly as possible on an equality in 
108 REGULATION OF SECURITIES
dealing in securities, but it is faced with the insuperable 
obstacle that the advantage of the insider rests upon the fact 
that he has knowledge and qualifications for estimating the 
future which are not possessed by and cannot possibly be 
extended to the general public. His advantage is not that he 
knows what the past earnings have been, but that he can 
judge what future earnings are likely to be—and no one 
would suggest that corporation executives should be com­
pelled by statute to prophesy.
To require that quarterly statements should be certified 
by accountants would be to ascribe to them an importance 
which they cannot possibly. merit. This is the principal 
reason which leads me to suggest the elimination of this 
requirement from Section 12. Other reasons are, that to 
require that quarterly statements should be audited before 
being published would involve a substantial delay in the 
presentation of figures which owe a large part of any value 
they possess to their timeliness, and that it would involve a 
very heavy burden of expense. I have no means of estimat­
ing how great this burden of expense would be, but it would 
certainly run to very large figures. I should not regard this 
as a fatal objection, but I should regard the expenditure 
as not merely wasted, but as actually being devoted to an 
undesirable end.
I believe, however, that in this matter the Congress has an 
opportunity to take a very simple but very effective step to 
improve present audit practice. The most serious problem 
which the auditors of the accounts of listed corporations have 
to face is that audits are required at the close of the fiscal 
year, and that the great majority of corporations end their 
fiscal year with the calendar year, with the result that there 
is an enormous congestion of work in a few months. The 
existence of this condition adds to the cost and detracts from 
the efficiency of audits, and it could easily be avoided by a 
simple provision such as I have proposed.
In many industries, December 31 is a most unnatural time 
for closing the accounts. In a few instances, this fact has 
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been recognized and another closing date has been selected— 
thus the packing houses generally close their accounts at the 
end of October. But assumed convenience in income tax 
affairs and similar considerations have led many corporations 
to adopt the calendar year as their fiscal year, although ac­
counts for a period ending at some other date would be more 
informative. The natural closing date for automobile and 
tire companies would be September 30 or October 31. For­
merly all the railroads closed their accounts at June 30. A 
discretionary provision such as I have suggested would admit 
of distribution of the work of auditing more equally over 
the entire year, thus not only reducing the cost and in­
creasing the efficiency of audits, but contributing to the con­
venience of the exchanges and regulating bodies and others 
who are called upon to scrutinize audited accounts when 
issued. I recognize that in the past audits of corporations 
other than financial institutions have usually been made at 
the close of the calendar year, but any inconvenience that 
might result from a change in this respect would be trivial 
in comparison with the advantages to be derived from a 
better distribution of the work of auditing over the entire 
year. Of course, the requirement of quarterly audits as pro­
posed in the bill would itself result in the equal distribution 
of work over the year which I regard as so desirable, but 
only at an undue expense to the corporation and the in­
vestors therein.
section 17:
I urge that the liabilities imposed by Section 17 should 
be limited to cases in which the issue of false or misleading 
statements is shown to be wilful, because I am convinced 
that it is contrary to the public interest to impose such lia­
bilities for honest error, either of fact or of judgment. Par­
ticularly is this true in respect of statements which are so 
largely matters of judgment as quarterly statements of profits. 
It is notorious that sometimes the most truthful statement 
may be the most misleading because of the unwarranted in­
ferences to which it gives rise.
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In the long run, the main part of the financial burden 
imposed by this Section will fall upon the corporation—that 
is, upon the investors—whereas the benefits thereof would 
accrue mainly to speculators, and I do not believe it is wise 
to place burdens on investors for the benefit of speculators.
The provisions of the Section relating to the measure of 
damages seem to me to be open to serious objection because, 
as has already been pointed out to your Committee, they 
would enable damages to be recovered which would bear no 
relation to the damage actually suffered, and this seems to 
me to be a vicious principle, particularly if it is to be ap­
plied to cases of honest error, either of fact or of judgment. 
If the Section is limited to cases of wilful misrepresentation, 
I do not suppose anyone would be concerned over a possible 
undue liberality in the measure of damages.
section 18:
I now turn to Section 18 (b), which confers on the regulat­
ing body not only the power to prescribe the form in which 
accounts shall be presented, but how profits shall be com­
puted.
I have said, and it cannot be too often repeated, that ac­
counts necessarily represent the result of the application of 
appropriate accounting principles and judgment to facts. 
Upon the soundness of the judgment employed first in choos­
ing and then in applying the guiding principles depends the 
value of the resulting accounts. Sound judgment can be 
based only on intimate knowledge and ample experience, 
and its exercise should be attended with responsibility. I 
believe the provision is unwise in so far as the Sub-section 
would vest the right to exercise this judgment in a commis­
sion which would have no responsibility, legal or moral, for 
the consequences that might ensue, and would necessarily 
lay down general rules which might or might not fit the 
specific cases to which they would have to be applied. I 
recognize that similar powers have been vested in the Inter­
state Commerce Commission and other bodies; but while our 
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theories of rate regulation probably necessitated some such 
procedure in the case of railroads and other public utilities, 
the results are to my mind none the less unfortunate because 
they may have been inevitable.
In the first place, the idea that uniformity can be attained 
and the exercise of discretion rendered unnecessary by rules, 
however detailed, is entirely illusory. Today, after more 
than a quarter of a century of intensive development of the 
accounting classifications of the Interstate Commerce Com­
mission, it is still possible to produce widely different ac­
counting results from a slight difference in the form of treat­
ment of substantially identical transactions. Moreover, 
under those classifications, while manuals running to hun­
dreds of pages exist in which the treatment of innumerable 
items large and small is prescribed in meticulous detail, it is 
still necessary to allow the railroads to determine the 
monthly charges to many important operating accounts on 
the basis of budget estimates of future expenditures. In re­
spect of other important elements, such as depreciation, the 
practice of regulated companies still varies widely. Mean­
time, the uninformed public assumes a uniformity and a 
comparability between accounts of different railroads and 
utilities which does not exist and can never be attained.
In the second place, uniformity necessarily means a uni­
formly low standard—indeed, laws can do no more than lay 
down minimum standards; higher standards can come only 
as the result of the recognition of ethical and moral obliga­
tions. The accounting standards of the majority of indus­
trial corporations with which I am acquainted are distinctly 
more conservative than those of regulated corporations.
In 1932, a committee of the American Institute of Ac­
countants, as a result of a study of the general question, 
rendered a report, a copy of which was put in evidence, be­
fore the Senate Committee by the Chairman of the Commit­
tee on Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange on Janu­
ary 12, 1933. In that report, the Committee recommended 
to the Exchange, inter alia, to use its influence:
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To make universal the acceptance by listed corporations 
of certain broad principles of accounting which have won 
fairly general acceptance, and within the limits of such broad 
principles to make no attempt to restrict the right of cor­
porations to select detailed methods of accounting deemed 
by them to be best adapted to the requirements of their 
business; but:
(a) To ask each listed corporation to cause a statement of 
the methods of accounting and reporting employed by it to 
be formulated in sufficient detail to be a guide to its account­
ing department; to have such statement adopted by its board 
so as to be binding on its accounting officers; and to furnish 
such statement to the Exchange and make it available to any 
stockholder on request and upon payment, if desired, of a 
reasonable fee.
(b) To secure assurances that the methods so formulated 
will be followed consistently from year to year and that if 
any change is made in the principles or any material change 
in the manner of application, the stockholders and the Ex­
change shall be advised when the first accounts are presented 
in which effect is given to such change.
(c) To endeavor to bring about a change in the form of 
audit certificate so that the auditors would specifically report 
to the shareholders whether the accounts as presented were 
properly prepared in accordance with the methods of ac­
counting regularly employed by the company, defined as al­
ready indicated.
I believe that this method of approach to the problem 
would prove more practically effective than an attempt to 
institute uniform accounting. I understand, however that the 
Department of Commerce is at the present time conducting 
a study into the whole question of uniform accounting and 
uniform statistics. Legislation on the subject does not seem 
to me to form an essential part of a law the primary purpose 
of which is the regulation of stock exchanges and stock ex­
change practices, and I would urge that Sub-section 18 (b) 
should be eliminated and the whole question dealt with on 
its merits in the light of full information such as I trust will 
be developed through the inquiry to which I have referred. 
Respectfully submitted,
March 10, 1934. George O. May
IX
INFORMATION FOR INVESTORS
THE TASK OF THE NEW SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION *
(1934)
Among the encouraging signs of the times are the first official 
actions of the Securities and. Exchange Commission and the 
public statements of its Chairman, which indicate a disposi­
tion to deal with the problems entrusted to the Commission 
in a practical manner and with a desire to be helpful to the 
investor rather than to stress the punitive and restrictive 
possibilities of the law.
The importance of the Commission’s attitude is obvious. 
Admittedly, the possibilities of more substantial recovery 
turn largely on the extent to which the demand for capital 
goods can be stimulated. There is no question as to the 
magnitude of the potential demand for such goods. In con­
versation recently, an executive indicated that in his own 
industry, three or four hundred million dollars could ad­
vantageously be spent in modernizing its equipment. How­
ever, the easy days in which new construction could be 
financed from undivided profits have come to an end. In 
the main, new construction waits on new financing; new 
financing, in turn, awaits the revival of confidence, and noth­
ing is so essential to a revival of confidence as an administra­
tion of the new laws relating to security issues which will 
not subject corporations to excessive burdens nor the honest 
and well-informed executive or director to unreasonable 
hazards.
The new Commission would seem to be tactically in an 
extremely favorable position to give the needed impulse to 
business. It is an entirely new body and is therefore un-
• An unpublished memorandum written in 1934.
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fettered by precedents—at the same time, it includes in its 
membership two former members of the Federal Trade 
Commission, who must be thoroughly familiar with the 
problem and with the impracticalities of the procedure re­
quired under the Securities Act of 1933. The Commission 
has been granted by Congress power to make rules which 
will not only bind but protect—indeed, the provision 
whereby persons acting in good faith in accordance with 
any regulations of the Commission are protected even 
though the regulations shall subsequently be revoked or 
held contrary to law, is potentially at least the most im­
portant amendment contained in the Act of 1934.
The difficulties of the task of the Commission must not, 
however, be underestimated. The greatest of all difficulties 
is to disabuse the public mind of the idea that regulation 
can secure safety of investment, and to protect it from the 
promoters of corporations which have no past and very little 
future, and who found it much easier to comply with the 
Securities Act of 1933 than did the established business cor­
porations. Another is to make the public realize what ac­
counts can and do mean, and what they do not and cannot 
possibly signify.
In the matter of earnings, for instance, what the investor 
would really like to know is what the business is going to 
earn in the future; but all that it is possible to tell him is 
what the business has earned in the recent past, according 
to a method of computation which is necessarily based 
largely on estimates and conventions.
Ideally, the proponents of an issue, who should have made 
a sufficient investigation to enable them to judge for them­
selves how far results of the past are likely to be reproduced 
in the future, should give to the potential investor the bene­
fit of their judgment on this point. When an issuer volun­
tarily gives information regarding the past he, unless he 
indicates otherwise, impliedly represents to the public that 
he regards the . experience of the past as a reasonable indica­
tion of the probabilities for the future. When, however, 
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such information is given under the compulsion of a statute, 
obviously there is not the same implication. The Act, by 
way of alternative, contemplates that the issuer shall give a 
mass of supplementary information which would supposedly 
aid an intelligent investor in forming an opinion of his own 
on this vital point. The defect of this procedure is that the 
potential investor, who has not the ability to make an ex­
haustive study nor a financial interest that would justify him 
in doing so, may be left in a position of attempting to dis­
cover a needle in a haystack.
The Commission must expect that any regulations which 
it may put forward will be met with criticism from two sides: 
issuers of securities will complain that the regulations call 
for useless information; while potential investors will com­
plain that the resulting statements afford no clear or simple 
guide to the merits of the investment. Experience has, it 
is believed, already demonstrated the desirability of curtail­
ing the volume of the historical information to be embodied 
in the registration statement; but what is even more needed 
is a procedure under which it would be possible for issuers 
to select that part of the information still required, which 
they might regard as most vital, and furnish it to potential 
investors, without incurring penalties for doing so. The 
fact that further information would be on file with the 
Commission, and the existence of organizations created for 
the purpose of analyzing such information, should form an 
adequate protection against any gross abuse of such a pro­
cedure in connection with reputable issues. In the long 
run, whatever statutes may do, the investor will have to 
depend very largely upon the character of the management 
of the enterprise in which he proposes to invest, and the 
character of those upon whose recommendations he makes 
the investment. The whole purpose of securing information 
in regard to enterprises in which investment is contemplated 
is to form a basis for inferences and judgment. Unless the 
inferences and judgment are wisely formed, the mass of 
underlying information is valueless, if not misleading. It 
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is the quality and the emphasis rather than the quantity of 
information that is important.
It is to be hoped that the Commission will receive the 
hearty cooperation of those best qualified to be helpful in 
the performance of its task, and that its rulings will be re­
ceived sympathetically. We have made great progress from 
the early days of 1933, when it seemed as if justified indig­
nation at then recent revelations had created a determina­
tion to punish bankers and to produce a law which not even 
the most ingenious lawyer could evade, which somewhat 
obscured the interests of investors and the needs of the 
country’s industries.
It is to be hoped and expected that the Commission will 
not be led astray by the deceptive promise of uniform ac­
counting, especially in view of the thoughtful and convinc­
ing discussion of this question contained in the report of 
the Committee on Statistical Reporting and Uniform Ac­
counting for Industry to the Business Advisory and Planning 
Council for the Department of Commerce. It will no doubt 
use all its great influence to bring about by voluntary action 
as great a degree of uniformity in different industries as is 
obtainable, and will insist on consistency from year to year 
in the accounting of each corporation subject to its regula­
tion. Here again, however, we have the position that if an 
issuer voluntarily uses a method of accounting, he implies 
to the investor that it is a fair way of determining profits 
as a guide to the future; but if he uses a method under com­
pulsion, he makes no such implied representation.
There is little doubt that the fantastically high prices of 
utility securities during the boom were partly the result of 
a belief that public utility accounting, being under regula­
tion, must be more reliable as a guide to investors than other 
accounting. The fact, as students of the question are aware, 
is that public utility accounting was and is far less conserva- 
tive than that of the responsible industrial concerns which 
offered their securities to the public. It is today possible 
for a regulated utility to use in the sale of securities state­
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ments of account which conform to the regulations of the 
body to which they are subject and are therefore acceptable 
under the Statute, but which would and should be rejected 
if proffered to the Securities and Exchange Commission by 
an industrial corporation.
The utterances of the Chairman of the Commission sug­
gest that it will face in a realistic spirit each of its three major 
tasks, viz.:
(1) To frame regulations which will give investors rea­
sonable information about respectable issues without 
placing undue burdens on the issuers;
(2) To make harder the work of those who seek to ex­
ploit cupidity by worthless issues;
(3) To educate investors to discriminate between securi­
ties and to appreciate both the value and the limita­
tions of investment information.
It should not be forgotten that the evils of the pre-depres­
sion period were mainly connected with high-pressure sales­
manship, and that except in the important respect of dis­
closure of the interests of those concerned in the issue, stand­
ard prospectus practice here was probably better than in any 
other important financial center. The Investment Bankers’ 
Code has done much to curb the evils connected with high- 
pressure salesmanship and has helped to bring about a fa­
vorable Situation for the creation of a sound system of dis­
tribution of securities.
XDISCUSSION OF COMMISSIONER LANDIS’ PAPER BY 
GEORGE O. MAY
AT THE MEETING OF THE AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 
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I did not have the opportunity of knowing what Mr. Landis 
was going to say until I came here this morning, so that 
what I say may probably be very disjointed.
The last note that Mr. Landis struck impressed me as 
much as any. Many of us differ as to the wisdom of the 
scheme of the Securities Act, but I think all those who have 
been in touch with the administration of it have been im­
mensely impressed with the understanding, the cooperative 
spirit and the efficiency with which it has been administered 
by the Commission of which Mr. Landis is now the head.
That, to my mind, is the great hope, because we account­
ants all know that a system is usually less important than 
the way in which it is administered. A good comptroller 
can make a success of a bad system and a bad comptroller 
can make a mess of the best system that can be devised.
I have seen, with regret, Mr. Kennedy leave the Com­
mission, and my great fear is that we may not continue to 
have the benefit of the services of men like Mr. Landis as 
long as we should like. There is always a call for such men, 
and how long they will resist the call is hard to know, but 
certainly I think I speak for all those who have to do with 
the Commission in saying that I hope Mr. Landis will stay 
as long as possible, because he has that great quality which 
is essential in his work: that if he reaches a conclusion on 
purely intellectual premises, he is quite willing to modify 
it in the light of actual experience, and has no hesitation 
in changing his mind. We have had to change our minds, 
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and it has been very nice to find the Commission was also 
willing to change its mind.
Those who came in at the beginning and realize the prob­
lems are the ones who can do the most efficient work in de­
veloping the administration of this task along the lines that 
are essential if it is to be a success.
I particularly welcome what Mr. Landis said about a 
shortened prospectus. In one of my discussions with the 
Commission I suggested that the first thing to be determined 
was the maximum useful length of a prospectus, and as much 
material as could be fitted in that should be chosen, with the 
rest eliminated. I think there is something in the thought. 
If we can find some way of permitting a short prospectus I 
think that would meet a lot of the criticism today because 
one criticism today is, I think, on the lack of emphasis in a 
prospectus.
Mr. Landis spoke of the importance of facts. I would 
slightly modify his statement and suggest that the implica­
tions that are drawn from the facts are the really important 
things. The fact that a company earned $1,000,000 last 
year is of very little importance to the future investor unless 
it implies there is a prospect of its earning $1,000,000 in 
another year. That is where the prospectuses of today are 
deficient as I see it; they do not place any emphasis on 
the essential points. There is a great deal of good informa­
tion in the prospectus; there is no doubt about that. There 
is even more that is good in the registration statement. 
There is more brandy in a plum pudding than you could 
put in a liqueur glass, but if you want to get a stimulant 
you would be wiser to drink a glass of brandy than to at­
tempt to digest a plum pudding; and if Mr. Landis can 
develop a procedure in which those who want a glass of 
brandy can get it, and those who want a plum pudding can 
take it and pull out their own plums, I think that would be 
a great step forward.
Mr. Landis spoke about accounting, and I think he was 
a little optimistic in suggesting that it was only the ignorant 
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or small investor that was still under the belief that book 
values of assets could be realized without question. I think 
the belief is much more widely spread than his remarks sug­
gested.  I welcome one thing the Commission did par­
ticularly, and that was its emphasis on such points as that, 
and on the fact that accounting cannot be a rigid and in­
flexible thing but requires the exercise of judgment, and 
must change as conditions change.
In connection with another matter which I am dealing 
with, I came across two decisions of the Supreme Court 
which emphasize how even in law, opinions change. In 
the famous Knoxville Water case the Supreme Court talked 
about the necessity of providing for depreciation of prop­
erty as it occurs. That was in 1909, but if you go back to 
1878—or 1876—you will find the Supreme Court saying that 
it is a matter of common knowledge that people seldom set 
aside any provision for depreciation, and in a case in which 
a railroad sought to deduct depreciation in an accounting 
with the Government, it flatly denied the right to do so and 
said that only the actual amount expended could with any 
propriety be deducted or charged against earnings.
Personally, I have always regretted that in the presenta­
tion to Congress and to the country of the questions involved 
in the Securities Act more emphasis was not placed on the 
inherent dangers of what we are pleased to call investment, 
and the fact that the degree of hazard in seasoned enter­
prises is not going to be very materially affected by the dif­
ference between the kind of requirements that we have now 
and the requirements that used to exist. I wish more had 
been done to discourage speculation, and I am rather afraid 
that the tendency of the Securities Exchange Act is to en­
courage speculation, and I think that is a bad thing. We 
are always in a hurry. We want radical solutions and we 
want quick results. Those characteristics, and the habit of 
issuing questionnaires (which I think is one of the most per­
nicious practices that has developed), are some of our na­
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tional habits that seem to me to be reflected to a large extent 
in the present Securities Act.
The Securities Act is defective, as I see it, in that it com­
bines two inconsistent theories: (1) enacting numerous spe­
cific requirements, and (2) adding a general requirement 
that all material facts shall be stated. The moment you 
require a whole lot of information to be stated, you take 
the emphasis and implications off those statements. In the 
old days no respectable accountant was willing to certify to 
the statement of earnings for a prospectus for the past three 
years, let us say, unless he believed that those three years 
were a reasonable indication of what might be expected in 
the future, and I think that an issue that put forth a state­
ment of that kind implied that was a reasonable indication 
of what might be expected in the future. When you are 
required by law to give the three years’ figures, that implica­
tion no longer exists, and I think what you are giving to 
the investor in the way of additional information you are 
largely taking away in the form of depriving him of the 
benefit of judgment as to the implications of figures which 
are often far more important than the figures themselves.
I would like in concluding, if I may, to mention one more 
point. It relates to the Securities Exchange Act. I fear 
that the attempt to tie together the Securities Exchange Act 
and the Securities Act—the annual report and the prospectus 
—is going to have many very unfortunate effects. It is again 
emphasizing the point of view of the speculator rather than 
the investor. The annual report is essentially historical, 
and the prospectus is a statement put forward deliberately 
to induce people to buy. The annual report is not so in­
tended. It is a report of stewardship by the stewards of a 
business. The attempt to convert it into a new edition of 
a prospectus is, to my mind, fraught with very serious dan­
gers, and I think ought to be given a great deal of considera­
tion. Prospectuses, I think, will become less informative if 
that policy is pursued, because already one finds a disposi­
tion on the part of executives to be unwilling to present
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figures in a prospectus in any different form from that pre­
sented in an annual report. In the old days the standard 
practice was to make such adjustments as were necessary to 
convert figures in an annual report which were part of a 
historical statement into figures that were appropriate in a 
document designed to sell securities. • I would like to em­
phasize very strongly the difference between an annual report 
and a prospectus in that respect, and urge it should be kept 
constantly in mind in any regulations under the Act.
I will conclude my remarks as I began them, if I may, by 
asking you to believe that nothing that I have said is in­
tended to be in the nature of hostile criticism of the acts 
of the Commission. I think I can speak for all of the ex­
perts with whom I have been in touch in saying that we 
regard its administration as highly efficient and sympa­
thetic. My only fears are: First, that we may not be able 
to retain the services of those who are now giving us such 
excellent service; and, secondly, that there is always a danger 
that the efficiency of administration may blind us to defects 
of the law or the system that is being administered. I stress 
those two notes because I had a good deal of opportunity 
to see the working of the Revenue Act of 1917, which, as 
it left Congress, was about as unworkable a piece of legisla­
tion as was ever presented to an administrative group. A 
very able group of volunteers, called together by the present 
Secretary of Commerce, and headed by Dr. Adams, whose 
services in the field of taxation we can never too highly 
praise, undertook that administration and did a perfectly 
remarkable piece of work. Then the emergency passed and 
those men went out of office. The administration fell into 
less competent hands—into the hands of people with less 
interest in accomplishing something really worth while, with 
the result that much of the work of that early group was 
reversed or destroyed. The damage was mitigated in that 
case because it was a tax bill for only a single year, but it 
brought home to me very strongly the dangers that are in­
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herent in, allowing an unsound system to continue because 
it is being well administered.
While I think there is much that is good in the Act, there 
is much yet to my mind that needs to be eliminated, and I 
trust that Mr. Landis and his colleagues will remain in office 
at least long enough to make the changes which I am sure 
they, better than most people, must realize to be necessary.

PART V
TAXATION

A. GENERAL
I
THE TAX MAZE *
(1925)
I
Maze.—A structure consisting of a network of winding 
and intercommunicating paths and passages arranged in be­
wildering complexity, so that without guidance it is difficult 
to find one’s way in it.—Oxford Dictionary.
The erection of the statue of Alexander Hamilton in front 
of the main Treasury Building in Washington raises the 
question who is to occupy the corresponding position in re­
lation to the new Treasury Annex, devoted to the uses of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue. The action of Congress on the 
Mellon tax plan last year suggests that the claims of the 
present Secretary would not—at this time, at least—be favor­
ably considered. It may be that, rather than undertake the 
invidious task of passing on the relative claims of present- 
day statesmen, such as Representative Volstead and Secretary 
McAdoo, it would be safer to resort to classical mythology. 
A dethroned Bacchus is the first idea that suggests itself, but 
for a Bureau that includes the Income Tax unit as well as 
the Prohibition unit is there not at least as strong a claim 
to be made for Daedalus? And it was the same Congress 
which by the Volstead Act dethroned Bacchus that in its tax 
law outbuilt Daedalus. In maintaining its supremacy Con­
gress has been at this disadvantage: that the labyrinth of 
Daedalus was designed only to entoil new victims, none of 
whom escaped to return and make a second attempt to solve 
its intricacies, whereas Congress had to prepare for adven-
The Atlantic Monthly (April, 1925). 
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turers who. would return year after year. It must be ad­
mitted that hitherto Congress has been extraordinarly suc­
cessful in introducing new complexities with sufficient fre­
quency to preclude any possibility of victims’ acquiring 
familiarity with its maze; but is it right to ask or even to 
permit Congress to continue this effort indefinitely? Should 
not Congress now attempt to achieve something of the 
breadth and simplicity of the architecture of Athens, instead 
of continuing to emulate the complexities of Crete?
Those who are compelled to study the tax maze find in it 
an extraordinary series of contradictions. One of the most 
striking is seen in the lengths to which Congress goes on 
some points to define its purposes and to avoid leaving any 
discretion to the administrators of the law, and in the enor­
mous range of discretion left to the administration on other 
points, with utterly inadequate provision made to ensure 
that such discretion shall be exercised on adequate informa­
tion and competent advice. Pages of an Act are devoted to 
explanations on such points as when an organization is a 
reorganization and when a dividend is not a dividend, and 
most specific rules are laid down for the guidance of the 
Commissioner on such matters, yet a brief clause in the Act 
may be the sole authority of and the sole limitation on the 
Commissioner in dealing with subjects of vast importance.
That the impossibility of dispensing with discretion in 
administration is realized by some in Congress, but not by 
others, is indicated by the following colloquy between mem­
bers of the Senate Committee investigating the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue:
Senator Couzens. But we want to know what the ques­
tions are at issue so we can pass a law to cover such cases, 
instead of leaving it discretionary.
Senator Ernst. I tell you, Senator, you will not be able 
to pass a law or laws that will cover all the questions that 
will arise in these cases, even though you pass laws from now 
until the end of time.
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In the Act of 1918, in which the rates of tax ran as high as 
82.4 per cent on corporations, deductions were authorized 
for a reasonable allowance for depreciation, based on the 
value of property at March 1, 1913. This simple clause im­
plied the making or approving by the Commissioner of valu­
ations of practically all the depreciable business property in 
the United States that was in existence at March 1, 1913: a 
problem in valuation far greater and of far more immediate 
and practical effect than the valuation of the railroads, on 
which the Interstate Commerce Commission and the rail­
roads have spent upwards of ten years and upwards of 
$100,000,000 without completing the task. A provision for 
the amortization of the cost of war facilities entailed the 
even more difficult task of deciding what these facilities 
would be worth at some time in the future, and under con­
ditions not easily capable of anticipation.
A clause allowing a deduction for depletion of natural 
resources implied a similar task of valuation as at March 1, 
1913, in relation to the entire natural resources of the coun­
try; and in the Act of 1921 this task was complicated by the 
allowance of a further deduction in determining the taxable 
income from operations of oil and mining properties, in 
respect of the appreciation in value resulting from the dis­
covery of minerals in hitherto unproven areas. This allow­
ance not only ran counter to the whole general theory of the 
law and placed the industries concerned in a specially fa­
vored position, but it also created an administrative task of 
the utmost difficulty.
The discretion given to the Commissioner in regard 
to methods of valuing inventories involved the decision 
whether millions of dollars should be accounted for as in­
come in years in which they would be subject to a tax of 50 
per cent or more, or in years in which they would be subject 
to little or no tax.
The burden of dealing with these problems was imposed 
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on a Bureau that had been formed only a few years earlier 
and had been administering a tax so low—1 or 2 per cent— 
as to be a matter of comparative indifference to taxpayers. 
Yet Congress created no new machinery to enable the Bureau 
to cope with its enormously increased burdens and responsi­
bilities.
Not only do these and similar problems in taxation in­
volve in the aggregate billions of dollars, but there are a 
large number of individual cases in which millions or tens 
of millions are involved. In such cases the taxpayer can 
afford to lavish money and skill on the study of every phase 
of the case, and on the development of a form of presenta­
tion that will bring out the strong and minimize or conceal 
the weak points. Consider for a moment the way in which 
these cases are finally decided: on the one side the taxpayer 
with millions at stake, familiar with every strength and 
weakness of his position, advised possibly by an expert whose 
compensation is contingent on results and who is therefore 
personally interested in the outcome to the extent of tens or 
hundreds of thousands of dollars; on the other side, the 
Government representatives without the skill, the time, or 
the organization to develop the case adequately, serving for 
a low salary, with little prospect in the way of promotion, 
with no interest in the result of the controversy except to 
avoid prejudicing their position in the Bureau—unless, per­
chance, there be hope of appearing some day on the other 
side of the table for other taxpayers—and possessing no ele­
ment of strength except the power of decision. It is in­
evitable that, in a large number of cases, either the Govern­
ment’s representatives will be overborne by the weight of 
the taxpayer’s case, which they are unable to answer, or that, 
realizing this inability but feeling that it may be due less to 
the validity of the taxpayer’s contentions than to the inade­
quacy of the Government’s means of refuting them, they will 
fall back on their power of decision and take an arbitrary 
position without attempting to justify it. In either case it 
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is unlikely that even approximate justice will have been 
done.
It would be idle to suggest that the blame rightly attaches 
to Congress in all the many cases in which the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue has been subjected to legitimate criticism, 
just as it would be unfair to ignore the large amount of ear­
nest, intelligent, and often really admirable work that has 
been performed in that Bureau.
In the circumstances outlined, however, a Senatorial in­
vestigation was hardly needed to show that the administra­
tion of the law has been far from perfect, or to prove that 
the administration has resulted in gross inequalities between 
taxpayers. It was obvious from the first that this must be 
so, but no more obvious than that the high tax laws were 
bound to operate with gross inequality, even if they could 
be perfectly administered. For instance: capital is a factor 
in producing income in almost every business activity, its 
influence varying in degrees by infinitely small gradations 
from practical insignificance to paramount importance. Yet 
in the Excess Profits Tax Law (1917) Congress attempted 
to draw an arbitrary line and to divide businesses into two 
classes, those in which capital is a material income-producing 
factor, and those in which it is not. Not only so, but it 
actually enacted the law in such a way that the minimum 
tax—8 per cent—fell on income derived from every business 
falling on one side of the arbitrary line of cleavage, and the 
highest rate of all—perhaps 60 per cent—fell on those busi­
nesses which happened to lie just on the other side of the 
line. In doing so it enacted a provision which was bound 
to create the grossest inequalities.
All this, however, while regrettable, was largely inevitable 
and, viewed in its proper perspective, constitutes only one 
of the minor injustices of war. Why one taxpayer should 
retain 40 per cent and another 80 per cent of the profit he 
made out of the war is a trivial question compared with the 
question why either should retain any profit when the soldier 
in the line suffered hardship, injury, and possibly loss of 
132 TAXATION
life, for a mere pittance. The only possible answer is, in 
both cases, that those measures had to be adopted which 
seemed at the time most likely to expedite the winning of 
the war and the termination of the whole series of injustices 
that were its inevitable accompaniment. What is both re­
grettable and preventable is that six years after the Armistice 
so many of the important tax-controversies should be still 
unsettled, and that, in regard to personal income taxation 
at least, our law should still operate in the same hit-or-miss 
fashion, and with inequalities almost as great as any that 
existed at the height of war taxation.
In liquidating the assets of a business the course most com­
monly followed is to realize in the ordinary way as much of 
the assets as can be disposed of within a reasonable time, 
and then to get rid of the remnants by some unusual and 
sweeping procedure. This analogy might well have been 
followed in the settlement of war taxes; and there is little 
doubt that even now the disposition of the outstanding tax­
cases of the war years on broad lines would prove far more 
beneficial, both to the Government and to the taxpayers, 
than the continuance of the present weary process, and 
would be likely to come just as near a theoretically correct 
solution. Competent and disinterested advisers have re­
peatedly suggested in the past the constitution of a commis­
sion of high quality and large powers to dispose of all pend­
ing tax-questions relating to the war years, and the sugges­
tion still holds the field, as presenting the best prospect of 
a satisfactory solution of this problem which the war has 
left us.
. The settlement of large tax-cases calls, not for fine distinc­
tions and meticulous accuracy, but for breadth and soundness 
-of judgment based on wide experience, and for courage; and 
it would have been advantageous to taxpayers and the Gov­
ernment alike if the major cases could have been dealt with 
promptly and finally by a body possessing those qualifica­
tions. The number of cases in which taxpayers have paid 
substantially more in taxes for the war years than they were 
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prepared five years ago to pay is undoubtedly small com­
pared with the number of cases in which they have paid, or 
will pay, far less than they would then gladly have paid in 
final settlement. Taxpayers in the aggregate have probably 
lost as much in expense and in diversion of thought and 
effort to tax matters as they have saved in taxes, and the 
country as a whole is the poorer, not only for this wasted 
effort, but for the demoralizing effects of tax controversies 
as they are now too often conducted.
III
As regards current taxation: while the problems of valua­
tion which have been referred to still remain, their impor­
tance in the case of corporations has become much reduced 
since the tax on corporations has been stabilized at the rela­
tively low level of 12.5 per cent. In the field of personal 
income taxation, however, the rates of tax are still high 
enough to make the inequalities in its incidence a serious 
matter for those affected.
Here again is contradiction. One observes how wide the 
net is cast to catch even the smallest of fish, and next one 
observes how large are the holes through which even the 
big fish may escape.
The chief executive of a foreign company who passes 
through the United States on his way around the world is 
held up at his port of embarkation and, because during his 
stay in the country he has devoted a few days to calling on 
agents or customers of his firm and discussing business with 
them, is told that he must pay income tax on a correspond­
ing proportion of his annual salary, as being income derived 
from sources within the United States. He might be par­
doned for characterizing our system as closely approaching 
conformity to the first two definitions of Euclid, and con­
sisting of a law having length without breadth, administered 
by persons having position but not magnitude.
A nurse, not yet naturalized, who upon going abroad with 
her employer finds that in case she might not come back she 
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must pay fourteen dollars income tax, which she is assured 
will be refunded to her if she returns, and who is told on 
her return that there is no appropriation out of which her 
payment can be refunded, may not unnaturally feel that 
the United States is engaged in a rather petty business.
Nor, surely, could any doubts regarding the meticulous 
care with which the law is administered survive a reading 
of the recently published decision which, first holding that 
a cash allowance to an officer for uniforms was income to 
the recipient and the cost of the uniforms not an allowable 
deduction, went on to specify that epaulets and campaign 
bars were business expense, but cap devices and chin-straps 
were not.
Such cases indicate how wide is the net and how small the 
mesh. On the other hand, the recent publication of tax re­
turns is in itself a sufficient demonstration of the size of the 
holes.
No one familiar with American business or social life, who 
has given even the most casual perusal to the published lists, 
can entertain any longer the belief that our present income- 
tax law possesses the basic justification of an income-tax sys­
tem, that it levies taxation substantially in accordance with 
ability to pay. Any inferences that might be drawn from 
the published lists regarding an individual taxpayer might 
be wholly unfair, because under our system an individual 
of large regular income may have been liable for only a very 
small tax, by reason of capital losses or other factors deter­
mining his tax liability. But when name after name has 
set opposite it a tax figure which is ridiculously small in 
proportion to the obvious income and ability to pay of the 
taxpayer, even the most ardent advocates of the policy that 
has inspired our laws must admit that those laws have not 
up to now been effective in taxing large incomes with any­
thing like the degree of universality and equality that is 
necessary to justify their existence and continuance.
Though the recent publication of tax returns has led to 
a clearer and more general realization of the inequalities of 
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personal income taxation, it was not needed to demonstrate 
their existence. As Secretary Houston said in his annual re­
port for 1920;
Tax returns and statistics are demonstrating what it 
should require no statistical evidence to prove . . . the fact 
remains that to retain such rates in the tax law is to cling to 
a shadow while relinquishing the substance.
While the rates when he spoke were higher than those of 
today, his comment is still largely applicable. But though 
Secretary Glass and Secretary Mellon have taken the same 
stand, Congress has refused to heed their advice and has 
continued to impose high rates of tax which in fact are, 
broadly speaking, not paid as contemplated by Congress, ex­
cept by those whose income is earned and those possessors 
of investment income who are unwilling to adopt ordinary 
methods of avoidance.
It may be worth while briefly to consider some of these 
methods.
IV
Apart from the creation of trusts, the three principal meth­
ods of avoidance are, perhaps: investments in tax-exempt 
securities; losses, real or artificial; and the transfer of prop­
erty to corporations that pay few or no dividends. The crea­
tion of trusts seems to stand on a somewhat different footing 
from the others, since it does involve the taxpayer’s divesting 
himself of property, or at least of the income from property, 
though it may be in favor of a near relative.
Of the three remaining methods of avoidance, investment 
in tax-exempt securities is the surest, in that the protection 
it affords is based on the Constitution, and therefore the tax­
payer resorting to it is not under the necessity of keeping a 
weather eye constantly lifting for any action of Congress that 
might affect his status. On the other hand, though the cost 
is small in proportion to the tax saved in the case of a 
wealthy man, it is nevertheless substantial.
Hence, while many prefer the freedom from both anxiety 
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and tax which tax-exempt securities afford, and are willing 
to pay the price, others prefer to risk hazards of the tax in 
an effort to secure immunity at low cost. And those who 
determine thus to venture into the labyrinth readily find 
daughters of Minos who know something of its secret and 
are willing to aid them; though, warned perhaps by the fate 
of Ariadne, they may insist that their reward be ample and 
well assured before that aid is given.
The success which has attended such efforts in the case of 
owners of investment income is notorious, and seems to have 
aroused the envy of some who have paid a higher price for 
immunity from tax by going into the tax-exempt field. Thus 
we have the spectacle of occupants of the invulnerable shelter 
of the tax-exempt stimulating and endeavoring to direct the 
attack on those who have found other and more precarious 
shelter.
In the law of 1924 Congress largely deprived the second 
method, that of taking losses, of its efficiency by limiting the 
saving in tax in respect of losses to 12.5 per cent of the loss; 
before doing so, however, it limited the tax on capital gains 
to 12.5 per cent, thus abandoning the attempt to levy high 
surtaxes on this form of income.
The third method, of transferring property to corporations 
which pay few or no dividends, continues to flourish, not­
withstanding that it has been the special objective of the at­
tack of a large section of Congress. Each new Revenue Act 
has contained a new provision for taxing undistributed 
profits, but there is little reason to think that even the latest 
effort will prove generally effective.
It will be observed that these various methods of avoid­
ance, as well as the limitation of tax oh capital gains to 12.5 
per cent, ease the burden on the capitalist, but afford no 
means of escape to those who derive their incomes from their 
own efforts or the products of their own brains, and not from 
accumulated capital. Indeed, among the many contradic­
tions found in the law, perhaps the most striking of all is 
that under legislation admittedly framed, not with an eye 
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single to fiscal requirements, but with the avowed purpose 
of striking at the rich, the burden of the tax should in actual 
operation fall most heavily on earners who have little or 
nothing in the way of accumulated savings; and that special 
relief should be granted, not to those who are adding to the 
wealth of the country by their researches, their inventions, 
and their toil, but to the beneficiaries of unearned increment 
and to those whose profits are derived from the exhaustion 
of the natural wealth of the country. True, Congress in the 
Act of 1924 pretended to give relief to earners, as urged by 
Secretary Mellon, but the relief was so paltry as to be a 
mockery.
Some optimists may think that patient revision of the tax 
laws would in the course of time suffice to make the present 
high rates generally effective and equal in their incidence; 
they can, however, have little conception of the actual work­
ing of this laborious process of trial and error. A hole in the 
law is detected and a provision is enacted for the purpose of 
stopping that hole. To the extent that the provision is re­
troactive the action taken may prove immediately effective, 
and as our tax laws from 1913 to date have been retroactive 
to the extent of a minimum period of six months in the case 
of the law of 1924, and a maximum period of fourteen 
months in the case of the law of 1913, the extent of this effec­
tiveness may be considerable, though its justice may be open 
to question.
The first effect of such a provision—aside from possible 
retroactivity—is a temporary suspension of the class of activi­
ties aimed at, while the tax lawyers, who include in their 
numbers some of the keenest minds in the country, decide 
on a modified course of procedure that will avoid the letter 
of the provision. Once such a procedure is developed, it 
quickly becomes common property among the class affected. 
The Government, however, remains in ignorance of its adop­
tion, perhaps, until it comes to light two or three years later, 
in the course of the review of the returns in which the effects 
of the new provisions of the law were expected to be made 
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manifest. When this happens the dreary round begins again, 
and it will continue so long as Congress refuses to recognize 
what successive Secretaries of the Treasury of both parties 
have pointed out—that it is attempting the impossible.
The various revisions of Section 220 imposing a tax on un­
distributed profits have caused stockholders much anxiety 
but little or no taxes, and there are large groups of rich men 
on whom the high surtax rates have been not a direct but an 
indirect burden. Undoubtedly the indirect burdens have 
been substantial. One form of the burden is the loss of 
income resulting from substituting tax-exempt securities for 
other forms of investment yielding higher returns, another 
the cost of advice on methods of avoidance. Another form 
occurs where the taxpayer transfers his property to a corpora­
tion; in such cases the difference between the normal tax on 
individuals of 6 per cent and the corporation rate of 12.5 
per cent together with the capital-stock tax, which has been 
estimated to be equivalent to a tax of 1.5 per cent on income, 
may be regarded as in some measure a commutation of the 
surtax rates, and the amount, say 8 per cent, is not incon­
siderable.
In this case the corresponding benefit does accrue to the 
Government, and the taxation of corporations at a rate sub­
stantially higher than that on individuals is perhaps the most 
practically effective measure for higher taxation of the rich 
that Congress has adopted, though not primarily designed for 
that purpose.
Undoubtedly, also, the reduction of the tax on capital 
gains to 12.5 per cent has resulted in large sums being taxed 
at that rate which had avoided, and would have continued 
to avoid, taxation, at the regular surtax rates. Taxpayers 
controlling sources of income who were unwilling to take 
steps that would subject them to high surtaxes have consum­
mated transactions that have resulted in their receiving as 
capital gains substantially what they were unwilling to re­
ceive as regular income. The capital gains reported in re­
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turns of over $1,000,000 in 1922 were greater than the entire 
net income reported in such returns in 1921.
Apart from their indirect effects and regarded solely as sur­
taxes, however, it is not putting the case too strongly to say 
that the higher rates have been as capricious and generally 
ineffective in their incidence as personal property taxes ordi­
narily are. So far as they have been effective they have fallen 
—and still fall—most heavily on earned income. Indeed, as 
advisers such as Dr. T. S. Adams pointed out to the com­
mittees in charge of the 1924 Bill, the reduction of 25 per 
cent in respect of earned income, which was urged by Mr. 
Mellon, would not have put its beneficiaries in a preferred 
position, but would merely have helped to redress the dis­
crimination against them which in practice resulted from the 
law of 1921 and continues today.
v
The question has been and will be asked, why the high 
surtaxes should not be made more generally effective. It is 
impossible to deal fully with this question in a short article, 
but the basic reason is the elusive and Protean character of 
income. When and in what amounts income arises from 
a series of transactions are largely questions of opinion and 
business practice—questions, moreover, which cannot be sat­
isfactorily answered unless the substance rather than the 
form is allowed to control the decision.
Great Britain attains a certain measure of success by re­
stricting its taxation to recurring income, and laying down 
only very broad principles, which are administered by a 
highly trained and relatively well-paid civil service, vested 
with a very wide discretion. We, in reaching out for more, 
aiming perhaps at a higher ideal have only too often, in 
Secretary Houston’s language, “grasped the shadow and 
missed the substance.”
Further, the attempts to set forth in legislation what pre­
cise transactions of a non-recurring character give rise to tax­
able income result mainly in the great bulk of essentially 
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similar transactions taking a slightly different form, not cov­
ered by the letter of the law.
If the maximum tax on individuals were reduced to a rate 
reasonably close to the corporation income-tax rate, whole­
sale avoidance would cease, simplicity would become pos­
sible, and the law would acquire that substantial equality of 
incidence and that universality which it now so completely 
lacks. Such a policy, it is believed, would be entirely com­
patible with the fiscal requirements of the United States and, 
like the reduction in tax on capital gains to 12.5 per cent, 
would bring under the surtaxes large amounts of income 
which up to now have escaped them.
Even, however, if surtaxes be substantially reduced, we 
should recognize that in some future emergency high taxes 
on income may become a national necessity, and should en­
deavor to put our income-tax system on a basis which would 
enable high tax-rates to be levied more simply, more equi­
tably, and more effectively than has been accomplished under 
recent and existing laws.
Prohibition of future issues of tax-exempt securities is 
clearly one of the first and most important requirements to 
this end. No part of the nation’s wealth should be in the 
position in which tax-exempt securities now are, that of be­
ing immune from taxation in any national emergency, how­
ever great.
A marked advance would also be made if a clearer concep­
tion and a closer agreement could be reached on just what 
is income and when it emerges. At present commercial and 
accounting ideas on these questions are at variance with the 
judicial decisions, with some economists holding still differ­
ent views. Much of the inconsistency and vacillation in the 
income-tax administration may be attributed to differences 
between the legal and the accounting schools of thought, and 
to fluctuations in the degree of influence exercised by mem­
bers of the two schools.
Our general theory of income taxation differs very ma­
terially from that of the much older British system, with 
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which comparisons are most commonly made; but there is 
little reason to suppose that the differences are the result of 
careful consideration leading to the conviction that our 
methods are sounder, more practicable, or better adapted to 
our conditions. If our legislators found their inspiration 
in England, the home of the income tax, it must have been in 
the maze of Hampton Court, not at Somerset House.
Great Britain, it must be realized, possesses a number of 
natural advantages in imposing income taxation, such as the 
single Parliament, the absence of any constitutional limita­
tions, the compactness and homogeneity of its territory; it 
also has the advantages of experience and a long-established 
civil service of high quality arid traditions. Further, its 
income-tax system antedates the modern industrial develop­
ment, which, therefore, in its growth has adapted itself to an 
existing income-tax scheme, whereas we are imposing an 
income-tax law on an already highly developed industrial 
and commercial organization. Those who have studied the 
proceedings of the last British Commission to report on in­
come tax will appreciate how important a factor this is con­
sidered to be by British income-tax authorities. In these cir­
cumstances, the fact that British taxation has been restricted 
as it has possesses a special significance. It is only fair to 
point out that our freedom from tradition perhaps makes us 
more ready to deal with new issues in novel ways; and that 
our tax law, for instance, seems to be a distinct advance over 
the British on such matters as relief from double taxation, 
reciprocal exemption from taxation of international trans­
portation, and taxation of income from international trade 
in general.
At present our law is being developed by court decisions 
dealing with single aspects of the question, the taxpayers’ 
views on which are usually presented fully and skillfully with 
a view to securing the decision and without regard to the 
effect on the law as a whole. The Government’s counsel have 
neither the time nor the technical advisers to enable them 
to present such cases in their proper relation to the whole 
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subject of income tax, if indeed they are able to present the 
particular aspect involved in any given case with a skill or 
thoroughness approaching that of their opponents.
Court decisions, moreover, are governed largely by earlier 
decisions, rendered in a comparatively early stage of our com­
mercial development and under conditions wholly unlike 
those now existing.
If the income-tax law could be taken out of politics and a 
body created in which the legislature, the administration, 
the interested professions—law, engineering, and accounting 
—the business world, the economist, and the individual tax­
payers could all be represented, a new and sounder under­
standing of the problem might be attained, which would be 
of permanent value to the country.
If we cannot revise our income-tax system on its present 
lines so as to make it reasonably equitable and simple, and 
so as to rid us of methods of avoidance that are demoralizing 
to taxpayers and that make a mockery of the law, let us seek 
some new approach to the whole question. No better time 
could be selected for such a search than the present, when the 
country is prosperous and the Treasury overflowing, and yet 
the memories of the problems of war taxation are fresh in 
our minds.
VI
Summing up these reflections, the chief evils of our in­
come-tax situation are, perhaps: the unsettled taxes for the 
war period, an unsound surtax system, and a law that at­
tempts to be too specific on some points while leaving far 
more important decisions on other points to the adminis­
tration—these last two leading to bewildering complexity, to 
wholesale and successful avoidance, and hence to gross dis­
crimination.
The suggestions to which they lead are neither novel nor 
revolutionary; they are, first: that even now a commission 
to clear up the old war taxes would be desirable; second: that, 
unless and until surtaxes at the present rates can be admin­
istered with a reasonable degree of equality and generality 
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of application, they should be reduced to a level at which 
those essentials of a sound tax system can be attained; and 
third: that the issue should be taken out of politics and a 
highly competent, nonpartisan body should be created—quite 
distinct from any body created to deal with the war taxes— 
in which the various elements of our community interested 
or able to make valuable contributions would be represented, 
to study the whole subject and to suggest revisions of our 
general scheme to make it simpler and more effective, and 
particularly to fit it for the strains that may require to be 
imposed on it in some great emergency in the future.
To accomplish this end we. must impart breadth to the 
law instead of making it an ever longer and more intricate 
maze. If, further, we could revise our civil service, so as to 
make it appeal to men of greater magnitude than we can 
possibly hope to attract and hold—except in a small number 
of cases—under our present system, we should have laid the 
foundations of a sound income-tax system, which would be 
the mainstay of the Federal fiscal policy in normal times and 
would be invaluable in times of emergency. The only losers 
would be those “taxperts” who look forward to a long run 
of the present tragi-comedy, in which they may profitably 
play the role of Ariadne to the Daedalus of Congress.
II
THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS *
(1922)
The treatment of capital gains under a steeply graduated in­
come-tax law constitutes one of the most difficult problems 
in fiscal legislation, as is sufficiently evidenced by the changes 
contained in successive revenue acts, impartial students of 
the subject will, it is believed, agree that the present state 
of the law is not satisfactory, and among the remedies which 
are receiving consideration is the abandonment of the taxa­
tion of capital gains and of the allowance of capital losses 
as a deduction from taxable income. In Great Britain, 
where capital gains have not heretofore been taxed or capi­
tal losses allowed as deductions, the question is being debated 
whether some change in the law is not necessary on account 
of the avoidance of taxation of what is essentially income 
by clothing it in the garb of capital. The time, therefore, 
seems opportune for a discussion of the problem.
1. THE NATURE OF CAPITAL GAINS
By capital gain is meant the profit upon the realization 
of assets otherwise than in the ordinary course of business, 
this profit being the excess of the proceeds of realization over 
the cost of the property realized.
In considering the proper treatment of capital gains under 
an income-tax law, it is desirable to keep in mind three 
different causes which may make a capital gain possible. 
These are:
(1) Change in absolute value due to natural growth or 
similar causes.
(2) Change in relative value of property in comparison 
with other property, due to external causes.
* Harvard Business Review, Vol. I (October, 1922). Cf. below, pp. 319-335.
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(3) Change in the money value of property due to depre­
ciation or appreciation of currency.
 In most cases, of course, a capital gain is due to a combi­
nation of these influences, some perhaps operating in a fav­
orable, others in an unfavorable, direction. All three, for 
instance, operating favorably might be found on the sale 
in the spring of 1919 of a privately owned barrel of whisky 
bought as new whisky in 1913. There would be first the 
increase in absolute value due to aging, second the increase 
in relative value due to the legislation enacted in January, 
1919, and third the increase in money value, common to 
nearly all property, resulting from the expansion of currency 
and credit during the war.
Looking at the problem from the standpoint of principle, 
the gain due to the first cause is clearly only a special form 
of investment income and therefore naturally comes within 
the purview of an income tax. Gains due to the second cause 
are real gains, and therefore fairly taxable, even if not ordi­
nary income. Indeed, if discrimination in favor of earned 
income as against investment income is well founded, it 
may well be argued that these gains from unearned incre­
ment should be regarded as less entitled to consideration 
than ordinary recurring investment income.
Gains from the third cause are more apparent than real. 
There would seem to be no true income or gain from sell­
ing property at double its cost, if everything which can be 
bought with the proceeds is also selling at double its former 
price. This has been a common situation in recent years and 
has been complicated by the factor of involuntary sale or 
realization. In recent tax laws attempts have been made to 
meet it: first, by replacement fund provisions under which 
no taxable profit is deemed to be derived from an involuntary 
sale if the proceeds are put aside to be employed in replac­
ing the property; and, secondly, by the provisions in the 1921 
law permitting exchanges of property without any liability 
to taxes as a result thereof.
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IL RELATION OF CAPITAL LOSSES TO TAXATION OF CAPITAL 
GAINS
As a practical proposition it would be impossible to ana­
lyze every capital gain into its component elements and ap­
ply different rules to different elements. In particular it 
would be a hopeless task to convince the average taxpayer 
who had completed a transaction showing a loss, that he 
should pay a tax on the transaction because the loss was 
found upon analysis to be made up of an increase of value 
due to the first or second of the three causes above mentioned 
and therefore taxable, offset by a larger loss arising from 
the third cause and therefore outside the scope of the tax 
law.
The alternatives, therefore, are to tax all gains or to ex­
clude all gains, except such as can be covered by simple 
rules. In considering the question whether capital gains 
should be taxed, the successive points which arise are:
(1) Is it in principle desirable to tax capital gains?
(2) If so, should capital losses be allowed as a deduction 
from taxable income?
(3) If both the first and second questions are answered 
in the affirmative, how serious are the dangers of 
evasion and how far is it practicable to guard against 
them?
It must be understood that the danger of avoidance is not 
disposed of by excluding capital gains and losses from the 
scope of the income tax, as is evidenced by the movement in 
England already referred to. A majority of economists 
would probably take the view that capital gains are not a 
proper subject for taxation under the guise of an income 
tax. Apart from this technical point, however, it would seem 
that in principle capital gains would form a most appropri­
ate subject of taxation, and the Supreme Court has held that 
they can be taxed as income. Some theoretical considera­
tions have already been briefly recited. Among other rea­
sons which would have weight with a statesman as well as
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with a politician is the fact that the great accumulations of 
wealth by individuals in the country have largely been the 
result of capital gains, and the salary- or wage-earning 
classes might quite naturally feel that they were being un­
justly discriminated against if they were taxed on their sala­
ries or wages and the large capital gains of the very wealthy 
should escape taxation. Moreover, even if the taxation of 
capital gains be regarded as necessarily involving the allow­
ance of capital losses, it would seem that treating both on the 
footing of income would ordinarily be expedient in a de­
veloping country in which naturally the capital gains would 
far exceed the capital losses. This proposition is, however, 
subject to the important qualification that it holds only so 
long as the form and degree of taxation are not such as to 
discourage the realization of gains and encourage the taking 
of losses, and thus to cause a serious disturbance of the 
normal balance between gains and losses.
Turning to the second point, while it may seem that in 
justice the rules regarding gains and losses in a tax law 
should be as nearly as possible similar, it may be recalled 
that this principle has not usually been applied in our in­
come-tax laws. Even in the case of ordinary business, until 
the enactment of the present law, a taxpayer who made a 
profit on trading in one year and an exactly similar loss in 
another paid tax on the profit and obtained no relief in re­
spect of the loss. As regards losses not incurred in the tax­
payer’s trade or business, the Act of 1913 allowed no deduc­
tion and the Act of 1916 allowed a deduction only to the 
amount of the gains of a similar character included in the 
same return. The tax rates under these Acts were, how­
ever, small as we now reckon tax rates, and the problem 
becomes difficult only when taxes are large. In 1917 when 
the maximum rate of tax was increased from 15 to 67 per 
cent, the limitation on the deduction of losses contained in 
the Act of 1916 was continued; but in 1918 when the maxi­
mum tax was still further increased to 77 per cent, all limita­
tions on deductions of capital losses were removed.
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Even under this law if a taxpayer pursued the even tenor 
of his way undisturbed, taking capital gains or capital losses 
as his judgment of present and prospective values dictated, 
and entirely uninfluenced by tax considerations, he was not 
in the position that tax relief resulting from a loss was ex­
actly equivalent to the tax burden resulting from an equal 
gain. Such a taxpayer, if he incurred losses, was thereby 
relieved from surtax at the rates he would have paid on 
his regular income; if on the other hand he made a profit, he 
paid surtaxes at the higher rates applying to income in ex­
cess of his regular income.
Thus, to take the case of a man who had a regular income 
in each of the years 1919 and 1920 of $50,000 and sold one 
investment at a capital loss of $20,000 on December 31, 1919, 
and another at a capital gain of $20,000 on January 1, 1920; 
in 1919 he paid on an income of $30,000 a total tax of $3,890, 
in 1920 on an income of $70,000 a total tax of $16,490, to­
gether $20,380. If, however, both transactions had fallen 
in the same year he would have paid on an income of $50,- 
000 in each year a tax of $9,190; a total for the two years 
of $18,380, and his capital gain, therefore, cost him in taxa­
tion $2,000 more than he saved on his capital loss though 
the tax rates were the same in both years.
However, this discrimination against the taxpayer was of 
relatively minor consequence compared with the whole­
sale loss to the Government resulting from the fact that 
taxpayers liable to heavy rates of surtax very generally re­
frained from taking profits, but not from taking losses. It is 
impossible now to estimate the loss of taxes which resulted 
from this disturbance of the normal policy of investors, but 
it must have been enormous. At the same time transfers 
which were desirable from the broad standpoint of public 
welfare were retarded or prevented. Men of advanced years, 
who were anxious to turn over their business affairs to 
younger and more vigorous men, were deterred from doing 
so by the tax which would have fallen upon them in the 
event of a sale, and in innumerable ways the ordinary course 
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of business was affected by the artificial restraint on sales at 
a profit and the encouragement of sales at a loss.
To meet some phases of the problem, extensive new pro­
visions were introduced in the Act of 1921, mainly in two 
forms: (1) the limitation of the tax on capital gains in the 
case of investments carried more than two years to 12½ per 
cent, and (2) provisions under which capital assets could be 
exchanged rather than sold without any tax being incurred. 
Under this law the rule that what is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander invoked by taxpayers in support of the 
removal of the limitation on deductible losses in 1918 was 
waived in favor of the taxpayer. Logically, the converse of 
the first provision just referred to would have been that a 
taxpayer sustaining a capital loss should pay the ordinary 
tax on his regular income and deduct therefrom 12½ per cent 
of the amount of his capital loss. The Act, however, permits 
him to save the maximum surtax he would otherwise have 
paid. Thus to use the same illustration as before, under the 
existing law a taxpayer with a regular income of $50,000, a 
capital gain of $20,000 in one year, and a capital loss of $20,- 
000 in the next, pays over the two years $2,800 less than if 
both transactions had occurred in the same year.
In the case of the very wealthy, therefore, the present law 
makes it distinctly advantageous to take capital gains one 
year and pay a maximum tax of 12 per cent thereon and take 
capital losses in another year, saving the maximum surtax to 
which the taxpayer would otherwise have been liable.
The position in regard to the exchanges is even more un­
favorable to the Government. A taxpayer holding stock of 
the A. B. Company desires to dispose of it and reinvest in 
the stock of the C. D. Company. If the present market value 
of the stock of the A. B. Company is less than its cost to him 
he sells this stock and buys the stock of the C. D. Company 
and is entitled to a deduction from his taxable income of the 
loss on sale. If, however, the market value of the stock of the 
A. B. Company is above cost, he arranges an exchange of this 
stock for stock of the C. D. Company with a cash adjustment 
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and under the law he derives no taxable gain and therefore 
pays no additional tax.
From this brief summary it will be seen that in less than 10 
years the relation between the provisions regarding capital 
gains and those regarding Capital losses has been changed 
from one of marked disparity in favor of the revenue to an 
even greater disparity in favor of the taxpayer. Probably, 
every change has operated to the detriment of the revenue 
except to the extent that legislation has been retroactive and 
heavy taxes have been levied on transactions which would 
never have been consummated if a change in the law had 
been anticipated. Retroactive legislation, however, is not 
a desirable practise; and while it was doubtless justified in a 
time of world warfare, it should be banned for the future, 
like many other practises developed during the war.
The above history of legislation since income taxes be­
came possible on March 1, 1913, suggests that though the 
disparity in favor of the taxpayers may be lessened, it would 
not be practicable, even if desirable, to restore the old dis­
parity in favor of the Government. It will be assumed, 
therefore, that if capital gains are to be taxed, capital losses 
must be allowed as deductions on at least an equal basis. 
Though specific provisions may facilitate tax avoidance or 
make it more difficult, the Treasury in dealing with all such 
problems suffers from the fundamental disadvantage that 
it is the taxpayer who not only decides the time and the form 
of transactions giving rise to capital gains or losses, but 
exercises the option whether they shall take place or not. To 
use a military analogy, the initiative, whose value in war­
fare is universally recognized, is always with the taxpayer. 
The Treasury has its fixed defences; the taxpayer moves only 
after careful study of these defences, and it is not surprising 
that the Treasury, with a defence impregnable against a 
frontal attack, often finds itself helpless against an envelop­
ing movement which attacks it in the flank or rear. This 
disadvantage is increased by the fact that the distinction be­
tween ordinary income and capital gain is often a fine one, 
CAPITAL GAINS 151
and a slight change in the form of the transaction may throw 
it into one class or the other. If, therefore, the Government 
decides to tax capital gains and allow capital losses as deduc­
tions, the taxpayer can refrain from taking gains but may 
take losses. If on the other hand the Government should ex­
clude capital gains and capital losses from the scope of the 
income tax altogether, there is danger of transactions which 
essentially give rise to income being cast into such a form 
that the gain would technically be held to be a capital gain. 
How fine the distinctions are, and incidentally how unex­
pected may be the results to the Government and to the tax­
payer of any action outside the ordinary course of business 
in a time when tax laws are rapidly changing both in form 
and in degree of severity, is very well illustrated in the case 
of the Phellis or du Pont case. This case and the Rocke­
feller-Prairie Oil and Gas case decided by the Supreme Court 
at the same time, constitute two of the most complete, and in 
amounts involved the most considerable, of the Pyrrhic vic­
tories of the Treasury in tax litigation. The point at issue 
was not, of course, whether the transaction involved resulted 
in a capital profit or in a profit in the nature of ordinary 
income, but what might seem a much simpler question, 
whether it resulted in any profit at all.
III. THE PHELLIS CASE
The amounts involved in the Phellis case are so large and 
its features so striking as to make it worthy of detailed con­
sideration.
The facts are briefly that the E. I. du Pont de Nemours 
Powder Company of New Jersey in 1915 transferred all its 
assets to a Delaware company in consideration of debentures 
and stocks of that company, and retaining debentures of the 
Delaware company equal to the par of its common stock 
(approximately $30,000,000) distributed to its common stock­
holders- two shares of Delaware company stock for each 
share of New Jersey company (or an aggregate of $60,000,- 
000). The market value of the Delaware company’s stock 
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at the date of distribution was $347.50 per share. The Su­
preme Court has now found that this distribution was a divi­
dend taxable to the stockholders of the New Jersey com­
pany, and by this decision has added to the taxable income 
of 1915 an amount of approximately $210,000,000, or nearly 
5% of the total taxable income disclosed by all the indi­
vidual tax returns of that year.
The five judges of the Court of Claims agreed in the view 
that in substance there was no income to the stockholders 
of the New Jersey company because the stock of the Dela­
ware company represented the same property and business 
as the stock of the New Jersey company had previously repre­
sented. This view was supported, however, by only a minor­
ity of the Supreme Court, the majority finding that both in 
substance and form the stock of the Delaware company con­
stituted real income to the stockholders of the New Jersey 
company.
In passing, it may be remarked that while each of the 
courts looked beyond the form and discussed the substance 
of the transaction—one finding that in substance there was 
no dividend, and the other that the whole of the stock of the 
new company at its market value constituted a dividend—in 
neither Court was a third alternative discussed which seems 
most accurately to reflect the substance of the transaction. 
This alternative is that the stock of the new company repre­
sented substantially what the old stock had previously repre­
sented, and that the old stock, .which after the transaction 
represented only an equal amount of debentures of the new 
company, was the real dividend. In substance the position 
of the stockholder after the transaction was almost identically 
the position in which he would have been placed had the 
New Jersey company created $30,000,000 of debentures and 
issued them to the common stockholders by way of dividend, 
or even if it had sold $30,000,000 of debentures at par and 
paid the cash to its stockholders. After the transaction, the 
stock of the old company represented to the stockholder of 
the old or New Jersey company something severed from 
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the du Pont property and business which he could realize 
without reducing in any degree his proportionate interest 
in the general du Pont assets.
The controversy extended over six years, during which 
anyone who was a stockholder at the time of the reorganiza­
tion and who subsequently sold a part or the whole of his 
stock in the Delaware company was unable to determine 
whether under the income tax law he had made a profit or 
loss by doing so. If, for instance, such a stockholder sold 10 
shares of the Delaware company’s stock for $2,000, the trans­
action would on the Government’s theory result in a de­
ductible loss of $1,475. If, however, the Government’s 
contentions were overthrown, the result would be a taxable 
profit of a rather greater sum. The Government having 
won, it is interesting to consider what this victory has gained 
for it and what has been, or will be, the cost.
The keynote of the decision by which the Supreme Court 
held that stock dividends were not taxable was perhaps the 
statement that a stock dividend provided nothing out of 
which the stockholder could pay a tax without parting with 
some portion of his interest in the corporation. Assuming 
that the taxpayers who were called upon in 1921 to pay sur­
taxes on the profits which they are deemed to have made in 
the transaction of 1915, should have had recourse to the sale 
of their stock to provide funds with which to pay their tax, 
what will their position be?
The market value of the stock of the Delaware company 
was at the time of the decision roughly par. Any holder who 
received his stock as a dividend in 1915 pays tax in that year 
on the basis of a value of $347.50 a share, and if he sold 
in 1921 he is entitled to claim a loss on sale in 1921 of 
$247.50 a share. In 1915 the normal tax was 1 per cent and 
surtaxes beginning at incomes of $20,000 ranged from 1 to 
6 per cent; in 1921 the normal tax was 8 per cent and sur­
taxes beginning at incomes of $5,000 ranged from 1 to 65 per 
cent. It will be apparent, therefore, at once how great the
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advantages of the decision to a taxpayer may be. Taking by 
way of illustration the case of a married man without de­
pendents whose income apart from the dividend in 1915 or 
sale of stock in 1921 was $7,500 in each year, and assuming 
that he held 10 shares of the New Jersey company’s stock and 
received 20 shares of  the Delaware company’s stock as divi­
dend in 1915, and that he sold this stock in 1921 at $100 a 
share, it will be found that the dividend does not bring him 
into the surtax class for 1915, so that he has no additional tax 
to pay for that year, but the loss of sale in 1921 reduces his 
taxes for that year from $320 to $2.
Multiplying the figures twenty-fold and taking a man 
whose income was $150,000 in each year and whose original 
holdings of the New Jersey company’s stock was 200 shares, 
it will be found that the addition of the dividend to his in­
come for 1915 increases his taxes for that year by $5,950, and 
the loss on sale in 1921 decreases his taxes for that year by 
$51,650.
The full effects of the decision are not reflected even in 
these figures, as had the opposite decision been reached there 
would have been a taxable profit instead of a loss on any 
sale of stock in the Delaware company. Presumably the de­
cision will also involve considerable saving of tax to the 
Delaware company.
No doubt some stockholders had sold a part or all of their 
stock prior to 1921 and in other cases the stock is held by 
persons who would not, and perhaps could not, without diffi­
culty, sell any great proportion of their holdings. The cost 
of the victory to the Government will therefore probably not 
come near its potential limits.
It is, however, reasonably certain that the cost to the 
Government in the form of taxes lost will enormously exceed 
the additional taxes recovered as a result of the decision. 
One is tempted to ask questions like those of the children 
in Southey’s poem “After Blenheim,” and one finds no 
answer except Kaspar’s:
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But what they fought each other for
I could not well make out.
But everybody said,’ quoth he, 
‘That ’twas a famous victory.’
A similar analysis of the Rockefeller and Harkness cases 
would lead to a similar conclusion.
The claim of the Government was at best largely technical, 
since it could not be said that the du Pont stockholders real­
ized true income from the transaction in an amount ap­
proaching the two hundred millions which the Court held 
must in law be deemed to be derived therefrom. The case 
turned on the special facts of a very unusual transaction and 
established no new principle, and the net result of upholding 
the Government’s contentions was bound to be a loss of 
revenue. It is surprising, therefore, that the Government 
did not accept the verdict of the Court of Claims.
The position after this decision and the stock dividend 
decision (Macomber v. Eisner) would have been most unsatis­
factory if Congress had not in the Act of 1921 provided in 
substance that no income should be deemed to be derived 
from corporate reorganizations.
The interest of the case, in relation to the subject of this 
discussion, lies in the evidence it affords of the room for wide 
difference of opinion concerning the income-producing effect 
of a transaction, even if the question is considered with re­
gard to its substance and not merely to its form. The room 
for difference of opinion on the question whether some of 
the complicated transactions of modern corporate finance 
produce income in the narrower sense, capital gains, or no 
gain or income at all, is obviously even greater.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Study of the subject over a period of many years has 
led the writer to the conclusion that while either course is 
fraught with danger and tax avoidance on a large scale is 
bound to continue as long as high rates of surtaxes are main­
tained, the losses of revenue involved in the taxation of capi 
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tal gains and the allowance of capital losses as deductions 
from taxable income are on the whole greater than those in­
volved in the opposite course; and further, that the margin is 
so great as to outweigh the consideration that in principle 
it is preferable to tax capital gains. Neither the war period, 
with its extravagant gains and unmerited losses, nor the 
period of readjustment immediately after the war was an 
opportune time for a change of policy in this regard. As, 
however, we get back to more normal conditions, such a 
change seems worthy of the most serious consideration, more 
especially as the existing law in remedying defects of the old 
law has created new opportunities for tax avoidance from 
which the Government is bound to suffer very heavily.
If capital gains and losses are in general to be excluded 
from the scope of the income tax, safeguards will be neces­
sary to prevent a wholesale escape from taxation of income 
by conversion into capital form. It is believed, however, that 
three provisions would be sufficient to prevent the great 
bulk of such evasion, namely:
(1) That where a capital gain or a capital loss arises in re­
spect of an asset, which from its nature is subject 
to a natural increment or decrement in value, any 
gain shall be deemed to be income to the extent of a 
reasonable return on the investment for the period 
during which it has been held. Conversely, the na­
tural decrement should be allowed as a deduction 
from taxable income.
(2) That where property is disposed of within, say, two 
years of its acquisition, the transaction shall be 
deemed to be a trading transaction and not a capital 
investment.
(3) A provision under which the tax would be levied 
on the sale of stock of corporations, particularly pri­
vate corporations, where it might appear that there 
was a profit which was attributable to the accumula­
tion of undivided profits by the corporation and that 
the sale was made to avoid the imposition of the tax 
which would be assessed on such profits if distributed 
as dividends.
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Of the three provisions it is believed that only the third 
would offer serious difficulty in its formulation, and it should 
readily be possible to surmount these difficulties with the 
assistance of a group of persons familiar with business prac­
tise and with tax procedure.
Doubtless the adoption of this suggestion would involve, 
the definite abandonment of a large amount of revenue which 
the Government ought some day to receive, but it is not be­
lieved that the sacrifice of revenue which the Government 
would otherwise be likely to receive would approach in 
amount the increase in revenue that would result from 
the elimination of deductions for losses.
Tax avoidance on a substantial scale would doubtless con­
tinue even if the suggestion were adopted, but this is bound 
to be true under any law so long as the extreme surtaxes 
now in force are continued. Most students of the subject 
are in agreement with the views expressed by the Secretary 
of the Treasury in his letter to the Chairman of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means of April, 1921, that the 
immediate loss of revenue that would result from the repeal 
of the higher surtax brackets would be relatively small, and 
the ultimate effect should be an increase in the revenue. 
Congress apparently clung to the outworn idea that such a 
repeal would result in a loss to the Treasury for the sole 
benefit of the rich. It will, however, ultimately be forced 
to recognize the shortsightedness of its policy, especially 
having regard to the existence of the huge volume of tax- 
exempt securities.
In justice to the present Congress one must recognize that 
not only is the problem an extremely difficult one, but it is 
made more difficult by the sacrifice of sound principles to 
political expediency in the original adjustment of income 
taxation to war necessities. Given a business world organ­
ized largely in the form of private companies which are prac­
tically incorporated partnerships, a world in which business 
transactions may readily be cast into different forms so as to 
produce ordinary income or capital gains as may be the more 
158 TAXATION
advantageous and given also a huge volume of tax-free se­
curities; under such conditions the combination of a low 
normal tax on income of individuals and corporations with 
very high surtaxes is neither equitable nor effective. This 
is equally true whether capital gains and losses are treated 
as entering into the determination of income or not. The 
form of tax avoidance changes to meet either rule. The 
only real solution is to reduce the disparity between normal 
taxes and surtaxes.
Had the Congress recognized these facts in war time and 
raised the normal tax and the lower range of surtaxes to 
higher levels as urged by the Treasury, it would have been 
possible later to make reductions all along the line. It is 
not surprising however that the present Congress should 
look askance at a proposal to increase the normal tax and the 
lower surtaxes and reduce the higher surtaxes. Though in 
reality such a scheme would be sound finance and benefit 
the entire community, it seems on the surface too much like 
a scheme to relieve the rich at the expense of the relatively 
poor to be expedient from the standpoint of party politics. It 
is certain, however, that the high surtaxes will prove increas­
ingly ineffective and injurious the longer the present system 
is continued.
In the meantime, it is believed that the revenues can be 
increased, tax avoidance greatly diminished, and greater 
equity secured by the abandonment of the rule of taxing of 
capital gains and, conversely, of allowing capital losses as a 
deduction from taxable income.
III
TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES
(1923)
(1) TAX EXEMPTION AND THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE * 
The report on tax-exempt securities which has been pre­
pared by the committee on taxation of the Chamber of Com­
merce of the State of New York and which is to be considered 
at the meeting of the Chamber tomorrow is a singularly un­
convincing document. That the committee should report 
adversely upon the Constitutional amendment prohibiting 
the further issue of tax-exempt securities was not wholly un­
expected, but it is to be hoped that the Chamber will not 
adopt the resolutions suggested unless stronger arguments 
can be adduced than are to be found in this report.
The Chamber certainly owes it to itself to insure that 
whatever action it takes shall be based upon broad and 
statesmanlike grounds, and not upon such narrow consider­
ations as are embodied in the committee’s report. That docu­
ment deals with the question of tax exemption as if it were a 
minor problem in arithmetic, and both its statement of the 
problem and its arithmetic contain egregious errors. For 
example, it compares the position of the holder of $1,500,000 
of 4 per cent tax-free bonds with that of a man whose income 
of $60,000 is wholly taxable, and reaches the conclusion that 
the former, by foregoing 1 per cent interest on his invest­
ment in return for the tax-exemption privilege, incurs a 
sacrifice of $15,000, while the latter’s sacrifice is only $11,940. 
Clearly, however, the comparison of the bondholder should 
be made with a man whose income after taxes amounts to 
$60,000; that is, with a man whose income is roughly $80,000.
* An editorial contributed to the New York Evening Post (January 31, 
1923).
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In that case his taxes would amount to $19,940, compared 
with the sacrifice of $15,000 by the bondholder. The cor­
rection of the committee’s arithmetic completely destroys 
its conclusions and makes the case cited really an argument 
against tax exemption.
This case, however, is not a common one. Ordinarily the 
taxpayer will invest in taxable securities up to the point 
where tax exemption becomes really profitable, and in tax- 
exempt securities for the rest of his capital. A comparison 
of such a case with that of a savings bank investing the sav­
ings of the poor in State and municipal securities brings 
out clearly the way in which tax exemption operates to re­
lieve the large taxpayers at the expense of the less fortunate. 
The question, however, involves much more than the elimi­
nation of minor inequalities in taxation. Perhaps that de­
fect alone would hardly be sufficient to justify invoking the 
complex machinery for amending the Constitution. Nor 
does the case rest mainly on the argument that it encour­
ages municipal waste and unwise extension of municipal 
enterprise, though this argument should appeal to members 
of the Chamber who “know the blighting influences of Gov­
ernment ownership,” as another report to be considered at 
tomorrow’s meeting states that they do. It is indeed disturb­
ing to note that issues of municipal securities have increased 
over 300 per cent in ten years, while the issues of railway, 
industrial, and public utility bonds have increased only 
about 70 per cent.
The strongest argument for the abolition of tax exemption 
is to be found in the principle that in a democratic state 
it is altogether wrong that any substantial part of the coun­
try’s wealth should be immune from taxation. A body which 
indorsed conscription of men in war time should hesitate to 
take the stand that billions of the nation’s wealth should be 
free not merely from conscription but from taxation in time 
of war.
If the Chamber finally decides to come out for tax exemp­
tion it should make it clear that in reaching its conclusions 
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it has had due regard for these and many other broad con­
siderations in favor of the amendment which have been 
brought forward by such of its advocates as R. C. Leffingwell, 
former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and the Daven­
port committee. It should certainly not base its action upon 
any such narrow, and incidentally inaccurate, statement of 
the case as is contained in the present committee’s report.
(2) TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AS ISLE OF SAFETY *
I regret that the Chamber of Commerce, in view of the 
clearly expressed doubts of its committee on finance and of 
the Secretary of the Treasury regarding the correctness of 
the premises on which the committee on taxation based its 
report on the tax-exemption amendment, did not yield to 
the request of a large percentage of the members in attend­
ance for an opportunity for fuller and more adequate dis­
cussion of this important question. Had I secured the 
floor, as I endeavored to do, I should have given specific 
illustrations to show that these doubts were well founded. 
I should, however, have urged that the question be decided 
on broader grounds.
With the “States rights” phase of the question eliminated 
by the form of the amendment now proposed, views on the 
question of preventing future exemption should depend on 
the view one holds regarding the general principle of taxa­
tion on the basis of ability to pay, particularly as embodied 
in a graduated income-tax law and on the degree of faith 
one retains in American democracy in its attitude towards 
the institution of private wealth.
If you regard private wealth in the United States today 
as being in the position, as it were, of Holland; if you believe 
that it is constantly threatened with inundation by the waves 
of radical legislation and is protected only by the dikes built 
by the founders of the Constitution, you naturally regard the 
income-tax amendment adopted in 1913 as having swept 
away one of the main dike systems. It follows that you re-
• A letter to the New York Evening Post (February 6, 1923). 
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gard tax exemption as an inner dike system which, when the 
surrounding fields of commercial wealth are inundated, will 
preserve an island of refuge in which so much of private 
wealth as is represented by public securities may still find 
safety. You may have doubts whether as the tide rises the 
dike will be of more avail in resisting it than Mrs. Parting­
ton’s mop, but you are determined to fight grimly to main­
tain the dike to the last moment. It would seem, however, 
that those members of the Chamber who belong to. this school 
of thought should have opposed the second of the resolutions 
offered by the committee on taxation, which condemns the 
extension of tax exemption to farm loan bonds and similar 
securities; surely their aim should be to enlarge the borders 
of their island wherever possible, and there is the added 
consideration that by throwing a sop to the farm bloc they 
might secure some support from it in maintaining the dike.
The income tax is comparatively new to us but is an old 
institution in England, and in earlier days a similar school 
of thought existed there and included many eminent men 
such as Pitt and Brougham, the latter of whom characterized 
graduation as “a gross and revolting absurdity.” The his­
torian of the English income tax who cites this expression 
and others offers the comment: “As time went on it became 
increasingly evident that the old unreasoning position could 
not be maintained in the face of modern and more scientific 
doctrines of taxation.” And however the Chamber of Com­
merce may be divided on the question, opinion in the coun­
try at large seems to be overwhelmingly in favor of the grad­
uated income tax; indeed, it is difficult to see how the neces­
sary taxation during the war could have been levied had the 
income-tax amendment not been adopted.
This is not to say that the manner in which the income tax 
was availed of was wholly satisfactory. I share the view that 
the high surtaxes are unwise from every standpoint. It is 
not, however, surprising that Congress should have used 
the new medium, which had become available only shortly 
before the war, with more zeal than discretion during that 
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emergency, and the wisdom of a more moderate use of the 
principle of graduation is likely to receive increasing recog­
nition. However that may be, if we are to have a graduated 
income tax at all, exemption of any particular form of in­
vestment of private wealth from its operation is contrary 
to the underlying principle of the system, constitutes dis­
crimination in favor of unearned as against earned income, 
and (the report of the committee to the contrary notwith­
standing) is financially unprofitable to government.
It is impracticable within the limits of this letter to ana­
lyze the committee’s report in detail, but such analysis 
would show that the report utterly fails to meet the point 
made by the Secretary of the Treasury in his letter to the 
chairman of the committee, as follows: “To one purchaser the 
exemption may be worth little or nothing and to another 
purchaser who pays the same price the exemption may be 
worth the equivalent of 10 or 11 per cent on the taxable 
security.” If, as Mr. Mellon and Mr. Kelsey both suggest, 
the maximum surtax should be reduced to 25 per cent, this 
disparity would be reduced, but it would still be substantial. 
In that case the true yield of a 4 per cent tax-exempt security 
would range from 4 per cent to a savings bank or exempt 
investor up to 6 per cent to investors subject to the maxi­
mum surtax. I do not think, however, we could afford to 
regard with equanimity the prospect of the wealthy investor 
receiving from the State an effective rate of interest half as 
high again as that paid to the less fortunate citizen. Secre­
tary Mellon does not overstate the case in saying that “grad­
uated additional income taxes cannot be effective when there 
exists side by side with them practically unlimited quantities 
of fully tax-exempt securities available to defeat them.”
In considering this question too much regard should not 
be had to the conditions of the moment. The outstanding 
lesson we learned from the last war was the necessity and the 
practicability of conscription of man power on a large scale; 
we also learned that a great war imposes a strain on the ma­
terial resources of the combatants far beyond that which it 
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had been supposed any nation could bear. If we should be­
come involved in another great war, conscription of man 
power would undoubtedly take place on an even larger scale 
than in the recent war, and certainly every dollar of the 
national wealth should be as available for the national de­
fence as every man will have to be. This, however, cannot 
be accomplished unless steps are taken to insure that as the 
special privileges now existing in the form of tax exemption 
expire they shall not be renewed, and that no new exemp­
tions shall be created.
(3) TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AS BURDEN ON PUBLIC *
In view of the first paragraph of my recent letter to you, 
I feel bound to accept the invitation extended by Mr. 
Kelsey in his letter appearing in the same issue to criticize 
the figures appearing in his committee’s report and the infer­
ences drawn from them.
The committee’s whole report is vitiated by an assumption 
which is contrary to all experience and probability. It as­
sumes that the rich man who buys tax exempts buys them 
blindly, whether it is profitable or unprofitable for him to do 
so. The fact is that most rich men have investments with 
which they are identified and which they could not and 
would not convert into tax-exempt investments, and the 
taxable income from these sources is more than enough to 
bring their incomes up to the level where the purchase of 
tax exempts becomes highly profitable.
The investor who has no business interests and an absolute 
freedom of choice in investments studies each investment 
carefully and buys taxable securities or exempt securities, as 
expediency dictates. It is only natural that he should do 
so, particularly as there is a wide range of gilt edge securities, 
including  Government bonds, outside the class of exempt 
securities. The case on which the committee bases its com­
putations—that of a man whose income is wholly derived 
from tax-exempt securities—is therefore so uncommon that
* A letter to the New York Evening Post (February 9, 1923). 
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any general conclusions drawn from it are valueless. In the 
days of slavery there were, I believe, slaves who refused free­
dom when it was offered to them, and such cases go quite as 
far. towards proving that slavery was a desirable institution 
as the committee’s illustration does towards showing that tax 
exemption does not operate to relieve the rich from taxation. 
Space will not permit of my discussing every point upon 
which I believe the committee has fallen into errors of fact 
or inference. I will therefore take a single case and will 
choose the point which the committee evidently regards as 
the most important—that which deals with the argument for 
the constitutional amendments, stated by it as follows: “It is 
said, though, that there is a great social reason why the issue 
of tax-exempt securities should be abandoned, that they are 
the means by which the rich unload the burdens of taxation 
on the poor. In fact, the whole agitation seems to be 
founded on this false premise. . . .”
The committee’s counter-argument is in two parts: first, 
“the opposite is true until you get to incomes exceeding 
$60,000 a year . . and secondly, “when it comes to equaliz­
ing the burdens between the two classes of incomes above 
the $60,000 mark, if it is important to do it, it can be 
accomplished by a reduction in the surtaxes, and that could 
be done and still leave the maximum surtax at not more 
than 25.”
Upon the first point, it is difficult to see how the poor are 
in a position to unload burdens on the rich through the 
medium of tax exemption so long as there is no compulsion 
on any individual to buy tax-exempt securities. The com­
mittee’s concern is unnecessary, and they may rest assured 
that the rich who buy tax exempts do it because they find it 
to be profitable.
Upon the second point, the committee assumes that the 
holder of 4 per cent tax-exempts forgoes from ½ per cent 
to 1 per cent in interest in consideration of the exemption. 
If this is so, the exemption costs him from 11 per cent to 20 
per cent of the income he would receive if the security were 
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not exempt. The Federal tax rate is more than 11 per cent 
upon all income in excess of $14,000 a year, and more than 
20 per cent upon all income in excess of $30,000 a year. 
Upon the committee’s own assumption, therefore, exemption 
of income in excess of these levels clearly constitutes relief 
to the holders at the expense of someone else. The excep­
tional case used as an illustration by the committee is, as 
already stated, so uncommon as to be negligible.
Finally, how far can the burden on the possessor of earned 
income and the holder of tax exempts be equalized by the 
reduction of the surtax to 25 per cent? With 8 per cent 
normal tax this would make the burden on the earned in­
come subject thereto 33 per cent, and the burden on the 
income from tax exempts is, by the committee’s own assump­
tions, not more than from 11 per cent to 20 per cent. It 
is apparent that earned income would still be subject to 
a burden from 65 per cent to 200 per cent greater than that 
on tax-exempt income. The committee, however, says “not 
more than 25 per cent.” There is much virtue in the “not 
more,” for to effect equalization the maximum surtax would 
have to be reduced to 12 per cent or 3 per cent, according 
to the spread assumed between taxables and tax exempts.
At this point the committee’s position stands revealed as 
the common position of opponents of the amendment: 
“Abolish the surtaxes or leave us tax-exemption as ah avenue 
of escape from them.”
IV
SCIENTIFIC TAX RELIEF *
(1923)
Advocates of some relief from taxation for earned income 
should recognize that it is hopeless to secure the reduction 
of surtaxes by any clear, uniform, and universal measure of 
revision. The possessors of earned income should therefore 
try to devise indirect forms of relief similar to those which 
have robbed the surtaxes of their terrors to possessors of in­
vestment income and yet have enabled them to escape from 
the monotony of tax-exempt investments.
For instance, a provision entitling the possessor of earned 
income to make a deduction from his gross income in respect 
of the exhaustion of his natural life would with a sympa­
thetic Natural Abilities Division afford a large measure of 
relief. If it is objected that the value and the term of life 
of an individual are incapable of determination, it is sufficient 
to answer that the difficulties are no greater than those in 
the determination of the quantities and values of the natural 
resources of the country, which the taxing officials have met 
and solved so nonchalantly and without hardship to the tax­
payers. As the development of the natural abilities of its 
citizens is even more important to the country than the 
opening of new oil wells, Congress should recognize the 
justice of a “discovery” clause which would permit of the 
exhaustion allowance being increased if the taxpayer should 
develop hitherto unsuspected ability to make money. A raise 
of salary received by a man who has held his position more 
than two years might be subject to a maximum tax of 12½ 
per cent in the same way as gains on investments held for 
that length of time.
* An editorial contributed to the New York Evening Post (November 8, 
1923).
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Doubtless the opportunities now accorded to the owner 
of investments to reduce his taxes by incorporating himself 
could, even under the present law, be made available to some 
extent to the worker. It would not seem unreasonable, how­
ever, in view of the difficulties in his case, to request Congress 
to enact a provision that every individual earning an income 
which would subject him to an average tax of 12 per cent or 
more should be deemed to be incorporated and be assessed 
under the provisions relating to corporations. Many pos­
sessors of earned income have poor relations or have intimate 
friends who have suffered losses, and in such cases permission 
to make a consolidated return would prove helpful.
These are only a few of the methods that suggest them­
selves, but they are presented to the possessors of earned 
income with the suggestion that there is far greater hope of 
relief in provisions such as these, the exact consequences of 
which Congress cannot readily perceive, than in any clear 
and unequivocal reduction of taxes.
VTHE INCOME TAX: SECRETARY MELLON’S 
PROGRAM *
(1923)
Hon. William R. Green, Acting Chairman,
Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Green:
Having been a student of taxation for many years and hav­
ing had the opportunity in various capacities to acquire some 
familiarity with the actual working of the income-tax laws, 
I venture to write you in advocacy of the program recently 
outlined by Secretary Mellon. Many of the suggestions con­
tained in the Secretary’s letter will, I imagine, be immediately 
understood and approved. The reasons underlying the sug­
gested rearrangement of surtaxes on the higher incomes are, 
however, probably less generally appreciated, and I would 
like to submit some considerations bearing particularly on 
that recommendation.
The argument that the high surtaxes divert capital from 
productive industry and encourage municipal extravagance 
by unduly stimulating the market for tax-exempt securities 
is unquestionably sound. It is, however, becoming of less 
relative importance for the reason that tax avoidance is grow­
ing more rapidly and is less limited in scope than tax exemp­
tion. I believe the time has come when justice to the earners 
who cannot resort to tax avoidance, and to those possessors 
of investment income who do not resort to it, requires either 
that the present extreme surtaxes shall be made generally 
effective, or, if that be impossible, as it has proved to be up
* Cf. The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXXVII (January, 1924).
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to the present, that the rates shall be reduced to a point 
where substantial enforcement becomes practicable.
I believe the conclusion is fully warranted that the taxable 
income reported today in the highest surtax groups is not 
more than between 10 and 20 per cent of what it would be 
but for tax exemption and deliberate tax avoidance. If 
earned income could be excluded from the computation, the 
percentage on the remainder would fall to still lower 
figures. ...
Surely the continuance of the present high surtaxes is in­
defensible. . . . The present situation is not due mainly to 
defects in the form of the present law, although some defects 
exist which could be remedied with benefit to the revenue. 
The difficulty lies far deeper. The distinction between capi­
tal and income is at best difficult to draw, and the complexi­
ties of modern business have greatly enhanced this difficulty. 
Tax laws must be specific and according to well-settled rules 
of construction must be interpreted strictly—any ambiguities 
being resolved in favor of the taxpayer. The form of every 
business transaction, and indeed whether the transaction 
shall Or shall not take place, is determined by the taxpayer, 
and his decision is reached with a knowledge of the tax law 
and is usually framed so as to produce the greatest possible 
profit after taking taxes into consideration.
, The difference in taxation between corporations and indi­
viduals alone creates an almost insoluble difficulty. The ease 
with which incorporation and disincorporation are effected; 
the difficulty of making laws and regulations governing cor­
porations which will apply with equal justice to the large 
public corporation and the small private corporation, which 
practically represents an individual fortune, and the further 
fact that between these two extremes there are innumerable 
gradations, so that it is impossible to draw hard-and-fast lines 
and to treat corporations on one side of the line in one way 
and corporations on the other side of the line in another— 
these and other such conditions make it impossible for legis­
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lation ever to do more than temporarily check the increase of 
tax avoidance, so long as the inducements to tax avoidance 
are so compelling as they are today in the case of all those 
possessing more than a very moderate income.
If it were possible to lay down a few broad principles and 
leave the administration of the surtax to the discretion of a 
highly competent taxing authority which could be governed 
by the substance rather than the form of the transaction, it 
might conceivably be possible to administer the surtaxes on 
the present scale with some measure of efficiency. This is, 
however, impossible and under any other conditions the form 
rather than the substance inevitably determines the tax, and 
the form is selected by the taxpayer so as to defeat the tax.
The continuance of the high surtaxes, therefore, means an 
unedifying contest of wits between the tax avoider and his 
advisers on the one side and Congress and the Treasury on 
the other—with all the advantages on the side of the tax 
avoider, and with those who are unwilling, or, like most 
earners, unable to avoid taxes, caught between the two and 
bearing the brunt of the conflict. Congress must legislate 
in advance and on broad lines to meet all conditions. The 
tax avoider acts after Congress has taken its position and 
deals with specific proposed transactions, capable of infinite 
variation in form and time to meet the rules laid down by the 
legislature. Naturally the result of the conflict is as disap­
pointing to the Treasury as it is demoralizing to the tax­
payer.
Whatever may be possible in time of war, all experience 
shows that it is impossible in times of peace to levy surtaxes 
on any such scale as is now in force with any degree of 
efficiency or with any approach to equity. I am convinced 
that readjustment of the surtaxes will ultimately benefit the 
revenue as well as the business of the country and will make 
taxation far more equitable. I hope, therefore, that your 
Committee will favorably regard the Secretary’s proposals 
on this as well as on other points.
November 26, 1923. Respectfully, George O. May.
VI
SOME ASPECTS OF TAX AVOIDANCE *
(1924)
Recognition of the truth of Secretary Mellon’s statement 
that the high surtaxes are steadily becoming unproductive 
appears to be gradually dawning on Congress. In some 
quarters this recognition is evidenced mainly in a display of 
indignation that men or even natural laws should fail to con­
form to the ideas of Congress.
Recently a senator characterized as “little short of actual 
disloyalty to this republic” the truism repeated by a wealthy 
man, that wealth always seeks to avoid what it regards as ex­
cessive taxation.
Now we can all agree that in an ideal republic every man 
would conduct his affairs and pay his taxes according to the 
intent of the law-making body, and no one would change his 
business conduct as so to reduce his taxes in ways not con­
templated by the legislature.
In this ideal republic, of course, the tax would be admin­
istered not upon technicalities and nice interpretations of the 
letter of the law, but upon broad considerations of equity 
and regard for its spirit. And above all the legislature would 
frame the tax law with an eye single to the apportionment 
of the inevitable burden among the citizens of the republic 
in the most equitable way that could be conceived.
So long, however, as the guiding principle in the allocation 
of the tax burden is political advantage and the assignment 
(in the first instance, at any rate) of the maximum burden 
to the minimum number of voters; so long, too, as the rule 
governing court decisions is that quoted by the Supreme 
Court recently from an English decision:
* An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXXVII 
(March, 1924).
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If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter 
of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may 
appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the 
crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject 
within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however ap­
parently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise 
appear to be.
So long as these conditions continue, is it not a little naive 
for anyone to expect those ^t whom the measures are aimed 
to make no move either to defend themselves or to escape 
from the impost?
The more serious aspect of the situation is that the next 
phase is apt to be an ill-considered attempt to assert the dig­
nity and power of Congress.
If one law fails to produce the result the legislator desires, 
let another more drastic be enacted. Its practical efficiency 
will probably be no greater and it will almost assuredly do 
much harm to many at whom it is not directed, but for the 
moment it will satisfy the outraged dignity and serve the 
political fortunes of the legislator who has pledged himself 
to the policy of making the rich pay without passing the tax 
on to others, natural laws and all other opposition to the 
contrary notwithstanding.
The professional man whose means of protection or escape 
are meager views the situation with deep concern, realizing 
that measures which the capitalist would probably, be able 
gracefully to avoid would be likely to fall in their full weight 
upon him.
The ostensible beneficiary of such measures, too, would, 
if he appreciated the situation, be equally concerned because 
unsound schemes of taxation are sure in one way or another 
ultimately to prove injurious to the general community.
Much of the tax is passed directly on to the community; 
the demand for tax exempts stimulates improvident state and 
municipal expenditures, which in turn increase local taxes 
falling on everyone; the interest rate on issues not exempt 
is increased and the increase ultimately reflected in costs and 
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prices. Thus and in innumerable other ways do men and 
economic forces “conspire” to defeat the efforts of Congress 
to run counter to natural laws.
In this connection the following extract from the examina­
tion of a witness by the English House of Commons is of 
interest:
Q. How is the assembly composed? What kind of 
people are the members; landholders or traders?
A. It is composed of landholders, merchants and artificers.
Q. Are not the majority landholders?
A. I believe they are.
Q. Do not they, as much as possible, shift the tax off 
from the land, to ease that, and lay the burden heavier on 
trade?
A. I have never understood it so. I never heard such a 
thing suggested. And indeed an attempt of that kind could 
answer no purpose. The merchant or trader is always skilled 
in figures, and ready with his pen and ink. If unequal bur­
dens are laid on his trade, he puts an additional price on his 
goods; and the consumers, who are chiefly landholders, finally 
pay the greatest part, if not the whole.
The examination took place in 1766, and the witness was 
Benjamin Franklin.
The Ways and Means Committee, though retaining the 
25 per cent deduction of tax on earned income, proposes to 
treat all income under $5,000 as earned, and all over $20,- 
000 as unearned; in other words, the Committee has con­
cluded that anybody can earn $5,000 and that nobody is 
worth more than $20,000 a year.
As a recognition of the economic fact that the earner has to 
set aside out of his income capital to provide for himself in 
his old age,.whereas the possessor of investment income is 
under no such necessity, the Committee’s action hardly merits 
consideration, however interesting it may be as indicating the 
result of introspection and personal experience of its mem­
bers. Its maximum effect would be to save the earner about 
$400 a year under the present scale of taxes, and $300 a year 
under the suggested Mellon scale. Such sums set aside annu­
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ally for twenty years at 5 per cent would provide capital sums 
which would yield perhaps $500 or $600 a year thereafter.
The relief is in substance insignificant but being nominally 
large (25 per cent) may deprive taxpayers of real relief in 
some other form.
The salaried, professional, and artist classes whose hopes 
were raised by the Secretary’s letter may well say with Mac­
beth:
And be these juggling fiends no more believ’d
That palter with us in a double sense: 
That keep the word of promise to our ear,
And break it to our hope.
Many will regard this language as equally applicable to 
those members of the House who voted to continue tax ex­
emption as a refuge for the rich, while vigorously demanding 
high surtaxes.
The opponents of the constitutional amendment differed 
on the question of how much the exemption feature saves in 
interest to the issuers of tax-exempt bonds. Clearly, how­
ever, this saving is trivial compared to the saving of tax 
to the rich buyers. Whether it is a little more or a little 
less than the Treasury estimated is of slight consequence. 
The greater it is, the more savings bank investors are being 
mulcted for a privilege that is valueless to them; the smaller 
it is, the less the wealthy are paying for a privilege that is 
most valuable to them.
 The vital point is that it is entirely contrary to the prin­
ciples of a democratic state that an amount of wealth increas­
ing, it is estimated, at the rate of something like a. billion 
dollars a year, should be completely beyond the reach of the 
taxing power, however great a national emergency may arise.
VII
METHODS OF TAXING WAR PROFITS COMPARED *
DIFFERENCES IN SPIRIT OF LEGISLATION WHICH CAUSE ENGLISH 
INDUSTRY TO ACCEPT A HIGHER RATE THAN IS PROPOSED 
HERE
(1917)
In the discussion of the pending finance bill reference is fre­
quently made to the taxation of war profits in England. In 
general the position is stated to be that in England 80 per 
cent of the excess profits are taken by the government, and 
there is, broadly speaking, no complaint, whereas here it is 
claimed that substantially lower rates of taxation will work 
incalculable harm to industry.
The statement as to England is, I believe, true, and the 
question, Why should there be such a wide difference in the 
attitude of business men toward taxation on the two sides of 
the Atlantic? is a fair and pertinent one. I do not think 
the answer is to be found, in any difference of degree in will­
ingness to make sacrifices, but that it is to be found wholly 
in the difference in the methods and spirit governing the 
determination of taxable profits in the two cases.
The English law proceeds on the theory of giving the tax­
payer a liberal pre-war standard and dealing equitably with 
special cases, and with this basis assured the manufacturer 
has no valid ground for objection to taxation of his excess 
profits, however high it may be.
A comparison of the pre-war standards allowed shows that 
in England the manufacturer is given a choice of two years 
out of three, each of which was a prosperous year in Eng­
land. To protect the manufacturer in any special cases 
where the three years in question were not prosperous ones,
• A letter to the New York Times (August 28, 1917).
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two alternatives are provided—either a choice may be made 
of four years out of six (if during the three years’ period the 
profits of the business were 25 per cent below normal) or a 
reasonable rate of return on capital may be claimed as the 
pre-war standard. The rate is fixed by the law at a minimum 
of 6 per cent in the case of corporations, but a specially con­
stituted board of referees has power to increase this rate in 
any given industry, and in practice the board has increased 
the rates allowed to 9, 10, 12, and in some cases 22½ per 
cent.
The finance bill now pending in Congress, on the other 
hand, fixes arbitrarily as the pre-war standard the average of 
the three years of 1911, 1912 and 1913, an average which is 
undeniably subnormal in many industries, including such 
important industries as steel and leather, and without al­
lowance for the fact that standards of values have completely 
changed since that period. The only alternative allowed 
is the average rate of earnings in the industry in which the 
corporation is engaged, which may give relief in a few cases, 
but does not meet at all the cases of whole industries which 
suffered from depression during the three years in question.
As to the determination of taxable profits, the pending 
finance bill bases the taxation on the returns for income tax, 
subject only to adjustments in respect of dividends received 
from other taxable companies. The result is that in many 
cases taxpayers are denied the full deduction for interest 
which they have paid, they are required to pay tax on profits 
outside the regular course of business, and in other respects 
are taxed on a sum exceeding their true income. No pro­
vision is made for dealing with special cases where the law 
operates harshly.
On the other hand, the British excess-profits tax law pro­
vides for modifications of the methods employed in ascer­
taining income for ordinary income tax purposes. It sets 
up special rules for determining the profits, but gives power 
to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or the Board of 
Referees to modify these provisions in any case where it seems 
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to them proper to do so by reason either of specific condi­
tions recited in the act, such as the postponement by reason 
of the war, of repairs; exceptional depreciation or ob­
solescence of assets employed in connection with the war; 
or the necessity in connection with the war of providing 
plant which will not be wanted for business after the war; 
or by reason of “any other special circumstances specified in 
regulations made by the Treasury.’’
Whenever a case of hardship is established the Treasury 
shows a willingness to provide for it in such regulations. 
For instance, it was recently represented to the Treasury that 
the method of valuing inventories, having regard to the rise 
in prices during the war and probable fall thereof on the 
conclusion of the war, would result in injustice, and the 
Treasury, after conferring with leading accountants, issued 
regulations to cover the case. These regulations provide that 
after the termination of the last excess-profits period every 
corporation shall be given time to liquidate its inventories 
and shall have the right to adjust its returns for the last 
taxable year so as to take up in that year any loss that may 
subsequently have been sustained on such liquidation of 
inventories.
Another important feature of the British law which is 
entirely absent from the pending finance bill is its treatment 
of fluctuating business. If a corporation’s profits largely 
exceed the pre-war standard in one year and fall short of that 
standard in the succeeding year, the corporation receives a 
corresponding refund of excess profits tax paid on account of 
the first year.
Another vital difference between the two bills is the pro­
vision as to the payment of the tax. Under the pending- 
finance bill the tax is payable at the same time as the income 
tax. Many corporations which are making large profits 
have those profits in the form of increased inventories, ac­
counts receivable, and even plants, and not in cash, and such 
corporations will be seriously embarrassed to meet the large 
tax payments required.
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Under the British law taxes are payable two months after 
assessment, but the commissioners have power to allow pay­
ment to be made by instalments in such sums and at such 
times as they may fix, and in practice the commissioners have 
dealt liberally with the taxpayers under these provisions 
where they were satisfied that hardship would result from 
demand for immediate payment.
These are only some of the more important differences 
between the provisions of the two measures, but they are 
sufficient to indicate the difference in the underlying prin­
ciples, and this difference is an essential factor in any com­
parison of the attitude of our manufacturers with that of 
the British taxpayers.
VIII
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRITISH INCOME 
TAX LAW *
(1924)
It is impossible in the brief space available to discuss the 
whole subject assigned to me in any detail. I have therefore 
thought it might be useful to try to answer a question re­
cently asked by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, in the hope that the answer might incidentally 
be suggestive of ways in which our own tax administration 
might be improved. Early in 1924 Chairman Green ad­
dressed an open letter to Dr. Adams in which he asked the 
question, Why Great Britain could collect surtaxes on the 
scale on which the United States is attempting to collect 
them, and do it successfully, and yet the United States could 
not do it.
I shall attempt to answer that question. I would say that 
the answer is twofold. First, there are many reasons, polit­
ical, legislative and administrative, why Great Britain should 
be able to do it; and second, it has not done it.
I will not attempt to discuss all the advantages they possess 
and I do not mean to say that they have nothing but ad­
vantages, but they have some striking advantages. Some of 
them are so universally recognized that I shall not do more 
than mention them, but others not so well recognized I 
would like to discuss very briefly.
First among the political advantages possessed by Great 
Britain I should place the executive responsibility for tax 
legislation instead of the separation of the executive and 
legislative responsibility that we have here. In the second 
place, I should mention something that perhaps is not so
* Proceedings, Academy of Political Science, Vol. XI (May, 1924).
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fully recognized, the advantage that they possess in dealing 
with all legislation in one parliament. Take, for instance, 
the question of corporations. I should say that the greatest 
opportunity for avoidance of taxes here is by artificial transac­
tions between individuals and corporations. In England, 
the control of corporation legislation rests with the same 
body that levies the taxes, and they have dealt with the 
corporation law so as to coordinate it with the tax law. If 
we could do that here, the stopping of the holes would be 
a much easier task than it is at present. The third political 
advantage is that the British have no constitutional limita­
tion and no basic date such as March 1, 1913, which is a con­
stant bugbear to anybody who has to frame tax laws here. 
Fourth, they have no tax-exempt securities. I do not think 
it is necessary to discuss that advantage; it has been so freely 
discussed heretofore.
Turning to their legislative advantages, I would place 
first their unwillingness to enact legislation until they are 
satisfied that the administrative problems involved can be 
successfully met. The English excess-profits tax in 1915, 
which was a brand-new experiment, was held up for a con­
siderable time awaiting assurances of that kind, and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in introducing it, pointed out 
that the machinery was as important as anything else in 
increasing taxation, and he went on to say that unless their 
whole tax proposals were to be a fiasco, they must see that 
the burdens which they were laying on the body charged 
with the administration of the tax were not greater than that 
body could successfully bear. I say without the slightest 
hesitation that this point was not considered at all in the 
law of 1917 in the United States and not adequately in the 
later laws, and that the burden that has been placed on the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue in this country has been far be­
yond the ability of any administrative body to perform. 
That, I think, is one of the main reasons why Great Britain 
has had relatively better success with high taxation during 
the war than we have had. Another factor that has con­
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tributed to their success, I think, has been their willingness 
to risk unpopularity, to recognize that the bulk of the taxes 
must fall ultimately on the bulk of the people and to place 
the burden on the many directly instead of trying to place it 
in the first instance on the few. Great Britain during the 
war went as high as a thirty per cent normal tax and never 
made the surtax more than one hundred per cent of the 
normal tax, whereas here we have been attempting to work 
with an eight per cent normal tax against a sixty-five per 
cent surtax, and we are coming down now to proposals of 
•four per cent normal tax, twelve and one-half per cent cor­
poration tax and fifty per cent surtax, a scale of relations 
that in my judgment makes satisfactory administration abso­
lutely impossible.
The third advantage they have is in simplicity. The 
British excess profits tax law, with its appendix, occupied 
about fifteen pages and remained substantially unchanged 
during the war. They have accomplished that largely by the 
different way in which they have dealt with the hard case and 
evasion. We have attempted to do it by rigid rules which 
have made our laws complicated and yet have not succeeded 
in making them effective or equitable.. They have been 
able to do it by leaving discretion to meet hard cases to 
apply the law so as to prevent avoidance.
That brings me to the final legislative advantage which 
they have and which has made use of this discretion possible; 
that is the creation of appeal bodies, independent both of 
the tax-collecting organization and the taxpayer. They have 
the local commissioners, and during the war they had also 
a board of referees, men of very high standing, serving with­
out compensation, whose decisions, generally speaking, were 
accepted, if not gracefully, at least without open complaint 
by taxpayers.
I had the opportunity of discussing this subject with one 
of the important officials of the English system quite re­
cently, and he told me how much they as administrative 
officers valued the services of the local commissioners and 
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now freely they used them in dealing with the hard cases. 
The commissioners, more swayed by sympathy than officials 
would be, may decide a case on what they think are the 
equities. The surveyor of taxes, who is the man directly 
dealing with the case, says, “Well, I will not accept the 
principle, but I am not prepared to appeal,” so the case is 
decided without establishing a precedent. By such pro­
cedure Great Britain has been able to ease the burden of 
the tax so as to make the collection substantial and yet not 
impose undue hardship, and so as to reduce the inequity 
between taxpayers.
First of the administrative advantages of the British in­
come tax law is, naturally, that they had had an income tax 
for seventy years in England before the war broke out, 
whereas our income tax system was only four years old when 
we suddenly ran into the period of very high taxes. That 
advantage, with all that it means in the way of a civil service 
that has been built up with high traditions and a splendid 
morale, coupled with the Government’s concern that the 
administrative problems should be solved before any tax 
law should be enacted, has been a tremendous one.
The second advantage—it may be a question of opinion 
but I think it is an advantage—is in their system of decentral­
ization to some six hundred surveyors’ districts, in a small 
country like England, where we centralize everything in a 
large country like ours. Then again, the system of appeals 
to an independent body to which I have referred is a very 
useful administrative aid. Finally, under that head, I would 
mention the fact that their laws have been so drawn that 
there is very little valuation necessary and there are no highly 
artificial and speculative concepts to be administered such 
as our so-called discovery value.
The problems of valuation that have been put on the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue in connection with discovery 
value, depletion, depreciation, capital gains, amortization 
and other items constitute a burden of valuation far greater 
than the task of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
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valuing the railroads of the United States. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the carriers have spent some 
hundred millions and ten years in the task of valuing the 
railroads, and still the task is by no means finished. The 
Bureau of Internal Revenue has been struggling with a 
greater problem of valuation with no such organization and 
without any general recognition of the enormous task that 
they were trying to perform.
I have given some of the reasons why I -think Great Britain 
should be able to collect very large surtaxes relatively more 
effectively than we can. And now I come to my second point 
—that it has not done it. I have already explained that at no 
time has the surtax more than doubled the normal tax, 
whereas here we have had and talk of having surtaxes eight 
or ten or twelve times the normal tax. In five years they 
raised nearly as much by income and profits taxes as we 
did, but the percentage of the total represented by surtaxes 
was only about two-fifths of the percentage represented by 
surtaxes in our case,* this in spite of the notorious fact that 
surtaxes here have largely been avoided. Instead of citing 
Great Britain as an example, Chairman Green might have 
cited it as a contrast. For two policies could hardly differ 
more than their policy of a high normal tax (twenty-five to 
thirty per cent) combined with a surtax of about the same 
rate and our policy of a small rate of normal tax and surtaxes 
running up to many times that rate.
In my judgment any attempt to combine such rates as a 
small normal tax of say four per cent, a tax of twelve and 
one-half per cent on corporations and a fifty per cent sur­
tax, with all the facility for incorporation and dissolution of 
corporations, and with the control of corporations vested in 
states entirely independent of the federal government that
* In the five years ending March 31, 1922, Great Britain collected £2,728,- 
000,000 in income and profits taxes of which £218,000,000, or rather under 
eight per cent, consisted of surtaxes. The returns in the United States for 
the five calendar years 1917-1921 showed total income and profits taxes of 
$14,774,000,000 of which $2,894,000,000, or about 19.6 per cent, were surtaxes. 
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is levying the income tax, creates an administrative problem 
that cannot be solved with any great degree of equity or 
efficiency. I do not think the administration of our Bureau 
of Internal Revenue has been by any means perfect, but I 
must say that to me the sight of Congress investigating the ad­
ministration of the tax law is the very height of irony, for 
whatever the responsibility of the administration may be, it 
is insignificant compared to the responsibility of Congress 
for unsound tax legislation and for imposing burdens on 
the Bureau without any recognition of the administrative 
problem involved and without any attempt to provide the 
machinery or to pay the men necessary to carry it out with 
a reasonable degree of efficiency.
The main responsibility is, and I think always has been 
since the war taxes started, on Congress. Look back at the 
law of 1917, an ill-conceived compromise between the House 
Bill and the Senate Bill, which was handed to the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue to administer. It was three months or 
more after the Bill was passed before even the chairmen of 
the committees responsible for the Bill in Congress could 
feel any assurance that it was possible to administer it, and, 
as everybody knows, it was administered by strong-arm meth­
ods, by the adoption of regulations which were in many 
cases of very doubtful correspondence with the language of 
the law. Until Congress faces the problem of administra­
tion, which it has never seriously considered, and provides 
some tax legislation which is devised scientifically and with 
due regard to the administrative problems entailed, it is 
quite impossible to get efficient tax administration.
Just one more point, there is hardly a provision that has 
seemed more clearly necessary to justice than the application 
of the same rule to capital losses as has been applied to 
capital gains. Yet that was rejected in the Senate last year, 
and the Senate Finance Committee has thrown it out of the 
bill again. Such a policy seems to be a policy of high taxes, 
so that the people at large may think that Congress is putting
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the burden on the rich, with holes by which the rich may in 
fact escape. “High taxes and plenty of holes” is a system 
that is inefficient, inequitable and demoralizing, and makes 
tax-paying not a function of the ability to pay, as it should 
be, but a function of the conscience of the taxpayer.
IX
DOUBLE TAXATION *
(1926)
Double taxation is one of many subjects which have as­
sumed much increased importance as a result of the war. 
Nor is the increased importance due solely to higher rates 
of taxation, though the imposition of taxes running up to 
more than 50 per cent has created situations in which double 
taxation of income amounts to practical expropriation. An­
other serious factor is the change in the fiscal situation of 
the leading countries which the war has brought about. 
Countries which before the war were in position to supply 
their own requirements of capital or even had a surplus 
for investment abroad, have become borrowers; other coun­
tries have found themselves not only in a position to invest 
abroad but almost compelled to do so. Our own country 
could hardly maintain its policies of restriction of imports 
through high tariffs, exportation of surplus food products, 
collection of foreign government debts and the building up 
of a merchant marine, without making foreign investments 
to balance the international account.
Again, lack of confidence in domestic finance and deprecia­
tion of currencies have created a demand for foreign invest­
ments even in countries whose capital resources are inade­
quate for their own requirements; and in the most stable 
European countries anxious investors having seen the dis­
astrous consequences of war on the strongest of states, have 
felt it was unwise to put all their eggs in a single basket, 
and have invested part of their capital abroad.
The setting up as separate nations of what were formerly 
parts of a single kingdom, which remain more or less eco-
* Foreign Affairs, Vol. V (October, 1926).
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nomically interdependent, as in the case of the succession 
states of Austria, is still another of the many contributing 
influences as a result of which the subject has assumed very 
real and general significance.
I
The problem arises mainly in relation to income and in­
heritance taxes. In its international aspects double taxation 
of income is by far the most important phase of the ques­
tion, but in our own country double taxation of inheritances 
by the States has created a particularly unsatisfactory situa­
tion. Attempts to deal with the problem have been made 
in domestic legislation in our own and foreign countries, and 
through international conferences—notably those conducted 
under the auspices of the League of Nations—which have 
resulted in a number of international conventions for the 
mitigation of the burden.
Dealing first with the activities of the League of Nations, 
since these have included authoritative studies of the the­
oretical and practical aspects of the problem, the question 
was discussed at the Brussels conference (1920) and referred 
to the Provincial Economic and Financial Committee. In 
accordance with the request of this Committee, Sir Basil 
Blackett, of the British Treasury, submitted two interesting 
memoranda—one dealing historically with British income 
tax practice, and the other with the purely economic ques­
tion of the effects of double taxation on foreign investments. 
In September, 1921, the Financial Section of the League in­
vited a group of economists consisting of Professors Bruins 
of Rotterdam, Einaudi of Turin, and Seligman of New. 
York, and Sir Josiah Stamp of London, to prepare a report 
on the subject. The group made in April, 1923, a full 
report dealing first with the economic consequences of 
double taxation on the equitable distribution of burdens 
and on the flow of capital, and second with the possibility 
of relieving or mitigating its evil effects either by domestic 
legislation of states or by international agreements.
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The Committee next brought together a group of tech­
nical experts, requesting them to examine both this problem 
and the collateral problem of tax evasion from an administra­
tive point of view. These experts used as a basis the report 
of the economists, which they characterized as a masterly 
report of inestimable value to them, and adopted resolutions 
that embodied the principles which in their judgment should 
govern the formulation of conventions for relief from double 
taxation. These resolutions were set forth with extended 
comments in a report published by the League under date 
of February 7, 1925. This report was brought to the atten­
tion of the International Chamber of Commerce, which had 
been continuously interested in the subject, and that body, 
after extended examination through a Committee headed 
by Prof. T. S. Adams, expressed its substantial agreement 
with the experts.
The next step was to ask the same group, enlarged to in­
clude representatives of other countries, to draft types of 
conventions of either a general or a bilateral character for 
the purpose of giving effect to the principles agreed on. 
The enlarged group met in Geneva in May last, but the 
session then held was occupied largely in securing agreement 
on principles on the part of the many new members, and it 
was not found possible at that time to do more than prepare 
preliminary drafts of conventions which are to be considered 
at an adjourned session to be held in October.
II
Double taxation of income arises from the fact that a tax 
may logically, and can effectively, be levied either where 
the income arises or where the recipient resides. In our own 
legislation both these principles are applied, and in addition 
a tax is levied on our own citizens even if they reside abroad 
and their income is derived from foreign sources.* The 
English income tax, the oldest of those in existence, though
* In the 1926 law exemption was granted to non-resident citizens in respect 
of earned income from foreign sources.
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it is in the main a personal tax, nevertheless taxes the income 
of non-residents derived from English sources. As a practical 
matter, it is hardly conceivable that any state which levies 
an income tax would wholly relinquish this source of 
revenue.
The question of the ultimate disposition of the burden 
of a tax on income from domestic sources, levied upon non­
residents, was considered at length by the economists selected 
by the League. In the case of a country seeking to borrow 
capital from abroad, a tax levied on the interest from the 
loan secured is likely to be thrown back either directly or 
indirectly on the borrowing country. Where, however, for­
eign capital is seeking to exploit the natural resources or 
commercial opportunities of a state, the tax on the income 
which that capital earns is not likely to be passed on.
As a logical consequence, countries whose natural re­
sources are relatively large in proportion to the foreign in­
terests of their residents are apt to stress the principle of 
taxation according to the source of income (especially as 
there would be strong political objection to the exemption 
of foreigners from a tax to which citizens engaged in similar 
enterprises would be subject); while the great capitalist 
countries are equally insistent on the principle of taxation 
according to residence.
The technical experts in their resolutions drew a distinc­
tion between taxes which are independent of the status of 
the taxpayer and those which are determined by such status; 
between impersonal taxes and personal taxes, or, using the 
French terms, between impôts réels and impôts globals. 
They suggested that the former should be levied only in 
the country in which is found the source of the income, and 
the latter only in the country of residence (domicile) of the 
recipient of the income. The practical value of the distinc­
tion has been questioned, and it must be admitted that the 
modern income tax is usually in some respects a personal 
and in other respects an impersonal tax.
In applying the distinction the experts laid down the gen­
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eral principle that taxes at progressive rates should be re­
garded as personal taxes, and should be levied only by the 
state of domicile. Acceptance of this principle would mean 
that no state would levy surtaxes on non-resident individuals 
on income derived from sources within the state, either 
with reference to their total income from all sources or with 
reference to their total income from sources within the state. 
Both the United States and Great Britain at present at­
tempt to levy surtaxes on non-resident aliens on the basis 
of their total income from sources within the taxing country. 
There is, however, reason to believe that such attempts are 
not very productive, and on practical as well as on theoretical 
grounds the two countries might well, under reciprocal 
agreements, forgo such surtaxes. The administrative diffi­
culties of effecting collection are great, and in any case in 
which the sums involved are sufficient to warrant the expense 
the taxpayer can make these difficulties practically insuper­
able by measures such as the interposition of a foreign cor­
poration under his ownership and control between the 
source of the income and himself.
Apparently also, though this is not perhaps absolutely 
clear from the report, the experts considered that no state 
should levy on the profits of an enterprise owned by non­
residents taxes computed at progressive rates, even if the 
scale were established entirely without regard to the status 
of the owners. This question is one on which American and 
British practice have differed sharply.
The British laws have proceeded on the principle that 
the ability to pay, which is the broad justification of the 
progressive income tax system, is a purely individual matter; 
and while income taxes are collected in Great Britain from 
corporations as a matter of administrative convenience, the 
system of relief is so arranged that if the income of a corpora­
tion were wholly distributed and the income of every in­
dividual shareholder were nevertheless still below the exemp­
tion limit, the shareholders would in the aggregate be en­
titled to recover an amount of tax equal to the tax payable 
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in the first instance by the corporation. We have adopted 
the view that not only may corporations properly be sub­
jected to an income tax as separate entities, but the prin­
ciple of ability to pay may properly be applied to them 
through a scale of graduated taxes without regard to the 
status of their shareholders. This was the vital difference 
between our excess-profits tax and the British. Whatever 
may be said on the question of principle, it is highly improb­
able that states in which the most important enterprises are 
being exploited by non-residents will in practice forgo ‘the 
right to levy graduated taxes on such enterprises.
It should be added that the experts clearly recognized 
that the principles laid down by them were not likely to be 
immediately and universally adopted, and made suggestions 
for procedure in cases where the states could not see their 
way to accept these principles in their entirety.
III
The experts next proceeded to lay down rules for deter­
mining the sources of income. These rules have been ap­
proved by the International Chamber of Commerce and are 
substantially similar to those embodied in our own Federal 
legislation. Income from real estate (or mortgages thereon) 
and income from agricultural enterprises are attributed to 
the country in which the property is situated; earned income 
to the country in which the services are rendered; income 
from business to the country where the business is conducted 
—an apportionment to be made if the business is carried on 
in more than one country, provided that in each there is a 
real establishment and not a mere agency. Incidentally, the 
experts recommended as a concession to practicability that 
maritime navigation undertakings should be taxed in only 
one country, namely, that in which the effective control was 
exercised—a provision similar to that in our own statutes 
exempting on a basis of reciprocity the earnings from ship­
ping registered under a foreign flag. Some shipping inter­
ests have urged that this rule should be accepted as based on 
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principle rather than on expediency. It is difficult to see 
how such a contention could be situated, though the fact 
that shipping income is earned mainly on the high seas 
and the extreme difficulty of making any satisfactory appor­
tionment thereof between states seem amply to justify the 
experts’ recommendation.
In regard to interest on bonds, deposits and current ac­
counts the experts suggested that:
The state in which the debtor is domiciled shall, as a rule, 
be entitled to levy the schedular tax, but the experts recom­
mend the conclusion of agreements whereby (particularly 
by means of affidavits and subject to proper precautions 
against fraud) reimbursement of, or exemption from, this 
tax would be allowed in the case of securities, deposits or 
current accounts of persons domiciled abroad, or whereby 
the tax would be levied either wholly or in part by the state 
in which the creditors are domiciled.
They thus recognized the right of the debtor country to im­
pose the tax and the practical consideration that the tax is 
likely to be passed back directly or indirectly to the debtor 
country.
The resolutions of the experts did not deal with inherit­
ance taxes at length, but merely indicated, that the rules for 
income taxes were applicable mutatis mutandis to them.
While the theoretical discussion was proceeding, substan­
tial progress was being made in negotiation of treaties for 
the mitigation of double taxation. In June, 1921, a con­
vention was signed at Rome between Austria, Hungary, 
Poland, Italy, Jugoslavia and Rumania. A large number of 
bilateral conventions have been entered into, Germany, 
Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden being among the 
parties to them.
The bilateral conventions which have been negotiated 
have followed generally the lines of the experts’ resolutions. 
An interesting exception, however, is the convention be­
tween Great Britain and the Irish Free State, which adopts 
the principle of residence and ignores the source of income.
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IV
Turning now to the consideration of internal legislation, 
the question of double taxation within the Empire appears 
to have been raised in the British Parliament as early as 
1860, but it was not until the heavy war taxes came into ef­
fect that an attempt was made, in 1916, to alleviate the hard­
ship. The question was discussed at an Imperial war con­
ference in 1917 and was exhaustively considered by a Royal 
Commission in 1919, and that Commission laid down the 
principles which in its opinion should be the basis of any 
sound solution of the problem. The Commission also con­
sidered the question of double income taxes in relation to 
foreign countries but did not see its way in the existing cir­
cumstances to recommend any change in the British prac­
tice. British measures for relief have therefore, with minor 
exceptions, been limited to double taxation within the Em­
pire.
In our Federal practice the question of double taxation 
was dealt with as soon as it became at all serious. The 
specific provisions enacted have exhibited much the same 
characteristics as our income tax laws in general. In many 
cases the spirit of the provisions has been broad, and, indeed, 
liberality has at times become prodigality. On the other 
hand, specific provisions have frequently been arbitrary and 
impracticable, and too often the administration has been 
productive of irritation and expense to taxpayers, rather 
than of revenue to the Treasury.
Since 1918 the law has contained provisions under which 
taxpayers might make a deduction from their United States 
income taxes in respect of income taxes paid in other coun­
tries. Such provisions were the more necessary because of 
our practice of imposing the tax on citizens irrespective of 
residence or the source of the income. We could hardly 
tax our citizens representing American business abroad on 
their income earned where they were residing, without sub­
stantial relief in respect of taxes paid in that country.
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The allowances made have not always been based on well- 
established principles of taxation; at times they have been 
obviously excessive. For instance, under the 1918 law a 
citizen resident in the United. States could deduct from his 
United States tax all taxes paid to foreign countries on his 
income from sources therein, even though such taxes ex­
ceeded the domestic tax on the foreign income in question. 
Thus, if his American rate were 20 per cent and one-third 
of his income were from foreign sources and subject to a 
foreign tax of 60 per cent, he would pay no American tax at 
all. A rule involving such sacrifice by our Treasury of taxes 
on income which was derived from American sources was 
quite uncalled for, and it was changed in 1921.
By a curious oversight an even more anomalous situation 
existed under the 1918 law, as a result of which a domestic 
corporation might in effect exclude from its gross income 
dividends received from a foreign corporation and yet de­
duct from its American taxes any taxes levied on those divi­
dends by the foreign country. This error was also corrected 
in 1921.
The principle of allowing a credit against the American 
tax for foreign taxes paid has from the first been extended to 
taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries of a domestic corporation. 
The rules laid down in the statutes for computing the credit 
in such cases have however been, and still are, unsatisfactory 
and impracticable.
Ever since 1918 any allowance for foreign taxes to a resi­
dent alien has been conditional on his own country’s grant­
ing a similar credit to citizens of the United States residing 
in that country. The general theory of reciprocal exemption 
is entirely sound, but our form of procedure is open to the 
objection that it requires foreign countries to conform to a 
method of exemption which we have devised, instead of to a 
method mutually agreed upon. This objection has particu­
lar force in a case such as that under our 1918 law, where 
our scheme was theoretically unsound and extravagant. It 
was not reasonable that a resident alien should be denied all 
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relief under that statute because his own country did not 
grant relief to the same unreasonable extent as ourselves. 
The law surely might have provided for relief either to the 
same extent as our citizens were relieved in his country or 
to the extent of the relief granted by us to residents who 
were citizens, whichever might be the lower.
In 1921, as already noted, exemption from United States 
income taxes was granted to foreign shipping on a basis of 
reciprocity. This broad-minded provision, which undoubt­
edly involved a sacrifice by our Treasury greater than the 
immediate gain to our shipping interest, has been availed 
of by the principal maritime countries.
It is probable that any further steps in the direction of 
relief from double taxation which we may take will be in 
the same form. With our growing interests in foreign coun­
tries it would seem wise to adopt a liberal policy. There 
are activities other than shipping to which similar treat­
ment might be given, and we might be well advised to offer 
exemption of non-residents from surtaxes on a reciprocal 
basis.
Incidentally, we should assuredly be wise to modify our 
attitude towards non-residents in the matter of returns, 
penalties and other matters of procedure. At present we 
proceed on the theory that it is the duty of everyone the 
wide world over to be familiar with our law and to file a 
return under it if he has income from an American source as 
defined by us, whether he has an agent or office here or not. 
Our laws levy the taxes on “every individual” and require 
a return from every individual having net or gross income 
from American sources in excess of specified limits, and our 
regulations interpret the language literally. Penalties are 
provided by law, and the regulations apply these provisions 
to residents and non-residents alike. The penalties collected 
from non-resident aliens must have been trivial, but the 
trouble, annoyance and expense occasioned by these provi­
sions has been considerable. The English courts, construing 
provisions which required “every person” chargeable with 
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supertax to make a return and made “every person” failing 
to make such a return liable to a penalty, held that a non­
resident alien was not required to make a return nor liable to 
the penalty. The Lord Chancellor, Viscount Cave, said 
(Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue) it was not 
easy to understand “by what right such a penalty could even 
in express terms be imposed” and concluded that the pro­
vision could not have been intended to apply to such a per­
son. Lord Phillimore said he was sure it was not the duty 
of a non-resident and undomiciled alien to know English 
tax law, and Lord Dunedin said:
The next step lay with the appellant, and he made no 
return, and I agree that the penalty section is inapplicable. 
For the appellant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
English Court, nor has the British Parliament power to en­
join him personally to, do anything.
These views seem eminently reasonable, and it is much 
to be desired that the Treasury or the courts should interpret 
our law similarly or that Congress should modify it to the 
same effect. At present we are merely creating precedents to 
no profit, which may be followed by other countries to the 
detriment of our citizens.
v
Our State income tax laws are not—with few exceptions— 
unduly burdensome, though the methods of apportionment 
of income are in some cases intricate and unsatisfactory. 
It is in the field of inheritance taxes that our States have 
acquired unenviable fame.
The situation cannot be better stated than in the language 
of the President’s address to the conference called at his 
suggestion, which met at Washington on February 19, 1925:
There is competition between States to reach in in­
heritance taxes not only the property of its own citizens, 
but the property of the citizens of other States which by any 
construction can be brought within the grasp of the tax- 
gatherer. A share of stock represents a most conspicuous 
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example of multiple inheritance taxation. It is possible 
that the same share of stock, upon the death of its owner, 
may be subject to taxation, first, by the Federal Government; 
then by the State where its owner was domiciled; then by 
some other State which may also claim him as a citizen; again 
in the State where the certificate of stock was kept; in the 
State where the certificate of stock must be transferred on 
the corporation’s books; in the State or States where is or­
ganized the corporation whose capital stock is involved; and, 
finally, in the State or States where this corporation owns 
property. All this means not only an actual amount of tax 
which may under particular circumstances exceed 100 per 
cent of the value of the stock, but the expense, delay and 
inconvenience of getting clearances of the States who claim 
a right to tax the property is a serious burden to the heir who 
is to receive the stock. Particularly is this expense dispro­
portionate to a tax paid by a small estate which has but a 
few shares of stock. In many cases the expense alone must 
exceed the total value of the shares which it is sought to 
transfer. Looking at it from the standpoint of State revenue, 
I am told it is probable that the full cost to executors of 
ascertaining the tax and obtaining the necessary transfers 
is in the aggregate nearly as much as the tax received by the 
States upon this property of non-resident decedents. Here, 
indeed, is extravagance in taxation.
As the President emphasized, the burden of expense and 
trouble was in many cases more serious than the tax. By 
the transfer of personal holdings to a corporation formed for 
that purpose, and by other means, large taxes outside the 
State of the residence of the decedent could usually be 
avoided. The amount of tax thus became dependent on 
the foresight and ingenuity displayed by the decedent rather 
than on any ability to pay. Calculations made showing pos­
sibilities of taxes amounting to 100, 200 or even 300 per 
cent of the estate were merely mental exercises of the expert.
Since the President’s speech was delivered, various events 
have improved the situation. By the Federal Tax Law of 
1926 the credit for State taxes against the Federal tax was 
increased from 25 per cent to 80 per cent of the latter. Next 
came the decision of the Supreme Court in the Frick case 
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which declared invalid a tax on tangible personal property 
without the State, and held that the State of residence must 
allow the tax on corporate stocks owned by the decedent 
levied by the State of incorporation as a deduction from the 
value of the gross estate in computing its tax. This was 
followed by another Supreme Court decision which held 
invalid a tax on the transfer of stock of a foreign corporation 
owned by a non-resident, based on the ground that the prop­
erty of the corporation was mainly within the State.
Important States such as New York, Connecticut, Penn­
sylvania, and Massachusetts, have enacted laws containing 
reciprocal exemption clauses, and conferences of the tax­
ing authorities of these States have been held in an effort 
to make such provisions effective. What the League has 
been seeking to bring about in the international sphere has 
thus been happening in our own interstate field.
VI
In any review of the measures relating to double taxation 
which have been taken since the war, it must be constantly 
kept in mind that the period has been one of unexampled 
difficulties in the field of government finance. Allowing 
for this fact, the progress made cannot be regarded as un­
satisfactory. The efforts of the League of Nations have 
borne and are bearing fruit.
The United States by reason of its prosperity and its in­
creasing foreign investments should be the leader in the 
adoption of broad and liberal policies in this field. Not­
withstanding the amelioration of the situation in the recent 
past, much remains to be done to put our State taxation 
on a fair and sound basis. There is room for improvement 
in our Federal law though even more in our methods of 
Federal tax administration. A Federal inheritance tax, for 
instance, is still levied on stock of a corporation owned by 
a non-resident decedent if either the corporation is organized 
under the laws of one of our States or the stock certificate 
is physically in the United States at the time of the death. 
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Surely we might, on a basis of reciprocity, grant exemption 
in such cases; at least we might adopt a single test of liability. 
The President’s criticisms of the States in this respect are 
justly applicable to the Federal Law.
The United States has hitherto declined to join in the 
work of the League of Nations, but if bur apprehensions 
preclude us from following the same precise path, we have 
at least taken some steps along parallel lines. We have the 
opportunity and it is to our interest to keep pace with, or 
even move ahead of, other nations and to offer reciprocal 
relief to any that are prepared to advance with us. The fact 
that some of the best informed students of the subject are 
among those whose judgment on tax questions is most highly 
valued by Congress gives some grounds for hope that we 
shall not neglect our opportunities and duties.
XFEDERAL TAX LEGISLATION IN 1935 AND IN 1936 *
In June, the country was surprised by a Presidential mes­
sage recommending heavy additional taxes on large incomes 
and inheritances and new taxes on corporations. The pro­
posals came late in an exhausting session; the amount of 
revenue they were expected to realize was admittedly trivial 
in comparison with current deficits; the importance asserted 
for them was purely social. They were supported by a 
Treasury memorandum which was freely quoted by the 
President and which contained highly questionable economic 
doctrines, obvious misinterpretations of statistics, and dis­
turbing administrative proposals. Hurried legislation re­
sulted, the form of which was determined mainly by reluc­
tance to repudiate the President and a desire to escape from 
the heat of Washington. The new provisions were not to 
take effect immediately, and it is intimated that the new 
Congress will be asked to repair some of the more obvious 
defects of the hasty enactment. It is opportune, therefore, 
now to reexamine the recommendations and the memoran­
dum by which they were supported.
The proposals were put forward as calculated to improve 
the distribution of wealth. Everyone who feels any social 
consciousness would like to add to the well-being of the 
mass of our people. Those in political life have no monop­
oly of this praiseworthy desire, though they are sometimes 
more concerned with creating the impression that they are 
doing something to bring about an improvement than with 
the actual results of the measures which they advocate. Even 
the best-intentioned reformers, also, are apt, in the lan­
guage of the great English economist, Alfred Marshall, “in
* Reprinted with Addenda, from “The Voice of Business” number of the 
New York Sun (January 4, 1936). 
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their anxiety to improve the distribution of wealth to be 
reckless as to the effects of their proposals on the production 
of wealth.”  And it is noteworthy that neither in the Presi­
dent’s message, nor in the Treasury memorandum, nor in 
any other official presentation of the question to Congress, 
is the effect of the proposals on the production of wealth 
so much as alluded to.
This points to the real criticism of the proposals. That 
criticism is, not that the proposed taxes, particularly those 
on inheritance, were incapable of strict enforcement and 
therefore bound to result in inequality in their application; 
nor that the amount of revenue they would raise was rela­
tively unimportant and that in the long run they would 
probably affect the revenue adversely. These are minor, 
though probably just, criticisms. The real criticism is that 
the proposals were calculated to destroy to a large extent 
the source from which the capital which is the life-blood 
of our industrial system has in the past been drawn, and 
that they failed to meet this objection or to indicate any 
alternative source of capital.
The importance to the great mass of our people of the 
continuance of a flow of capital into industry can scarcely 
be exaggerated. Perhaps I may quote what I said upon the 
question before the Senate Finance Committee: *
It is generally recognized that one of the most vital 
needs of an industrial community is an adequate supply of 
capital to be invested in new enterprises.
A little thought will convince that to keep our people 
busy, development of new industries must be on a constantly 
increasing scale. In the next generation, we must create 
new industries exceeding in magnitude the motor, radio, and 
other industries created during the last thirty years. Now, 
in the course of such development large losses of capital 
will be incurred. Professor Allyn Young, one of our great­
est economists, used to say that he doubted whether, taking 
all enterprises together, there was such a thing as profit; that 
losses equaled profit over a reasonable rate of interest. The 
important consideration for our people is what effect the
* See below.
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proposed taxes will have on the supply of capital for these 
purposes.
In England, Sir Josiah Stamp has estimated that roughly 
twenty per cent of the national income is required to be 
reinvested in industry in order to maintain a healthy prog­
ress, and has pointed out that the maintenance of this flow 
of capital into industry is vastly more important to the peo­
ple at large than the question in whom the nominal owner­
ship of the capital shall be vested. Mr. Justice Holmes has 
emphasized the same truth.
Statisticians of the right wing and those of the left wing 
may argue whether the amount which could be added to the 
weekly income of the less wealthy by a distribution of the 
excess income of the wealthy would be more or less by a 
dollar a week. They will agree that the amount would be 
small, and trifling in comparison with the improvement in 
well-being of the people at large that has in the past been 
produced and can again be produced in a generation or less 
from the employment of capital in the development of new 
inventions and new large scale industries, which in the 
President’s own words bring “many things within the reach 
of the average man which in an earlier age were available to 
few” or, one might add, in many cases to none.
The omission to deal with these aspects of the question 
cannot be attributed to their novelty or to a dearth of evi­
dence. Economists like Taussig, Carver and Adams have 
repeatedly emphasized the point that, while progressive taxa­
tion can be applied up to a certain point, once legislators 
“pass beyond this limit—apply progression so sharply or 
limit inheritance so narrowly that accumulation is seriously 
affected—and you must supply ways of filling the gap.” Pres­
ident Wilson, in 1919, said:
There is a point at which, in peace times, high rates of 
income and profits taxes discourage energy, remove the in­
centive to new enterprise, encourage extravagant expendi­
tures and produce industrial stagnation with consequent un­
employment and other attendant evils.
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In England, the question has been the subject of extended 
study by a committee of high quality, which in 1926 made 
a report known as the Colwyn report, which is regarded as 
perhaps the most authoritative pronouncement on the broad 
question. This report is of particular significance because 
for years proponents of higher income and inheritance taxes 
have pointed to England as the country where the very rich 
really paid high taxes compared to which ours were moder­
ate. In its report, the Committee, after indicating its full 
acceptance of the principle of ability to pay as a guide in 
taxation, said:
But there is a complementary aspect which imposes a 
check on the application of the ability to pay principle. . . . 
The larger the income, the more room is there for savings; 
and the State, when putting a heavy tax on incomes with the 
greater margin, has to consider the risk of doing too much 
damage to savings. . . . The graduation now existing in 
this country, whether or not it has proceeded too far in the 
ultimate interests of society, has certainly been checked by 
the fear of entrenching too heavily upon the essential sup­
ply of capital. . . . We conclude with regard to the supply 
of capital from individual and corporate savings, that in­
dustry has suffered materially from the effect of high Income 
Tax and Super-Tax. This remains true, when full allowance 
has been made for the proportionate application of revenue 
to the large payments on account of the National Debt which 
accrue directly or indirectly to the benefit of trade (§§ 333, 
373, and 444).
When this report was written, the maximum combined 
rate of income and super-tax was 50% and the maximum 
rate of estate tax was 40%, and it is pertinent to point out 
that not even the minority of that Committee recommended 
rates approaching those proposed in the bill which the House 
passed to give effect to the President’s proposals.
The considerations which led the Committee to reject 
higher graduated taxes are strengthened in our country by 
two considerations which do not apply in England—first, 
that they do not tax capital gains and therefore the man who 
risks his capital has the opportunity of making non-taxable 
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gains as well as a taxable income, whereas here we tax both 
incomes and gains, though we make no corresponding al­
lowances in respect of losses; and secondly, that there is no 
isle of refuge for wealth in England corresponding to our 
tax-exempt securities.
The three commonly recognized main sources of capital 
for the creation of new and the expansion of old enterprises 
are private savings, corporate savings, and the State. In his 
discussion of the proposed additional taxes on corporations, 
the President said: “We should likewise discourage unwieldy 
and unnecessary corporate surpluses,’’ which indicates that 
he did not propose that the main reliance for the supply 
of capital should be put on corporate savings. In any event 
the depression has made great inroads on corporate savings. 
A recent bulletin (No. 55) of the National Bureau of Eco­
nomic Research states that “The situation revealed is a dark 
one. In the aggregate, the drain in the form of losses and 
dividends for the period 1930-1933 exceeded the corporate 
savings of the entire post-war decade.’’
The proposal that the State should supply capital for in­
dustry was therefore implicit in the Presidential message; 
and it is surely a just criticism that the real issue which 
should have been presented to our people was not whether 
they desired slightly to improve the distribution of wealth, 
but whether they desired to substitute a system of industry 
initiated, financed and controlled by the State for the system 
of privately financed industry under which we have lived 
and progressed for generations. If such an issue is once 
squarely raised, it is hardly conceivable that the common 
sense of our people will not lead them to recognize that a 
system of private enterprise, subject to the checks and con­
trols of government, is preferable to conduct of industry 
by government—or, to speak realistically, by politicians.
Apart from the power which the control of capital gives, 
the benefits flowing from accumulated wealth which the 
nominal owners thereof can retain for themselves are ob­
viously limited, and from a national point of view insignifi­
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cant. Hence it is that the selfish creator of wealth unwit­
tingly benefits his fellow men, while the well-meaning re­
former urging a redistribution of wealth is likely to do his 
fellow men only an injury.
Anyone who will read carefully the sympathetic discussion 
of The Christian Ethic as an Economic Factor contained in 
Sir Josiah Stamp’s social service lecture in 1926 will be 
forced to agree with his conclusion that “In centering our 
teaching and our hopes upon the point of redistribution to 
produce greater well-being we are ‘barking up the wrong 
tree’ and diverting attention from the more real and power­
ful remedies.”
The attack on great wealth was, it may be noted, based 
on the very fact that it was turned back into production. It 
was not that wealth ministered to private extravagance and 
waste—the complaint was that large estates were not being 
squandered; that the old saying that wealth was dissipated 
in three generations was being falsified.
The Treasury memorandum quoted by the President fur­
nished statistics purporting to support this view, saying that 
“even informed observers were startled at the tendency to 
concentration, and the rate of concentration indicated by 
the 1933 returns ... in the face of generally declining in­
comes, and in spite of the bank holiday and other events 
of that year, the number who reported net taxable incomes 
of $1,000,000 or over more than doubled, having increased 
from twenty in 1932 to fifty such persons in 1933.”
The charitable view of this statement is that it was penned 
by someone in the legal department of the Treasury un­
versed in the interpretation of statistics. Statisticians know 
that the significance of our statistics of large incomes is prac­
tically destroyed by the inclusion in income of capital gains 
and the frequent changes in the law relating thereto. A 
man retires from active life and sells at a profit of a million 
dollars a business which represents a lifetime of creative 
effort. Thereupon, he makes his appearance (for one year 
only) among the possessors of an income of a million dollars, 
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alongside the man who draws an income of a million dollars 
a year from industrial bonds.
Changes in the law are constantly occurring. Thus, 1932 
was the last year in which capital net losses were allowed 
as a deduction, and 1933 the last in which capital gains could 
be taken on the basis of a relatively moderate flat tax—hence 
there were special incentives to take losses in 1932 and gains 
in 1933; devaluation, and the inflation market in the latter 
year added to those gains as measured in devalued dollars. 
Thus it is found, as was to be expected, that the incomes of 
over a million dollars in 1933 were made up largely (actually 
to the extent of almost exactly one-half) of net capital gains, 
whereas the same groups in 1932 had reported net capital 
losses of about a million dollars.
It was obvious that the Treasury’s interpretation of the 
1933 statistics could not survive the publication of the 
statistics for 1934. Nevertheless, it was a little surprising to 
find the Bureau of Internal Revenue interpreting the Statis­
tics of Income for 1934, recently published (which showed 
a large increase in aggregate income and a marked decrease 
in the number of million dollar incomes) as evidence that a 
great redistribution of wealth had taken place since 1929. 
The statistics form no basis for such a wide generalization, 
but the indications are that the conclusion drawn from a 
study of the national income from 1914-1926, published by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1930, is still 
true, and that “there is practically no tendency towards the 
putting of more income into the hands of the extremely 
opulent sections of the community.”
Whenever the rate of tax on the transfer of property is 
made so high that the margin left to the taxpayer becomes 
small in proportion to the margin of possible error in the 
valuation of the property, the practical result is, inevitably, 
taxation at the discretion of the taxing authority. When 
the Treasury, in its memorandum, admitted that cases would 
arise which “will require sympathetic administration on the 
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part of the Bureau if hardship is to be avoided," it merely 
stated in blander language the truth that the adoption of 
the President’s proposals as embodied in the House Bill 
would have put large estates at the mercy of the Treasury.
As an example, the supposition that Mr. Henry Ford 
would leave his interest in the Ford Motor Company to 
Mr. Edsel Ford was taken in the discussions before the 
Senate Finance Committee. Under the House Bill, and 
upon the assumptions made by the Treasury representative, 
the tax that would have been payable by the estate and the 
beneficiary on such a transfer as is assumed would have ap­
proximated 90% of the value of the stock. Now, of three 
equally competent valuers, one would be quite likely to 
place the value of the stock at a figure 20% above and an­
other 20% below that reached by the third. A tax of 90% 
levied upon 120% of the fair value would, of course, amount 
to 108% of that value. On the other hand, a tax of 80% 
of the true value would be 72%. Assuming, however, that 
the tax was levied on the true value, and that ten years were 
allowed for payment, the annual instalment (ignoring in­
terest) would be, roughly, 9% of the value of the stock be­
queathed. Now, assuming that the stock paid dividends 
equaling 10% on the assessed value, surtaxes under the 
House Bill would have absorbed 75% of such dividends, 
leaving an amount equal to only 2.5% on the original valua­
tion available to pay the annual instalment of tax which, as 
already stated, would be 9% of the original value. Ob­
viously, such a tax could not be collected, and the only ques­
tion would be at what point could a figure be reached which 
the beneficiary would be willing to pay and the Treasury 
to accept.
It would be a gross mistake to suppose that such problems 
would arise in only a very few large cases. Even if the 
amounts involved were reduced to only two or three per 
cent of those assumed in the case of Mr. Ford, the annual 
dividends from the stock bequeathed would, after deduction 
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of surtaxes, still fall far short of the amount required under 
the House Bill to pay one-tenth of the taxes annually; and 
it may be added that in these computations all questions of 
interest, state taxes, etc., are ignored, though in the aggre­
gate they constitute a substantial additional burden.
That differences in legitimate opinion as to value would 
probably be far greater than has been supposed in the fore­
going illustration is apparent from innumerable contested 
cases. To mention only one, which involved the value of 
the stock of the Ford Motor Company itself: Some years ago 
the Treasury fixed the fair value of this stock at March 1, 
1913, at somewhat less than $3,600 a share, and held that 
all the proceeds of sale in excess of that basic value were 
taxable. After protracted hearings, the Board of Tax Ap­
peals fixed the value at $10,000 a share, and the Treasury 
accepted its decision.
Now, we must assume that both of these valuations were 
made in good faith; indeed, on the basis of some personal 
knowledge of the case, it may be said that at least some of 
the officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue believe that 
the value fixed by it was too high, though it proved to be 
barely one-third of the value fixed by the Board. If such 
legitimate differences of opinion as to value exist, can a 
system which levies taxes of 60% or 70%, or even more, 
upon such valuations, be wise or sound?
Fortunately in the Senate the proposed new inheritance 
taxes were eliminated and the law regarding valuation was 
liberalized so as to mitigate somewhat the extreme effects of 
the excessive estate taxes, but the law as passed was never­
theless economically and socially unjustifiable.
Before leaving the question of inheritance taxes, refer­
ence may be made to the regret which many will feel that 
Federal taxation should have made this further advance into 
a field which they believe should be left to the States. How­
ever, so long as the Federal Government continues to bear 
large burdens which seem to belong more properly to the 
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States, it can hardly be criticized for invading also their 
revenue preserves.
It cannot be said that the President’s proposals in regard 
to corporations were supported either by evidence or by any 
sound principle of taxation. The statement that “The drain 
of a depression upon the reserves of business put a dispropor­
tionate strain upon the moderately capitalized small enter­
prise” is neither inherently reasonable nor in accord with 
experience—on the contrary, there is much more reason to 
think that the large corporations are so constantly in the 
public eye as to make it impossible for them to resort to 
economies which could be effected by smaller companies 
without difficulty. The conclusions drawn by the Treasury 
from unanalyzed statistics are at variance with the results 
of more thorough studies, such as those of Epstein. But 
schemes of capitalization, and fiscal policies, have doubtless 
had more influence than size upon ability to withstand the 
depression.
The statement, “We have established the principle of 
graduated taxation in respect of personal incomes, gifts and 
estates; we should apply the same principle to corporations,” 
completely ignores distinctions which have been pointed out 
so frequently and insistently that it cannot be supposed that 
the President’s advisers were unaware of them. However, it 
would be unfair to judge the proposals on their fiscal merits, 
for they are avowedly a part of a larger campaign against 
bigness.
The recommendation of an amendment which would per­
mit the Federal Government to tax the income of subse­
quently issued state and local securities, and the taxation by 
state and local governments of future issues of Federal se­
curities, is no doubt entirely sound from a purely tax stand­
point; but even this recommendation would carry more con­
viction if it were made at a time when Government ex­
penditures were being prudently limited and the budget bal­
anced. The administrative proposals of the Treasury met 
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with no favorable response from the Congress and need not 
be discussed here.
Our tax structure today includes an unsound income and 
inheritance tax scheme resting on an absurdly narrow base 
(less than seven per cent of the national income paid out to 
individuals paid even a normal tax in 1933) and imposing 
rates that are unwise and in some cases unenforceable. 
Among minor schemes, we have the linked capital stock 
and excess-profits taxes, which, though described as “rather 
clever,” are certainly neither wise nor fair—for there is no 
justice in the assumption, which underlies them, that profits 
are excessive if they represent more than a moderate return 
upon the current value, at the bottom of a depression, of 
the capital invested in a business; and we have taxes levied 
on corporations, partly because of hostility to corporations 
and partly because this method disguises the burdens that 
ultimately fall on the individuals who constitute the elector­
ate. No such structure can sustain the burdens which bal­
ancing the budget will entail.
The defects of our tax system are not chargeable to any one 
administration nor to any one Congress. The period of pros­
perity was the appropriate time for creating a system with a 
broad base and low rates of taxation which could be adapted 
readily to the needs of more difficult times. When the de­
pression came upon us, new taxation, which would have bal­
anced the budget, was rejected as politically impracticable. 
The proposals of last June, by carrying to lengths never be­
fore contemplated the false doctrine that the rich can be 
made to pay without burdening the less wealthy, made in­
finitely more difficult the task of creating a sound basis for a 
balanced budget, which must be faced before long if we are 
to be spared from the bitter awakening that follows the first 
pleasant dreams produced by Government spending and 
inflation.
Sound finance today obviously calls for the lowering of 
rates of taxation in the higher brackets and a real stiffening 
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of the rates in the lower brackets, accompanied by a reduc­
tion of the exemptions. But a combination more unattrac­
tive politically can scarcely be conceived. There is danger 
that if the task is faced at all, some device which throws the 
added burden of taxation less obviously on those with small 
means will be preferred, though economists may urge the 
critical importance of bringing home directly to the people 
the cost to them of Government expenditures.
Measures designed to create a greater degree of social 
security will make a broader basis of taxation even more im­
peratively necessary. And surely the people at large, who 
are to benefit from such measures, would prefer to pay their 
fair share of the cost during their earning years. They 
would not be willing to accept private charity, and, logically, 
they should not be willing to accept public charity, but only 
benefits during sickness, unemployment or old age out of 
funds to which they have themselves made their just contri­
bution. The idea that such schemes should be financed by 
levies on the rich is demoralizing as well as impracticable.
England, with less natural resources, has been able to 
balance its budget during the depression, though it has gone 
further than we have in social legislation, because of the 
broad basis of its tax system and its repudiation of the false 
notion that the rich can be made to pay the bulk of the 
taxes. Statistics show that in 1928 England raised a far 
smaller proportion of its revenue from taxes on income and 
property, including inheritances, than we did, and that since 
that time it has made only small increases in the scale of 
taxation, a large part of which has already been remitted. 
Today the highest income tax rate is 60% compared with 
our 75% and the highest estate tax rate 50% compared with 
our 70%. In 1930, the last year for which satisfactory com­
parisons can now be made, less than 6% of our total Federal 
income taxes were collected from persons with incomes of 
under $10,000; while England collected about 40% of its 
total from persons with incomes below £2,000. The report 
made last year by Treasury representatives on the English 
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system shows that an income of $100,000 concentrated in one 
individual there paid 2½ times as much as the same income 
distributed equally between ten individuals; here, it paid 
seven times as much even before the 1935 law was passed. 
Much the same thing is true of inheritance taxes.
There is no hope of a balanced budget until a drastic cur­
tailment of expenditures has taken place and we have an 
Administration and a Congress willing to face the fact that 
the bulk of the taxes must be paid by the mass of the people. 
It is too much to hope for either in an election year. In the 
meantime, some minor but important improvements might 
be effected.
First among these I would put the abolition of the tax 
on capital gains; or, if that is deemed too much of a sacri­
fice to sound principle, the substitution of a flat tax not large 
enough to act as a deterrent to sales of capital assets. I be­
lieve this alternative could be adopted without causing any 
serious loss of revenue, and with wholesome effects on the 
general situation through the encouragement of sales, other­
wise likely to be withheld from the market for tax reasons.
In the second place, the principle admirably stated by the 
Democratic Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee in 
1918, that what is, in fact, a single economic unit ought to 
be taxed as a unit, should be restored and the consolidated 
return again permitted; the tax on intercompany dividends 
should also be eliminated. If these two steps are not to be 
taken, at least the provisions relating to non-taxable reor­
ganizations should be amended so as to permit corporate re­
adjustments between affiliated companies to be effected with­
out tax. Unless this is done, duplication of taxation as a 
result merely of the change of a long-established policy in 
the tax laws will result.
The indefensible linked capital stock and excess-profits 
taxes should be eliminated; a straightforward tax, designed 
to raise an equivalent amount would be more statesmanlike 
and infinitely less harmful in its direct and indirect effects 
than this exhibition of tax-craft.
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Such changes as these would do something to arrest the 
decline in respect for Federal taxation, which today is too 
generally regarded as having reached a stage where justice 
and fairness to the large body of taxpayers have been lost 
to sight in reprisals against practices which, whatever their 
merits or demerits, are being followed by only a small num­
ber of those on whom the burden of such reprisals falls.
ADDENDUM I
Administrative Proposals of the Treasury
In the foregoing article, considerations of space made it 
necessary to omit discussion of the administrative proposals 
of the Treasury; but, although these proposals met with no 
favorable response from the Congress, they were of such a 
disquieting character that it seems worth while to append a 
brief comment upon them. They related to the Board of 
Tax Appeals and to the Courts.
In regard to the Board of Tax Appeals, the Treasury 
memorandum said:
The device of permitting a litigation of tax first and pay­
ment afterwards, with no security, or penalty or disadvantage 
whatever for the delay is proving so costly as to present a 
challenge to effective enforcement.
It is stated by a retiring member of the Board of Tax 
Appeals that since 1926 the Government had lost two-thirds 
in amount of its cases before the Board of Tax Appeals, the 
average tax case involving a deficiency of $28,000.
This brief description of the existing system is inaccurate. 
The Treasury has and uses the power to require payment 
or bond for payment in any case in which it has reason to 
feel that the eventual collection of the tax in any case pend­
ing before the Board might be jeopardized. And since any 
judgments in favor of the Government carry interest, it is 
incorrect to say that there is no penalty or disadvantage what­
ever to the taxpayer for the delay. To an impartial observer, 
the fact that the taxpayers had succeeded in two-thirds of the 
cases before the Board might seem to be evidence of the need 
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for continuance of the present system, in order to protect tax­
payers from oppression by the Treasury. Only a belief in its 
fitness to exercise autocratic power can explain the contrary 
view expressed by the Treasury.
In respect of the Courts generally, the memorandum 
stated:
When the time comes to consider more fully administra­
tive provisions, consideration should be given to settling 
valuation questions wherever they arise in tax administration 
in some manner other than by litigation. The litigation 
method of determining values is too technical, slow and un­
certain.
If we could interpret this comment as looking to the crea­
tion of a body of some such character as the English Tax 
Commissioners, independent of both the taxing authority 
and the taxpayer, we might perhaps derive encouragement 
from it. But the Board of Tax Appeals, itself, was the out­
growth of such a suggestion; and the fact that the Treasury 
now regards the procedure before that Board as a challenge 
to effective enforcement makes such an interpretation quite 
improbable. The only alternative would seem to be a grant 
of final power in the matter of valuation to the Treasury, 
to be exercised by it “sympathetically” whenever sympathetic 
treatment seems to be called for. Admitting the defects of 
the legal apparatus for determining values, the Courts possess 
one advantage which more than offsets any which the Treas­
ury may be presumed to have, namely, that their attitude 
is purely .objective. In theory, the Treasury may recognize 
that it has a duty to be just to taxpayers as well as to collect 
revenue, but in practice it takes the position that its mission 
is to collect revenue, and that it is for the taxpayer to protect 
himself.
ADDENDUM II
Some Considerations Relating to the Taxation of Capital 
Gains
I. The present system of taxing capital gains without al­
lowing equivalent relief in respect of capital losses is plainly 
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inequitable. It therefore inspires disrespect for the law and 
affords a plausible moral justification for tax evasion. As 
between the alternative of allowing deductions for losses or 
abolishing the tax on gains, the latter alternative is sounder 
in principle and is steadily becoming more and more ex­
pedient from the fiscal standpoint.
II. At an earlier stage of our development, the argument 
that capital gains would normally greatly exceed capital 
losses went a long way to offset the consideration that whether 
a gain or loss should be taken lies with the taxpayer, so that 
the normal relation between capital gains and losses is liable 
to be violently disturbed whenever it is made advantageous 
for the taxpayer to take or to refrain from taking one or the 
other. Today, with the exploitation of the natural resources 
of the country as far advanced as it is, and with the prospect 
of growing social demands adversely affecting capital values, 
there is no reason to anticipate that the normal tendency, 
even if unaffected by tax considerations, would be to produce 
an excess of gains over losses.
III. The enactment of heavy inheritance and gift taxes has 
largely destroyed the argument in favor of taxation of capital 
gains that, in the absence of such taxes, unearned increment 
escaped all taxation. Capital gains are in the main either 
lost or added to capital. If they are lost, it is entirely un­
just that the gains should be taxed but no relief given in 
respect to the losses; while, if relief is given, the fact that 
the taxpayer can choose the time of taking gains and losses 
will result in a reduction in taxes in respect of losses which 
will exceed the increase in taxes as a result of gains. To 
the extent that capital gains are added to capital, the Govern­
ment now collects a substantial tax when that capital passes 
by gift or bequest—consequently, there is not the same argu­
ment as there would be for taxing gains as gains.
IV. The taxation of gains with equivalent relief in respect 
of losses produces additional revenue when it is least needed 
and impairs revenue when the need is greatest.
V. Taxation of capital gains also creates highly artificial 
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markets, through causing sales which would otherwise take 
place to be withheld from the market. Unquestionably, this 
factor is operating to a very considerable extent at the pres­
ent time.
VI. The abolition of the taxation of capital gains would 
make possible the elimination of the extremely complex pro­
visions for non-taxable exchanges and reorganizations, which 
constitute one of the most difficult branches of income tax 
practice and administration. It would greatly facilitate the 
corporate readjustments necessary to bring about the reduc­
tion in the number of holding companies which the Admin­
istration and the Congress seem to regard as highly desirable.
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE FINANCE 
COMMITTEE, AUGUST 7, 1935 *
Senator King. Will you state the capacity in which you 
appear, Mr. May?
Mr. May. I appear as an individual, primarily because of 
my interest in tax matters. I was connected with the Treas­
ury during the war and later was a member of the Advisory 
Committee to the Joint Congressional Committee on Taxa­
tion. I am senior partner in the firm of Price, Waterhouse & 
Co.
I wish to speak very briefly on the question of the effect 
of the proposed taxes added to the existing taxes upon those 
not directly subject thereto. I do not propose to touch on 
the effect on the persons subjected to the tax except inso­
far as that is necessary to indicate the probable effect on the 
great majority of our population who will not be directly 
subject thereto.
It is generally recognized that one of the most vital needs 
of an industrial community is an adequate supply of capital 
to be invested in new enterprises. A little thought will con­
vince that to keep our people busy, development of new in­
dustries must be on a constantly increasing scale. In the next 
generation, we must create new industries exceeding in mag-
* Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1935, pp. 303-10.
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nitude the motor, radio, and other industries created during 
the last thirty years. Now, in the course of such development 
large losses of capital will be incurred. Professor Allyn 
Young, one of our greatest economists, used to say that he 
doubted whether, taking all enterprises together, there was 
such a thing as profit; that losses equaled profit over a rea­
sonable rate of interest. The important consideration for 
our people is what effect the proposed taxes will have on the 
supply of capital for these purposes. Obviously, this phase 
of the case is far more important than the amount of revenue 
which is expected to be derived therefrom.
In a generation, according to the Treasury’s estimates, that 
yield would not be greatly in excess of the deficit for the 
last year. Economists, even those who favor practically con­
fiscatory taxes on wealth, recognize that such taxation will 
destroy the principal source of capital for new enterprises, 
and that if the community is to continue to exist in any­
thing like the present scale of living, a new source for such 
capital must be found.
So far as I am aware, no study of the effects of such legis­
lation on the supply of capital has been submitted to the 
Congress or any of its committees. The subject was very 
exhaustively studied over a period of 2 years by an English 
committee on national debt and taxation headed by Lord 
Colwyn, which made a report dated November 15, 1926, 
which is rated, I believe, as perhaps the most authoritative 
pronouncement on the subject available.
Senator King. Do you know whether our committee, of 
which Mr. Parker is a member, and who made a rather 
extensive study of the taxation system in Great Britain, 
took cognizance of Lord Colwyn’s report?
Mr. May. I have not had the pleasure of seeing Mr. 
Parker since that report was made; I could not tell. I have a 
copy of it here if you would like me to leave it.
Senator King. I wish you would leave it with the secre­
tary. I would like to examine it.
Senator Gore. How large is it? Could it go in the record?
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Mr. May. It is a very big document [handing volume to 
Senator King].
Senator King. Is that the only copy you have?
Mr. May. I have another one in my office.
Senator King. Have you any objection to leaving that 
with the Committee?
Mr. May. I would be very pleased to leave it.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. May. This report is regarded as perhaps the most 
authoritative pronouncement on the subject available.
They started, as I do, with the assumption that graduated 
income taxes and inheritance or estate taxes were necessary 
and proper, and that the limits on such taxes should be either 
the limit of ability to collect them or the limit at which the 
injury to the community would be greater than could be 
compensated by the collections. In the course of the report 
they said:
Money in the free disposition of the citizen has a utility 
to the State as well as to himself. Saved and invested, it sup­
plies the financial and industrial needs of the community. 
The special utility to the community only begins when the 
greatest utility to the individual has ceased. The larger the 
income, the more room is there for savings; and the State, 
when putting a heavy tax on incomes with the greater 
margin, has to consider the risk of doing too much damage 
to savings.
And elsewhere they said that the effect of an estate tax 
was substantially the same.
Again they said:
Any taxation which unduly diminishes the reward of 
entrepreneurs for taking pioneer risks is in that respect a 
source of harm to the community.
At the time when the report was written, the maximum 
rate of income and super-tax was 50 per cent and the maxi­
mum rate of estate tax was 40 per cent to which was added 
an inheritance tax which, in the case of direct descendants, 
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was only 1 per cent and in no case exceeded 10 per cent. 
That is the same as today.
In their conclusion, the committee stated:
We conclude, with regard to the supply of capital from 
individual and corporate savings, that industry has suffered 
materially from the effect of high income tax and super-tax. 
This remains true, when full allowance has been made for 
the proportionate application of revenue to the large pay­
ments on account of the national debt which accrue directly 
or indirectly to the benefit of trade.
Of course, under the present proposals, there would be no 
compensating benefit from the reduction of the national 
debt. Everyone realizes what a problem the proposed taxes 
would create in a case such as that of Henry Ford, but it is a 
gross mistake to assume that the difficulties would arise in 
only a few extreme cases like his.
I notice that Mr. Jackson, in his testimony yesterday, esti­
mated the value of Mr. Ford’s holding in Ford Motor stock 
at $354,000,000. He said, quite fairly, that that was an ex­
ceptional case, but I think that in fairness he should have 
added that substantially similar results would ensue if the 
figures were only a tenth of those assumed by him.
In fact, they would be almost confiscatory if the figures 
were reduced to a bare 1 per cent of the figures in the Ford 
case. Since reading his testimony in the press, I have made a 
comparative table showing the results of the application of 
the proposed taxes to a case similar to that of Mr. Ford, us­
ing first, values of $350,000,000; second, values of $35,000,- 
000; and third, values of $3,500,000, the last being 1 per cent 
of the Ford figures, roughly. They show that if Mr. Ford left 
stock in the Ford Motor Co. having a value of $350,000,000 
to his son, and the estate and inheritance taxes were payable 
over 10 years, without interest, and the stock received by 
Mr. Edsel Ford paid 10 per cent dividends annually, the net 
yield of those dividends, after deducting the proposed sur­
taxes, would amount to only 28 per cent of the annual in­
stallment of one-tenth payable on the taxes.
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I think that is a point that was not clearly made in Mr. 
Osgood’s presentation. He overlooked the fact that the tax 
would fall on the beneficiary and not on the Ford Motor 
Car Co., and you could raise money only on the stock, and 
you could get money to pay the tax only by dividends on the 
stock, and those dividends would be subject to these heavy 
surtaxes.
I have the table here; you might be interested to see the 
figures.
(The table referred to is as follows:)
Statement showing effect of existing estate state tax and 
proposed inheritance tax on an estate consisting of stock of a 
corporation left to a single beneficiary (son), assuming the 
value of the estate to be (A) $350,000,000, (B) $35,000,000, 
and (C) $3,500,000, and assuming (1) that the taxes could be 
paid in 10 annual installments and (2) that dividends on the 
stock may be expected at the rate of 10 per cent per annum 
on the valuation, and that the proposed surtax rates will be 
payable thereon (State taxes and interest on deferred pay­
ments of estate and inheritance taxes ignored).
(A) Valuation of estate...................................... $350,000,000
Estate and inheritance taxes thereon........ 312,970,750
Annual installment of tax, 1/10.................. 31,297,075
Annual dividends........................................ 35,000,000
Surtax thereon.............................................. 26,091,000
Balance for payment of estate and in­
heritance taxes............................ 8,909,000
Per cent of estate and inheritance taxes 
that could be paid out of dividends and 
inheritance taxes that could be paid out 
of dividends annually.......................... 2.8
(B) Valuation of estate...................................... 35,000,000
Estate and inheritance taxes thereon.......... 29,470,750
Annual installment of tax, 1/10.................. 2,947,075
Annual dividends........................................ 3,500,000
Surtax thereon............................................ 2,481,000
Balance for payment of estate and in­
heritance taxes............................... 1,019,000
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Per cent of estate and inheritance taxes 
that could be paid out of dividends an­
nually................................................... 3.5
(C) Valuation of estate...................................... $3,500,000
Estate and inheritance taxes thereon... . 2,031,168
Annual installment of tax, 1/10.................. 203,116
Annual dividends........................................ 350,000
Surtax thereon............................................ 185,000
Balance for payment of estate and in­
heritance taxes............................ 165,000
Per cent of estate and inheritance taxes
that could be paid out of dividends an­
nually ........................................................ 8.1
Mr. May. Briefly summarizing this statement, the valua­
tion of the estate is $350,000,000; estate and inheritance tax 
thereon, $312,900,000; the annual installment of the tax, 
one-tenth, $31,297,000; annual dividends, $35,000,000; sur­
taxes thereon, $26,000,000; leaves a balance for the estate 
and inheritance taxes of $8,900,000, which is 2.8 per cent 
of the total charges, or 28 per cent of the annual installment 
of the tax.
Senator King. Did you take into consideration the taxes 
that might be imposed in the various States?
Mr. May. I have left out the State taxes, interest on de­
ferred tax, and everything of that kind.
Senator King. If they paid all of those, there would be 
nothing left.
Mr. May. When you get to 2.8 per cent, it does not make 
very much difference about the rest. It amounts to practical 
confiscation.
Senator Gerry. Was there not a suggestion made in the 
House in the hearings, if I recollect, that it can be worked 
out of income?
Mr. May. I believe Mr. Jackson did make that statement. 
But you see what that involves. You work it backward. You 
have, roughly, $31,000,000 of an annual installment to pay, 
and if you are going to pay that out of dividends, you have 
to have enough dividends to pay 75 per cent surtax and still 
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have $31,000,000 left, and that means you have to have four 
times $31,000,000 in dividends, and that is $124,000,000 in 
dividends on the stock valued at $350,000,000, or, roughly, 
35 per cent.
If a stock was going to pay 35 per cent, you would not get 
the Treasury to value it at par. I think you would have 
difficulty in getting them to value it at 10 times the annual 
earnings, which is the figure I have used in my calculations.
But as I say, that is a quite exceptional case, and that might 
be dealt with as a special situation; but when you divide the 
figures by 10 and come down to $35,000,000, you find that 
after the dividends have been paid and the surtaxes deducted, 
what is left is no more than 3.5 per cent on the amount of the 
tax. So that if the tax was paid over 10 years, it would be 
only 35 per cent of the annual installment of the tax.
And finally, if you get down to an estate which is 1 per 
cent of the size of Mr. Ford’s—
Senator King (interposing). That is, three and a half 
million?
Mr. May. Yes. The annual installment of tax would be 
$203,000, and the balance that would remain out of the 
dividends after paying the surtaxes would be $165,000. So 
you would be able to pay 80 per cent of your annual install­
ment, or 8 per cent of the total taxes. Those are the figures 
in the case of a $3,500,000 corporation.
Senator King. Supposing you had no dividends?
Mr. May. Then you would be out of luck.
Mr. Jackson also said that he thought this could be 
financed by a bond issue, and people would be glad to 
finance a bond issue. On $350,000,000, the taxes would be 
89.5 per cent.
Mr. Jackson’s experience with underwriters may be more 
favorable, although I think it is probably less extensive than 
mine; but I have never found a bond house that was able 
to underwrite a bond issue for 90 per cent of the value of the 
property, and I doubt if his hopes are well founded, and I 
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doubt if anybody is going to try the experiment with a 
$350,000,000 issue.
Senator Gore. Could we not tax these underwriters if they 
did not do it? [Laughter.]
Mr. May. If the figures were reduced, as I say, to one-tenth 
of the figures used in the Ford case, the percentage borne by 
the net income on the stock bequeathed to the annual in­
stallment of taxes would not rise to more than 35 per cent; 
and even if the figures assumed are only 1 per cent of those 
in the supposed Ford case, the income from the stock be­
queathed would fall substantially short of paying the annual 
instalment of the taxes. In either case of the first two as­
sumed,  the beneficiary would be better advised to let the 
Government take the property for the taxes and buy it from 
the Government on the best terms he could get, rather than 
pay taxes amounting, as they would, to from 84 per cent to 
89.5 per cent of the Treasury’s valuation.
In the first two cases, the beneficiary would be in little 
better position to pay the tax if he owned large amounts of 
other property in addition, for 90 per cent of all such addi­
tional property would be taken in taxes.
Further, in each of these cases a 10 per cent overvaluation 
would make the tax practically 100 per cent of the real 
value.
Another point I would like to make is that I do not believe 
that anybody could value the Ford estate holdings within a 
margin of 15 per cent one way or other from a given figure, 
or a total spread of 30 per cent.
If they put the valuation of that stock 10 per cent too high 
and taxed it at 90 per cent, that is 100 per cent of the true 
valuation.
That I think is one of the great points that has perhaps not 
been so fully stressed before your Committee as I would like 
to see it stressed—the importance of valuation in connection 
with this matter, and the wide range of difference of opinion 
that exists in respect to valuation.
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At this point I would like to quote some illustrations to 
show the difficulties of the problem of valuation. I would 
recall, first, a case in which I was personally concerned, in 
which the District Court found as a fact and was upheld by 
the Circuit Court of Appeals in doing so, that the fair market 
value of an insurance stock was $55 a share on the day on 
which it sold on the New York Stock Exchange at $90, on the 
basis of which figure the Treasury proposed to tax the trans­
action.
In the case of the Tex-Penn Oil Co., the Board of Tax Ap­
peals said:
Our problem, then, at this point is to determine the “fair 
market value, if any” of the 1,007,834 share block of Trans­
continental stock. In determining the deficiencies in these 
cases, the respondent used a fair market value of $47.55. He 
has now abandoned that figure and asserts that the stock had 
a fair market value of $12 per share ... we have deter­
mined that the fair market value of this stock of Trans­
continental Oil Co. received by petitioners in the transaction 
before us was $7 per share.
Now, ignoring the Commissioner’s first valuation in this 
case, it is obvious that a tax of 60 per cent, let alone 90 per 
cent, would amount to more than the total value found by 
the Board of Tax Appeals.
Another case which is perhaps pertinent is the case which 
involved the valuation of the Ford Motor Co. stock itself, 
the valuation of that stock as of March 1,1913. In that case 
it was to the interest of the Government to put the value low. 
The Commissioner claimed that the value of the stock was 
$3,547.84—marvelous accuracy—a share. Eventually the 
Board of Tax Appeals found that the tax value was $10,000 
a share or very nearly three times the figure fixed by the 
Commissioner.
The competent and honest estimates of the. value of a busi­
ness may vary 15 per cent to 20 per cent from a prior figure. 
To levy taxes which leaves a residuum less than the reason­
able margin of error is unsound taxation.
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The report of the House hearings contains a copy of a 
letter written by the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee 
on Internal Revenue Taxation suggesting extraordinary 
measures to meet the hardships imposed on the estates of 
decedents who died in 1929, because of changing values. 
That was under a statute levying a maximum tax of 20 per 
cent. Even under that statute, it was frequently found to be 
impossible to collect the full tax so that valuation had to be 
arbitrarily reduced or a compromise worked out. Under the 
proposed bill that would be the normal case in respect of any 
considerable estate. The rates in the bill would in such cases 
be only nominally enforced. Taxation would, in fact, be at 
the discretion of the Treasury, as possibly limited by liti­
gation.
I would like to draw attention to another consequence that 
would flow from such taxation, that is, that capitalists would 
be forced to spread their capital over numerous enterprises 
so as to avoid the effects that come if their capital is locked 
up in a single enterprise, with the result that our system of 
businesses owned by small private groups would disappear. 
The separation of beneficial ownership from control would 
be accelerated instead of being checked.
Senator Gore. That is the worst defect in our whole 
structure, as I see it now.
Mr. May. But the really vital objection to the measure is 
the effect it would have on savings and enterprise and, ulti­
mately, upon employment and taxable income of the future.
It is difficult to see why capitalists should undertake new 
enterprises if the proposed burdens were added to the 
burdens of the existing laws, so long as any alternative might 
be open to them. Here there is the alternative of tax-exempt 
securities, which would at least avert surtaxes, and provide 
liquid funds to meet estate and inheritance taxes.
The disastrous effect of the general result now and on 
future enterprises is incalculable. To adopt the policy re­
flected in the bill without having first reviewed this alterna­
tive is rather like drawing water from a tested reservoir into 
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a cistern known to be leaking, and to do so without provid­
ing some other source of capital seems to me with all respect 
to be improvident. I am reminded of the words of a great 
English economist, Alfred Marshall, referring to the social 
reformers who, as he put it, “in their desire to improve the 
distribution of wealth are reckless as to the effect of their 
schemes on the production of wealth.”
Senator King. Mr. May, please state for the record your 
experience in connection with taxation and revenue meas­
ures generally, and particularly measures relating to in­
heritance and estate taxes.
Mr. May. My experience has not been so much with in­
heritance and estate taxes, because they were not so active at 
the time that I was engaged; but I was in the Treasury dur­
ing the war and I made a trip to England on one occasion 
at the request of the administration to study the English sys­
tem while I was there; and later I was a member of the Joint 
Congressional Committee, and I have been in consultation 
with the Treasury Department very freely during the last 
20 years; in fact, the first contact I had was with the present 
Secretary of State when he drew the first income tax bill, and 
I sat down with him and discussed the problems that pre­
sented.
Of course, in my business work I have a very close contact 
with taxation, although I do not specialize in it personally. 
That is handled by one of my partners, but I see it and its 
effects on business in a very decided way.
Senator King. Price, Waterhouse & Co. has to do with 
estates and with business generally, and their accounts and 
investigations?
Mr. May. Oh, yes; we do a very large amount of account­
ing business in such fields.
Senator Gore. Mr. May, we have heard a good deal said 
about the sharing of the wealth. In all of what you and 
Mr. Osgood have said, don’t you think that is rather con­
servative?
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Mr. May. “Sharing” is not the word that I would have 
selected.
Senator Gore. That is the point.
Mr. May. I think it is an entire fallacy to believe that this 
would be a revenue producer, if you take account of the taxes 
that would be destroyed as well as the taxes that would be 
received. If you do that, I think it would be a net loser. 
The taxes that are received will show, they will show up in 
the return, and those that are lost will not be computed.
XI
THE PROPOSED GRADUATED TAXES ON UNDIS­
TRIBUTED CORPORATE PROFITS*
I am going to discuss today the proposals made by the Presi­
dent and now before the Congress for graduated taxes on 
the undistributed profits of corporations. I am not going 
to discuss the details of the pending measure because they 
are likely to be changed. I intend to discuss only the prin­
ciples, and I want to talk about them from various stand­
points such as those of practicability and justice; the ad­
ministrative problems presented; and above all, the economic 
consequences their adoption would be likely to produce. 
In view of the fact that comparisons between our system and 
the British are very frequent, and that some years ago I 
made a study of the British system at the request of the 
then Administration, I shall try from time to time to illus­
trate some of the points I make by comparison between our 
methods and those employed in Great Britain.
My approach to the question is entirely non-political—in 
fact, I have never been affiliated with any of the political 
parties. My interest in the subject is a part of my general 
interest in the whole question of taxation, which developed 
when I was in the Treasury during the war and had some­
thing to do with the difficult problems of taxation which 
were then presented. Even prior to that time, I had taken 
some part in the formulation of the income tax law of 1913. 
Since the war, through service on the Advisory Committee 
to the Joint Congressional Committee, and in other ways, 
my interest in the subject has been kept alive and active.
The new proposals may be divided into two distinct parts: 
the first contemplates determining the tax on corporate 
profits in so far as they are distributed according to the tax
* A lecture before the School of Business Administration of the University 
of Buffalo, April 7, 1936 (slightly revised).
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status of the individual who receives the dividend. This is 
the same principle as is followed in England, and there is 
much argument in its favor, although I am not prepared to 
say that I should be willing to accept the principle in its 
entirety, and I think that from an administrative standpoint 
the method of giving effect to it now proposed is open to 
very serious objection.
The second half of the proposal is a steeply graduated tax 
on profits of corporations which are not distributed. This, 
I believe, is a principle new to the tax systems of the world.
Before I discuss the present proposals I should perhaps 
give you a little of the background against which they have 
to be considered. At the present time, our tax system in­
cludes a small normal tax (4 per cent) and graduated sur­
taxes rising to 75 per cent on individual incomes; a tax on 
corporate incomes, into which last year a very limited ap­
plication of the idea of graduation was introduced so that it 
now runs from 12½ per cent to 15 per cent; we have also a 
combined capital stock and excess profits tax which was in­
troduced in 1933. Under the latter scheme, each corpora­
tion chooses its own valuation for its capital stock and pays 
an excess-profits tax based on the relation between its profits 
and the capital stock valuation it has itself fixed. The idea 
is that if a corporation tries to save money on one tax it will 
get caught on the other. The merit of ingenuity has been 
claimed for this tax, but I think that is its only possible 
merit; and one of the sound features of the present proposal 
is that it contemplates the abolition of this undesirable 
excrescence on our tax system.
In order to bring the new proposals into a clearer light it 
may be useful to compare the rate of tax paid on a given 
amount of income, the beneficial interest in which belongs 
to a taxpayer who already is in the highest bracket, under 
three different conditions: First, every hundred dollars of 
additional income earned by him directly pays a tax of 
$79.00; second, each hundred dollars of income earned on 
stock of a corporation which he owns pays a tax of $15.00; 
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third, if a hundred dollars of income is earned on a stock 
which he owns and the balance remaining after payment 
of the corporation income tax is distributed to him, the total 
tax paid on it is $78.75. The disparity between the tax in 
the second and third cases obviously creates an incentive 
for persons in the high income brackets to allow income 
earned on stock which they own to remain undistributed. 
It is this fact which underlies the present proposal. The 
vital question is whether the remedy proposed is a sound 
one and, frankly, I do not think it is.
You will readily perceive that the problem grows out of 
the wide disparities between the normal rate of tax on in­
dividuals, the rates of tax on corporations, and the surtaxes 
oh individuals; and at this point I might refer to British 
practice, because there the problem is less acute, for the 
simple reason that the disparities between the different rates 
of tax are less. In England, the normal rate of tax on cor­
poration. profits and the normal rate of tax on individual 
incomes are identical—at the present time, 22½ per cent, 
which is five and one-half times our normal tax on indi­
viduals and half as much again as our maximum corpora­
tion income tax. The maximum surtax there is 41¼ per 
cent, which is not much more than one-half of our maximum 
of 75 per cent.
England makes no attempt to interfere with or influence 
the freedom of public companies in the distribution of 
dividends. The advantage to the national economy of the 
reinvestment of profits in industry is apparently deemed 
sufficient to outweigh any loss of surtaxes. A solution of our 
problem which would take the form of a closer approxima­
tion to the English rates would, I believe, be sounder from 
every point of view than the proposal now before Congress.
You are all no doubt familiar with the graduated tax on 
individual incomes, and I should like, therefore, to point 
out that there is no analogy whatsoever between the grad­
uated tax on individual incomes and the proposed graduated 
tax on undistributed profits of corporations, I am entirely 
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in sympathy with the principle of graduated taxes on in­
dividual incomes, though I believe we have carried the idea 
in practice further than is desirable in the economic interest 
of the country, or is advantageous to the revenue. This 
graduation is based on the theory of “ability to pay” or, per­
haps, rather on that of “equality of sacrifice.” The thought 
is that a rich man can well afford to pay not only more tax, 
but a larger proportion of his income in taxes than the poor 
man, most of whose income is required to meet the neces­
sities of life.
The proposed graduated tax on undistributed corporate 
income rests on no similar principle. It is what may be 
called a “pressure tax,” designed to compel a course of action 
which the Administration or the Legislature thinks desir­
able. It operates by imposing a very heavy penalty or tax 
upon those who do not follow the course of action desired 
by the Legislature. I shall develop this point more fully 
later. For the present, I merely wish to emphasize that any 
supposed analogy between a graduated tax on undistributed 
profits and a graduated tax on individual incomes is entirely 
specious and false.
I have already said that our existing system undoubtedly 
creates an incentive to withhold profits from distribution, 
and in such circumstances it is inevitable that profits should 
in some cases be withheld from distribution which ought to 
be distributed. This fact has long been recognized by the 
Congress, and for many years our laws have contained pro­
visions for special taxation in cases in which it appeared that 
profits were being withheld for the purpose of avoiding the 
surtaxes. These provisions have been gradually made more 
drastic, and certainly today they provide the Bureau of In­
ternal Revenue with a far more powerful machinery for 
dealing with abuses than, for instance, does the English law.
It is, I think, a common mistake to assume that our cor­
porations generally distribute a smaller proportion of their 
profits than those of other countries. The only country 
with which it is readily possible to make any sort of com­
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parison is Great Britain, and I think the evidence shows 
clearly that our companies, even in times of prosperity, dis­
tribute in the aggregate a larger percentage of their profits 
than do English companies. Not only so, but it is an un­
questioned fact that during the depression American cor­
porations have distributed dividends in excess of their cur­
rent earnings to an amount exceeding the profits withheld 
from distribution in the preceding ten years. It therefore 
cannot justly be said that in the aggregate our corporations 
withhold more than they should. As I have said, there are 
unquestionably some corporations which could properly dis­
tribute far more than they do, but I believe the present law 
provides adequate machinery for dealing with those cases— 
if not, let the machinery be strengthened. If there will be 
some cases which it will not be possible to reach, we should 
not allow resentment over this fact to lead us to adopt meas­
ures that are economically unwise and unjust to the great 
body of corporate taxpayers.
While abuses undoubtedly exist, there is no room for 
doubt about the fact that the amount of profits withheld 
from distribution in order to save taxes is a relatively small 
proportion of the amount of profits that normally remain 
undistributed. The present proposal, however, contem­
plates treating all withholding of profits from distribution 
alike, whether they are actuated by a desire to avoid taxa­
tion, by statutory requirement, by contractual obligations, 
or by honest belief that such withholding is essential to the 
continued existence of the enterprise.
Since the proposals have been before the Congress, amend­
ments have been suggested in the House Committee to 
modify the application of the principle in cases where it 
would be manifestly improper for the profits to be dis­
tributed; but in their latest appearances before the Com­
mittee the representatives of the Treasury have insisted that 
there should be no exception whatever from the scheme of 
taxation which they have put forward.
It cannot be denied that a universal application would 
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produce serious injustice and do great harm to important 
parts of our economic system, and it is a fair question to ask 
what are the arguments that can be advanced in favor of 
proposals Which are bound to have such an effect. Though 
the measure was proposed originally as a means of meeting 
the so-called ordinary deficit in the budget for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1937, it is apparent that it would not serve 
this purpose—indeed, it is a practical certainty that it would 
lead to reduction of tax collections for that particular year. 
The loss of taxes on corporations would be felt immediately 
—the gain from additional taxes on individuals would, in 
the main, not be realized until 1938, if then.
Incidentally, I may say that I believe the estimates of 
probable revenues are excessive. I am convinced that they 
do not make adequate allowance for the changes affecting 
tax liability which such a measure inevitably brings about. 
For instance, reclassifications of capital stock or transfers 
of property from taxable individuals to charitable institu­
tions might vitally affect the calculations. If I were convinced 
that the measure would produce a large increase of taxes I 
might be. willing to support it even though I regarded it, as 
I do, as a bad tax. I think we are today in the position not 
.that half a loaf is better than no bread, but that almost any 
taxes are better than none, because the alternative is infla­
tion, which will do more injury to our people than even the 
worst of taxes.
If the purpose of the measure is not primarily an imme­
diate increase of revenue, what motives have led to its being 
advanced at this particular time? Obviously, an election 
year is a most inopportune time for reforms in our general 
system of taxation. Sound tax proposals are seldom palatable 
to the great majority of the people, and an election year is 
apt to produce proposals which are popular in their appeal 
rather than sound in their principles, and which disguise 
rather than minimize the burden which really falls on the 
people at large.
It would be quite easy to make out a case that these pro­
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posals are deliberately socialistic in intent. Last year’s high 
taxes on inheritance, as proposed by the President, might 
fairly be said to have been designed to strike a heavy blow 
at private savings as a source of supply for the capital of 
industry. This, it might be said, is an equally heavy blow 
at corporate savings as a source for such capital. Now, there 
are only three important sources for the supply of capital, 
which is the life-blood of industry; namely, private savings, 
corporate savings, and the State. If you. eliminate private 
savings and corporate savings, the only recourse for a supply 
of capital is to the State, with the inevitable sequel that the 
State wall control industry. In the present unprecedented 
depression, the State has had to come to the aid of industry 
to a substantial extent. If corporations are compelled by 
taxation to distribute all their surpluses in times of prosper­
ity, it is inevitable that in any subsequent period of depres­
sion when they suffer losses they will be compelled to resort 
to State aid to a far greater extent.
But while the motive which actuates some of those who 
are supporting the present proposals may. be socialistic, 
others, particularly in the Treasury, are, I think, supporting 
them for a somewhat different reason. I have spoken of the 
cases in which the present laws were abused, and I think 
some persons in the Treasury have their eyes glued on those 
cases, and in their attempt to penalize the small group of 
gross abusers of the law are willing to adopt measures which, 
they believe, would add to the burdens on that group; and 
lose sight of the injurious effects which such measures would 
have on the large body of taxpayers. The welfare of the 
many is lost to sight in the attempt to punish or thwart the 
few whose actions have doubtless in a substantial, but still 
relatively small, number of cases been anti-social.
Others are actuated, I believe, by a still different motive 
—concern about the power that is exercised by corporate 
wealth—and believe that the measures proposed, by decreas­
ing or arresting the growth of corporate wealth, will lessen 
this power.
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There is no doubt that the power of . corporate wealth has 
at times been abused; but in the world as it is constituted 
today, great power must be entrusted to some individuals, 
and it may be questioned whether the situation would be 
improved by transferring the power now vested in those 
who administer large corporations to persons in the political 
world. If our. present industrial system is judged by its 
abuses, no doubt it stands condemned; but, equally, if our 
political system were judged by its abuses, it could not sur­
vive a single day.
I turn now to consideration of the practical aspects of the 
measures proposed. This problem lies in the field of in­
come taxation. It is a very common mistake to think of in­
come as something very definite, simple and easily ascer­
tained. Of course, when a man is living on a salary his 
income is well defined; but the income of a complex business 
is an extremely difficult thing to calculate. In practice, all 
calculations of it are provisional, and based on conventions, 
judgments and assumptions. What we call income today is 
income only on the assumption that certain things will hap­
pen in the future. Take a simple case: Suppose you are 
offered $25 for performing a task that will take three days, 
you to get nothing unless you complete the task. Well, 
you work hard and satisfactorily and do one-third of it the 
first day. In one sense, you have earned one-third of $25. 
But suppose something happens on the second day to pre­
vent your completing the task. You have earned nothing. 
What is the true view of the situation—did you earn $8.33 
the first day and lose $8.33 the second day, or did you earn 
nothing on either day?
That is a simple illustration of what runs through the 
whole determination of income. There is great room for 
legitimate difference of opinion whether a certain amount is 
income of one year or of another. Even under the existing 
tax law a great deal of injustice and hardship results from 
the fact that the taxpayer really thinks an amount is income 
or a deduction from income in one year, and the Bureau of 
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Internal Revenue decides that it belongs in another. The 
taxpayer, let us say, claims a deduction in 1933. Later, the 
Bureau says: “No; that should have been taken in 1932.” 
You cannot take that deduction in 1933, and you cannot get 
any relief in respect of 1932 because that year is statute 
barred.
One must recognize that there is bound to be a certain 
amount of injustice under any tax law; but the object of the 
taxing authority should always be to try to frame tax meas­
ures so as to minimize that injustice. One of the simplest 
ways of doing that in the case of income taxation is by uni­
formity. If you have substantially the same scheme of taxa­
tion and substantially the same rates year after year, it does 
not make very much difference whether an item is taxed in 
one year or another. But if you have a constantly changing 
system of taxation, or if you have the rates of tax going up 
and down or steeply graduated, then the allocation of profits 
between years becomes a matter of great importance and 
great unfairness may result—either to the benefit of the tax­
payer, or, more often, to his detriment.
Here, again, I should like to refer to English experience. 
Their system of taxation has remained substantially un­
changed for many years except during the war. The war 
naturally led to a general rise in the rate of taxation, but I 
believe it is true that for the last dozen years, which cover 
the whole period of the depression, the English tax system, 
in principle, has remained unchanged and the rates of tax 
have varied very little. The income tax on corporations, 
which is the general normal income tax, has varied from a 
low of 20 per cent to a high of 25 per cent. That is a rela­
tively small change, and in England it has not made a great 
deal of difference whether items were put in one year or an­
other. During the same period our rates have varied greatly 
and, as I have explained, our system of taxation, itself, has 
been changed, and now we are contemplating another radical 
alteration in the system.
In the case of individual income takes, steep graduation 
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does exist in England. The amount of the tax payment 
may vary considerably according as a particular item is added 
to the income of a year in which the taxpayer was in a low 
bracket, or to that of a year in which he was in a much 
higher bracket; but in relation to individual incomes the 
principle of graduation is, broadly, a just one, resting as it 
does on the principle of “equality of sacrifice,” and in Eng­
land graduation, though steep, is restricted within far nar­
rower limits than with us.
In the present proposals, however, the graduation rests on 
no sound principle and is extremely steep, and the argument 
based on the fact that it will inevitably create gross injustice 
gains strength accordingly. The virtual certainty of in­
justice is strengthened by certain technical facts.
The first is that the tax is to be levied on the basis of 
profits as determined under the income tax law. Now, in 
business practice, there are many reservations which no pru­
dent man can fail to make before arriving at the amount 
properly available for distribution, but which are not de­
ductions for tax purposes until the loss in respect of which 
they are created is actually sustained and measured. In the 
second place, under our system we have what I regard as a 
most unfortunate practice of treating as income capital gains 
—gains on the sale of property not in the ordinary course 
of business. That practice produced a large amount of tax 
in the boom years, but the corresponding deductions for 
losses caused a great loss of revenue after the break of 1929, 
with the result that we now have in the law the very unjust 
provision that gains are taxable but losses are not deductible 
except to a very limited extent. So you have this possibility 
—a company might make a large capital gain in one year 
and a large capital loss in the next, but under the proposed 
law it would be liable for a heavy tax unless it distributed 
more than its actual income, whether or not you include 
capital gains and losses in the computation of income.
Another unfortunate phase of our system which makes this 
question of allocation to years vitally important is an ad­
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ministrative problem. The Bureau of Internal Revenue 
has to employ a number of agents to check tax returns. It 
has to find some way of judging whether the men are effi­
cient, and unfortunately the most obvious test is how much 
additional taxation the agent has caused to be assessed. 
That being so, an agent who is charged with the task of 
examining returns for a particular year has an incentive to 
make the income for that particular year as large as he can— 
whether the increase is achieved at the expense of a cor­
responding reduction of the income of another year is im­
material from his standpoint. I know from actual experi­
ence that this system has resulted in reallocations between 
years that have often been quite unreasonable—sometimes 
unjust to the taxpayer, and sometimes unprofitable to the 
revenue. The possibilities of injustice inherent in this sys­
tem of judging efficiency will become greatly enhanced if 
a steeply graduated tax is applied to the undistributed por­
tion of corporate' profits.
I come, now, to the vital question of the probable eco­
nomic effects of these proposals. First, if I may, I will read 
to you by way. of preface, a few words from testimony which 
I gave before the Senate in the Hearings on last year’s tax 
bill:
A little thought will convince that to keep our people 
busy, development of new industries must be on a constantly 
increasing scale. In the next generation, we must create new 
industries exceeding in magnitude the motor, radio, and 
other industries created during the last thirty years. Now, 
in the course of such development large losses of capital will 
be incurred. Professor Allyn Young, one of our greatest 
economists, used to say that he doubted whether, taking all 
enterprises together, there was such a thing as profit; that 
losses equaled profit over a reasonable rate of interest. The 
important consideration for our people is what effect the 
proposed taxes will have on the supply of capital for these 
purposes. Obviously, this phase of the case is far more im­
portant than the amount of revenue which is expected to be 
derived therefrom.
240 TAXATION
It seems to me that this bill, if it operates in at all the 
way in which the Treasury expects it to operate, will have a 
most harmful effect on the supply of capital for industry, and 
particularly on the development of new industries.. Busi­
nesses differ radically in their character. I will not try to 
classify them, but will take two extremes. There are com­
panies which are in a stage of development—they are en­
gaged in creating a new industry or in developing a new 
idea. At the other end of the scale are businesses in what 
may be called a liquidating stage—either because the nature 
of the business is liquidation in itself, or because they have 
seen their best days and are gradually passing out of exist­
ence. The outstanding case of companies that are liquidat­
ing in their nature is that of the mining companies. The 
mines are being worked out and the owners are gradually 
getting their capital returned to them in cash, as well as their 
profits. Such companies can well afford to pay out all of 
their profits in dividends—as a matter of fact, statistics com­
piled by the National Bureau of Economic Research show 
that in the last sixteen years the mining companies of the 
country as a whole have paid out in dividends more than 
their earnings, according to income tax standards, in every 
year except two, and in one of those years the two amounts 
were practically identical. That means substantially that 
mining companies would be free of taxation under this law. 
 On the other hand, take any company that is develop­
ing a business. It does not have cash on hand equal to its 
profits because the proceeds of sales are spent largely on de­
velopment of new facilities, experimental work, additional 
inventories, etc. Such companies, if they paid out all the 
cash they had at the end of the year in excess of what they 
had at the beginning, would still be liable to a very heavy 
tax.
Does that seem to be the sort of thing that is economically 
desirable? Granting that any laws we frame are bound to 
operate with some inequality, is it economically desirable to 
frame laws so that those who are exhausting the natural re­
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sources of the country for private gain will be free from 
tax, while those people who are developing new industries 
which, if successful, will benefit them primarily but will also 
strengthen our industrial system, should bear the full brunt 
of the taxation?
To my mind, that is the vital economic question, and I 
cannot conceive of the possibility of anyone’s reaching a con­
clusion other than that this sort of taxation is calculated to 
benefit the wrong class of companies—those that are liquidat­
ing in nature and those that are going down-hill, instead of 
those that are trying to build up additions to our economic 
structure.
The proposal seems also to constitute an unwise and un­
sound attempt to fetter judgment and substitute fixed rules 
and regulations for the wise discretion which must be exer­
cised if an enterprise is to succeed. What proportion of its 
profits a corporation can wisely distribute is a matter of 
judgment dependent on the circumstances of the particular 
company and the particular time when the decision has to be 
made. To impose a rule of thumb, as this proposal con­
templates, is bound to produce both unjust and economically 
undesirable results.
I have already mentioned the dilemma in which the Com­
mittee on Ways and Means finds itself. On the one hand is 
the Treasury, demanding that a rule shall be laid down to 
which there shall be no exception. On the other hand, are 
witnesses showing conclusively that such a rule would im­
pose heavy penalties on corporations for withholding from 
distribution profits which they are debarred either by statute 
or other compelling considerations from distributing. The 
Treasury says that once you make exceptions there is no 
logical place at which you can stop doing so and this is true. 
The choice is between arbitrary and unjust rules and the 
exercise of judgment, with protection to the Treasury against 
abuse of that privilege. Only those with a myopic vision 
concentrated on a few exaggerated cases of abuse can ques­
tion that if the choice has to be made, the rule which permits
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distribution to be made according to the ability and neces­
sities of the individual corporation is the only one that is 
either just or economically wise.
The proposed law seems to me to be another manifesta­
tion of a tendency altogether too general in our country 
today to make fixed rules and regulations to govern every­
thing, and to attempt to eliminate judgment from the whole 
scheme of things. Such measures are bound to operate un­
justly, and tend in the direction of a narrow, bureaucratic 
control of our life, which means a very large sacrifice of in­
dividual freedom.
No doubt there are those who would differ from the views 
I have expressed, but no one, I think, can fairly claim either 
that the merits of the proposal are clear or that they have 
been examined sufficiently to enable an informed opinion to 
be reached that the merits outweigh the demerits. I sug­
gest that no major change should be undertaken until it has 
been exhaustively studied and opinions upon it secured— 
not only from those who have a theoretical knowledge of the 
subject, or who are familiar with the problem only from the 
administrative side, but from those who are familiar with 
the practical aspects of taxation and are in a position to ex­
press an informed opinion on the question of the probable 
indirect effects of the measure proposed. We need some­
thing analogous to an exhaustive study by a Royal Commis­
sion, which in England invariably precedes any substantial 
change in the fiscal system or, indeed, almost any major 
modification of domestic policy. Those commissions consist 
of members of both houses of the legislature and men chosen 
from the worlds of finance, science, economics, and the pro­
fessions. They seek testimony from competent witnesses on 
specific points. They cross-examine the witnesses, politely, 
but searchingly. They make a report (or majority and 
minority reports, if irreconcilable differences develop be­
tween the views of the different members). These reports 
are state papers of the highest value, and those who are 
called upon to vote on proposals can find in them an ade-
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quate and fair statement of the arguments for and against 
the proposals.
In conclusion, I would say this: on my way here I spent 
yesterday in Rochester, and I had a very interesting after­
noon going over the Kodak plant—or rather, a small fraction 
of that plant. With this talk in mind, and thinking, also, 
of the first time I went over that plant thirty-nine years ago 
with Mr. Eastman, the founder of the business, I could not 
help thinking that there were object lessons which one could 
draw from the case of that Company. I recalled that on my 
first visit, in rather less than half the time we spent yesterday 
going over a fraction of the plant, Mr. Eastman and I went 
through every building and every department. The East­
man Kodak Company was then a developing business; it is 
now fully established and highly successful. I do not sup­
pose this tax law would impose any additional burden upon 
it or its stockholders. On the other hand, anyone attempting 
to rival the business of the Company with a new company 
would be greatly hampered by this law. Further, if we can 
imagine this law having been passed back in the nineties, 
when that business was being built up, we may question 
whether in those circumstances that industry, and all the 
enterprises that have grown out of it, would have progressed 
at anything like the rate at which they did progress; and we 
must realize that the continued growth of new enterprises, 
and the continued development of new inventions, are essen­
tial to continued successful life as an industrial community.
Then, there is another thought which I brought very 
strongly impressed upon me away from Rochester. I looked 
at many huge machines that do the most complicated things 
in the most ingenious ways, and I thought that a new tax 
law was a very important new piece of Governmental ma­
chinery. And I contrasted the way in which the machinery 
of industry and the machinery of Government were being 
developed in our country today. I thought how before one 
of those industrial machines had been built the best theoret­
ical and technical advice had been secured as to how a de­
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sired result could, in theory, be attained; how the idea had 
then been subjected to the criticism of those familiar with 
the practical working of machinery; how working models 
had first been developed and subjected to all kinds of strains 
and stresses and experimental operations before the actual 
machines were put into operation. Not only that, but I 
observed the many ingenious devices to prevent those ma­
chines from doing injury to other property or people work­
ing in the plant, and reflected how those safety devices had 
been given as much consideration as the principles of the 
machines themselves.
Further, I thought how lightheartedly legislative proposals 
which may conceivably serve a given purpose, are put for­
ward without much thought of all the indirect consequences 
—the injury, the unfairness, and the injustice—that might be 
caused by them. Does it not seem that since the power of 
Government machinery to influence the lives of our people 
is so much greater than the power of any industrial machine, 
we should give more care and thought to trying to make any 
new machine work with at least some part of the efficiency 
and safety which we demand and secure in the industrial 
field?
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE FINANCE COM­
MITTEE, MAY 6, 1936 *
The Chairman. Mr. May, you represent the firm of Price, 
Waterhouse & Co.?
Mr. May. Yes; I am senior partner of the firm, sir. I 
appear here as an individual interested in the subject of 
taxation, upon which I have worked from the time of the 
passage of the first income-tax law.
I was in the Treasury during the war and subsequently 
I served on the advisory committee of the Joint Congres­
sional Committee on Taxation, and my interest in the sub­
ject has been active and continuous.
I represent no private interests of any kind, nor any clients
* Hearings on the Revenue Act, 1936, pp. 538-48. 
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or institutions in the country. I would like to state broadly 
the reasons why I am here today.
I am intensely sympathetic with the view of the Treasury 
regarding the avoidance of taxes by withholding of divi­
dends. Nevertheless, I am convinced that a graduated tax 
on corporations’ undistributed earnings is not a satisfactory 
solution, is unsound in principle, will cause great injustice, 
and the evidence that I have seen in the record does not lead 
me to believe that this bill will produce any substantial in­
crease in revenue.
I would like to say in regard to that that my reason is not 
so much that I think the estimates of the revenue that will 
be produced are excessive—I am in no position to pass on 
that—but I think the Treasury underestimates the yield 
under the existing law if business picks up. I think the 
Treasury underestimates the effect of the recovery of earning 
capacity of the country under the existing law.
I would like in the first instance to address myself to the 
paragraph in the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to this Committee which reads as follows:
What are the dimensions of tax avoidance with which we 
are dealing? A few simple figures tell the story. It has been 
estimated by the Treasury Department that under the pres­
ent tax law the income-tax liability of corporations on the 
basis of 1936 earnings would approximate 964 millions. 
The Department has also estimated that under the present 
law more than 4½ billion dollars of corporation income in 
the calendar year 1936 will be withheld from stockholders 
and that if this income were fully distributed to the indi­
vidual owners of the stock represented in those corporations, 
the resultant yield in additional individual income taxes 
would be about $1,300,000,000.
It is, I think, most unfortunate that the Secretary should 
have been permitted by his advisers to make, as he does make 
in this paragraph, an obvious and serious misstatement of 
fact upon such an important question. The misstatement is 
apparent on a comparison of his language with that of the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who said:
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The Treasury estimates that, if the present corporation in­
come, capital-stock, and excess-profits taxes were repealed, 
and all corporation earnings during the calendar year 1936 
were currently distributed, the income of individuals would 
be increased by more than 4½ billions of which approxi­
mately $4,000,000,000 would be taxable.
The Secretary says that the 4½ billion represents the sum 
available for distribution to stockholders under the existing 
law; the Commissioner makes it clear that the repeal of the 
existing law is prerequisite to the existence of the 4½ billion. 
Under the existing law, according to the Treasury tables, 
approximately $1,100,000,000 of the 4½ billion mentioned 
by the Secretary as being withheld from stockholders would 
go to the Federal Government in taxes.
 In the second place, it is unjust to describe the figure, 
even when it has been reduced by a billion or more, as “tax 
avoidance.” A very large part of this income accrues to 
public companies whose dividend action is not in the least 
influenced by thoughts of tax avoidance but is dictated either 
by legal or contractual requirements or practical necessities, 
or an honest regard for the best interests of the stockholders.
Senator King. There were considerable dividends from 
those corporations, I assume?
Mr. May. Yes; but some withheld profits for perfectly 
good reasons that have nothing to do with tax avoidance.
In the third place, I think the figure of 4½ billion dollars, 
even when interpreted as the Commissioner interprets it, is 
greatly overstated. This figure appears on the sixth line of 
the main statement submitted to the Treasury in support of 
the proposal which appears at page 36 of the House hearings. 
A careful study of that table leads me to the definite con­
clusion that the figure is excessive even as applied to the 
special circumstances of the year 1936. If it be regarded—as 
we are entitled to regard it—as an indication of the perma­
nent increase in revenue which the proposed law is expected 
to produce, the overstatement becomes larger and even more 
apparent.
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If the Treasury estimate of statutory net income for 1936 
of $7,200,000,000 is correct, then the increase of yield which 
may be expected from this law if all net income is distributed 
thereunder, turns on the estimate of the dividend distribu­
tion which would take place under the law as it now exists. 
To secure a fair comparison this estimate should be an esti­
mate of the dividends which will be paid out of 1936 earn­
ings either in 1936 or in the first months of 1937. The 
Treasury, however, makes the comparison with the dividends 
which it estimates will be paid in 1936 partly out of 1935 
earnings and partly out of those for 1936. Since dividends 
naturally rise as income rises, and since the Treasury esti­
mates that 1936 income will exceed that of 1935 by $1,700,- 
000,000, or 30 per cent, this method of comparison artificially 
inflates the estimate of increase of yield from the new law by 
a sum which must run into the hundreds of millions. It is 
like comparing the rainfall in two places, A and B, taking 
the rainfall at A for the calendar year and that of B for 
the year ending on the 15th of March in the following year, 
with the knowledge that the first 75 days of the earlier years 
were in both places a period of relatively small rainfall.
Further, the estimate of distribution within the year 1936 
seems to me to be low. The Treasury estimates that the 
increase of dividends in 1936 over 1935 will be from $3,600,- 
000,000 to $3,900,000,000, or 8% per cent. Statistics for the 
first quarter, covering rather less than 3,000 corporations, 
show an increase from $659,000,000 to $781,000,000, or an 
increase of $122,000,000, equivalent to more than 18 per 
cent. If earnings continue to rise, as the Treasury estimates 
they will, then the rate of increase in dividends should grow. 
Only on Monday the General Motors Corporation declared 
a dividend on its common stock for this quarter which was 
greater by 43½ million dollars than the dividend which it 
paid to the corresponding quarter of last year. This is one- 
seventh of the total increase for all corporations for the 
entire year as estimated by the Treasury.
Approaching the question in a somewhat different way, 
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I find from a table submitted by the Treasury showing the 
statutory net income and dividends for corporations having 
net income that during the 12 years for which actual or 
approximate figures are given dividends have averaged about 
66 per cent for statutory net income. The Treasury’s esti­
mate of $3,540,000,000 as the dividends which would, under 
the existing law, be paid by such corporations in 1936 is 
equivalent to about 49 per cent of the estimated statutory 
net income. The difference of 17 per cent amounts to about 
$1,200,000,000.
Apparently, also, the Treasury, while making its main 
calculation on the basis that all net income would be dis­
tributed within the year, assumes that the amount of divi­
dends paid by corporations having no net income will not 
be affected by the change of law. This seems to me to result 
in an overstatement of the increased distribution to be ex­
pected by some two or three hundred million dollars.
Finally, the amount estimated as the increase in yield due 
to the change in law includes taxes which will or might be 
recovered under the existing law in respect of dividends 
unreasonably withheld by corporations, and I am not con­
vinced that the Treasury has made adequate allowance for 
the changes in taxable status that such laws inevitably pro­
duce, such as charitable gifts, reclassifications of capital 
stocks, and so forth.
Taking all these considerations together, I do not find in 
the statistics presented any ground for believing that this 
law, if adopted, will increase the revenue. It is, of course, 
possible that it will do so, but the Treasury has not, to my 
mind, made out any case that it will. The position is such 
that immediate enactment of the law is certainly not neces­
sary from a fiscal standpoint.
No doubt there is a large amount of tax avoidance through 
the device of withholding profits from distribution, and all 
taxpayers—especially, I might say, those professional men 
whose income is almost wholly taxable—are sufferers from it. 
It should be curbed, and I am entirely sympathetic with the 
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desire of the Treasury to curb it. But measures which affect 
equally those who are and those who are not avoiding taxes 
are unnecessary and unjust, and too often, like Herod’s mas­
sacre, they cause great suffering but fail to reach the par­
ticular cases which inspire them.
The figure of profits withheld should be revised and 
analyzed. Corporations may be divided into three groups— 
(1) a very large number of small corporations which in the 
aggregate contribute and should contribute only a small frac­
tion of the revenue from taxation of corporate income; (2) 
a relatively small number of public corporations most of 
which are owned by large bodies of stockholders and follow 
dividend policies practically Uninfluenced by consideration 
of taxability of their stockholders; (3) a relatively small num­
ber of privately owned companies, some engaged in business, 
others substantially private holding companies, the dividend 
policies of most of these being governed largely by tax con­
siderations. If we knew how much of the profits withheld 
were retained by these different classes of companies, the 
formulation of sound legislation would be facilitated greatly.
After all, the problem is not one of stupendous magnitude. 
In 1933, for instance, about 10,000 corporations paid 90 
per cent of the corporation income tax. An analytical study 
of those 10,000 cases would not be a burdensome task, and 
I think the Congress and the people are entitled to have 
some information of this kind furnished them and legisla­
tion framed in the light thereof, instead of being asked to 
support a hit-or-miss measure of the kind now before the 
Senate.
I would emphasize the fact that continuity in taxation is a 
consideration of great importance. It inspires confidence 
and it minimizes the injustice which inevitably results from 
heavy and changeable taxation applied to income on the basis 
of a necessarily very imperfect allocation of income to par­
ticular years. Hasty experiments are wholly undesirable.
I would point out, further, that income taxation, and the 
business to which it is applied, constitutes an intricate net­
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work, and that any important change in the frame of this 
network produces all sorts of strains and stresses which can 
be guarded against only by very careful and prolonged study. 
The Treasury, when proposing this measure, contemplated 
its universal application. Some of the most striking in­
justices that this would produce have been brought to the 
notice of Congress, and in the House provisions were im­
provised to guard against, or at least alleviate, these injus­
tices. It cannot be supposed that all the important injus­
tices have been developed. Obviously, the Treasury made 
no exhaustive study of them, because it contemplated a rigid 
rule, free from any exceptions.
I should like, purely by way of illustration, to mention 
one or two injustices which immediately occur to me. Take, 
first, the law which taxes capital gains but substantially 
denies relief in respect of capital losses. Suppose a corpora­
tion to have an ordinary income of $100,000 in each of 2 
years, and to make a capital gain of $100,000 in 1 year and 
a capital loss of $100,000 in the other. Its true income over 
the 2 years is clearly $200,000, whether capital gains and 
losses are or are not considered as entering into the deter­
mination of income. This is the amount that it should be  
required to distribute in order to get the maximum benefit 
of the proposed law. Actually, it would have to distribute 
practically $300,000 in order to get such a benefit.
Again, in this same field we have recognized that capital 
gains should not be taxed in the year in which they are 
realized in the same way as if they were ordinary income 
of that year. We have provided that individuals making­
capital gains shall pay a tax which decreases according to 
the length of time for which the investment has been held. 
An individual who sells property which he has held for more 
than 10 years pays tax on only 30 per cent of the profit. 
Under the proposed law, if a corporation in which he is in­
terested makes such a profit, and in order to avoid taxes dis­
tributes all its statutory income, the individual would pay 
tax on his share of the full amount of this profit—yet the 
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whole basis of the present proposal is that individuals should 
pay neither more nor less on profits which come to them 
through the medium of a corporation than on profits which 
come to them directly.
Section 27 (i) also violates this same principle, not only in 
respect of the holding companies at which it is aimed, but 
also in respect of minority stockholders in corporations in 
which such holding companies own a majority. Their tax 
is determined not by their own status but largely by the 
status of the other stockholders. This provision should be 
eliminated.
Many other instances of the same kind could be cited. I 
do not think it is possible to anticipate all the serious in­
justices. I am inclined to agree with the Treasury that once 
you begin to make exceptions there is no logical place at 
which you can stop. This, however, merely means that the 
real choice is between a rigid rule and the abandonment of 
the principle, and I have no hesitation in saying that the 
wise choice is to discard the principle.
I should like to point out, also, that all the injustices which 
result from the taxation of corporate income under the exist­
ing law will be magnified by the substitution of a steeply 
graduated tax on undistributed earnings for a practically 
uniform tax on the whole amount of earnings.
For instance, the injustice which even under the present 
law results from the discontinuance of consolidated returns 
will be aggravated. Certainly opportunities ought to be 
given to readjust corporate structures so as to prevent double 
taxation resulting from the discontinuance of such returns, 
and Section 112B (6) is quite inadequate for the purpose.
To sum the matter up, I think the bill is as likely to pro­
duce less revenue as it is to produce more, and to produce 
more injustice than it remedies.
When we consider the measure from the standpoint of 
social policy as distinct from fiscal policy, we of course 
enter the realm in which wide differences of opinion are 
possible. On this point I should first of all like to point out 
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that this law does not constitute an application of the prin­
ciple of “ability to pay” which underlies the graduated tax 
on individual incomes and has no analogy to that scheme of 
taxation. The closest analogy in the field of individual taxa­
tion would be a steeply graduated tax on income saved 
under which all individual income would be exempted from 
taxation if spent. It is a surprising thing to me that Dr. 
T. S. Adams—who regarded the opposite concept of a tax 
on spending which would leave saved income free as ideally 
preferable to the individual income tax—should be claimed 
as a supporter of a measure of this kind.
Senator King. What was your view when you were in the 
Treasury advising them?
Mr. May. As a matter of fact, I had extended discussions 
with Dr. Adams and Treasury officials on the question of a 
substitute spending tax. We agreed it was ideally preferable, 
but there were some objections on the ground of excessive 
accumulation of fortunes by individuals, and of practical ad­
vantage, and on the whole we advised against it. But cer­
tainly, in all the long and intimate talks I had with Dr. 
Adams I had never heard a word that would lead me to sup­
pose he would support this measure.
Senator Barkley. A tax on spending is a sales tax.
Mr. May. A graduated tax on spending is paid by the 
individual.
Senator Barkley. That is a sales tax.
Mr. May. An ordinary sales tax is a regressive tax because 
it falls equally on all products.
Senator Barkley. Any sort of a tax based on spending is 
a tax on sales.
Mr. May. It is in one sense, but not when it is ordinarily 
thought of as a sales tax.
Senator Barkley. - You have got to buy something when 
you spend anything, and you are taxed on that.
Mr. May. That is the same thing. The sales tax is usually 
levied on the sale.
Senator Barkley. Regardless of that, it is levied on the 
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price, whether you levy it on the sale or on the expenditure.
Mr. May. There is a great deal of argument that under 
an ordinary income tax there should be an exemption of 
saved income. I think the argument is against it.
Senator Walsh. Is a graduated spending tax a spending 
tax?
Mr. May. That is what we contemplate, a graduated 
spending tax. It would reach the man who spent his capital.
Senator Walsh. A man who spent $50,000 would pay a 
higher tax than a man who spent $5,000?
Mr. May. That is right.
Senator Hastings. Would the spending tax apply to the 
wages of a chauffeur, for instance?
Mr. May. Yes.
Senator Hastings. In that instance it is different from a 
sales tax.
Mr. May. Yes; it covers all expenditures for goods, and 
services.
Upon the social aspects of the bill generally all I propose 
to do is to indicate some effect that it seems to me to be 
likely to have, leaving the Committee to decide whether 
those consequences are socially desirable.
I do not want to go over ground already covered by other 
witnesses. I agree with Mr. Ballantine that the adoption of 
these proposals will have a serious adverse effect on the de­
velopment of industry and the ability of industrial corpora­
tions to withstand depression. Not only was the policy of 
withholding profits in periods of prosperity followed and 
approved before our income tax was initiated; it is common 
in all countries and was followed in England before the 
principle of graduation was introduced here. I believe that 
in recent years the proportion of profits retained by English 
companies has been as great as here even in the years of pros­
perity. To regard such retention by publicly owned cor­
porations as tax avoidance or even as prejudicial to the inter­
est of the revenue, is, I think, an error.
Clearly, if corporations are compelled by taxation to dis­
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tribute all their surplus in times of prosperity, it is inevitable 
that in any subsequent period of depression when they suffer 
losses they will be forced into bankruptcy or compelled to 
resort to State aid to a greater extent than heretofore. The 
idea that they should sell additional stocks to finance future 
losses seems to me academic and unrealistic.
I think it is a great mistake in formulating measures such 
as this to attach much importance to averages. Taxes are 
not levied on averages, but on individual cases. Businesses 
differ radically in their character. Some companies are what 
may be called developing companies, creating a new indus­
try or exploiting a new idea. At the other extreme are cor­
porations of a liquidating character, either because the na­
ture of the business is in itself liquidation, or because the 
businesses are declining. Mining companies, for instance, 
are essentially liquidating in their nature. Such companies 
can well afford to pay out all of their profits in dividends. 
As a matter of fact, statistics show that they do in almost 
every year in the aggregate pay out more than they earn.
Senator King. Now, in regard to profits, most of the min­
ing companies have had no profits for. many years.
Mr. May. That is true.
Senator King. Where one succeeds there will be two or 
three hundred who fail.
Mr. May. That is quite true; but as a matter of fact, the 
statistics show that in almost every year the mining com­
panies, in the aggregate, pay out more dividends than they 
earn, so they would be practically free of tax under this law.
On the other hand, developing companies, if they paid 
out in dividends the net cash they received from operations 
during the year, would as a rule be liable under the law to 
a heavy tax. It seems to me a pertinent question whether 
it is desirable to frame laws which favor those who are ex­
hausting the natural resources of the country for private 
gain, and handicap those who are developing new industries 
which they expect, no doubt, to be profitable to themselves 
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but which, if successful, would also strengthen our industrial 
system.
I think it is unquestionable that the law will operate in 
favor of the large, established companies as against those of 
their aspiring rivals. This no doubt accounts for the fact 
that comparatively little opposition to the bill has come from 
the large corporations.
Senator Gerry. Mr. May, I notice in going over the House 
hearings that there were certain large copartnerships, 23 of 
them, if I recollect correctly, that had incomes of over a 
million. What sort of businesses would they be in?
Mr. May. Senator, I saw those figures myself. I thought 
that 23 must be on the low side, to be quite frank, because 
I thought I could have named 23 firms within a gunshot 
of the corner of Broad and Wall in New York that had in­
comes of a million, the large stockbroking firms which, under 
the New York Stock Exchange regulations, cannot incor­
porate, and the large Wall Street law firms, and other service 
firms of that kind, I should think would have numbered 
more than 23 alone.
Senator Gerry. How would the partnership compare with 
a corporation? Of course, the corporation has the advantage 
of a limited liability.
Mr. May. Yes. I think, broadly speaking, when you get 
into large partnerships they represent, in the main, different 
classes of business from corporations; comparatively few of 
your partnerships carry on an industrial business. They 
are mostly what I might call service businesses. Their in­
come is derived in cash. They would make their returns on 
the cash basis. So they have cash equal to the profits that 
they return.
On the other hand, business corporations, as we all know, 
have either got to develop or else die, generally speaking. 
That means that they are constantly making new investments 
in plant and capital assets, and the reality of their profit 
today is dependent on the usefulness of their plant in the 
future. Their income is determined, as I see it, on a less 
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favorable basis to the corporation than the average partner­
ship’s income is determined to it.
So I think the disparity between the two is somewhat 
exaggerated, and, incidentally, in relation to those figures 
that you mentioned, I think you will find that while the 
Commissioner took as an illustrative case a partnership with 
an income of $1,000,000 and four partners, the more typical 
company in that number of 23, or whatever the proper num­
ber may be, would be a firm with far more partners than 
that. Big law firms have, perhaps, 15 or 20 partners, which 
rather modifies the conclusion.
Senator Barkley. Mr. May, is your firm a corporation or 
a partnership?
Mr. May. It is a partnership, sir.
Senator Barkley. It is a partnership of certified account­
ants, economists, experts, or which?
Mr. May. Certified public accountants.
Senator Barkley. You appear here just as an amicus curiæ, 
a friend of the court, you do not represent anybody?
Mr. May. No; not at all, sir.
Senator Walsh. Mr. May, you stated that corporations 
could be placed in three classifications. One which you 
have stated was few in number. Are those the corporations 
that did not distribute their earnings because they wanted 
to avoid their taxes?
Mr. May. When I say “few,” I mean relatively few, of 
course.
Senator Walsh. Have you any information as to their 
number?
Mr. May. No, sir; I have no knowledge at all. It must 
be a considerable number. You know, under the English 
law there is a distinction in taxation between the publicly 
owned corporation and privately owned corporation, and I 
always thought we ought to pursue the question in that way 
if we are to arrive at really satisfactory legislation.
Senator Walsh, You think that there are a considerable 
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number of corporations that withhold distributing their 
earnings for the purpose of taxation avoidance?
Mr. May. I have no doubt that that is a substantial ele­
ment, undoubtedly.
Senator Barkley. What do you mean by the distinction 
between publicly owned and privately owned corporations? 
You do not mean that in the sense that we use the term 
“public ownership”?
Mr. May. No; owned by the general public. In England, 
of course, the legislature has a very great advantage. We 
have always got to recognize, in comparing our procedure 
with the English, that all their legislation is confined to the 
one body. They control corporations as well as taxation and 
they can classify corporations for their own purposes, which 
you cannot do, because the States have jurisdiction in one 
field and you are legislating in another. I do think that that 
whole problem could be intensively studied to great ad­
vantage.
Senator Barkley. Where is the line of distinction in the 
number of owners of stock in order to make it public or 
private?
Mr. May. You mean in England?
Senator Barkley. Yes.
Mr. May. In England there is a limit, on the number of 
stockholders, and as a penalty for being a public corporation 
you have to disclose a lot of information which private cor­
porations do not have to, and they offer advantages that 
counterbalance. On the other hand, the private companies 
stand in a different relationship for tax purposes from those 
that are called public companies, and they are a larger num­
ber.
Senator Barkley. What is the line of distinction?
Mr. May. Any line is bound to be more or less arbitrary.
Senator Barkley. Under the British law, how many stock­
holders form a private corporation and how many does it 
take to make it public?
Mr. May. I do not know at the moment. If I should 
258 TAXATION
make a guess, I would say 20 was the figure; something of 
that sort.*
Senator Walsh. You do not mean that private corpora­
tions are personal holding companies?
Mr. May. No.
Senator Walsh. For your information, in connection with 
the question I asked you, the expert informs me that there 
are 4,000 personal holding companies who make filings 
under the existing law and who, in all probability, do so for 
the purpose of the tax.
Senator Barkley. Do you know whether the British law 
makes any distinction as to whether the shares of stock are 
listed on an exchange where they may publicly inspect and 
purchase them?
Mr. May. I do not think it turns on the listing on an 
exchange, but it does require disclosure of information to 
the Registrar of Companies. They have to give more in­
formation to the public than the private companies do.
Senator Bailey. You began by making a statement which 
indicated a contradiction of fact as between the Secretary of 
the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 
I would like for you to make a statement about that. Just 
give me the facts over again.
The Chairman. May I ask you, was the Commissioner’s 
statement from which you quoted made before the House 
Ways and Means Committee?
Mr. May. No; I think they were both made before this 
body.
The Chairman. You read the statement which was made 
before this Committee?
Mr. May. Yes; I think I am right about that.
* Under the existing English law a private company is one whose regula­
tions limit the number of its members to fifty, restrict the right to transfer 
its shares, and prohibit any invitation to the public to subscribe for any 
of its shares or debentures. (Cf. Companies Act of 1929, Sec. 26.) The dis­
tinction between companies for purposes of the surtax no longer follows 
the distinction between public and private companies. In order to be liable 
to surtax on undistributed income, a company must inter alia be under the 
control of not more than five persons, as defined in the Act. (Cf. Finance 
Act of 1927, Sec. 31.)—Author’s note.
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Senator Bailey. Just what is the difference between them?
Mr. May. The Commissioner states that if the existing 
taxes were repealed, there would be four and a half billion 
dollars. The Secretary says—
Senator Bailey (interposing). Four and a half billion 
dollars of what?
Mr. May. Of income available for distribution, which 
the Treasury estimates would not be distributed. I think 
that is a fair way of saying it. The Secretary said there 
would be that same amount of money available under the 
existing law. The difference between the two statements 
is that the amount of the taxes under the existing law, which 
is a billion one hundred million dollars, roughly—
Senator Bailey (interposing). Is it possible that both state­
ments could be reconciled?
Mr. May. I do not see how. It seems to me that the 
Secretary misunderstood the figure, and I believe the word­
ing of the figure was a little unfortunate and may have given 
rise to that misunderstanding.
Senator Bailey. Did he adopt that figure for this state­
ment from the Commissioner’s statement without getting the 
facts upon which the Commissioner’s statement was predi­
cated?
Mr. May. I am not in the confidence of the Treasury.
Senator Bailey. Can you explain that?
Mr. May. I think there is no other explanation.
Senator Hastings. As I understand your position, you 
figure that there ought to be a billion one hundred million 
taken from the figures given by the Secretary of the Treas­
ury?
Mr. May. I think one billion one hundred million should 
be deducted from his figure.
Senator Hastings. So that instead of his figure being four 
billion one hundred, it ought to have been three billion?
Mr. May. If he wanted to state it on that basis.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. May.
. Senator Bailey. Your other statement is that, in your 
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opinion, the proposed legislation if adopted is not likely to 
raise much more money, if any, than the existing law? Is 
that your opinion about it?
Mr. May. And the reason is I think the Treasury under­
estimates the yield of the present law on the conditions.
Senator Bailey. We have been predicating legislation on 
the basis of fifty-five billions this year. I read in the New 
York Times this morning an article in which the President 
was quoted as saying that the annual income this year would 
be about sixty-five billion. Can you give me some informa­
tion or view about that?
Mr. May. I am afraid I am not currently up to date on 
the statistics sufficiently for that, Senator. I am taking the 
same estimates that the Treasury assumes; they take as their 
basic year on which these calculations are predicated, an 
estimate of seven billion of statutory net income. I think 
the yield under the existing law would be larger than they 
have assumed on that basis. It is not that I think they are 
exaggerating the yield under the new law, but that they are 
underestimating the yield under the existing law.
Senator Bailey. Your theory is that the bill is wrong in 
principle and that we cannot get rid of injustices in it?
Mr. May. Yes. And I do not feel that we have adequate 
bases to formulate legislation in which we could reasonably 
limit the injustices.
Senator Bailey. Are you prepared to suggest to us legisla­
tion that would surely add $800,000,000 revenue as com­
pared with the last bill?
Mr. May. I do not think that I can say that on the Treas­
ury figures it is necessary to increase the yield of the taxation 
under the present law by $800,000,000 in order to reach the 
total taxation that is contemplated. I think you will get 
pretty close to it under the existing law, if all of the other 
estimates are realized; that is what I got from an analysis of 
these figures of the Treasury. Certainly my strong feeling 
is that there is not sufficient fiscal advantage in passing this 
law to justify precipitate action, and I would like to see a 
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very careful study made and more considered legislation 
based on it.
Senator Connally. Would you rather raise the flat cor­
poration tax, rather than this plan?
Mr. May. I would; I would rather see any rational levy 
raised, frankly. I would be willing to see my own taxes 
raised, because I think it is much better for us to pay more 
taxes than to leave the budget unbalanced.
Senator Connally. I congratulate you.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. May.
Senator Gerry. I would like to ask Mr. May a question, 
and see if I get it clear, on this last statement. What you feel 
is that the revenue raised by the present bill will be greater 
than the Treasury estimates?
Mr. May. Yes.
Senator Gerry. Under the present law?
Mr. May. Under the present law.
Senator Gerry. Than the Treasury estimates?
Mr. May. That is my feeling.
Senator Bailey. How much greater?
Mr. May. Very considerably, sir.
Senator Bailey. Six or seven hundred millions?
Mr. May. Of course, I have not got the detail, but I 
should say pretty nearly the amount that this increase was 
expected to raise. Five or six hundred million.
Senator Bailey. Could you prepare the data in a short 
time?
Mr. May: I could make a summary, as I have done here 
of the causes which lead to it; but I should have to have 
some information from the Treasury to convert increases in 
individual incomes into taxes on individual incomes, be­
cause they have figured it out on the distribution to be ex­
pected, which I have not.
Senator Bailey. I would like very much to have it.
Mr. May. I would have to have certain data from the 
Treasury in order to do it.
The Chairman. You believe the increase would come 
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under the present law because of the general increase in 
business?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Senator Connally. Disregard the income. Could you esti­
mate how much the corporation income in 1936. would be 
over 1935 if we make no change in the rates? Can you give 
a rough estimate?
Mr. May. I do not carry those figures clearly enough in 
my head to make the estimate. I am cautious of making esti­
mates except from actual figures.
Senator Connally. I am not calling for an opinion that I 
will pay you for as an expert.
Mr. May. My services are always at the disposal of the 
Committee.
Senator Connally. You figure the business in 1936 is 
going to be better than in 1935?
Mr. May. The Treasury estimates it, and I believe there 
is ground to believe it.
Senator Connally. But you do not know how much?
Mr. May. The Treasury estimates that there will be one 
billion seven hundred million increase in taxable statutory 
income, which, on a 15 per cent basis, would be $255,000,000.
Senator Barkley. You think that the present law, un­
changed, would raise this eight hundred million in addition 
to the amount raised in. 1935, or in addition to the Treasury 
estimates for 1936?
Mr. May. I think for the graduated tax end of it, it would 
raise the larger part of the six hundred million that it was 
supposed to raise over the Treasury’s estimates for 1936; yes.
Senator Barkley: You think we are liable to be more 
prosperous than the Treasury does?
Mr. May. I think more money is going to be distributed 
than the Treasury estimated, and that will mean large in­
creases to the individual income tax.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. May; thank you.
B. TAXATION AND ACCOUNTING
I
CLASSIFICATION OF PROFITS ON INVESTMENTS *
(1921)
The question involved in the case of Brewster v. Walsh in 
which a decision was recently handed down by the Connecti­
cut district court is one of far-reaching and great interest to 
accountants. That question is whether profits realized on 
investments are capital or income.
We shall not attempt to deal with the legal aspect of the 
question, but in the business and accounting world such 
profits would, we think, ordinarily be regarded as income. 
The average man also doubtless thinks that he can properly 
spend such profits without laying himself open to the charge 
of dissipating his capital: indeed he is likely to regard them 
as a peculiarly appropriate basis for expenditures on luxuries 
as being what is sometimes called “velvet.”
There is a group of economists whose views are in accord 
with those of the District Court that such profits are not in­
come. This group includes those economists who solve the 
problem of living within one’s income for everyone by 
holding that whatever is spent is ipso facto income. We 
are very far from saying that this concept is useless or un­
interesting, but we feel that it is so far at variance with the 
commercial concept of income that the economists in ques­
tion would be well advised to adopt for it some name other 
than income. Fortunately there is a larger body of econo­
mists whose concept of income does include such profits as 
were involved in this case and is more closely in harmony
*An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXI (Jan­
uary, 1921). 
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with the accounting and commercial interpretation of the 
phrase.
We should be sorry to see the meaning of the word “in­
come” restricted by the courts either on legalistic grounds or 
on the basis of an interesting but unpractical economic con­
cept in such a way as to limit the ability of Congress to tax 
anything that is ordinarily regarded by the average citizen 
as being income. If a taxpayer by choosing investments, the 
fruits of which are to be expected in the form of the return 
of a larger sum at the end of a period of years rather than in 
actual income, can thereby escape the income tax altogether 
in respect of such investments, the opportunities to the rich 
taxpayer now offered by tax-exempt securities will be im­
mensely enlarged, and dissatisfaction with the tax will corre­
spondingly increase.
In our view it is desirable that the broadest possible inter­
pretation should be given to the term “income,” leaving the 
determination of the forms of income to be taxed to be con­
sidered by the legislative bodies.
II
THE SOURCE OF PROFITS *
(1922)
A provision of the new tax law which has a general account­
ing interest apart from the tax feature, is the rule that profits 
from the sale of personal property produced within and sold 
without the United States, or produced without and sold 
within the United States, shall be treated as derived partly 
from sources within and partly from sources without the 
United States, the Commissioner being authorized to pre­
scribe processes, formulas and general apportionment for de­
termining the portion of such net income attributable to 
sources within the United States.
The previous act did not deal specifically with this ques­
tion and the Attorney-General, when the question was re­
ferred to him, ruled that in such cases all the income was de­
rived from sources within the country in which the goods 
were sold. In the course of his opinion he said: “No income 
is derived from the mere manufacture of goods; before there 
can be income there must be sale; and there is no income 
from sources within the United States from goods manufac­
tured here unless there is in the language of Section 223 both 
manufacture and disposition of goods within the United 
States.”
Many qualified persons felt that the Attorney-General had 
been betrayed into an incorrect application of a sound ac­
counting rule and that the argument just quoted was a clear 
case of non sequitur. The completion of the sale deter­
mines the time of the making of the profit, but it does not in 
the least follow that it determines the source. The real 
source of profit in a manufacturing business is the employ-
* An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXXIII 
(March, 1922). 
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ment of capital and labor in the conversion of goods; selling 
is the realization of the profit rather than the source. The 
amount of profit is affected by the degree of efficiency of 
the methods of realization, just as it is affected by the degree 
of efficiency of the capital assets and the labor employed in 
production, and it is entirely equitable that there should be 
attributed to sale some part (but certainly not the whole) of 
the profit.
The new provision is therefore sound in principle. It 
should be understood, however, that it does not lend any 
sanction to the practice of taking interdepartmental profit 
when goods are transferred from the manufacturing to the 
selling department. This practice, thanks largely to its con­
demnation by accountants, is now comparatively seldom 
adopted, and the new law should not be allowed to form an 
excuse for its revival. The essential fact on which the ac­
countants’ opposition has always been based still remains. 
There is no profit until the goods have been both manufac­
tured and sold
in
TAXABLE INCOME AND ACCOUNTING BASES FOR 
DETERMINING IT *
INTRODUCTION
On various occasions when the question has arisen, I have 
been impressed by the uncertainties and misconceptions 
shown to exist concerning accounting bases for determining 
income for tax purposes and in regard to the significance 
of such terms as “the cash basis” and “the accrual basis” com­
monly employed in tax practice. It has therefore seemed 
to me to be worth while to devote some time to a considera­
tion of this subject and in so doing to go back over the de­
velopments affecting it since the passage of the corporation 
excise-tax law in 1909.
As a preliminary to such consideration it seems necessary 
to inquire to some extent into the nature of taxable income, 
but I do not propose to go into this very large subject except 
in so far as may be necessary to an intelligent discussion of 
the accounting bases for determining income. To allay still 
further any anxiety created by the comprehensiveness of the 
title of this paper, I will add that I shall confine myself to 
commercial income, which constitutes the major part of the 
taxable income of the country and presents the more difficult 
problems, and I shall not discuss personal, professional or in­
vestment income.
In income taxation, the first problem is to define income 
and the second to allocate income in respect of time. The 
question of allocation to sources geographically arises in some 
cases and presents some difficulties, but this question affects 
only a restricted field.
The problem of definition resolves itself mainly into a
• A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Institute of 
Accountants at Washington, D. C., September 15, 1925. Published in The 
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XL (October, 1925).
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choice between several different concepts of the nature of 
the income and, though important, is relatively simple. The 
more serious difficulties are encountered in determining 
when income emerges from the complicated business trans­
actions of modern commerce so as to be properly taxable.
The accounting bases employed in determining income 
affect the time when income becomes taxable rather than 
the amount of income ultimately taxable, and this paper 
therefore has to do mainly with the time element in taxa­
tion. This is conspicuously a case where “time is of the 
essence.” Whether an amount is to be deemed taxable in a 
year of high war taxes or in some remote future year may be 
of far more practical importance than whether the whole or 
only a part is to be finally taxed.
WHAT IS TAXABLE INCOME?
Since 1913 our income tax laws have been enacted under 
the authority of the sixteenth amendment to the Constitu­
tion, which authorized Congress to tax without apportion­
ment among the several states “incomes from whatever 
source derived.”
Now there are numerous theories as to what is income. In 
one case (Doyle v. Mitchell) the government argued that the 
gross proceeds of sale were income. Economists sometimes 
argue that earnings that are saved are not income, so that 
what is income is determined by how what comes in is subse­
quently expended. Apart, however, from any such extreme 
views, there are two materially different theories of income 
which are supported by considerable authority: One holds 
that income is necessarily gain, the other that it may be in 
part a conversion of capital.
The difference may be illustrated by the case of a man 
purchasing an annuity. The general public regards the 
whole of the annuity as his income and this view is shared, I 
think, by many economists and reflected in the English and 
probably other tax laws. The actuary and the accountant 
would, however, insist that only in part is the annuity right­
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fully called income, a part being a realization of capital.
Congress in 1913 might, I suppose, have adopted either of 
these theories, and if its intent had been clearly manifested 
the Supreme Court would hardly have rejected that theory.
This, however, Congress did not do. The clauses of the 
1913 and 1916 acts purporting to define income or gross in­
come, as definitions, left much to be desired. What are we 
to infer from the definition of income as including “gains, 
profits and income” from certain specified sources “or from 
any source whatever”? Is income something different from 
gains and profits, and if so, what is the distinction? In Sec­
tion 4 of the act of 1916 Congress provided that annuities in 
so far as they represented returns of premiums were not 
taxable income, but in doing so it in plain language char­
acterized them as income; the law of 1918 retained the ex­
emption but avoided the characterization [Sec. 213 (a)].
It might fairly be argued that Congress, taking the acts as a 
whole, indicated an intention to tax only gains. This view is 
supported by the provisions above mentioned and by those 
allowing depreciation and depletion. On the other hand, 
the fact that these items were allowed by way of deductions 
from income or gross income in arriving at taxable income, 
the limitation of the deductions in purely arbitrary ways, 
and the language of Section 4 of the Act of 1916 above al­
luded to, might be claimed to support the view that Congress 
intended to assert the right to tax as income what might be 
in part a conversion of capital, but not to exercise its rights to 
that extent.
However this may be, the Supreme Court presumably 
settled the matter when in the case of Eisner v. Macomber 
it defined income as the gain derived from capital, from 
labor, or from both combined.
This decision, for the reason that it contained the defini­
tion I have referred to and held that Congress had attempted 
to tax as income what was not income, is of great importance, 
and it may be worth while to discuss it briefly. Many pass­
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ages from the opinion are of interest to accountants, but I 
will quote only one paragraph:
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; 
Standard Dict.; Webster’s Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), 
we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two 
cases arising under the corporation tax act of 1909 (Stratton’s 
Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415; Doyle v. 
Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185)—“Income may be de­
fined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from 
both combined,” provided it be understood to include profit 
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which 
it was applied in the Doyle case (pp. 183, 185).
In the dictionaries cited, both of the views of income above 
mentioned are set forth; the definition coming closest to 
that adopted by the Court is found in Bouvier’s Law Dic­
tionary.
Reference to the decision in Stratton’s Independence v. 
Howbert, in which the definition was first used, discloses 
that in that case the Court was at pains to point out that, as at 
the time of the passage of the 1909 law Congress had no 
power to levy a general income tax without apportionment, 
the theoretical distinctions between capital and income were 
of little value to the Court in interpreting that statute. Curi­
ously enough also, the case was one in which the court sus­
tained the taxation as income of the proceeds of gold mining 
without any provision for the exhaustion of the capital rep­
resented by the mine. In Doyle v. Mitchell, arising under 
the same act, the Court adopted the same definition in a 
decision in which it ruled that the proceeds of lumbering 
could not be taxed as income without a deduction for the 
capital value of the timber exhausted. However, these de­
cisions, being rendered under the excise-tax law, have no 
necessary bearing on the present question; and in Eisner v. 
Macomb er which was decided under an income tax law, 
none of these special features was present.
Just how far-reaching the effect of that decision is in law 
is a question for lawyers. The Supreme Court decisions 
under the excise-tax law of 1909 rather suggest that Con­
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gress can levy an excise tax measured by income without 
availing of the sixteenth amendment, and in so doing can de­
fine income as it pleases without regard to the views of the 
Supreme Court or anyone else. So long, however, as it levies 
a tax on income it apparently cannot tax as income what the 
Supreme Court does not consider to be income.
The point is largely academic, and Congress has not shown 
any disposition to disagree with the general interpretation 
of income adopted by the court. The two bodies have, it is 
true, differed on the question whether stock dividends are 
income; but dividends constitute a special problem and are, 
both under the acts and under court decisions, an exception 
to the rule that there is no income unless there is gain. If 
an investor buys $100 shares of a company which has a sur­
plus equal to its capital stock for $200 a share and if the next 
day the company pays a dividend of $100 a share and its 
shares fall to par, the dividend is not gain to the investor 
whether the dividend is paid in stock or cash. Dividends are 
however, in general, income; and it is so manifestly impos­
sible to provide for treatment thereof varying according to the 
circumstances surrounding the holders’ acquisition of the 
stock on which the dividend is paid, that purchasers of stocks 
of companies having large earned surpluses may reasonably 
be expected to realize that in making such purchases they not 
only acquire the prospects of dividends out of profits earned 
prior to their purchase but also assume the burden of any 
tax on the dividends they may receive. It was for this reason 
that Mr. Justice Pitney in the Phellis case said the hardship 
in the case of such purchasers was more apparent than real. 
It is on similar grounds that supporters of the English system 
justify its treatment of the proceeds of an annuity or of min­
ing and similar operations as taxable income without any de­
duction for exhaustion of capital. In this connection it is 
pertinent to point out that the English income tax has been 
levied continuously since 1842 and that therefore the great 
expansion of industry and corporate enterprise has taken 
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place mainly with notice of the burdens in the form of in­
come tax to which it might be subject.
Other similar cases may arise where something which is 
not gain is taxed as income. It would probably be a fairly 
accurate statement to say that the general test of the exist­
ence of income is whether there is gain, but that items which 
ordinarily constitute gain and are commonly regarded as in­
come may be taxed as such even though in exceptional cases 
they may not result in a gain to the recipient.
As regards commercial operations there are probably few 
exceptions to the rule that income must be in the nature of 
gain. Gain in commercial business is, however, usually not 
a separate item but a difference between items on opposite 
sides of the account. On the one side are the proceeds of 
sale, on the other the costs involved in producing the sales. 
Frequently also the gain is the result of a series of transac­
tions or a gradual process extending over two or more dis­
tinct tax periods. If a taxpayer buys raw materials in one 
year, manufactures finished goods therefrom in another, sells 
those goods in a third and collects the proceeds in a fourth 
year, the ultimate gain is obviously not attributable wholly 
to any one of these four years nor is there any way of allocat­
ing portions of the gain to the operations of the several years, 
which can be said to be the scientific and only proper way. 
In one such series of transactions the main factor contribut­
ing to the gain may be cheapness of buying, in another low 
cost of manufacture, in another advantageous selling and so 
on. Further, the transactions of a taxpayer are frequently 
so interrelated that we cannot ascertain the profits of any 
given series separately. Commercial profit is in fact, as an 
eminent English judge puts it, necessarily a matter of esti­
mate and opinion.
In the determination of income for commercial purposes 
the best practice is to be governed by considerations of con­
servatism. Profits are not taken except when and to the ex­
tent that they are received or at least reasonably assured. 
Losses that are foreseen are provided for even though not 
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actually sustained or measured. The legislature naturally 
approaches the question from a rather different point of view. 
On the first point it may be questioned whether Congress has 
power to tax profits not actually received. On the second, 
if it allows actual losses as deductions it can hardly be ex­
pected to allow deductions for potential future losses to be 
made at the discretion of the taxpayer.
It should be said at once that Congress has shown no dis­
position either to tax income not received or to deny losses 
actually sustained. Indeed in at least one important instance 
it has deliberately allowed the anticipation of potential 
losses. The provision in the Act of 1918 that inventories shall 
be taken on the basis conforming to the best trade practice 
was enacted with the knowledge that one of the best trade 
practices was to value inventories at cost where cost was less 
than market, and at market where that was less than cost, 
thus anticipating a loss wherever market might be below 
cost. This recognition of one of the best established of those 
trade practices which find their justification not in logic or 
scientific considerations, but in conservatism and practical 
wisdom, is very significant. In 1921 also the law was amended 
to permit deduction of a reasonable reserve for bad debts in­
stead of only debts ascertained to be worthless, thus recog­
nizing another well-established trade practice.
Whether the deductions permitted for depreciation and 
depletion are properly regarded as provisions for anticipated 
losses is difficult to say. From the accounting standpoint the 
provisions for depletion and depreciation of manufacturing 
plant are elements of cost, which must be provided for be­
fore there can be said to be any gain. The decisions of the 
Supreme Court on this branch of the subject are not alto­
gether easy to reconcile either with one another or with the 
Court’s general definition of income. Quite apart from the 
decision in the Stratton’s Independence case, under the Act 
of 1909, the significance of which may be lessened by the fact 
that the claimants were asserting that all the proceeds of min­
ing were capital, the court has approved under an income 
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tax law a purely arbitrary limitation on the depletion allow­
ance which it would seem could hardly have been sustained 
except on grounds which would have applied equally to the 
total denial of any deduction. This, in turn, would seem to 
mean that depletion is not a factor necessarily taken into ac­
count in determining the gain.
One other point may be noted. In general our laws have 
taxed the income of the taxpayer from his business, which 
may be less than the total gain from the business to the ex­
tent of the portion of the economic gain which the taxpayer 
may be required to pay over to others in the form of interest, 
rentals and other participations. In this respect ours has 
differed from the English system, which assesses against the 
taxpayer carrying on the business the entire gain from that 
business without regard to any such distributions, leaving the 
equitable adjustment between taxpayers to be effected by a 
system of deductions by the taxpayer when making the dis­
tributions, and refunds by the revenue to the distributees if 
they should be exempt from tax. In the Act of 1909 and the 
income tax acts up to that of 1918, however, the interest de­
duction allowed to corporations was arbitrarily limited and 
the limitation was sustained by the courts. Here again the 
power to impose purely arbitrary limitations on the deduc­
tion would seem necessarily to imply power to deny any 
deductions whatever. In the cases which came before the 
court the objection urged was apparently that the limitation 
was discriminatory and the decisions may, therefore, not be 
authority for the proposition that Congress has the power to 
tax all that is economically income in the hands of the per­
son who realizes the income, even though it is not all income 
to that person. The point might become important, for a 
tax so levied without some provision for the proper adjust­
ment of the burden between the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
gain might easily result in a tax on a person receiving the 
income greater than the portion thereof which he might be 
entitled to retain. In the year 1917 the limitation on interest 
deductions undoubtedly worked some hardship, and would 
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have caused gross injustice but for the action of the Commis­
sioner in allowing, without any very obvious warrant in the 
law, the capital sum corresponding to the interest disallowed 
to be treated as invested capital.
While the arbitrary limitations to which I have referred, 
and which are now fortunately removed, were blemishes on 
the earlier acts, criticism of the methods of determining tax­
able income established by those acts must be directed mainly 
at their lack of precision and clarity and their failure to 
recognize business methods and considerations of practical 
convenience.
BASES OF ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED
It is perhaps not surprising that at the outset receipt or 
payment in cash should have been adopted as the general 
basis for inclusion of items in income tax returns. Legisla­
tion is framed and interpreted largely by lawyers, and 
lawyers apparently seek to atone for the bewildering com­
plexities they have introduced into their own sphere of activ­
ity by insisting on the utmost simplicity in other spheres. 
The legal mind that distrusts simple interest and regards 
compound interest as wholly pernicious is naturally suspi­
cious of any account more complex than a cash account. In 
Great Britain, the home of the income tax, this tendency has 
been manifest, but in regard to commercial income it has 
been counteracted by another principle of judicial action, the 
principle that in commercial affairs the established practices 
of business men are a better guide than rules framed by 
theorists. Consequently, the courts there have always held 
that the determination of income from business was a busi­
ness problem and that in the absence of express statutory 
provision to the contrary, established trade practices must be 
followed even though to the revenue authorities or even the 
court those practices might seem theoretically unsound or 
illogical. An excellent illustration is found in the methods 
of valuing inventories, the English courts having sustained 
both the “cost or market” basis and the “basic stock” method 
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where a practice in the trade was shown to exist and there 
was no statutory prohibition.
In our case, however, the tendency towards the cash basis 
was perhaps strengthened by the accident that our first in­
come tax was enacted in the guise of an excise tax. The law 
of 1909 was framed so as to provide that corporations should 
return income actually received and expenses actually paid. 
As soon as this became known the accountants vigorously 
protested to the Attorney-General that such a basis ignored 
the nature and practices of modern business and would en­
tail inconvenience that would be more burdensome than 
the tax. The Attorney-General, however, remained un­
moved by their protest, said that the straight cash basis was 
adopted advisedly, and retorted that he had too much con­
fidence in the ability of the accountants to think that they 
would find the difficulties of complying with the law unsur­
mountable. His confidence was apparently justified, 
for with the assistance of accountants the Secretary of the 
Treasury issued regulations which certainly presented no spe­
cial difficulties to taxpayers.
Some have thought that the authors of those regulations 
found their inspiration, where so many others have found 
inspiration, in the works of W. S. Gilbert. Certainly when 
one reads the provisions to the effect that the term “actually 
paid” does not necessarily contemplate that there shall have 
been an actual disbursement of cash or even its equivalent, 
and that an item is paid as soon as a taxpayer recognizes that 
it has to be paid, one is irresistibly reminded of Koko’s ex­
planation to the Mikado of his statement that Nanki Poo had 
been executed when in fact he was still alive.
When your Majesty says, ‘Let a thing be done,’ it’s as good 
as done,—practically it is done,—because your Majesty’s will is 
law. Your Majesty says, ‘Kill a gentleman,’ and a gentle­
man is told off to be killed. Consequently, that gentleman 
is as good as dead, practically, he is dead, and if he is dead, 
why not say so?
TAXABLE INCOME 277
It is, however, quite possible to find a more logical justifi­
cation for the method of determining net income established 
by the regulations at least in the main, though this justifi­
cation, I admit, does not extend to the language in which the 
method is prescribed and ostensibly justified.
The Act of 1909 provided that the “net income” which was 
subjected to tax should be determined by deducting “from 
the gross amount of the income . . . received within the 
year from all sources:”
First. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid 
within the year out of income in the maintenance and opera­
tion of its business and properties including all charges such 
as rentals or franchise payments required to be made as a con­
dition to the continued use or possession of property.
Second. All losses actually sustained within the year and 
not compensated by insurance or otherwise, including a 
reasonable allowance for depreciation of property if any.
Third. Interest actually paid within the year subject to 
specified limits.
Fourth. All sums paid within the year for taxes.
Fifth. Dividends from other companies subject to the tax.
The regulations regarding commercial income apparently 
ignored the word “received” just as fully as the word “paid.” 
It was not necessary that proceeds of sale should have been 
received in order that there should be taxable income there­
from. The regulation treated income from sales as received 
when the goods were exchanged for an account or note re­
ceivable or cash. This was, in ordinary cases, an obviously 
convenient rule (and in considering the almost complete 
acquiescence these regulations secured, it must always be 
borne in mind that the tax was so small as to make it not 
worth while to fight a reasonably convenient rule), but 
whether if challenged it would have been sustained is open 
to question. The courts have pointed out that the expecta­
tion of gain in the future is not present income and have 
been reluctant to sustain a tax where nothing had been re­
ceived out of which the tax could be paid. The justification 
of the regulation would have had to be found in the argu­
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ment that something equivalent to cash had been received, 
and in many classes of transactions the recognition of the 
principle of cash equivalence must be conceded to be prac­
tically essential to an effective income tax administration. 
Once this principle is adopted, however, it has to be admitted 
that in measuring the gain the proceeds must be reduced to 
a true cash equivalent. This would mean bringing pro­
visions for the cost of collection, for discounts and for credit 
risks into account at the same time as the sale itself, which 
it may be noted the regulations did not permit.
The next point to be observed is that the proceeds of sale 
are not income (Doyle v. Mitchell); only so much as is gain 
is income. Assuming, therefore, that the gain is received 
when the proceeds of sale are received (not necessarily in 
cash), it follows that all costs attributable to the sale must be 
brought into account at the same time as the sale itself, 
whether such costs have or have not been paid. -Otherwise, 
on balance, something which is not gain will inevitably have 
been brought into account and taxed as income. It is gen­
erally recognized that this is true of the direct cost of the 
goods sold, but it is not so universally understood that it is 
equally true of the cost of making the sale and the cost of 
collecting the proceeds. A commission paid in order to 
effect a sale is as much an element in determining the gain 
therefrom as the cost of the property sold. This point seems 
to me to have a most important bearing on the determina­
tion of taxable income whether the question be approached 
from the theoretical, historical, or practical standpoint.
In considering the proper treatment of any item in rela­
tion to taxable income, the first essential is to decide whether 
it properly relates to the determination of gross income or 
to a deduction from gross income. If the former, its treat­
ment is not in any way affected by any limitations of deduc­
tions to amounts paid, accrued or incurred, as the case may 
be, since these limitations apply only to items which are in 
fact charges against gross income after gross income has been 
determined. As the Court indicated in Doyle v. Mitchell it 
TAXABLE INCOME 279
is immaterial whether there is any express provision allowing 
elements in the production of gross income as deductions 
from gross proceeds, for until they are deducted there is noth­
ing ascertained which Congress can properly tax as income.
This principle would have warranted a regulation that 
all costs of effecting sales, as well as the costs of producing 
the goods sold and provisions for the costs of collection, were 
allowable in the period in which the sales were returned, as 
a part of the computation of gross income. Only expenses 
not falling under any of these three heads would have been 
left to be taken as deductions under the head of “ordinary 
and necessary expenses actually paid within the year out of 
income.”
Looking back on the problem of 1909 in the flood of light 
which the developments of the last sixteen years have thrown 
on the subject, one feels that along such lines a • solution 
might have been found that would have been almost as con­
venient as the one adopted and would have avoided inter­
preting the words “actually paid” in the Gilbertian manner 
of the regulation then promulgated. It may be suggested 
that the language of the provision for deduction for business 
expenses stood in the way, but this does not seem to be 
necessarily so. That provision authorized the “deducting 
from the gross amount of the income all the ordinary and 
necessary expenses actually paid within the year out of in­
come” Expenditures necessarily made to produce income 
surely did not fall in any such category. In point of fact, 
expenses of maintenance of the property of the taxpayer 
were specifically enumerated in the Act among the “ordinary 
and necessary expenses,” yet the regulations provided that 
expenditures for maintenance of manufacturing plant should 
be included in cost of goods sold in computing gross income 
and not under the deduction.
The regulations of 1909 did not follow the course I have 
suggested, but treated only cost of goods as a deduction from 
sales in determining gross income and dealt with cost of 
selling and collection as “ordinary or necessary expenses” 
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to be deducted from gross income when “actually paid” pro­
viding, however, that when such items were duly set up on 
the books they were “actually paid” within the meaning of 
the law.
The convenience of the solution is undeniable, and it may 
be that the framers were governed by this consideration. 
They may well have felt that the solution was so convenient 
that no one would be likely to challenge it, and that if it 
were challenged they could readily show that it produced 
erroneous results only as regards expenses which were not a 
part of the cost of effecting and collecting the sales returned, 
the amount of which was in ordinary cases relatively in­
significant.
In substance these regulations were sound, convenient and 
did little real violence to the language of the law. Their 
form, however, must be admitted to have been defective, 
particularly in its apparent disregard of the language of the 
law. No doubt if continued interest in the work of ad­
ministering the law by men of the quality of those who 
framed the regulations could have been secured, the defects 
in form would have been corrected, while the advantages of 
the substance would have been retained. This, however, was 
not possible, and in the event just the opposite result fol­
lowed. The influence of the defective form has continued 
long after the advantages derived from the substance have 
ceased to be felt.
One result of the defective form was that a widespread 
feeling was created both within and without the department 
that the regulations were at variance with the law and that 
any day dissatisfaction with their operation in a particular 
case might bring the issue into court and cause the whole 
house of cards to collapse. Another result was that the aver­
age taxpayer who was told that when used in connection with 
expenses the word “paid” did not necessarily mean a dis­
bursement in cash, but that when used in relation to interest 
or taxes it did contemplate such a disbursement, felt that 
the law was unreasonable and so far as he was concerned 
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incomprehensible. Still another result, certainly of a most 
unexpected character, which I shall discuss later in this 
paper, grew out of the establishment by the regulations of 
the making of book entries as a criterion of deductibility, a 
criterion not warranted, either in theory or in the language 
of the law.
Further, while the solution by the Secretary of the Treasury 
of the problem presented in the Act of 1909 produced im­
mediate benefits in the form of convenience, it stood in the 
way of efforts to secure a more satisfactory wording when 
in 1913 the first income tax law was enacted. Efforts to 
secure an improvement were made by, among others, the 
American Association of Public Accountants. The sugges­
tion of a change was met with the argument that the existing 
law had in practice worked quite satisfactorily and that if 
such a law could be applied to corporations there was even 
greater justification for applying it to individuals, most of 
whom would keep no books and would make returns on a 
purely cash basis. The law of 1913 thus followed closely 
the language of the law of 1909. The efforts were, however, 
continued, and in 1916 a modification was effected and tax­
payers were given the option of making returns either on 
the statutory basis or on the basis on which their books were 
kept, provided the method of keeping the books was such 
as in the opinion of the Commissioner correctly reflected in­
come. For various reasons which it is hardly necessary at 
this time to discuss, this provision did not work very well, 
and the regulations under the Act of 1916 continued to follow 
very closely those made under the Acts of 1909 and 1913.
In passing it may be pointed out that Article 126 of Reg­
ulations No. 33 issued January 2, 1918, strongly suggests 
that at the time those regulations were issued the line of 
reasoning which I have put forward above as an alternative 
to that indicated by the language of 1909 regulations had 
developed in the Bureau. It begins by apparently flouting 
the language of the statute in the most open and flagrant 
manner. The first sentence reads “ ‘paid’ or ‘actually paid’ 
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within the meaning of this title, does not necessarily con­
template that there shall be an actual disbursement in cash 
or its equivalent.” The next sentence, however, states very 
succinctly the underlying justification of the results of the 
regulation which I have suggested. “If the amount involved 
represents an actual expense or element of cost in the pro­
duction of the income of the year, it will be properly de­
ductible even though not actually disbursed in cash, pro­
vided it is so entered upon the books of the company as to 
constitute a liability against its assets, and provided further 
that the income is also returned upon an accrued basis.’’
It will be observed that this regulation does not in terms 
permit the deduction of any expense which has not actually 
been paid unless it is “an expense or element of cost in the 
production of the income.” To support such a position it 
was not necessary to give a forced construction to the words 
“actually paid” used in the statute. In practice, however, 
the regulation was applied to all business expenses, and the 
Bureau no doubt preferred to retain substantially the lan­
guage of the regulations under the Acts of 1909 and 1913 
and to be in a position to invoke the rule that re-enactment 
of the provisions of an act by Congress with a knowledge of 
the way in which it has been interpreted sanctions that in­
terpretation.
When in 1917 the excess-profits tax law was passed levying 
high taxes on the income determined under the 1916 law 
and regulations, the whole question assumed new importance 
and the need for revision of the law became apparent.
In the 1918 law, therefore, it was provided (in Section 212) 
that returns should be made on the basis on which the tax­
payer’s books were kept unless that basis did not clearly re­
flect income, in which case returns were to be made on such 
basis as the Commissioner might prescribe as clearly reflect­
ing income.
In considering this section it is important to bear in mind 
the provisions of the Act that the terms paid or incurred 
(used in relation to deductions for expenses) and paid or 
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accrued (used in relation to deductions for interest and taxes) 
should be construed according to the method of accounting 
used in computing net income.
Even more important, however, is the provision that items 
of gross income were to be included in returns for the tax­
able year in which received, unless under methods of ac­
counting permitted under Section 212 they were properly 
accounted for as of a different period.
The intent seems clear to give the fullest effect to sound 
accounting practice in the determination of gross income. 
It may be conceded that the law gave no authority to the 
Commissioner to prescribe or permit bases of accounting 
which would result in deductions from the gross income of 
expenses in periods other than those in which they were paid 
or incurred, or of interest and taxes in periods other than 
that of payment or accrual. “Incurred,” however, is a suffi­
ciently broad term and no serious criticism of the rules thus 
established could be offered by the most ardent advocate 
of the policy of allowing commercial practice to govern the 
determination of commercial income. The law certainly 
authorized the acceptance of well-established practices for 
determining gross income on the basis of the fair present 
value of the sales price, instead of its face value—in other 
words, the exclusion from the computation of gross income 
of so much of the nominal sale price as might be necessary 
to provide for discounts, for the credit risk assumed and 
the cost of collecting that sale price. It did not permit de­
duction from gross income of reserves for potential future 
losses nor for expenditures not yet incurred and not in­
volved in the production of the gross sales reported. From 
the legislative standpoint such deductions could not reason­
ably be allowed, however legitimate or even praiseworthy 
purely precautionary reserves may be from the standpoints 
of sound finance and business prudence.
To most accountants the Act of 1918 seemed to dispose 
of the vitally important question of accounting bases for 
determining taxable income in a sound and satisfactory way.
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It can hardly be said that the expectations entertained 
have been fully realized. The regulations (Reg. 45) seemed 
to observe the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Article 
23, for instance, provided that “approved standard methods 
of accounting will ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflect­
ing income’’ and Article 24 said “the law contemplates that 
each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems of account­
ing as are in his judgment best suited to his purpose.” In 
such articles as 151 the propriety of computing gross income 
upon the basis of the cash equivalent rather than the face 
value of credit sales was recognized. Other articles explicitly 
recognized approved alternative methods of treating ex­
penditures in the twilight zone between obviously capital 
expenditure and ordinary operating expense. In adminis­
tration the law has frequently been construed with less 
breadth and with less regard for its spirit. In part this is 
perhaps attributable to failure to realize the nature of the 
problem of determining the income of a single year.
Accountants realize that income cannot with even approxi­
mate accuracy be allocated to a particular year, especially in 
the case of taxpayers carrying on an extensive and complex 
business. No year is sufficient unto itself—each year’s opera­
tions are bound up with and dependent on the operations 
of earlier and later years. Consequently, any attribution of 
income to a single year in such cases must at best be no 
more than a very rough approximation based on accepted 
conventions. Many, however, who have not had much ex­
perience in such matters look on the income of a year as a 
very definite, significant and even a precise thing. They are 
reluctant to accept the proposition that there can be two 
ways of determining the income of a given year, which will 
give substantially different results and be equally admissible 
and correct. Experience suggests that such reluctance was 
very general among those in the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
and when the 1918 act compelled recognition of the prin­
ciple that there might be more than one legally correct way 
of computing income for a given year, they apparently re­
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solved at least to limit the number of alternatives. Since 
the passage of the 1918 act the correspondence and briefs of 
the Bureau have contained constant references to the two 
bases of accounting permitted under the act, these two being 
described respectively as “the cash basis’’ and “the accrual 
basis.” Of course, the more experienced members of the 
Bureau realized that there were far more than two bases of 
accounting possible and recognized under the Act, and doubt­
less many of those who spoke of the cash basis and the accrual 
basis used the latter term generically to describe anything 
other than a cash basis. But to a large number of the em­
ployees of the Bureau the accrual basis has become not 
merely a significant phrase, but an article of faith. Indeed, 
one can almost imagine such employees of the Bureau scat­
tered over the land turning their faces towards the Treasury 
daily at the appointed hour and reciting their creed, “There 
is but one accrual basis and the Bureau is its prophet.”
“the accrual basis”
It may be worth while to inquire just what is meant by 
“the accrual basis.” This is by no means clear, nor is it even 
clear precisely how it differs from the so-called cash basis 
as applied to commercial income since 1909.
It will be evident from what I have already said that both 
in theory and in practice cash has very little to do (in the 
case of commercial enterprises) with the determination of 
income on the “cash” basis, and very little reflection is neces­
sary to a realization of the fact that accruals (in any proper 
sense of the word) have still less to do with the determination 
of income on the so-called accrual basis. This fact has been 
obscured by the practice, which has grown up, of using the 
word “accrue” in senses hardly dreamed of before the Reve­
nue Act of 1916 was passed. The Bureau, having adopted 
“the accrual basis” as the only alternative to “the cash basis,” 
has proceeded to term “an accrual” almost everything that is 
not a cash item. Thus, we find the Bureau speaking of 
taking up an inventory as an accrual and of “accruing ac­
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counts receivable from sales” and quite generally using the 
word “accrue” in a transitive sense as being equivalent to 
the “setting up on the books” which, as I have pointed out, 
was, under the regulations of 1909, established as being for 
tax purposes equivalent to actual payment. Applying 
Euclidean methods, we may deduce that since setting up on 
the books is equivalent to actual payment or receipt and is 
also equivalent to accrual, and since things which are equal 
to the same thing are equal to one another, accrual is equiva­
lent to actual payment or receipt and the cash basis and the 
accrual basis are identical. Such use of the word “accrual” 
could not have been justified from the dictionary nor from 
common accounting or business practice. Indeed, the latest 
citation in any standard dictionary of the use of the word 
“accrue” in any transitive sense whatever, that I have been 
able to discover, is from a work published in 1594.
The fact is, that the word “accrue” is a singularly un­
happy choice for use in income tax practice. One of the 
great difficulties of income taxation is that income earning 
is a gradual process, and yet the necessities of taxation require 
that particular portions of income shall be attributed to 
particular moments in time. It is not feasible to tax income 
during the period of growth, but only when it becomes defi­
nite and measurable. Now in its basic meanings, the word 
“accrual” is ambiguous when applied to such a situation, 
because one of its meanings is to “grow up” and the other 
is to “spring up” or “fall in,” so that it is equally capable of 
application either to the period of growth or to the moment 
of falling in of income when it takes a definite form. There 
is a similar ambiguity in the legal and commercial uses of 
the word. When the term “accrue” is used in regard to 
interest, the reference is usually intended to be to the gradual 
accumulation of interest between one maturity date and an­
other. In regard to taxes, it has repeatedly been held to 
mean “become due.” The use of the word in the recent acts 
has been sufficiently confusing in that the two deductions in 
respect of which it has been used in the acts are interest and 
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taxes, two items in relation to which it has quite different 
meanings. When to such ambiguities is added the further 
confusion arising from the use of the word by the Bureau in 
the transitive sense as equivalent to “set up,” its last shred 
of descriptive value disappears.
One may wonder why of all the terms used in the acts this 
term, which is the least illuminating, should have attained 
the widest use in the Bureau. Partly, no doubt, it is due to 
the fact that of the various terms used such as “paid,” “re­
ceived” and “incurred,” “accrued” is the. only one from 
which an adjective is easily formed that is applicable to both 
sides of the account. Its use therefore achieved brevity, 
though at a complete sacrifice of significance. However this 
may be, I venture to suggest that the misuse of the word 
“accrue” has contributed to the confusion of the income tax 
administration in the later stages as much as the artificial 
solution of the problem presented by the words “paid” and 
“received” in the Act of 1909 occasioned in the earlier stages.
Before leaving the subject, I would like to admit that the 
accountants are not wholly without responsibility for the con­
fusion that has existed. Our own use of terminology is 
lamentably inconsistent and reflects too often the idiosyn­
crasies of the individual rather than the established practice 
of the profession. I recall a statement put forward over the 
signature of a well-known accounting firm which began with 
a figure described as “gross income” from which allowances 
and refunds were deducted to arrive at a figure described as 
“net gross income.” Operating expenses were next deducted 
and the result described as “net operating income”; the addi­
tion to which of net income from other sources produced a 
so-called “gross net income” which it must be observed 
meant something quite different from “net gross income.” 
Our treatment of cost of goods, cost of selling and cost of 
collecting in relation to gross income has too often been 
determined by habit rather than by logic. Many of us have 
acquiesced in or even adopted the Bureau’s unwarranted 
usage of “the accrual basis,” Burdened with so much re­
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sponsibility, we must be restrained in our criticisms of the 
Bureau which, facing a heavier task and equipped with less 
experience, has fallen into errors similar to our own.
CONCLUSION
We may now, I hope, look forward to rates that will be 
lower and more stable than in recent years with a resulting 
reduction of the temptation to taxpayers to allow their ac­
counting methods to be influenced by tax considerations. If 
so, there will be even more reason than in the past why the 
Bureau should carry out the obvious intent of the law and 
adopt a broad policy towards taxpayers’ accounting methods, 
which will make the law less burdensome in procedure as 
well as in amount.
In order to accomplish this result some old misconceptions 
need to be removed and some old truths emphasized anew. 
It would greatly improve the administration of the income 
tax if the Bureau generally—not merely those who frame 
regulations but all charged with the administration of the 
law—would realize that “the accrual basis” is a meaningless 
phrase; that the choice today is not between a so-called “cash 
basis” and a so-called “accrual basis” but between the basis 
on which the taxpayers’ books are kept and the basis pre­
scribed by the Commissioner as clearly reflecting income; and 
that as stated in Regulations 45, Article 24, the law contem­
plates that “each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems 
of accounting as are in his judgment best suited to his pur­
pose.”
They should keep constantly in mind the fundamental 
difference between the considerations governing the deter­
mination of gross income and those governing the treatment 
of authorized deductions from such gross income. In this 
connection they should realize that the mention of any class 
of items among the authorized deductions from gross income 
does not stand in the way of the deduction of similar items 
from gross proceeds in the determination of gross income 
where they are a part of the cost of producing that income.
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For instance, the provision that taxes may be deducted 
either when paid or when accrued does not stand in the way 
of customs duties accrued and paid last year entering into 
the determination of the income of this year if the goods 
imported are sold this year. Similarly, the provision that 
debts actually ascertained to be worthless may be claimed 
as deductions does not stand in the way of valuing sales ac­
counts receivable at their fair market value at the time when 
they are created, in determining the gross income from such 
sales, but merely limits the deduction which may subse­
quently be claimed for bad debts if the account receivable 
proves uncollectible.
They should never forget that income is at best a matter 
of estimate and opinion, and that in its allocation in respect 
of time, business practice and the treatment adopted in good 
faith by the taxpayer are entitled to great weight; also that 
the injustice of taxation of income which has not been re­
ceived may not be adequately remedied by allowing the 
amount as a so-called loss against the income from other 
transactions in a later year. Both the law and business prac­
tice warrant conservatism in determining when income is 
received and is taxable.
These are the practical conclusions which seem to me to 
emerge from consideration of our subject. I hope you will 
feel that they give some present value to this paper, which 
otherwise might seem to have at best only historical interest.
IV
ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING AND RESERVES IN TAX 
PRACTICE *
(1925)
May I ask the privilege of your columns to discuss briefly 
two points arising, one directly and the other indirectly, 
out of my paper † which was published in your October 
issue? Of these points the first relates to the origin of the 
expression “the accrual basis of accounting’’; the other to 
the treatment of reserves in tax practice.
In my paper I implied that the expression “accrual ac­
counting” had little if any currency among accountants prior 
to the development of the expression in tax practice. It has, 
however, been suggested to me that the phrase had been used 
for many years by economists, and it is I think due to your 
readers that the fact should be brought to their notice.
Professor H. C. Adams, in his Public Finance, published 
in 1898, uses the phrase and discusses the relative advantages 
of cash and accrual accounting for governmental purposes. 
Professor Adams does not seem to me to deal altogether 
satisfactorily with the question when items accrue, and the 
difficulty suggested in my paper as arising from the fact that 
to accrue may mean either “to grow up” or “to fall in,” is 
indicated but not solved in his book. Thus, he regards taxes 
as accruing as assets to a government when they are assessed; 
interest he regards as accruing from day to day. Supposing 
then that a special annual tax be levied to meet interest on 
government debt, the income to the government (taxes) 
would be deemed to accrue on the day or days of assessment, 
but the expense to accrue from day to day. For the pur­
poses of annual budgets the inconsistency would be of no
* A letter to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XL (December, 1925).
† Taxable Income and Accounting Bases for Determining It. (See above.) 
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great importance, but as soon as accounts are made up for 
a shorter period, or a balance sheet is prepared, the incon­
sistent uses of the term “accrued” give rise to serious diffi­
culties.
That the phrase “accrual accounting,” even though used 
by economists in regard to government accounting, was not 
generally employed by accountants even in that limited 
sense is indicated by the proceedings at the first congress of 
accountants held in St. Louis in 1904. A series of papers on 
municipal accounting formed an important part of the pro­
gram at that congress, arid the need for something more 
than “cash accounting” was one of the main points stressed 
in these papers; yet the alternative was nowhere, I think, de­
scribed as a system of “accrual accounting.” In the first 
paper Harvey S. Chase said:
The fundamental basis of correct municipal accounting 
is now being thoroughly discussed from a true accounting 
standpoint as witnessed in the other papers presented at this 
meeting. This true accounting standpoint is of course 
revenue and expense in contradistinction to cash receipts 
and disbursements.
Indeed, the title of one of the papers, which was presented 
by Professor F. A. Cleveland, was “Revenues and Expenses 
as Distinguished from Receipts and Disbursements in Mu­
nicipal Accounting.”
It is interesting to note that speaking of commercial ac­
counting Professor Adams said, “Should we turn our atten­
tion from public [i.e., governmental] accounting to the 
best corporation accounting one will discover that ‘earnings 
and expenses’ have almost universally supplanted the older 
bookkeeping phrases of ‘receipts and expenditures.’ ” Fur­
ther evidence on this point is afforded by the correspondence 
between a number of accounting firms and the Attorney- 
General immediately prior to the enactment of the corpora­
tion excise-tax law of 1909. As opposed to the cash basis they 
advocated the basis of earnings and expenses, and throughout 
the correspondence used the word “accrue” only in regard to 
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interest. They spoke of income earned, expenses incurred 
and losses sustained, and written off and when they came 
to taxes they used no qualifying adjective at all, from which 
it might, perhaps, be inferred that they were not prepared 
to suggest any alternative to taxes paid.
A discussion of English authorities would, I am sure, lead 
to precisely the same result, and the economists must there­
fore be left to share with the Bureau of Internal Revenue the 
credit or responsibility for giving currency to the phrase 
“accrual accounting.” Incidentally, it is consoling to ac­
countants, who are frequently criticized for adopting ter­
minology for their own purposes without regard to practice 
in other fields of activity involving the same subject matter, 
to find that the economists apparently coined the phrase 
“accrual accounting” to meet a need without regard to the 
fact that accountants commonly used another term which 
if not quite so brief was at least clearer and more accurate.
It would, I believe, be an advantage if we should revert 
to the practice indicated by the correspondence with the At­
torney-General, and restrict the use of the word “accrue” to 
interest and similar items which grow with the mere lapse 
of time, in which relation its sense is universally understood 
and agreed. In recent years its use has been extending in 
the same sense to items to which it is not properly applicable, 
and in other and ill-defined senses to still other items. This 
is particularly true, as pointed out in my paper, of tax 
practice, and even the tax law has for many years provided 
for the deduction of taxes accrued as well as interest accrued.
Now, undoubtedly the legal and accounting usages of the 
phrase “taxes accrued” differ, even if lawyers do not differ 
as to its legal, and accountants as to its accounting, meaning. 
Much controversy has arisen on the question whether the 
term is used in the tax laws in its general legal sense or in 
an accounting sense. It would be a distinct gain if account­
ants would cease to use the term “taxes accrued” in a sense 
altogether different from its legal meaning.
Consideration of possible alternatives brings me immedi­
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ately to the second point on which I would like to comment 
in this letter. Probably the first alternative which would 
occur to most accountants would be “reserve for taxes,” 
but the use of the word “reserve” in accounting practice 
must be admitted to be even more vague and inconsistent 
than any use of the word “accrue” to which I have referred. 
A reserve may be anything from segregated surplus to a 
mere accounting device for adjusting to a proper net value, 
assets which it is convenient to carry on the books at more 
than their actual value.
Accountants have recognized this unsatisfactory situation 
for many years, but it must be conceded that they have done 
little or nothing to correct it. A perusal of the decisions 
of the Board of Tax Appeals, however, suggests that the Board 
does not sufficiently appreciate that the proper treatment 
of reserves cannot be determined without enquiry into their 
nature and their effect on the accounts.
The point may be illustrated by a decision in the case of 
M. I. Stewart & Co., Docket 473, decided September 30, 1925, 
on the question of reserves for discount. The Board dis­
poses of the question in effect by saying, “Reserves are not 
allowable deductions from gross income unless specifically 
provided for by statute.” True, but irrelevant. A reserve 
for discount is a step in the computation of gross income, 
not a deduction therefrom. If a trader sells on December 
31, 1924, goods which cost $80 for a nominal price of 
$100 less 2% ten days, his gross income in that year from 
the transaction is but $18. The impossibility of maintain­
ing any other view becomes apparent if we assume the debt 
to be paid on January 1, 1925. How can it be argued in 
such a case that the trader made a profit of $20 in 1924 
and a loss of $2 in 1925 (as the Board’s treatment implies) 
when he received exactly what he had a right to receive.
Correct accounting calls for determining income in such 
cases on the basis of taking accounts receivable at the sum, 
which if paid on December 31 would completely discharge 
the indebtedness. If through failure to pay promptly the 
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debtors become obligated to pay more in the subsequent 
year, the forfeited discounts are income of that year. 
Whether such correct accounting is secured by taking the 
accounts receivable at their present value when created and 
taking up the discount as an asset, as, when and if, forfeited, 
or by setting up the accounts receivable immediately at their 
nominal sum on the one side and carrying a reserve on the 
other is immaterial. The so-called reserve is not a reserve 
but a mere accounting device the convenience of which is 
obvious. The Board in such decisions as above quoted is 
misled by terminology into taxing as gross income some­
thing which has not and may never become income.
The first essential to a correct disposition of so-called re­
serves in computing taxable income is to determine into 
which of various categories the reserves in question fall. If 
they are reservations made out of profits, the dictum of the 
Board above quoted from the Stewart case applies to them. 
If, however, they are merely a part of the accounting mechan­
ism for determining either the gross income earned or the 
expenses incurred, then the sole question is whether the 
method of accounting is such as correctly reflects income.
V
OBSOLESCENCE OF GOODWILL
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke *
(1930)
It is to be hoped that we shall not be suspected of introduc­
ing a highly controversial question of national importance 
into the columns of a technical journal if we discuss a recent 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of the Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company; † 
nor, we trust, shall we be charged with a refusal to accept 
the decisions of the Court or with a lack of respect for its 
members if, in the course of discussion, we question the 
validity of the arguments by which the decision is supported 
in the opinion handed down. The case is interesting to ac­
countants in more ways than one. The point at issue— 
whether under the tax law an allowance should be made for 
obsolescence of goodwill—is itself an interesting technical 
question. The decisions in the courts below turned largely 
on the legislative history of tax provisions, which account­
ants played an important part in formulating, and the whole 
history of the case indicates the strange turns of fortune to 
which taxpayers may be subject. We propose, therefore, to 
consider it in some detail.
Let us deal first with the proceedings in the Supreme 
Court. As has been said, the question at issue was whether 
or not under the Revenue Act of 1918 an allowance could be 
made for the obsolescence of goodwill. No question of fact 
was in dispute. In the language of the opinion, “The good­
will was that of a brewery and is found to have been de­
stroyed by prohibition legislation. The deduction claimed
* An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLIX 
(March, 1930).
† 280 U. S., 384.
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is for the fiscal year ending May 31, 1919, it having been 
apparent early in 1918 that prohibition was imminent, and 
the officers having taken steps to prepare for the total or 
partial liquidation of the company. The amount of the 
deduction to be made is agreed upon if any deduction is to 
be allowed.” The sole contention of the Government, which 
brought the appeal, was that in the provisions of the Revenue 
Act of 1918 relating to exhaustion, wear and tear and ob­
solescence, “the statute only intended to embrace property 
of such a nature that it was decreased, consumed or disposed 
of by use in the trade or business, and goodwill is not such 
property.”
As between the parties, nothing turned on the nature of 
the event which destroyed the goodwill. The Government’s 
position would have been precisely the same had the case 
been one of a business brought to an end by an unexpected 
exhaustion of the world’s supply of its raw material. The 
Court, however, decided against the taxpayer, on the ground 
that neither of the words “exhaustion” and “obsolescence” 
was apt to describe termination by law as an evil of a busi­
ness otherwise flourishing; and that to make such an allow­
ance would be to grant part compensation to the taxpayer 
for the extinguishment of his business by law, in the form 
of “an abatement of taxes otherwise due,” and that it was 
incredible that Congress should have intended such a result. 
But it is difficult to perceive how any question arises of 
abatement of taxes otherwise due. The profits for the last 
years of the Company’s operation had to be determined and 
taxed. The fact, conceded on the record, that the useful 
life of the capital assets of the business was to be cut short, 
was claimed to be under general provisions a factor which 
would reduce the taxable income and the tax. The Revenue 
Act did not exclude breweries from the benefit pf these pro­
visions. The taxpayer had been guilty of nothing illegal. 
Upon what theory, then, can the taxpayer be denied the 
benefit of the provisions and its tax increased by such denial? 
If the general provisions would not give the relief sought, 
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if the premature termination of the useful life of an asset 
employed in a business which is brought to an unexpected 
end is not covered by the terms used in the act, the taxpayer 
has no right to succeed. But if they would afford that re­
lief, there is nothing in the Revenue Act, nor surely in con­
siderations of public policy, to deprive the taxpayer of the 
benefit on account of the nature of the event which brought 
the business to a premature end. Congress, acting within its 
powers, saw fit to enact prohibition without compensation; 
but there is nothing to suggest that it intended to impose 
an added burden on the industries affected by requiring that 
their taxable income, during the short period of legal opera­
tion left them, should, by an exception to a general rule, be 
determined as if that period had been unlimited. The opin­
ion, we think, does an injustice to Congress when it imputes 
to Congress such an intention.
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Stone concurred 
in the result, but wrote no opinion. Their decision prob­
ably turned on the question of the applicability of the clause 
relied upon to goodwill in general, rather than on the inter­
pretation of the attitude of Congress toward a business which 
had become noxious to the constitution, which led to the 
rather summary dismissal of the taxpayers’ contentions by 
Mr. Justice Holmes. The only words in his opinion which 
seem to bear directly on this question are contained in the 
sentence: “Neither word is apt to describe termination by 
law as an evil of a business otherwise flourishing, and neither 
becomes more applicable because the death is lingering 
rather than instantaneous.” It may be that if the effect of 
the decision as an authority comes to be considered in a 
future case, the declaration that neither word (exhaustion 
or obsolescence) is apt to describe the termination of a busi­
ness otherwise flourishing will be held to have been the basis 
of the decision, and the references to the prohibition law to 
have been merely obiter dicta. Accurately speaking, the 
question is perhaps whether either “exhaustion” or “ob­
solescence” is or is not an apt term to describe the effect on 
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capital assets of an event which is about to bring a pros­
perous business in which they are employed to an unex­
pected end, rather than whether the words are apt to de­
scribe the event itself or not. In considering such a ques­
tion, an examination of the history of the legislation and of 
the practice of the Treasury would seem, under the decisions 
of the Court, to be pertinent if not essential.
In the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in the court below, 
the question had turned on the interpretation of the pro­
vision of Section 234 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1918, allowing 
as a deduction from gross income, inter alia, “a reasonable 
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used 
in the trade or business, including a reasonable allowance 
for obsolescence.” Acting under this authority, the Treasury 
in 1919 issued a regulation providing for an allowance for 
obsolescence of goodwill of breweries as a result of prohibi­
tion. This ruling remained in effect from 1919 until 1927. 
In 1927, a case having come into the courts on the question 
whether or not the goodwill had, in fact, been destroyed in 
that case, a district court held that the provision relied on 
did not authorize a deduction in any case for obsolescence 
of goodwill. This decision being affirmed by the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the Commissioner amended the regulations 
so as to deny the deduction. It is to be presumed that the 
great majority of the cases had been decided under the 
regulations in force from 1919 to 1927, so that only a small 
residue of taxpayers was affected by the change of position. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in deciding the case referred 
to (the Red Wing Malting Company case), held that the 
language, “including a reasonable allowance for obsoles­
cence,” did not add a new kind of deduction, and that the 
allowance for “exhaustion, wear and tear of property used 
in the trade or business” covered no more than the pro­
vision of the Act of 1916, which allowed a deduction for the 
“exhaustion, wear and tear of property arising out of its use 
or employment in the business or trade,” and that there­
fore exhaustion was not allowable unless caused by use. This 
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conclusion was based largely on the Court’s reading of the 
legislative history of the provision, a history which is of par­
ticular interest to accountants.
The corporation excise-tax law of 1909 allowed the de­
duction of “a reasonable allowance for depreciation of prop­
erty, if any.” This act. is memorable because it led to the 
first occasion on which the accountants of the country as a 
body presented the views of the profession on what they 
conceived to be unsound legislation, and also the first oc­
casion on which members of the profession were called in to 
assist in framing regulations to give effect to an apparently 
unworkable act. Since the tax was in terms based on receipts 
and payments, any allowance for depreciation might seem in­
congruous if it were not well understood that the law was 
conceived and was to be administered as an income or profits 
tax, and that the words “received” and “paid” were used as 
what has since come to be known as camouflage, which was 
expected to protect the law from attack on constitutional 
grounds. In the regulations, the term “depreciation” was 
interpreted in the accounting rather than the etymological 
sense, and it was provided that the deduction should be “the 
loss which arises from exhaustion, wear and tear or ob­
solescence out of the use to which the property is put.” 
There was, however, a disposition in the Treasury to make 
the determination of the allowance at least in part a ques­
tion of value rather than of exhaustion.
When the Revenue Act of 1913 was being prepared, a 
committee of the American Association of Public Account­
ants, predecessor of the American Institute of Accountants, 
conferred with those who were drafting the bill and recom­
mended, among other things, that the sense of the regulation 
under the Act of 1909 should be embodied in the text of the 
Act of 1913. That Act, when passed, provided for “a reason­
able allowance for depreciation by use, wear and tear of 
property, if any.” It was, however, apparent that deprecia­
tion of property used, which ought to be allowed, might 
arise while the property was in use, but not by or from use. 
300 TAXATION
Such allowances were commonly made by the Treasury under 
the Act of 1913 and also under the Act of 1916. In 1918, 
income taxation had assumed a new importance, and, the 
1917 law having proved almost unworkable, the Treasury, 
for the first time, was allowed to draft a law. The bill, as 
it passed the house, provided for “a reasonable allowance for 
exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or 
business.” The Senate amended the provision to read, “a 
reasonable allowance for depreciation of property used in 
the trade or business.” The conference committee changed 
the provision to read as it now stands, “a reasonable allow­
ance for exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the 
trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for 
obsolescence.” The reasonable interpretation of the intent 
of Congress would seem to be that in 1918 it sanctioned the 
previous practice of allowing deductions for exhaustion of 
property used, even though that exhaustion resulted not 
from use but from other causes such as lapse of time, and 
that it specifically provided for consideration of the element 
of obsolescence in determining the allowance. It was upon 
this construction that the Treasury regulation, above referred 
to, specifically allowing obsolescence of goodwill in the case 
of breweries, was formulated. The Circuit Court of Appeals 
in the eighth circuit appears from the record to have based 
its decision adverse to this regulation in the Red Wing 
Malting Company case on a reading of this history which was 
not entirely accurate. The Circuit Court of the second cir­
cuit, in a careful opinion in the Haberle Crystal Springs 
Brewing Company case, sustained the regulation. It was on 
this narrow point of statutory construction that the latter 
case went to the Supreme Court, there to .be decided, as we 
have said, on a point which apparently had not been con­
sidered by anyone in the ten years’ history of the question.
This history strikingly illustrates the hazards involved in 
taking a tax case to court. The Red Wing Malting Com­
pany, presumably convinced of the soundness of its position 
on the question of fact which was at issue in the Treasury 
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(i.e., whether its goodwill had been destroyed or not), went 
to the courts only to have its contention on the question of 
fact sustained but the allowance denied as a matter of law 
on the basis of a new meaning read into the statute in the 
light of the previous legislative history of the question. The 
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company, having suc­
ceeded in convincing one circuit court of appeals that the 
other circuit court had erred in its reading of legislative 
history and its legislative construction, was taken to the 
Supreme Court on this narrow question, only to have its case 
decided on a point which had never been urged or argued.

PART VI
THE INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTING ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECONOMY
THE INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTING ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECONOMY
The following three chapters constitute an expansion of a 
paper under the above title read before the annual meeting 
of the American Institute of Accountants in October, 1935. 
The first deals with the question of how accounting can 
influence the development of an economy, which involves 
some consideration of the nature and purposes of account­
ing. The second discusses accounting practice in the treat­
ment of gain or loss on the sale of capital assets, and some of 
the economic effects of such accounting and of the habit of 
thought which it reflects. The third is devoted to a his­
torical consideration of the accounting treatment of the ex­
haustion of property in the course of operation, in the case 
of railroads, and a discussion of the effect of the accounting 
theories adopted upon the growth of the capital equipment 
of the United States.
I
THE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING *
Growing recognition of the importance of accounting is 
bound to result in closer examination of the relation between 
accounting and economics, a subject that has not as yet re­
ceived very extended consideration. Professor John B. Can­
ning, in his The Economics of Accountancy,† suggests that 
the accountant’s approach to problems is similar to that of 
the economist, but there is little to suggest that the course of 
accounting has been consciously influenced to any consider­
able extent by economic thought. The fact is, rather, I 
think, that accounting is a tool of business, and that the 
development of accounting, like the development of business 
law, has been determined by the practices of business men.‡ 
Where accounting and economic thought are found to run 
along parallel lines, it is probable that both will be found to 
be running parallel to good business practice. Where ac­
counting treatment diverges from economic theory, a similar 
divergence is likely to be found between economic theory 
and business practice.
To many persons, even in the business and financial world, 
the first question which our title would suggest is: How can 
accounting have any effect upon the development of a na­
tional economy? “Is not accounting,” they would ask, “the 
application to particular facts of certain definite rules which 
can produce only one result?” Such a misconception of the 
nature of accounting is, I believe, less general today than 
it was a few years ago. During the last five years much has 
been done to secure recognition of the fact that accounting
• The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. LXI (January, 1936).
†Cf. below, pp. 371-73.
‡ This being so, the subject of this paper is, I recognize, merely one phase 
of the broader question of the effect of business practice on economic develop­
ment.
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is not exact and rigid but is based very largely on convention 
and judgment. To the necessary work of education on this 
point the New York Stock Exchange and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission have made important contributions.
The regulations of the Commission have followed the 
policy adopted by the Exchange in allowing registrants to 
follow their own methods of accounting, provided that those 
methods were not obviously unacceptable and were clearly 
disclosed. I have understood that objection was offered to 
this proposal on the ground of its novelty, and it was, there­
fore, with particular interest that I read an editorial brought 
to my notice, in which this principle was referred to many 
years ago almost as a truism. The editorial appeared in the 
Morning Chronicle of London in 1849, when the question of 
railway accounts was being widely agitated and was under 
consideration by a select committee of the House of Lords:
What are the precise criteria which distinguish revenue 
from construction charges it is no easy matter to determine. 
... At present there is great room for controversy, but this, 
at least, will be generally agreed to, that the principle adopted 
by any company in the distribution of its expenditure be­
tween the two accounts is of comparatively minor impor­
tance, provided that the system pursued be distinctly avowed 
and understood by the shareholders.
The English courts, in decisions under the income-tax law, 
have repeatedly taken the view that what is profit is to be 
determined by the practices of business men. Moreover, as 
I have pointed out on other occasions, our own tax law has 
since 1918 laid down the rule that taxable income is normally 
to be determined “in accordance with the method of ac­
counting regularly employed by the taxpayer in keeping 
his accounts,” and this language remains on the statute book, 
although it must be admitted that the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue has done its best to make it nugatory.
So today it is, I think, clear that upon both principle and 
authority, accounting must be regarded as a process involv­
ing the recognition of custom and convention and the use 
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of judgment, rather than as the application of rigid and un­
varying rules. It follows that rules may, and sometimes must 
be, changed as conditions change. This is of course true of 
law; and it may serve to emphasize the point in relation to 
accounting if I refer here to certain legal decisions on an 
accounting question with which I expect to deal in a later 
article.
In 1876 the Supreme Court said that the public “rarely 
ever took into account the depreciation of the buildings in 
which the business is carried on,” and in 1878 it supported 
the government in its claim that a railroad company should 
not be allowed to include a depreciation charge in operating 
expenses, holding that “only such expenditures as are actually 
made can with any propriety be claimed as a deduction from 
earnings.” In 1909, however, we find the Court saying: “Be­
fore coming to the question of profit at all, the company is 
entitled to earn a sufficient sum annually to provide not only 
for current repairs but for making good the depreciation and 
replacing the parts of the property when they come to the 
end of their life.” *
Now, once it is recognized that accounting is largely a 
matter of convention, it is easy to perceive that the nature 
of the conventions adopted may greatly influence the de­
velopment of an economy. This is particularly apparent 
under a system of free enterprise, under which the hope of 
profit is the main reliance for the upbuilding of the industry 
of the community; for what is profit in the commercial sense 
here involved is not only an accounting question but is, 
indeed, the central question of modern accounting.
In the simplest forms of organized life, accounting prob­
lems arise, and the way in which they are decided influences 
action. The administrators of even a non-profit institution 
—a club, for instance—are called upon to account to its mem­
bers. Shall they limit the accounts to actual receipts and 
disbursements? Must they not at least exclude or deal sepa-
* Eyster v. Centennial Board of Finance, -94 U. S. (1876); U. S. v. Kansas 
Pacific Ry. Co., 99 U. S., 459 (1878); City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water 
Company, 212 U. S., 13 (1909). 
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rately with borrowings and repayments; and if they ignore 
unpaid bills, may there not be a temptation to delay pay­
ments that ought to be made in order to present a more 
favorable showing? If bills owing by the club but unpaid 
are to be brought into account, should amounts owing to the 
club also be taken into consideration? In technical language, 
should not the account be one of income and expenditure 
rather than one of receipts and disbursements? Taking a 
further step-in order to reduce the cost thereof, insurance 
has been written for three years; should the whole cost be 
charged against the one year and the next two years be re­
lieved of any corresponding charge? Or, an automobile has 
been bought—should the cost be charged against the year 
or distributed over the probable useful life of the car? 
Speaking technically again, should not some accrual basis 
of accounting be employed?
From this example, it is easy to see how considerations of 
policy may influence accounting, or how the form of account­
ing may influence the course of events. One form of ac­
counting may show a balance for the year in favor of the 
club, with the result that the dues may be left unchanged 
or even reduced; another might show a balance against the 
club and lead to an increase of dues. Reluctance to put an 
increase in force may lead the administrators to choose the 
method which gives the seemingly more favorable result. 
Indeed, to leave bills unpaid at the end of an administration, 
thus unfairly relieving the accounts of the outgoing and 
unfairly burdening those of the incoming administration, is 
a well-known device of dishonest politicians.
Apart from such crude devices as this, what would have 
been the effects if our municipalities had adopted the ac­
counting practice of providing for future pensions in the 
years in which the service which gave rise to the right thereto 
was rendered? It is by no means abnormal that the actuarial 
value pf the pension benefits attaching to municipal employ­
ment should be equal to twenty per cent of the nominal 
compensation of the employee. If, therefore, municipal 
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budgets provided currently for the deferred compensation 
as well as for that immediately paid, and if the present value 
of the future liability were treated as a part of the indebted­
ness of the municipality, both the budgets and the borrowing 
capacity of the municipality might be very largely affected. 
In the City of New York, some of the funds are maintained 
on at least a quasi-actuarial basis, while in other cases no 
provision is made for future liabilities, the present value of 
which today runs into several hundred millions of dollars. 
As against the advantages of a more accurate disclosure of 
the costs of government and of the financial position of a 
municipality which would be derived from the inclusion of 
the provision for deferred pensions liabilities, there would 
no doubt have to be considered the possibilities of abuse that 
would be created if funds to meet such liabilities were cur­
rently set aside and entrusted to city officials for investment 
in order to provide for the obligations as they become due.
The most important group of problems which the account­
ant has to consider relates to the distinction between capital 
and income. In some cases, the question is whether amounts 
receivable or payable shall be carried once and for all to the 
income account or to the capital account. In other cases, 
the issue is how and when amounts which have been carried 
in the first instance to the capital account shall be transferred 
to the income account.
At this point it seems desirable to emphasize the fact that 
accounting is not essentially a process of valuation, as some 
writers on accounting and some economists conceive it to be. 
Professor C. R. Rorem’s Accounting Method * seems to me 
to suffer from this misconception, and it is hardly too much 
,to say that Professor Canning’s book (to which I have already 
referred) is built up on it. Primarily, accounting is historical 
in its approach, with valuation entering into it at times as a 
safeguard. The emphasis is on cost, though where an asset is 
intended for sale and its selling value is known to be less 
than cost, the lower figure may be substituted for cost. The
* Cf. below, pp. 365-70.
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outstanding illustration of this practice is the almost uni­
versal custom of valuing goods on hand at cost or market, 
whichever is lower.*
Capital assets, in particular, have traditionally been re­
corded by the accountant at cost or at cost less deduction for 
depreciation. To the accountant it has seemed to be neither 
a practicable nor a useful undertaking to attempt to deter­
mine the value of assets not intended to be sold and for 
which there is no ready market, especially as the concepts of 
value differ (and it has been said that in one English act 
the word “value” is used in twenty-seven different senses †). 
If the accountant accepts the economic measure of value as 
being the discounted value of a prospective income stream, 
it seems to him futile to attempt to reflect fluctuations of the 
income prospects and the discount rate on the books of a 
corporation which has no thought of attempting to realize 
its capital or of doing anything except receive and deal with 
the income stream as it comes in. He would rather concen­
trate on the more useful task of measuring—with what ac­
curacy is attainable—the income stream as it flows.
True, during the 1920’s, accountants fell from grace and 
took to readjusting capital values on the books of companies 
to an extent never before attempted. In extenuation, they 
might plead that unsound laws, unpractical economics, and 
a widespread, if unfounded, belief in a new order of things 
combined to recommend such a course, but the wiser policy 
is to admit the error and to determine not to be misled into 
committing it again.
The accounting function in relation to capital assets is to 
measure and record not the fluctuations in their value but 
the extent to which their usefulness is being exhausted 
through age or use, and to make proper charges against in­
come in respect of such exhaustion, based on the cost of the
* Incidentally, the growing emphasis on the income account as an index of 
earning capacity, and hence of capital value, may make desirable some modi­
fication of the treatment commonly adopted in this matter.
† See Proceedings of the International Congress on Accounting, London 
(1933), p. 135.  . . 
NATURE OF ACCOUNTING 311
property exhausted, with the intent that the property shall 
stand on the books at its salvage value when the term of its 
usefulness is ended. Conversely, when money is borrowed 
to be repaid at a premium (as, for instance, when a bond is 
sold at a discount), the amount borrowed forms the basis of 
the accounting, with sums added thereto and charged to in­
come periodically as the obligation is maturing, so that at 
maturity the full amount repayable will stand on the books 
as a liability.
In practice, two accounts are frequently used in dealing 
with either capital assets or capital liabilities. In the case, 
of an asset, one will record the original cost and the other 
the accumulated provision for exhaustion. In the case of a 
liability, one will record the ultimate amount repayable and 
the other the proportion of the discount which is carried for­
ward to be charged against the unexpired period of the loan; 
but this subdivision of the account into two parts is merely 
a technique employed for the sake of convenience.
The fact that cost rather than present value is thus com­
monly used in the accounting upon which published balance 
sheets are based is by no means universally recognized; and, 
when recognized, it is sometimes criticized on the ground 
that the main purpose of a balance sheet is to enlighten the 
investor, and that what the investor is interested in is the 
value of property, not its cost. The misunderstanding and 
the criticism are so common, and reflect so many disputable 
assumptions, that it seems desirable to discuss them briefly.
The misunderstanding appears to arise mainly from the 
looseness in the use of language which is responsible for so 
much of the existing confusion of thought in relation to ac­
counts. I have already mentioned the fact that in a single 
act of the English parliament the word “value” is alleged to 
have been used in at least twenty-seven senses, and it would 
certainly not be difficult to match this record in our own 
experience.
Any thoughtful student of finance must have been struck 
by the fact that one constantly encounters the word “value” 
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with a qualifying adjective attached to it which in every case 
limits and in some cases negatives the meaning of the noun. 
Thus we have the phrases—“book value,” “cost value,” “re­
placement value,” “assessed value,” “going concern value,” 
“liquidation value,” “market value,” “intrinsic value,” “fair 
value,” “sound value,” “discovery value” (perhaps the most 
fantastic of all), etc., etc. Almost any asset will be found 
to be stated in the balance sheet at one or other of these 
so-called values.
These expressions, no doubt, have a certain usefulness, 
though in some instances the concept they are used to de­
scribe is remote from the concept of value. The real trouble 
is, that since the word “value” forms a part of each phrase, 
and since all of them represent things that are expressed in 
money, essential dissimilarities in their significance are apt 
to be overlooked. Hence people who would not dream of 
adding together a cart-horse and a saw-horse and speaking 
of the result as two horses, have no compunction at all about 
adding together a book figure (or, as they call it, a book 
“value”) and a market value, and speaking of the result as 
a “value,” even in the case of a stock the selling price of 
which is a mere fraction of that “value.” Oscar Wilde de­
fined a cynic as a man who knew the price of everything and 
the value of nothing.* It would be well if some of those 
who talk glibly of value would develop enough cynicism 
to keep the test of salability (and earning capacity) more 
constantly in mind.
The fact is that the word “value” has come to be used to 
describe what is often really a mere figure—“book figure” 
would be more accurate than “book value,” and the “figure” 
at which an asset is carried more accurate than the “value” 
at which an asset is carried. It must be admitted that ac-
* Cecil Graham: What is a cynic?
Lord Darlington: A man who knows the price of everything and the value 
of nothing.
Cecil Graham: And a sentimentalist, my dear Darlington, is a man who 
sees an absurd value in everything and doesn’t know the market price of any 
single thing. 
Lady Windermere’s Fan, Act III.
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countants have themselves some responsibility for the mis­
understanding that exists, and academic writers, regulatory 
bodies and appraisers have also largely contributed to it. 
However, what has come to be called “wishful thinking” is 
probably mainly responsible for it. The transition from the 
thought that it would be convenient and helpful if balance 
sheets did represent realizable values to the thought that 
they do has been all too easy.
A similar misunderstanding is not altogether uncommon 
in England, though there is little or no real justification for 
it there. In the case of railroads and public utilities, to 
which what is known as the “double account” system has ap­
plied (as prescribed, for instance, in the Regulation of Rail­
ways Act of 1868), capital assets have not appeared as such 
in any balance sheet—instead, the expenditures thereon have 
been recorded in a statement of receipts and expenditures on 
account of capital, only the balance of which has entered 
into the general balance sheet of the company. In the case 
of companies incorporated under the general incorporation 
law, the model balance sheet embodied in Table A of the Act 
of 1862 contained an instruction in respect of not only capi­
tal assets but also stock in trade, reading as follows: “The 
cost to be stated with deductions for deterioration in value 
as charged to the reserve fund or profit-and-loss account.” I 
have even seen an opinion by eminent counsel, now on the 
English bench, to the effect that it was no part of the purpose 
of a balance sheet to reflect the values of assets, though di­
rectors might, in their discretion, see fit to embody in it in­
formation which would throw light on those values.
Turning now to the objection that if balance sheets do not 
reflect values they ought to do so, because that is what the 
investor is interested in—a number of minor exceptions to 
the position thus asserted might be taken, but the answer to 
the objection is that it is utterly impracticable to ascertain 
the values of capital assets in the case of businesses of any 
magnitude, and that the figures would be of no real interest 
to the investor if they could be ascertained. What the. in-
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vestor is actually interested in is, obviously, the value of his 
investment; and the objection therefore presupposes that 
the value of an investment may be computed by adding up 
the values of the assets which represent that investment and 
deducting from the total any liabilities to which they are 
subject.
Now, only brief consideration is necessary to show that this 
assumption is valid in the case of a profitable business only 
upon the further assumption that the value of the assets essen­
tial to the business and not intended for sale is simply the 
difference between the value of the business as a whole and 
the realizable value of the assets which can be separately sold 
without sacrifice. By the hypothesis and in fact, what the 
investor or speculator is interested in is the value of the 
business as a whole, and that is dependent mainly on what 
it will produce in the future and is not determinable by any 
purely accounting process. Not only so, but if the account­
ant were to assume the task of valuing the business as a 
whole, he would have met the assumed need, and it would 
be entirely supererogatory for him to attempt to allocate 
that value as between the different assets of the business.
How great the difficulties presented by such an allocation 
would be may be indicated by stating generally the character 
of the problem presented, as follows: How shall we compute 
the value of a producing unit which has been in use for a 
term of years, assuming that another type of unit could be 
bought new today for substantially less than the cost of re­
producing the existing unit and would effect an economy 
in operation; assuming, further, that there is a strong prob­
ability that still another type will be developed within a few 
years which will cost less and be more efficient than any now 
available, and making due allowance for the fact that the 
existing unit is in actual operation and that a period of time 
more or less considerable would be needed for the installa­
tion of a new unit?
There may be other elements in the problem to be con­
sidered, but certainly any so-called valuation which ignores 
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those I have suggested cannot be claimed to represent the 
value of the asset. The easy solutions, termed “replacement 
values” or “sound values,” beg the question. While it is im­
possible to say what percentage of the capital equipment of 
the country would be replaced even substantially where 
and as it is, it is quite certain that the percentage is small. 
It is well known, also, that correct timing of major replace­
ments is one of the most important factors in determining 
whether a given industrial enterprise shall succeed or fail.
To carry consideration of the question one step further— 
inasmuch as the value of a successful business is dependent 
mainly on its earning capacity, it follows that to anyone in­
terested in determining that value the greatest service which 
accounts can render is to throw light on earning capacity— 
not on the so-called values of assets which are not intended 
to be sold. And, so far as the records of the past can be an 
aid to the estimation of future earning capacity, an account 
which ignores fluctuations in the value of capital assets is 
likely to be far more useful than one that attempts to reflect 
them.
Accounts have other important uses, possibly not less im­
portant than that of throwing light on the value of the evi­
dences of ownership in a business. The determination of 
realized profits, and of the income subject to taxation, and 
the presentation of fairly comparable statements of operating 
results for successive periods, would all be made more diffi­
cult and more complex if at the same time the accounts were 
being adjusted periodically so as to reflect the fluctuations in 
the value of the assets held for use and not for sale. 
The canon of sound accounting, that fluctuations in the 
value of capital assets not only may but should be ignored, 
rests on surer ground and is more realistic than the conten­
tion that balance sheets should aim to reflect values. In this, 
as in so many other fields, error has resulted from attempts at 
oversimplification. What the equation: “Assets minus lia­
bilities equals proprietorship” and the phrase “net worth” 
gain in simplicity, they sacrifice in significance. A balance 
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sheet, in which one asset is stated at book value, another at 
replacement value, a third at liquidation value and a fourth 
at going-concern value, and the liabilities at their face value, 
does not yield a figure that can be described as net worth 
expressed in a single measure of value any more than a figure 
in which were mingled American and Chinese dollars and 
Mexican and Chilean pesos, all preceded by the same famil­
iar dollar sign, could produce a net worth expressed in any 
one of those currencies.
Of those who decline to recognize the impossibility of de­
termining capital value by the methods commonly proposed, 
few have suggested annual or anything more than periodical 
adjustment of the balances on property accounts to conform 
with so-called valuations. The Interstate Commerce Com­
mission, while insisting on the need for valuation as a basis 
for a revision of the property accounts of the carriers, has in­
dicated quite clearly that, once the revision had been ef­
fected, it contemplated cost as the basis for all subsequent 
accounting; and it has treated as axiomatic the proposition 
that charges against income for property exhaustion should 
be based on cost.
The question may no doubt fairly be raised whether, even 
if value is eliminated as a possible basis for arriving at the 
figures at which capital assets shall be carried (due allowance 
being made for exhaustion of useful life), there is any other 
basis which is preferable to cost. The alternative most fa­
vored is estimated cost of replacement; but while the useful­
ness of computations of cost of replacement for a wide variety 
of administrative purposes may be admitted, the regular 
use thereof as the basis for the restatement of the book figures 
is not, I think, one of them.
Any adequate discussion of this question would involve 
consideration of all the manifold purposes for which ac­
counts are used and go far beyond the scope of such an 
article as this. In my judgment, however, it will as a rule be 
wiser to retain the virtues of continuity and reality in the 
book records which the cost basis affords and, in appropriate 
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cases, to furnish to stockholders a supplementary statement 
based on replacement cost (which must in any event be hy­
pothetical and ephemeral). Whatever course is followed, it 
is necessary to relinquish the hope that balance sheets can be 
made to reflect the value of capital assets, if that word is to 
be used without any qualifying phrase that destroys the sub­
stance and leaves only the shadow of its meaning.
Cases will arise—as, for instance, that presented by a de­
valuation such as occurred in Germany—in which cost figures 
lose their significance to such an extent as to make some 
different treatment necessary, but such cases are exceptional 
and their existence merely emphasizes the fundamental im­
portance of honest and competent judgment in accounting.
This does not mean that the balance sheet is valueless, but 
only that it is a highly technical production the significance 
of which is severely limited and has in the past often been 
greatly over-rated. In origin the balance sheet is an ac­
count; in England it still commonly bears the headings 
“Dr” and “Cr” instead of the “assets” and “liabilities” to 
which we have become accustomed. These facts were 
recognized by the Committee on Cooperation with Stock 
Exchanges of the American Institute of Accountants in its 
report to the New York Exchange of September 28, 1932, 
in which it included as among the objects which the Ex­
change ought to pursue:
1. To bring about a better recognition by the investing 
public of the fact that the balance sheet of a large modern 
corporation does not and should not be expected to represent 
an attempt to show present values of the assets and liabilities 
of the corporation.
2. To emphasize the fact that balance sheets are necessarily 
to a large extent historical and conventional in character, 
and to encourage the adoption of revised forms of balance 
sheets which will disclose more clearly than at present on 
what basis assets of various kinds are stated.
3. To emphasize the cardinal importance of the income 
account, such importance being explained by the fact that 
the value of a business is dependent mainly on its earning 
capacity.
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In recent years it has become increasingly apparent that 
for the large modern corporation, at least, the balance sheet 
is not in itself an adequate supplement to the income and 
surplus accounts, and it is not surprising that the regulations 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission have called for 
additional statements. The schedules filed under those reg­
ulations, and the explanations, often voluminous, which 
commonly accompany them, should do much to create a 
juster appreciation of both the significance and the limita­
tions of a balance sheet. There will still be those who will 
clamor for an unattainable combination of completeness, pre­
cision and simplicity and for a uniformity which would be 
superficial and illusory. The demand for predigested prepa­
rations which will meet all needs, without any exercise of 
selective judgment or intelligence, is encountered in the 
fields of accounting and finance as elsewhere.
II
CAPITAL VALUE AND ANNUAL INCOME *
One of the most striking contrasts between American and 
English financial and accounting practice is to be found in 
the fact that here we regard gains or losses on the sale of 
capital assets as finding a place in the income account, while 
in England they are regarded as increasing or decreasing 
capital. In this article I propose to consider some of the 
economic policies which may be in part, at least, attributable 
to the habit of mind which our practice reflects.
Unquestionably, the difference in practice does reflect a 
difference in habit of mind. Anyone who has lived both 
here and in England will recognize the truth of the state­
ment that here we think in terms of capital value and there 
they think in terms of annual income. Inquire whether a 
man is well-to-do here and you will be told he is probably 
worth so many dollars; ask a similar question in England and 
the answer (if you get one at all) will certainly be that he is 
probably worth so much a year. It is not difficult to under­
stand why this should be so. In England, modern business 
developed in a community in which previously the predomi­
nant interest had been in land and which already thought 
in terms of annual produce. The opening sentence of Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) reads:
The annual labor of every nation is the fund which origi­
nally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniencies 
of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always 
either in the immediate produce of that labor, or in what is 
purchased with that produce from other nations.
Cannan, in his edition of the work, comments on this 
passage as follows:
* The Journal of Accountancy (February, 1936).
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This word [i.e., “annual”], with ‘annually’ just below, at 
once marks the transition from the old British economists’ 
ordinary practice of regarding the wealth of a nation as an 
accumulated fund (Note 1, p. 1).
He says, further, that:
The conception of the wealth of nations as an annual 
produce, annually distributed, . . . has been of immense 
value (Introduction, p. xxxiii).
With us, business developed in a new country: the great op­
portunities for gain lay in sharing in the growth of the 
country rather than in securing a part of its current annual 
yield.
Three fields in which the effects of the difference in the 
point of view may be discovered at once suggest themselves 
—those of local taxation, rate regulation, and income taxa­
tion.
In colonial days, according to Seligman, there were many 
cases in which, while the tax was imposed on property, the 
assessment was made on the basis of annual value. This was 
true of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, New 
York, Delaware and Virginia.* Bullock, in discussing the 
local general property tax, also mentions that Massachusetts 
as a province levied taxes on the basis of the annual value of 
property, but that the second tax law passed after the adop­
tion of the Constitution of 1780 changed to the basis of capi­
tal value, which is today, in general, the basis of local taxation 
throughout the United States.† Whether the causes of the 
change were in any way related to those which produced the 
more momentous political developments of that time, I am 
not sufficiently versed in history to say.
When we turn to rate regulation, it is apparent that the 
principles we have adopted were based upon the Federal 
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in a series 
of cases of which the most important was perhaps Smyth v.
* The Income Tax, 2nd ed., p. 380.
† c. J. Bullock, Selected Readings in Public Finance, 3rd ed., p. 311,
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Ames (1898). So, too, the enactment of what was really an 
income tax law in 1909, and of an avowed income tax law in 
1913, brought definitions of income in conformity with the 
same habit of mind in the cases of Stratton’s Independence v. 
Howbert, Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., and Eisner v. Ma­
comb er.
In Smyth v. Ames the Supreme Court decided for the first 
time that the basis for all calculations as to the reasonable­
ness of rates must be the “fair value” of the property being 
used for the convenience of the public. Giving only the 
most general indication of how this value was to be deter­
mined by reciting some of the factors that must be con­
sidered, without any expression of opinion as to the weight 
to be assigned to each, and making the clear reservation that 
there might be still other factors to be considered, the Court 
started that pursuit of the will-o’-the-wisp of fair value which 
is still being carried on with no greater success than was to 
be anticipated. The charge made by Jevons against Ricardo, 
that he “shunted the car of economic science on to a wrong 
line,” might perhaps with more justice be made against 
those who were responsible for bringing about the decision 
in Smyth v. Ames.
In Doyle v. Mitchell the Court held, first, that the value, at 
the date of the passage of the taxing act, of capital assets con­
verted into manufactured articles and sold, must be deducted 
from the proceeds of sale before anything to be taxed as in­
come could be arrived at; and, secondly, that the proceeds of 
sale or conversion in excess of that basic value were income.
On the first point, there is at least some appearance of in­
consistency between this decision and that in Stratton’s In­
dependence, in which the Court held that the proceeds of 
mining could be taxed as income without any allowance for 
the exhaustion of the mine which was a necessary incident of 
the operation. However, no distinction between the two 
cases was made in the decision in Eisner v. Macomber which 
provided what has become the accepted legal definition of 
income in our Courts:
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After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouvier’s 
Law; Standard; Webster’s International and the Century), 
we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in 
two cases arising under the corporation tax act of 1909 
(Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S., 399, 415; 
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S., 179, 185): ‘Income 
may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, 
or from both combined,’ provided it be understood to in­
clude profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital 
assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle case. (252 U. S., 
207.)
It may be noted that in presenting the Income Tax Bill of 
1913 Congressman (now Secretary) Hull expressed the view 
that an occasional purchase not for immediate resale, fol­
lowed after a substantial interval by sale at a higher price, 
would not produce taxable income thereunder. It would 
have been well, perhaps, if his view had prevailed.
The decision in Smyth v. Ames forced the question of 
present value of capital assets upon the attention of all public 
utility companies. The income tax decisions made the value 
of capital assets at March 1, 1913, a question of cardinal im­
portance for all corporations owning capital assets at that 
date. The attention thus focused on the subject of present 
fair value, and the marked change in price levels which took 
place during the war period, together constitute an adequate 
explanation of the extent to which the practice of readjusting 
book values of capital assets to so-called present values was 
carried in the 1920’s, which was criticized in the previous 
article of this series.
That the principles and practices, established as I have out­
lined, have met with scant approval in economic circles is 
indicated by examination of the works of economists of high 
standing. Upon the question of local taxation, Bullock says:
After forty years’ discussion, the United States has the 
most crude, inequitable, and unsatisfactory system of local 
taxation—if, indeed, we can call ‘system’ that which more re­
sembles chaos—that can be found in any important country 
in the civilized world.*
* Bullock, op. cit., p. 289.
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And T. S. Adams speaks of the system as “a hypocritical pre­
tense, a source of wholesale lawbreaking and chronic in­
equality, a by-word for inefficiency and injustice.” *
Undeterred by this experience, we enacted Federal capital 
stock tax laws which required taxpayers to report annually 
under oath the “fair value” of property for which no market 
existed or was desired, and any real valuation of which would 
have involved the difficulties and complexities mentioned in 
my previous article and would have been useless for any 
other purpose than compliance with the law. Needless to 
say, in practice no real attempt to fix fair value was made— 
instead, the tax being relatively small, the taxing authority 
was usually able to collect substantially more than was justly 
due because the additional tax was less than would have been 
the cost of demonstrating its injustice.
This tax was abolished in 1926, but in 1933 it was revived 
in the particularly obnoxious form of the linked capital tax 
and excess-profits tax—the corporate taxpayer was first per­
mitted (and required) to fix the taxable fair value itself, with 
the knowledge that placing the taxable value low would in­
crease its liability to excess-profits tax on its income. The 
two taxes were imposed at the bottom of a depression, when 
the market value of capital invested in industry was gener­
ally far below the amount actually invested—thus the tax­
payer was faced with the choice of paying a capital stock tax 
on a value that did not exist, or an excess-profits tax on 
profits which were not excessive upon the test set forth in 
the law of what constituted an excess. It is hard to conceive 
of a tax device better calculated to bring the taxing system 
into disrepute.
In England, local taxation has for centuries been based on 
the annual value of property.^ In national taxation the in­
fluence of the landowning classes was for a long time domi­
nant, and prior to 1894 even death duties on land were levied 
only on the capitalized value of an annuity equal to the net
* Bullock, op. cit., p. 982.
f Cf. Carman, History of Local Rates in England, passim.
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rental value of the land for the life of the heir. In that year, 
however, land was subjected to death duties (estate duty) on 
the basis of its full capital value, at progressive rates which 
have since been greatly increased.* In 1909, a further step 
was taken. A system of taxation on the increment in land 
value was initiated, but the administrative difficulties proved 
so great that this experiment was abandoned. Thus, apart 
from transaction taxes, such as stamp duties on the transfer 
of property, death duties remain as the one case (of course, 
an important case) in which English taxes are levied on the 
basis of capital values.
The estimation of the capital value of land from the an­
nual value, which is fostered by the English practice, serves 
a useful purpose in checking too optimistic valuation. Had 
this method of approach been general here, the disastrous 
Florida land boom could hardly have occurred, and fewer 
of our farmers would have found themselves ruined through 
acquiring by the use of borrowed money additional lands 
at prices out of proportion to the annual yield obtainable 
therefrom. A writer in the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review for December, 1935, has suggested that there is a 
tendency today to give more weight to current annual value 
in establishing valuations of real property for purposes of 
local taxation.†
Economic opinion on the theory of value in relation to 
rate regulation scarcely calls for comment, if that opinion is, 
as I believe it to be, accurately summed up in the following 
quotation from J. C. Bonbright:
* These provisions were the subject of a sharp difference of opinion be­
tween the Prime Minister (Lord Rosebery) and the Chancellor of the Ex­
chequer (Sir William Harcourt) who had been the rival candidates for the 
succession to Mr. Gladstone. It is interesting to find in the Chancellor’s reply 
to the Prime Minister’s criticism this comment:
“Your observations upon the American attempt at a property tax are well 
founded, but everybody admits the objections to a property tax, which is 
levied annually on the possessors do not apply to a death duty which occurs 
only once in a generation on the transmission of estates into other hands.’’ 
Cf. A. G. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, Vol. II, p. 285.
† A bill to amend the tax law, in relation to the assessment of real property, 
has recently been introduced in the New York State Senate. It would re­
quire that all real property: "Shall be assessed at the full annual income 
value thereof.”
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I think I am speaking the truth when I say that every 
economist without a single exception agrees that whatever 
is the proper basis of rate control . . . that basis cannot 
logically be the value of the property . . . this country alone 
of all the countries in the world attempts to use valuation 
as a basis of rate control.*
I shall, however, discuss some special phases of the problem 
of regulation in my final article,
In the third field already mentioned, that of income taxa­
tion, economic opinion has not, I think, generally approved 
the taxation of capital gains as income, even though the prac­
tice has escaped the wholesale condemnation which has been 
visited on our systems of local taxation and rate regulation. 
For myself, I have long felt that though it may seem unfair 
that unearned increment should escape taxation while earned 
income is heavily taxed, the weight of the argument is against 
the taxation of capital gains. And I am still more opposed 
to the treatment of capital gains as income for purposes other 
than those of taxation—indeed, one of the minor objections 
to the taxation of such gains as income is that it encourages 
the taxpayer to treat them as income in ordering his own af­
fairs, instead of adding them to his capital or holding them 
in reserve against the all too probable future capital loss.
In an article written in 1922,† I recited some of the reasons 
that led me to the conclusions which I still hold, and I shall 
now do no more than consider what further light on the ques­
tion the events of the intervening years have afforded. They 
have shown that the tax operates to produce artificial markets 
for securities, by preventing sales which, but for the tax, 
would be made, and thus has tended to make the fall more 
violent when it comes. They have also demonstrated with 
disconcerting completeness the validity of the argument that 
an equitable tax, designed to give relief in respect of losses 
commensurate with the tax on gains will, on balance, ad­
versely affect the revenue, and that the adverse effect will be
* J. C. Bonbright, Accounting Review, Vol. V (1930), pp. 111, 122. 
† See above, Part V, Chap. II. 
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felt when the revenue is least able to bear it. As a result, 
changes have been made in the law which implicitly admit 
that capital gains are not income but leave them subject to 
tax as if they were, changes which sacrifice justice to im­
mediate revenue, through the continuation of the tax on net 
gains and the practical denial of relief in respect of net 
losses.
The new provisions, by which a portion of the gain on 
sale of assets held for a period of years is taxed as income 
at rates which are reached by adding that portion of the 
gain to what happens to be the income of the year in which 
the gain is realized, are difficult to justify upon any theory 
of ability to pay or equality of sacrifice, or upon any of the 
canons of sound taxation. The denial of allowances for 
losses on property sold is manifestly unjust and results in 
such absurdities as taxpayers being led to sacrifice substantial 
salvage values in order to preserve the right to take deduc­
tions for losses which are allowable if property is abandoned 
but not if it is sold. There is, moreover, something repug­
nant to one’s sense of justice in the sight of a Government 
deliberately devaluing the currency and taxing as a gain the 
difference between the price received in depreciated cur­
rency and the price paid prior to devaluation in the unde­
preciated currency, and at the same time denying to tax­
payers relief in respect of losses occasioned by the fall in 
prices which is pleaded in justification of the devaluation.
The provisions of the law relating to non-taxable reorgani­
zations and exchanges, and other provisions necessitated by 
the taxation of capital gains, are constantly adding to the 
complexities and uncertainties of taxation. Meanwhile, the 
great argument for the taxation of capital gains—that without 
it unearned increment would go untaxed—has been greatly 
weakened by the enactment of high gift and estate taxes.
The amount of capital gains spent as income, though large 
in itself, is small in comparison with the aggregate of such 
gains. If gains are offset by later losses, it is grossly unjust 
that heavy taxes should be levied on the gains with no com-
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pensating relief in respect of the losses; if they are added to 
capital, that capital is heavily taxed whenever it is transferred 
by gift or bequest.
Students of taxation have agreed that an income tax at 
high rates cannot long continue to be successfully levied un­
less the law is generally regarded as broadly just in its form 
and administration. It cannot, I think, be maintained that 
this is true of our existing income tax system, and those who 
deny its justice can point to the provisions respecting capi­
tal gains and losses as striking evidence in support of their 
position. It is inevitable that provisions which the taxpayer 
regards as deliberately unfair shall encourage deliberate eva­
sion; and, even if it is true that evasion existed prior to the 
enactment of these unjust provisions, this hardly seems suffi­
cient ground for a policy of deliberate injustice on the part 
of the Legislature. Congress would be well advised to aban­
don the policy of taxing capital gains—or, if that is deemed 
to be politically impossible, to tax them as something other 
than income at a flat rate not high enough to act as a deter­
rent to the taking of profits. This could be done without 
awaiting the general revision of our Federal tax system, 
which it so urgently needed.
Sooner or later, however, we must broaden the scheme of 
Federal taxation, and particularly the basis of the income tax. 
Not until this has been done can we hope to enjoy the rela­
tive stability of revenue which England has experienced in 
spite of the depression and of the magnitude of its tax 
burden.
Turning from the tax aspect of the question of capital 
gain, I would draw attention to a danger against which some 
safeguards are, I think, urgently required. This danger arises 
from the alarming habit which seems to be developing of 
regarding every' annual report as a new edition of a pros­
pectus. Even those who contend that realized capital gains 
are a form of income must concede that such gains and recur­
rent income have no common relationship to earning capac­
ity, except to the small extent that capital gains may represent
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recurring income that has not been distributed. Apart from 
this item, which for practical purposes may be disregarded, 
the gain normally represents either (a) the capitalized value 
of a change in capacity to earn recurring income (demon­
strated or assumed); or (b) a change in the rate of capitaliza­
tion applied to an unchanged earning capacity; or (c) a com­
bination of the two. This being so, such a capital gain can­
not properly be added to a recurring earning capacity (which 
has not already been capitalized) to form the basis from 
which, by multiplication, a capital value may be determined. 
To my mind, few points are of more importance in connec­
tion with the problem of presenting illuminating reports to 
investors than that of taking some steps which will tend to 
prevent investors from including capital gains with current 
income in one sum, from which they will compute capital 
value by a single multiplication.
The treatment of capital gains as income reached its most 
pernicious development during the boom period in the 
practice of regarding stock dividends as income in an amount 
equal to the market value of the stock, the evil being espe­
cially marked in the case of pyramided holding companies. 
To the extent that the amount included in income exceeded 
the amount of earnings which formed the basis of the distri­
bution by the company declaring the dividend, the credit to 
income by the receiving company represented nothing except 
an unrealized capital appreciation. Another unsound prac­
tice is that of requiring investments of insurance companies 
to be carried in their reports at “market value” even if above 
cost.* When market prices rise to dizzy heights, as in 1928- 
29, the assets of such companies as reported under the regula­
tions rise with them. When prices fall too precipitately, 
however, the evidence of the market is rejected and artificial 
market prices are constructed by the Commissioners. The 
result in practice is, therefore, that the portfolios of what 
should be our safest and soundest institutions are carried at 
quoted market prices if those are very high but above
* It should be noted, however, that in the case of bonds “amortized value’’ 
is permitted and freely used as an alternative,
CAPITAL VALUE AND ANNUAL INCOME 329 
market prices if those are very low. The fact that resort 
to artificial prices was deemed necessary three times within a 
quarter of a century suggests that the Commissioners should 
at least recognize the limited significance of market quota­
tions when they are high as well as when they are low.
From the point of view of the technical accountant, it is a 
curious contradiction that we, who have gone further than 
any other country in refining double-entry bookkeeping and 
distributing charges over successive periods by elaborate sys­
tems of accrual, should in our thinking have, in effect, ad­
hered to the old single-entry method of determining gain 
or income by deducting worth at the end of the period from 
worth at the beginning thereof.
Some of our economists and statisticians have even under­
taken to include fluctuations in the value of the “national” 
capital in computations of the “national” income. In doing 
so, they have exaggerated the growth of wealth in boom 
periods and its decline in periods of depression with, as I 
think, unfortunate results. In a recent article, Sir Josiah 
Stamp commented on this procedure as follows:
American writers have included the rise in the market 
value of capital assets under income (or the fall as a deduc­
tion), but the practice is not generally accepted in other 
countries.*
He went on to express the opinion that this was “all of a piece 
with the strange compound of capital charges and income in 
the American system of taxation.” In fairness to American 
economists, however, it may be questioned whether the 
views which he criticized are shared by more than a small 
minority of them. In publishing his paper, he printed the 
following interesting footnote:
On the day of reading, the latest official publication was 
received from Washington.† In this, the whole method has 
been abandoned: ‘the inclusion of gains and losses yielded
* "Methods Used in Different Countries for Estimating National Income,” 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (1934), pp. 449-50.
†National Income, 1929-1932, Department of Commerce in cooperation 
with the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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by such changes in asset values would be either a duplication, 
since it would amount to counting both a change in net in­
come, and the change in capitalization of that income, or a 
distortion of the national income estimate as a measure of 
the economic system’s end product.’ It seems clear that the 
publication to the nation of figures of national income al­
ready heavily diminished, but reduced to a minus quantity 
by the special deduction of the huge shrinkage in capital 
values for 1932-3, was too much for any realistic official 
statisticians to face.
The preoccupation with capital and capital gains is also 
to be found in the securities legislation passed under the 
present administration, which is obviously, if unconsciously, 
framed in the interest of the short-time speculator for the 
rise rather than of the long-time investor for the yield. Even 
the members of the Securities Commission seem to have 
developed doubts on the question whether the Acts were 
really necessary or will prove beneficial in relation to issues 
of securities by seasoned corporations. Further, some of the 
information which is required by the Commission in regis­
tration statements and annual reports would seem possibly 
to be helpful to speculators (though more clearly to competi­
tors), but more likely to injure than to benefit the long-time 
investors, whose interests surely deserve special considera­
tion.
It has seemed to me particularly unfortunate that at a time 
when devaluation, inflation, and apprehension of further ex­
perimentation with our fiscal system were impairing confi­
dence in what had been regarded as high-grade securities and 
tempting small savers to gamble in equities, the whole em­
phasis of the Administration and of Congress should be upon 
efforts to diminish slightly the hazards of stock gambling, 
and none upon the magnitude of the hazards that were bound 
to remain.
Granting the desirability of telling the public that great 
losses had been caused by the misdeeds of issuers and vendors 
of securities, it was at least equally desirable to tell the public 
that these losses were but a small fraction of those resulting
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from the financial, industrial and political hazards to which 
all business is subject, and that enormous losses on invest­
ment in enterprise and invention are a part of the price we 
must pay for progress.* The two Securities Acts are calcu­
lated to create expectations which they cannot satisfy; and 
although they may perhaps be made to serve a useful pur­
pose, the hope would be stronger if the Acts had been less 
theoretical and punitive in conception, and had had more 
regard to what is remedial and practical. It lies in continued 
wise administration and judicious amendment rather than 
in the Acts themselves. Indeed, one of the dangers of the 
admitted excellence of administration by the Securities Com­
mission up to the present time is that it may tend to blind us 
to the inherent defects of the law.
The same emphasis on capital value is, I think, also in 
large measure responsible for the laws passed in recent years 
making the propriety of dividends dependent on there being 
an excess of assets over liabilities and capital, thus displac­
ing the old rule under which the source of income to a stock­
holder was the earning of a profit by the corporation in 
which he held stock, and the declaration of a dividend merely 
fixed the time when it became income to him. This change, 
whether desirable or undesirable,' may obviously have very 
important economic consequences, particularly in conjunc­
tion with the no par value stock laws. If generally adopted, 
it would rob the word “dividend” of its old significance, since 
under it the payment of a dividend does not imply the previ­
ous earning of a profit and a dividend may be, in every real 
sense, a distribution of capital. Though perhaps the new 
law represents only an attempt to escape from the difficulties
* I expressed substantially these views when securities legislation was pend­
ing, both in 1933 and 1934. In my testimony before the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency in 1934, I said:
“My feeling on this subject, I think, must be very much that which the 
committee feels in regard to the larger subject. You want to do everything 
that you can to make buying and selling securities, particularly by the small 
man, safer and surrounded with more information. But you must realize 
that all you can do will not reduce the risks that he is bound to run very 
greatly, and there is always the danger that by legislating you create a feeling 
of confidence in the securities that are offered which legislation cannot pos­
sibly impart to them” (Hearings, p. 7176).
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with which we are familiar without adequate thought of the 
new difficulties which may be encountered, to me it seems to 
be fraught with great possibilities of evil.
There was doubtless a time when the assets test was re­
garded as protecting the interests of creditors and necessary 
for that purpose; but with the law and common practice 
permitting legal capital to be fixed at nominal figures, such 
a rule adds little or nothing to the common proviso that no 
dividends shall be paid when a corporation is insolvent or 
when payment of the dividend would make it so. It is 
noteworthy that even this last provision is deemed unneces­
sary in England; it was in the English law of 1855, but was 
eliminated in 1862. Since then, apart from the general 
Statute of Frauds, the sole reliance in England for protection 
against improper dividends (and also against the acquisition 
by a corporation of its own capital stock) has been the section 
which sets forth the way, and the only way, in which the 
share capital may be reduced. This protection seems to 
have been adequate; no doubt its effectiveness has been in­
creased by vigorous declarations such as that of Lord Camp­
bell in Burnes v. Pennell (1849): “Dividends are supposed 
to be paid out of profits only, and when directors order a 
dividend, to any given amount, without expressly saying so, 
they impliedly declare to the world that the company has 
made profits which justify such a dividend.” This dictum is 
commonly reflected in articles of association in the form of a 
terse declaration that: “No dividend shall be paid otherwise 
than out of profits.”
In its new form (e.g., in Delaware), the assets test is, of 
course, nothing more than a device to permit directors to 
declare dividends when there are no profits. The power con­
ferred by that law to make the legal capital of a corporation 
only a fraction of its economic capital makes such dividend 
declaration possible without insuring any substantial margin 
of protection to creditors.
An anomalous situation is presented by the New York 
law as at present construed by the courts of that state (the
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construction and the constitutionality of the provision, how­
ever, are at present involved in cases pending in the Court of 
Appeals of the State). It makes directors of a business cor­
poration liable if they declare a dividend unless, after the 
declaration of the dividend, the value of the remaining assets 
is at least equal to the liabilities and the legal capital of the 
corporation. The elusive term “value” is not further de­
fined, and as the law is at present construed, no defense of 
good faith or reasonable care will protect the director if it is 
subsequently found by a court of competent jurisdiction that 
upon some theory of value accepted by it the value of the 
assets fell short of the required standard.
Now, in any such legislation, the relationship between the 
theories governing the definition of capital and the restric­
tion of dividends is of the first importance. A rigid rule re­
garding dividends may be made tolerable by liberal rules de­
fining capital. If the law seeks to make legal capital and 
actual capital correspond closely, then a dividend rule like 
New York’s becomes unreasonably harsh.
It is obvious that in the case of a company whose legal- 
capital is approximately the same as its actual capital, such 
a law would subject directors to a hazard which they would 
not be warranted in assuming; a director could vote only at 
his peril for the distribution by way of dividends of unques­
tioned current earnings. New York, which took the leading 
part in adopting the questionable device of stocks without 
par value has, however, afforded domestic corporations an 
opportunity to make their legal capital a purely nominal fig­
ure which may be only a fraction of the true capital. This 
provision, while open to many objections, does afford a way 
in which the hazards of the dividend rule may be avoided.
However, the New York law goes further than to establish 
a rule applicable to domestic corporations—it imposes the 
same liability on directors of foreign corporations which 
transact business in New York. Now, outside the State of 
New York, and particularly outside the United States, there 
are many jurisdictions in which either the law or custom
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makes the legal capital substantially the true capital of the 
corporation and in which the law permits the distribution 
of current profits without regard to fluctuations in the value 
of capital assets not intended to be sold. Such an approach 
to the question is at least as reasonable as that of the State 
of New York, but it will be observed that the directors of a 
company formed in such a jurisdiction, but transacting busi­
ness in New York, are placed in a peculiarly unhappy posi­
tion. For the capital of the corporation will be determined 
by the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated, 
but the question whether a dividend paid was warranted 
will be determined by a New York court, under New York 
law, and upon New York theories of value. The law so con­
strued seems to constitute an obnoxious attempt to impose 
New York ideas of questionable soundness upon corporations 
formed in other jurisdictions but transacting business within 
the state. If the Court of Appeals sustains the current con­
struction, modification of the law would seem to be called 
for.
In each of the several fields which have been considered, 
the habit of thinking in terms of capital value seems to me 
to have encouraged economic tendencies which are harmful 
to the community. It is clear, also, that while it is seldom 
possible to determine annual income precisely, and some­
times difficult to arrive at even an approximation thereto, the 
problem of determining income is easier than that of estab­
lishing capital value. This for the simple reason that value, 
itself, must be dependent mainly on the income prospects; 
and in order to measure it, we must first estimate earnings. 
Then we still have to face the difficulty of determining what 
is the capital value of an earning capacity of the kind with 
which we are dealing.
Economists, teachers, legislators and accountants should 
all do what is in their power to bring home to our people the 
truth of Adam Smith’s doctrine that the annual produce 
constitutes the wealth of the country; and to encourage them 
to rely for economic security on the income derived from
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their work and their property, rather than upon the hope 
of enhancement of capital value, which may seem to offer 
the easy road to affluence but more often proves a lure to 
disaster. Then the Economist may no longer be able to say, 
as it did on October twelfth last, that:
Even today, in spite of depression and Securities Acts, the 
capital profit is still as completely monarch in Wall Street 
as the income yield is in Throgmorton Street.
III
RAILROAD RETIREMENTS AND DEPRECIATION *
In this article I propose to consider briefly some economic 
and historical aspects of the problem of accounting for the 
exhaustion of the useful life of fixed properties (not includ­
ing equipment) of railroads.
I have chosen this question for discussion for a number of 
reasons. Undoubtedly, the way in which it has been dealt 
with has had a marked effect on the economic development 
of our country; it lies in the field in which, as I pointed out 
in my first article, the most important problems arise which 
the accountant has to consider; it has a close relation to the 
question of regulation of rates on the basis of capital values 
on which I touched in my second article; and the Interstate 
Commerce Commission has, in recent years, decreed a revo­
lutionary change in the practice of carriers under its control. 
An examination of past practice and of suggested alterna­
tives raises sharply the question of the nature of accounting 
conventions and of the justification therefor.
Methods of providing for the expense represented by the 
exhaustion of property, though varying greatly in detail, fall 
into two broad classifications: those which aim to distribute 
the charge as uniformly as possible over the period of use­
fulness of the particular unit of property, and those accord­
ing to which the time for making the charge is fixed by the 
actual or impending retirement of a unit. The former are 
commonly referred to as depreciation methods and the latter 
as retirement methods, and these convenient designations 
will be employed in this article.
In order to keep the discussion within appropriate limits, 
it seems desirable to restrict it narrowly to the fixed proper­
ties of railroads and to refrain from dealing either with
* The Journal of Accountancy (March, 1936).
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equipment, which constitutes the other main division of the 
capital assets of railroads, or with the case of other public 
utilities. The cases of fixed property and equipment differ 
in the fundamental fact that so long as operations are con­
tinued, fixed property must either be reasonably maintained 
or replaced, while so long as an adequate supply of newer 
equipment is available to do the work of the road, obsolete 
equipment can be kept in nominal service and under a re­
tirement system of accounting carried at cost in the accounts, 
indefinitely. It was doubtless this consideration which led 
the Interstate Commerce Commission to require the railroads 
in 1907 to adopt a system of depreciation charges in respect 
of equipment, but not in respect of track and other fixed 
properties.
Up to the present, railroads both here and abroad have 
generally adopted retirement methods. The question 
whether railroads should adopt some depreciation method 
does not appear to have been extensively considered in our 
country at least until the railroad system was largely built up. 
The word “depreciation” does not appear in the Instructions 
in regard to the keeping of Railway Accounts, issued by the 
Railroad Commissioners of Massachusetts in 1876, or in the 
index of Hadley’s Railroad Transportation (1885), or in the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames (1898). Our 
practice, however, was undoubtedly greatly influenced by 
English practice, and in that country the issue was hotly dis­
cussed as early as the middle of the last century, following the 
collapse of the great railroad boom of the forties. A select 
committee of the House of Lords in 1849 took testimony on 
the subject (including, incidentally, that of an accountant 
who stated that he had been carrying on his profession in 
London for more than twenty years) and in its report favored 
the creation of depreciation reserves:
It must be obvious [it said] that for the maintenance of 
railways in a due state of efficiency, as relating to the way, the 
buildings, the rolling stock and other property, an adequate 
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provision ought to be made, as a matter of necessary precau­
tion and prudence. The creation of a Reserve or Deprecia­
tion Fund for such purposes, as contemplated by Parliament 
(Companies Clauses Act of 1845, 8 Vict. c. 16, s. 122),* seems 
now to be generally admitted as necessary, and in some in­
stances, the Committee rejoice to observe, it is practically 
adopted. Without such fund there is a constant temptation 
to misapply capital, where capital still exists; and where capi­
tal is exhausted, the progressive deterioration of the line can 
hardly be avoided, greatly to the risk of the public, and to 
the inevitable sacrifice of the ultimate interests of the com­
pany itself. It would be difficult to prescribe by law the ex­
act amount to be carried annually to this fund; but the 
fact of the creation or the non-existence of a Reserve or De­
preciation Fund, together with its amount, where it exists, 
should always appear upon the face of the accounts. The 
receipts and expenditure of such fund, where it has been 
established, should in all cases be kept and exhibited, sepa­
rate and distinct, should be examined and certified by the 
auditors, and should be annually submitted, as well as left 
open to the inspection of the shareholders.†
The controversy continued for many years until the pas­
sage of the Regulation of Railways Act of 1868. That act 
provided a special form of accounting for railways, which 
came to be known as the double account system. Under that 
system, all capital outlays were carried in an account entitled 
“Receipts and expenditures on account of capital”; only the 
balance of this account appeared in the general balance sheet 
of the company. Rejecting the pleas that depreciation re­
serves should be made mandatory, Parliament contented it­
self with requiring certificates that the properties had been 
adequately maintained and that the dividends proposed to be 
declared were, in the opinion of the auditors, properly pay-
*.The provision seems to have been permissive rather than mandatory. 
Section 122, the section cited, provides that:
"Before apportioning the profits to be divided among the shareholders the 
directors may, if they think best, set aside thereout such sum as they may 
think proper to meet contingencies, or for enlarging, repairing, or improving 
the works connected with the undertaking, or any part thereof, and may 
divide the balance only among the shareholders.”
† Third Report, Select Committee on Audit of Railway Accounts, X Parlia­
mentary Papers (1849), p. ix.
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able after making all charges against revenue which in their 
opinion ought to be made thereagainst.
Thus, while directors were free to make provisions for 
depreciation if they saw fit to do so, the question whether 
such provisions had to be made turned ultimately on whether 
the auditors regarded such depreciation as one of the ex­
penses which ought to be provided out of revenue; and lead­
ing accountants both here and in England took the view that 
this was not a necessary expense.*
I turn now to consider what the effect on the develop­
ment of our country would have been if the depreciation 
method of accounting had been put into effect in the early 
days of railroad enterprise. I raised this question in a 
memorandum which was submitted in 1927 to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and in an article which appeared in 
the Quarterly Journal of Economics of February, 1929, and 
from which I may, perhaps, quote:
The result of a depreciation plan is obviously to throw 
an added charge for use and exhaustion of property upon 
the earliest years of operation, years in which the traffic 
development would be in progress and in which conse­
quently the charge would be more burdensome than in later 
years. Such a condition would seem to be exactly the reverse 
of that which would be economically desirable from the 
standpoint of the community. Its interests would be served 
by keeping the charges in the early years down to the mini­
mum consistent with maintaining the efficiency of the prop­
erty, thus enlarging the volume of the commodities that 
could profitably be transported, and building up both the 
traffic and the community more rapidly than would other­
wise be possible. The best interests of the community in 
such a situation would be served, it would seem, by a mutual 
agreement to ignore the depreciation on the property in so 
far as it could never be made good while the property was 
being operated; the owners of the railroad agreeing that 
this depreciation should not be treated as a part of cost of 
operation, and the community agreeing on the other hand
* Cf. H. R. Hatfield, Accounting, p. 142.
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that in computing return no deduction should be made from 
the original investment therefor.*
From a financial standpoint, with depreciation charges 
treated as a part of operating cost, only a small proportion 
of the enterprises proposed could have been claimed to pre­
sent the prospect of being able to earn their fixed charges 
within a reasonable period after being opened for traffic. 
The published results of the ventures of those who had been 
bold enough to proceed would have discouraged others from 
attempting similar enterprises. On the basis of the account­
ing methods then employed, which ignored accruing depre­
ciation, Hadley estimated in 1885 that the railroads as a 
whole were earning not more than five per cent on the actual 
capital invested. To my mind, it is incontestable that the 
effect of the application of such depreciation accounting 
would have been that the construction of a large part of our 
railway mileage would at least have been greatly delayed—if, 
indeed, some part would ever have been constructed at all. 
Such a result would have been exactly the opposite of that 
sought at the time by legislatures and the public.
Hadley begins his chapter on railroad legislation with the 
statement:
The early railroad legislation in the United States was 
devised for the object of securing railroad construction. The 
only fear was that railroads would not be built as fast as they 
were needed. †
And, as late as 1907, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
was complaining:
It may conservatively be stated that the inadequacy of 
transportation facilities is little less than alarming. ‡
Since the development of other public utilities and com­
mercial enterprises followed naturally on the development 
of railroads, this portion of the growth of our capital equip-
* Vol. xliii, p. 211.
† A. T. Hadley, Railroad Transportation (1885), p. 125.
‡ Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), p. 9. 
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ment would also have been greatly retarded. It has been 
said that we owe our great railroad facilities and the develop­
ments which they made possible, in a large measure, to un­
sound finance; but if it be held that depreciation provisions 
are an essential element of sound railroad accounting, then 
unsound accounting must share with unsound finance in the 
responsibility for the tremendous economic development 
that has taken place since railroad enterprises were first 
begun. I do not here undertake to consider whether the 
growth may have been too rapid to be healthy—I make only 
the point that the accounting practice affected the economic 
development of the country; whether for better or for worse, 
others may dispute.
It is no doubt true that as a result of the accounting meth­
ods followed, large amounts of capital have been lost by 
investors. How large such losses in the aggregate must have 
been is brought home to us when we consider enterprises 
such as street railways, in respect of which capital has been 
furnished by investors—first, for the cost of an original in­
stallation of horse-cars; then for the cost of equipping the 
lines for electrical operation (with, in some cases, an inter­
mediate cable development); and, finally, as we have recently 
seen in New York and elsewhere, the electrically operated 
street cars have been displaced by buses. This, however, 
merely emphasizes the truth too often ignored by unfriendly 
critics of the existing economic order—who see only the large 
gains made by a relatively small number of fortunate indi­
viduals from the development of the capital equipment of 
the nation—that in the aggregate, the community pays only 
a relatively small return to capital for the amount invested, 
and that it is the community that is the one sure gainer 
therefrom. However legitimate the project, however honest 
the finance, however conservative and scrupulous the ac­
counting, and however competent the management may be, 
the losses in industry are bound to be enormous, and the 
community can well afford to allow the few who meet with 
unusual success to receive and retain substantial rewards 
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as a part of the price it pays for all the capital invested.*
I should perhaps anticipate here an objection that the 
methods of accounting adopted may have been an effect 
rather than a cause: the objection that this may be a case in 
which methods of accounting have been influenced by other 
than accounting considerations, rather than one in which 
accounting judgment has influenced the economic develop­
ment. True, the methods followed here and in Great Britain 
might represent the giving of effect to an opinion deliber­
ately reached as to what was economically desirable, or they 
might be the reflection of the views (born, perhaps, of the 
wishes) of those who were interested in the creation of such 
enterprises. There is, however, nothing to suggest that the 
depreciation method was regarded by those responsible for 
the enabling legislation, either here or in England, as 
sounder, but was deliberately ignored because it was believed 
that the development and welfare of the country would be 
aided by ignoring it. Nor do I believe that those who were 
responsible for finding the capital for railroad enterprises 
in England or here, or those auditors in England who were 
required under the Act of 1868 to certify that dividends 
were bona fide due after providing for the charges which 
ought to be made against revenue, believed that sound 
finance or good accounting called for depreciation provisions 
which would ultimately provide for the amortization of out­
lays on all property except that which was indestructible and 
could never become obsolete, and deliberately refrained from 
requiring such provisions.
The policy that omitted any provisions for depreciation 
was, in England, entirely consistent with the policy which 
omitted any provision for amortization of obviously wasting 
assets such as mines, ships, or annuities. It was consistent 
with the whole theory of the determination of income under 
the English income tax laws (which had been revived in 1842
* Failure to recognize frankly these simple truths seems to me to be a 
major ground for criticism of measures for control of security issues which 
have been put forward in the last year or two.
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before railroad development in England had proceeded very 
far). American practice in the early days was undoubtedly 
determined largely by English precedents, which was natural 
in view of the fact that the capital for our railroad enter­
prises came largely from abroad, and particularly from Eng­
land.
I believe that in dealing, or omitting to deal, with de­
preciation the railroads merely followed the general account­
ing practice of the times. In my first article I referred to the 
change of attitude on the question on the part of the Su­
preme Court between 1878 and 1909. It was not until 
the present century that depreciation charges became general 
even in industrial accounting practice in our country—in 
fact, full recognition of the necessity therefor might almost 
be said to date from the enactment of the first corporation 
income tax law in 1909, under which depreciation was an 
allowable deduction which corporations generally were 
anxious to secure, and which was allowed only if taken up 
on the books.
The first serious proposal to apply depreciation methods 
to fixed properties of railroads appears to have been made as 
the result of the study of the question of railroad valuation 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Valua­
tion Act of 1913, though, as already noted, the Commission 
had in 1907 taken steps looking to the application of a de­
preciation method to railroad equipment. In its valuations 
under the authority of the Act, the Commission consistently 
deducted from the gross value depreciation on what is known 
as the straight line method—that is to say, the method which 
aims to distribute the ultimate loss of value evenly over the 
service life of a unit of property. The Supreme Court in its 
decisions on valuation questions has consistently rejected the 
straight line method, and the deductions it has recognized 
have resembled more nearly what has been called observed 
depreciation.
By an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1920 
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(Section 20, § 5), the Commission was given authority to pre­
scribe the classes of property for which depreciation charges 
might properly be included under operating expenses and 
the percentages of depreciation which should be charged 
with respect to the uses of such classes of property. After 
much consideration of the question and extended hearings, 
the Commission handed down a report in November, 1926; * 
but, as a result of objections to its conclusions, granted a 
rehearing which eventually resulted in a new report dated 
July 28, 1931.† This varied in some important respects from 
the earlier one, but adhered to the theory of straight line 
depreciation which the railroads were ordered to put into 
force as from July 1, 1933. The effective date has since been 
changed by executive order and now stands indefinitely post­
poned.
Shortly before the second report, the Supreme Court in 
the United Railways case ‡ had laid down the principle that 
for the purposes of rate cases any depreciation charge must 
be based upon present value and not upon original cost, as 
was contemplated by the Commission. Clearly, however, a 
system of depreciation charges based upon a fluctuating 
present value was altogether impracticable for the purposes 
of current accounting by the railroads. If the Commission 
was for such current purposes to require depreciation charges, 
they could hardly be based on anything except cost. At 
the same time, with the Commission insisting on straight line 
depreciation and original cost, and the Court insisting on 
observed depreciation and present value, there was no ap­
parent prospect of the Commission’s attaining the objective 
which it had stressed of placing railroad accounts on such a 
basis as to make them equally useful for the purposes of 
current accounting and rate-case determination.
In the report of 1931 the Commission, after citing the
* No. 14700, Depreciation Charges of Telephone Companies; No. 15100, 
Depreciation Charges of Steam Railroad Companies.
† Same title.
‡ United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore v. West et al., 280 
U. S. (1930), 234.
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varied views of carriers and the need for uniformity, con­
cluded that a depreciation method was preferable to a re­
tirement method. Observing that in regulating accounts 
the Commission was performing its administrative function, 
and that so long as the regulation was not arbitrary in the 
sense of being without reasonable basis, there was no ground 
for judicial interference, it proceeded to consider various 
depreciation methods. It recognized that the arguments in 
favor of the sinking fund and annuity methods had force, 
going so far as to say, “It may be that from a scientific and 
theoretical standpoint the annuity method is the soundest 
of all,” but concluded that the balance of the argument was 
in favor of the straight-line method. Its discussion of this 
question concludes thus:
We are disposed to abide by the finding in our prior re­
port in favor of the straight-line method. It is the method 
which has consistently been used in our valuation proceed­
ings. On the record before us, indeed, we would hardly 
be justified in reaching any other conclusion.
This conclusion, it should also be said, is associated with 
the confidence we entertain that the courts, when the issues 
and facts are made entirely clear to them, will recognize the 
connection and interrelation between depreciation in ac­
counting and in valuation which have been pointed out 
hereinbefore (p. 413).
Here we have what are at once the weakest and the deter­
mining arguments of the Commission on the question at 
issue. While unquestionably straight line depreciation is 
commonly used for current accounting purposes, particularly 
in the industrial field, its use for valuation purposes does 
not find support either in theory, in practice, or in court 
decisions. The Commission’s own view of fixed property is 
that it represents a given number of years of service value. 
If this view be accepted, the unit which has at the beginning 
of a year 100 years of useful life, has at the end thereof 99 
years of such life left in it, and the reduction in value during 
the year is measured by the difference between the value of
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an annuity for 100 years and that of an annuity for 99 years. 
This difference is not 1%, but less than 1% of 1%.
Continuing, the Commission found that (to use the lan­
guage of the syllabus), “Depreciation accounting becomes a 
necessary measure of self-protection to the carriers, in view 
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
to the effect that accrued depreciation must be taken into 
consideration in ascertaining the rate-base value” (§ 34, p. 
353). This argument would be more convincing if the 
views of the Commission had been shared generally by the 
carriers, which, however, regarded the Commission’s pro­
posals as “neither practicable nor wise” (p. 382), or if the 
methods of computing depreciation prescribed by the Com­
mission had been more in harmony with the past decisions 
of the Supreme Court. Perhaps a more accurate statement 
of the argument would be that depreciation accounting will 
become necessary for the self-protection of the carriers if the 
Supreme Court justifies the confidence of the Commission, 
recognizes the connection and interrelation between valua­
tion and depreciation accounting, and does so in such a way 
as to substitute the Commission’s ideas upon depreciation for 
those which it has heretofore expressed.
Referring again to the syllabus, while paragraph 22 reads: 
“It is not essential that the accounts should correspond in 
all respects with the facts which may be controlling in a con­
fiscation case,” we find in paragraph 43 the statement: “It is 
a matter of vital importance to harmonize the requirements 
for valuation and depreciation accounting purposes, so that 
unnecessary duplication of effort will be avoided.”
Reading the order as a whole, one is left with a very defi­
nite impression that the Commissioners participating in it 
are thoroughly convinced that straight line depreciation 
should be deducted from gross value in any determination 
of the rate base, and that depreciation computed on the 
same basis should be charged against income. In order to 
secure recognition for the first of these two points, they are 
willing to make large concessions on secondary questions.
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Encouraged by dicta in minority opinions of the Court, 
they hope by the exercise of their authority in the matter of 
current accounts to induce the Supreme Court at long last 
to come around to their point of view. In presenting their 
case they make effective use of the arguments and practices 
of the telephone companies in support of straight line depre­
ciation as an operating charge, though declining to accept 
the contention of those companies that unexpended deprecia­
tion reserves are in the nature of surplus.*
In 1934 an opportunity was afforded to judge how far the 
reasoning of the Commission had made progress with the 
Supreme Court. The opportunity did not come in a rail­
road case, in which the proponents of straight line deprecia­
tion would have had to face the argument that their proposal 
ran counter to the practice of railroads generally, here and 
abroad since the earliest days of operation, including nearly 
a quarter of a century during which railroad accounting had 
been under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Com­
mission—it came up in the case of a telephone company † 
which had followed a straight line depreciation plan after 
the Commission’s own heart. As a result, the depreciation 
reserve had grown to be from 26% to 28% of the cost of 
property, including land. The court below had found the 
proper deduction for depreciation for valuation purposes 
to be from 15% to 16%, and the telephone company had 
claimed the proper deduction for this purpose to be from 
8% to 9%.
 The Supreme Court’s decision against the telephone com­
pany was based on the ground that it had failed to sustain the 
burden of showing that the amounts charged to operating 
expenses for depreciation had not been excessive. It spoke 
of the “striking contrast” between the reserve that had been 
accumulated and the existing depreciation as indicated by
* For efforts to enlist the support of the Congress, see letter of January 21, 
1931, reprinted in the Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(1931), pp. 347-57.† Lindheimer et al. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. (1934), 151. 
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“proof which the Company strongly emphasizes as complete 
and indisputable in its sharp criticism of the amount of 
accrued depreciation found by the District Court in valuing 
the property.”
Mr. Justice Butler, in a concurring opinion, indicated that 
he was not a convert to the view of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. In doing so, he stated in clear language one 
of the objections which has been most strongly urged against 
the depreciation method;
From the foregoing it justly may be inferred that charges 
made according to the principle followed by the company 
create reserves much in excess of what is needed for mainte­
nance. The balances carried by the company include large 
amounts that never can be used for the purposes for which 
the reserve was created. In the long run the amounts thus 
unnecessarily taken from revenue will reach about one-half 
the total cost of all depreciable parts of the plant. The only 
legitimate purpose of the reserve is to equalize expenditures 
for maintenance so as to take from the revenue earned in 
each year its fair share of the burden. To the extent that 
the annual charges include amounts that will not be required 
for that purpose, the account misrepresents the cost of the 
service.
The company’s properties constitute a complex and 
highly developed instrumentality containing many classes of 
items that require renewal from time to time. But, taken 
as a whole, the plant must be deemed to be permanent. It 
never was intended to be new in all its parts. It would be 
impossible to make it so. Expenditures in an attempt to 
accomplish that would be wasteful. Amounts sufficient to 
create a reserve balance that is the same percentage of total 
cost of depreciable items as their age is of their total service 
life cannot be accepted as legitimate additions to operating 
expenses (pp. 181-82).
The argument thus admirably stated raises two important 
questions pertinent to the present discussion. The narrower 
one is whether any economic advantage is to be gained by 
adopting a system which calls for the creation today of a 
reserve of the character described by Mr. Justice Butler as 
“unnecessary”—a reserve which if created at all should have 
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been created in the past, but which has not been called for 
under the system of railroad accounting heretofore in force. 
The second is whether there is any principle higher than that 
of general economic advantage and justice by which account­
ing practices must be governed and judged.
It is interesting to note the way in which the Commission 
has dealt with the first point. In its report of November, 
1926, it ordered that a reserve account equal to the amount 
of depreciation which under its new system was deemed to 
have accrued in the past could be set up on the books of the 
carriers, and a suspense account of equal amount set up on 
the asset side. It asserted, quite unjustly I think, that the 
theoretically correct way would be to make the charge to 
profit and loss, on the ground that it represented a failure 
to accrue depreciation charges in the past; but recognizing 
the impracticability of this course, proposed that it should 
remain in suspense until extinguished by charges against 
profit and loss in the future. Strong exception was taken to 
these proposals, and in the revised order of 1931 the Com­
mission decreed that the amount of the accrued depreciation 
at the date when the new system was to become effective 
should be computed and broken down into component parts 
corresponding to the primary investment accounts—but that 
no cognizance of the sum so computed should be taken in 
the books.
This solution was more realistic than the Commission’s 
previous proposal and was calculated to avert in the case of 
the carriers such criticism as that expressed later by Mr. 
Justice Butler in respect to the telephone company. Coupled 
with a change which required depreciation accounting by 
groups of units instead of by units (as previously contem­
plated), it provided a way out of the difficulty of dealing, 
when retirement occurs in the future, with the depreciation 
deemed to have accrued in the past on the unit retired. In 
effect, this depreciation is to be charged against the reserve 
that is to be created to provide for depreciation in the future. 
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The procedure as laid down is open to several criticisms: it 
is illogical; it involves the abandonment of a large part of 
the Commission’s theory; and it results in charging against 
a reserve expenses for which no corresponding credit has 
previously been made to that reserve. However, the only 
alternative would have been to require the accumulation of 
a reserve out of future earnings at the expense either of the 
shippers or of the security-holders, a course for which there 
would be no economic justification. Of the two alternative 
courses, that adopted by the Commission was doubtless the 
wiser.
Our railroads having reached a state of maturity, there is 
reason to expect that a depreciation plan on the modified 
basis would over a period of years produce charges to opera­
tion not greatly different from those which would result from 
the application of a sound retirement method. With the 
objection to the earlier plan that it added greatly to the 
burdens upon the carriers’ future earnings largely removed, 
the major question now is whether any advantages sufficient 
to justify such a change in the general railroad practice of 
the past, here and abroad, are likely to result from the adop­
tion of the Commission’s plan.
A serious demerit of the scheme is its complexity, and the 
enormous amount of bookkeeping which it would entail. 
Outside the Commission probably no great virtue will be 
seen in the fact that with the aid of the extra-accounting 
statistical record of accrued depreciation at the date when 
the system becomes effective, it would bring about some sort 
of coordination between the accounting and the Commis­
sion’s theory of valuation. A further advantage claimed by 
the Commission was that the procedure would insure more 
uniform charges for upkeep against operating in good times 
as well as in bad. Events since 1931 have already proved 
the vanity of this hope. We find the Commission itself re­
porting in 1934 that, although depreciation remained on a 
pre-depression basis, it had allowed carriers to charge not 
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only certain retirements but also certain repairs against profit 
and loss instead of against operating expenses.*
Unless the order does bring about a change in the attitude 
of the Supreme Court as the Commission hopes, and of this 
there is no present indication, it will, I think, have to be 
conceded that the results of the activities of the Commission 
in the matter have not justified the expense they have occa­
sioned. Moreover, the importance of the rate base in the 
case of the railroads as a whole has steadily diminished as 
competitive methods of transport have reduced their rev­
enues. Recapture of earnings has gone by the board and 
railroad valuation has lost most of its former importance.
I shall conclude this series of articles by discussing very 
briefly the question raised earlier herein, whether there are 
principles higher than those of general economic advantage 
and justice by which accounting practices must be governed 
and judged. Some accountants believe that there are such 
principles, and it has been suggested that the American In­
stitute of Accountants, or some other body, should under­
take to lay them down. It is difficult, however, to see why 
this should be true of accounting, when it is obviously not 
true in respect of law or of economics.
The better opinion is, I believe, that, as I suggested in the 
first of these articles, accounting is a tool of business, and the 
development of accounting, like the development of business 
law, should be determined by the best practices of business 
men. As stated in the report of the American Institute to 
the New York Stock Exchange of September 28, 1932, out 
of the necessities of business there has “grown up a body of 
conventions, based partly on theoretical and partly on prac­
tical considerations, which form the basis for the determina­
tion of income and the preparation of balance sheets today.’’
There is every reason to desire and to expect improve­
ments and a constantly increasing degree of uniformity in 
accounting conventions. This improvement and this uni­
formity cannot be attained through any attempt to make
* Annual Report (1934), p. 2.
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accounting practice a reflection of purely metaphysical con­
cepts, but only through careful consideration of what is fair 
and in the best interest of those having a legitimate interest 
in accounts. In the case of corporate accounts, this may in­
clude stockholders and creditors—actual or potential—em­
ployees, customers, and the general public, and nice ques­
tions may arise in giving just recognition to the rights of 
the different groups. Clearly, however, no rule which is con­
trary to the interests of all of the parties should be established 
on the sole ground that it conforms to some abstract notion 
of what is sound accounting.
It is because the best accounting can be attained only 
through wide knowledge of business, sound judgment and 
mental integrity that the profession of the accountant offers 
today one of the most attractive fields of activity to the high- 
minded and clear-minded among the rising generation.
PART VII
REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS

I
REASONS FOR EXCLUDING INTEREST FROM COST *
(1916)
Standard schemes of accounting for various industries are 
receiving much consideration at the present time. This is 
due partly to the encouragement given such movements by 
the Federal Trade Commission, and partly to the work which 
has been carried on for some time by the Bureau of Busi­
ness Research of Harvard University and other organiza­
tions, the value of which is now being recognized.
In connection with these schemes it may not be amiss to 
reconsider the question of the treatment of interest, par­
ticularly interest on invested capital. Many who favor in­
cluding interest in expense or cost as a general principle be­
come dubious when they are asked to specify the rate or the 
kind of rate they would adopt. Broadly there are three kinds 
of rate suggested:
(1) A rate equal to that yielded by the safest investments. 
(Some go further and try to eliminate the small ele­
ment of risk from such a rate and call the balance pure 
interest or compensation solely for the use of the 
money.)
(2) A rate equal to that at which money can be borrowed 
for the particular industry.
(3) A rate sufficient to attract permanent investment into 
the industry.
Of the three alternatives the second is probably the most 
generally favored, and it will therefore be assumed as the 
basis of the following discussion.
At the outset it is important to consider what such a rate 
represents. In an industrial business commercial loans can 
usually be obtained up to a limit of, say, 50 per cent of the
* The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXI (June, 1916).
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current assets. Money lent, therefore, has behind it 100 per 
cent margin of security in current assets alone, as well as 
plant values which may represent another 100 per cent or 
more. The difference between the position of the loan and 
that of the invested capital which stands behind it is there­
fore obvious.
It is suggested that it is undesirable to treat such a rate of 
interest on invested capital as cost in standard classification 
of expense or in cost of manufacture:
First, because the method is unscientific and unsound for 
the immediate purpose in view;
Second, because the inclusion of interest in cost produces 
results which are financially and economically undesirable;
Third, because in so far as the results of such methods have 
a bearing on the broad question of the relations between 
capital, labor and the public, the inclusion of interest in the 
manner suggested tends to mislead and thus to promote dis­
cord and social injustice.
Objection No. 1. “Because the method is unscientific and 
unsound for the immediate purpose in view.”
The purpose in view is to arrive at the cost or expense in­
volved in doing business in the line of industry under con­
sideration. For such a purpose the essentials are:
First, tp ascertain as far as possible all costs and to exclude 
anything that is not a cost;
Second, to arrive as far as possible at results that are 
actual and to avoid if possible the introduction of arbitrary 
or estimated figures;
Third, to present each element of cost as a separate item 
in the classification and to avoid the inclusion of any one 
element in more than one heading thereof.
Considering these essentials in order, whether the return 
on proprietor’s capital is wholly or in part a cost or expense 
is a question on which opinions differ. As to this it is suffi­
cient to say that if, after consideration of other essentials, it 
should be deemed preferable to omit the charge in respect 
of proprietor’s capital from cost or expense, this fact would 
at least not impair the value of the results presented.
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Turning to the second essential, it is obvious that any 
charge in respect of proprietor’s capital must be an estimate.
The next point to consider is, therefore, how accurate an 
estimate made in the way that is proposed will be. Now it is 
apparent that if the capital required in a business is pro­
vided partly in the form of a loan by A, who is given priority 
in respect of principal and interest, and partly by B (the 
proprietor) whose rights are subordinated to those of A, then 
without attempting to define exactly the rate of interest ap­
plicable to B’s contribution, it must obviously be something 
different from and greater than the rate applicable to A’s 
contribution. It appears, therefore, that the proposed rate 
is from its very nature inapplicable.
Further, it is apparent that some of the compensation of 
the proprietor’s capital must be left to be provided out of 
the balance remaining after deducting costs, so that the pro­
cedure involves the sacrifice of the third essential above re­
cited, namely, the presentation of each element of cost as a 
separate item in the classification. It may be suggested that 
the compensation of the proprietor’s capital is not an ele­
ment but a compound of two elements, namely, the compen­
sation for the use of the capital and the compensation for 
the risk incurred. The answer to such a contention is, how­
ever, that the rate proposed to be used is itself a compound 
of these two elements, the defect of the rate being that it is 
formed in an erroneous and half-hearted manner.
At this point it may be worth while to consider roughly 
how far the method does provide for the two elements. The 
rate at which money is lent to industry, and especially small 
industries, is probably double the interest rate on the safest 
securities. The rate necessary to attract investments (not 
loans) into such an industry is not less than three times the 
rate on the safest investments.* If, say, one-third of the
* If the safe investment rate be taken at, say, 3 per cent, this gives, a bor­
rowing rate of 6 per cent and an investment rate of 9 per cent, which happens 
to be almost exactly the average rate earned on the amount invested (capital 
and surplus) in all the national banks of the country for the seven years end­
ing June 30, 1914.
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capital be raised by borrowing, the rate to be applied to the 
proprietor’s capital would on these assumptions be three and 
a half times the safe investment rate.
For, taking the total capital invested at 300 and r as an­
nual interest on a safe investment of 100:
the interest on 300 at r would be.................................. 9 r
the interest on 100 borrowed at 2 r.............................. 21
leaving for interest on 200 proprietor’s capital of 3½
r per cent...................................................................... 7 r
Now if the rate on safest investment (r) be taken as the 
compensation for use of capital, the borrowing rate of 2 r 
provides 1 r for risk. If the proper rate for proprietor’s 
capital be taken at 3½ r, of which 1 r represents compensa­
tion for use and 2½ r compensation for risk, it may be said 
that the method provides for the “use” element and about 
40 per cent of the “risk” element contained in the “cost” of 
proprietor’s capital.
To sum up, the position is that whether the first essential 
is fulfilled is a controversial question, and that the second 
and third essentials are clearly sacrificed. It would seem that 
in these circumstances the first objection urged is fully sus­
tained. This objection would not be fatal if the method 
produced good results when viewed from a broader stand­
point, and it is therefore desirable to proceed to a considera­
tion of the next objection.
Objection No. 2. Because the inclusion of interest in cost 
produces results which are financially and economically un­
desirable.
The evil effects from an administrative, financial and ac­
counting standpoint of including interest in cost have been 
pointed out in previous articles in The Journal of Account­
ancy, and no attempt will therefore be made to deal with 
this subject exhaustively here. Briefly the main objections 
are:
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First, plant investment which yields only a rate which is 
admittedly less than commensurate with the risk attending 
investment in the industry is commercially and economically 
unsound.
A method which purports to allow for cost of increased 
capital by means of a rate determined by the rate at which 
money can be borrowed, therefore, tends to encourage un­
wise plant expenditure.
If the money is obtained, not by borrowing, but by a 
permanent increase of capital, then the return on that cap­
ital will have to be far greater than the loan rate. If the 
money is obtained by borrowing, then, quite apart from the 
rate, the policy is unwise—excessive investment in fixed assets 
of capital obtained by borrowing being one of the common­
est causes of failure.
Second, there is no sense or advantage in including in cost 
interest on investment in fixed assets unless interest on in­
vestment in current assets employed in manufacture is also 
considered.
The attempt to introduce correctly computed interest al­
lowances on both classes of investments involves difficulties 
out of all proportion to any possible benefits.
These objections may seem strange in view of the fact that 
the principal argument advanced in favor of including in­
terest in cost is that it takes capital investment into account 
in comparative costs. But it is submitted that it is better 
to leave capital investment out of account altogether than 
to take it into account on a basis that does not even purport 
to represent the true cost of capital. There are theoretical 
grounds for the claim that interest on some logical basis 
should be included in cost, though it is not worth while in 
practice to attempt to do it. There would seem to be no 
basis in theory and far more danger than advantage in prac­
tice in including a rate determined as the rate now under 
discussion would be determined.
Third, the method leads to less conservative valuation of 
inventories and to showing as profits available for dividends 
amounts which have not been realized or even earned.
It may be asked why, if these views are correct, so many 
people do favor including such a rate of interest in cost. The 
answer is perhaps found partly in the following considera- 
tions:
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First, the great extent to which capital is obtained by 
borrowing in this country;
Second, the very general use and acceptance of 6 per cent 
as an interest rate;
Third, the general failure to appreciate the true rates of 
return earned in industry. This is in a measure the natural 
result of the “watering” of capital in the past for the purpose 
of concealing the true rates of profits being earned;
Fourth, anxiety to do anything that tends to reduce under­
selling;
Fifth, the hope that, by including part of its claim to com­
pensation as cost and a part as profit, capital may be able 
to secure more than it otherwise would obtain. Later rea­
sons will be advanced for concluding that such a hope is 
ill-founded;
Sixth, the influence of bankers, based on a false analogy 
from their own business.
A man who has never considered the problem of fair re­
turn regards 6 per cent as a* well-recognized rate, applies it 
often where it has no proper application, and accepts it when 
it is charged against him.
The executive head of a business who charges 6 per cent 
on capital employed against each department of his business 
may or may not be conscious that he would never invest 
money in a department at that rate. He knows, however, 
that the department head will recognize and accept that rate, 
but would not probably understand or willingly accept a 
charge of a higher rate and feels that by charging 6 per cent 
he gets at least that much protection against underselling. 
The same comment applies to trade associations which com­
bine to put out accounting schemes, the underlying purpose 
of which is as a rule the reduction of destructive competition.
Whether or not the result accomplished in this direction 
is good or bad from an economic standpoint is an open ques­
tion. In the case of a man who does not realize what a 
selling price ought to include, it is probably helpful both 
to him and to his competitors. But at its best the method 
is a hybrid and a makeshift, and taking all effects together 
the evil effects preponderate.
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Objection No. 3. “Because in so far as the results of such 
methods have a bearing on the broad question of the rela­
tions between capital, labor and the public, the inclusion 
of interest in the manner suggested tends to mislead and 
thus to promote discord and social injustice.”
The relation of the problem to the broad question of the 
proper distribution of the fruits of organized industry be­
tween labor and capital is apparent, and nothing could be 
more essential than that the practice adopted should avoid 
anything likely to add to misconceptions of one another’s 
equitable claims which are largely responsible for the bitter­
ness of the controversy between the two.
Upon any great question the tendency must be to reduce 
the issue to the simplest terms. The fair disposition of the 
results of organized industry is one of the greatest of ques­
tions, and the issue here is reduced in the public mind to 
one between labor and capital—everything that does not go 
to labor is regarded as going to capital. The elements other 
than labor entitled to compensation may in the economic 
mind be subdivided, and the economist may attempt to dif­
ferentiate between pure interest, compensation for risk, the 
reward of the entrepreneur, etc., but in the public mind 
and for practical purposes these elements are combined in 
capital. Moreover, in general, once an enterprise is 
launched these elements are vested in the same body of in­
dividuals, so that the fact that the isolation of the elements 
is not possible except in theory does not cause any difficulty 
in practice.
If so-called interest on capital is deducted as expense, the 
general disposition will be to assert claims to a part or the 
whole of the balance. The public (especially in the case of 
public service companies) will attribute the net profit shown 
to over-exaction from the public. Labor will claim that it 
is attributable to underpayment of labor or at least to the 
results of combined effort in which labor should participate.
If, however, the results are presented without including 
anything in expense for return on capital, it will be clearly 
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recognized that if capital is not entitled to all the residuum, 
at least capital has a claim on it which must first be satisfied. 
That claim would seem to be for an amount standing as 
nearly as possible in the same relation to capital as the 
amounts included in expense in respect of labor stand to 
labor.
The elements included in the compensation to labor in­
clude some or all of the following:
(a) A minimum wage;
(b) Payment for special skill;
(c) Compensation for special conditions of employments 
including risk, responsibility and inconvenience;
(d) Compensation paid on account of specially favorable 
financial conditions (such as the two 10 per cent additions 
to wages by the Steel Corporation recently);
(e) A share of the final residuum (paid in the form of 
wage dividends or otherwise);
All these items except (e) are treated as expense, under 
the head of wages.
Turning now to capital—pure interest may be said to cor­
respond roughly to minimum wage in the case of labor. 
There is no element in capital corresponding to the special 
skill in the case of labor. There are, however, in the case 
of capital, elements corresponding exactly to the items (c), 
(d) and (e).
But while the items (a) to (d) are included in expense in 
respect of labor, only item (a) and an indefinite fraction * 
of (c) are proposed to be included in expense in respect of 
capital.
The ordinary reader of the figures (and certainly also the 
enemies of capital) will, however, assume that the interest 
included in expense stands to capital in the same relation 
as the wages included in expense do to labor, and no amount 
of explanation will be very effective in avoiding or removing 
such a misconception. Nor can such an explanation be 
effectively made, since it involves explaining that while the
* Possibly 40 per cent.
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amount included under wages does represent compensation 
based on the conditions under which the labor is employed, 
the compensation assigned capital under interest does not 
even purport to be the compensation to which it is fairly 
entitled under the conditions under which it is invested, but 
what it would fairly earn if employed in some different and 
much safer way.
An analysis of the amounts paid or due to labor and cap­
ital such as is suggested above is outside the scope of a classi­
fication of expenses, though it would be a positive contribu­
tion towards the proper treatment of the problem of the re­
lations between the two bodies. It is, however, in the high­
est degree important that classifications should not present 
figures in such a one-sided and erroneous way as to add an­
other misconception to those that already keep labor and 
capital apart. If accounts cannot actually promote harmony 
between the two, at least let every possible step be taken to 
insure that they shall not add to the discord.
It may be asked whether interest should not be included 
in expense on some other basis if not on the one proposed. 
The alternatives are apparently the “pure interest” rate 
(or the rate on the safest investments which approximates 
thereto) or else the rate that will attract investment into the 
industry. To adopt the pure interest basis means providing 
for compensation for the use of money, but not for the risk 
to which it is subjected; and as the risk is by far the more 
important element, there would seem to be little or no prac­
tical advantage in following this course, nor indeed any 
probability of being generally understood. The rate which 
will attract capital into an industry would seem to be one 
of the things which accounts should help to determine rather 
than anything which could be assumed as an element of cost.
II
COST ACCOUNTING *
(1925)
This term embraces methods of cost determination which 
are either a part of, or coordinated with, the general ac­
counting of the enterprise as distinguished from estimates 
of costs not so controlled or checked. Cost accounting meth­
ods have probably been developed more extensively in the 
United States than in any other country. This development 
has taken place mainly in the period since 1895, and it may 
be regarded as a natural phase of the general industrial 
development in that period. The same conditions which 
have stimulated the use of labour-saving methods and mass 
production have naturally lent new importance to the de­
termination and analysis of costs; and have made it impera­
tive that the substantial accuracy of the statistics of cost used 
shall be beyond question. This can only be assured by link­
ing up cost statistics with general financial and accounting 
records and results.
In the problem of cost accounting there may be said to 
be usually three main objects to be achieved, three main 
classifications to be followed and three major considerations 
governing the scope of the methods to be employed. These 
nine elements are necessarily to some extent interrelated, 
and it may therefore be well to state them at the outset.
The main objects referred to are: (1) To afford a sound 
basis for selling policy; (2) To provide tests of operating 
efficiency; (3) To establish a basis for accounting records 
and financial policy. The classifications of cost are broadly, 
(1) labor, (2) material, (3) overhead expenses. The character 
and scope of the methods to be employed must be deter-
* From an article written for The Encyclopedia Britannica, 13th edition 
(1926). 
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mined largely by considerations of (1) speed, (2) accuracy, 
(3) expense.
The relative importance of the objects enumerated varies 
with different classes of enterprise. In the case of a builder, 
contractor or shipbuilder, or in the case of a plant capable 
of producing different types of products, a cost system may 
be of even greater value in the determination of selling 
policies than in producing operating efficiency. On the 
other hand, in the case of a plant producing standard articles 
for a highly competitive market, the value of a cost system 
may lie almost wholly in helping to secure manufacturing 
or operating efficiency.
The success of any cost accounting system depends largely 
on correct judgment concerning the relative importance of 
the different elements of the problem in the particular case 
involved, and particularly on the success with which the 
naturally conflicting considerations of speed, accuracy and 
expense in the cost department are reconciled. If the cost 
system is to be of real service to those in charge of operations 
or sales, its results must be substantially accurate and suf­
ficiently specific to enable those officers to localize waste and 
the responsibility therefor. Such results will, however, be 
of .little value if in an attempt to secure accuracy the ascer­
tainment of the results is unduly delayed, or an expense is 
incurred greater than the possible benefits to be derived 
from the greater accuracy ultimately secured. The recog­
nition of this fact and the consequent resort to simpler, 
though perhaps less scientific and less meticulously accurate 
methods, have perhaps been the most marked characteristics 
of the development of cost accounting in the United States 
in recent years. The growth of interest in cost accounting, 
which began about 1895, was greatly stimulated by the con­
solidations which were effected about the year 1900.
Among the results of these consolidations were the trans­
fer of ownership on a large scale from persons immediately 
interested in the operation of plants to the general public, 
and also a transfer of the general direction from small groups 
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of operating officers to boards of directors less intimately 
associated with actual operations. This change resulted in 
a demand for more frequent and more accurate reports of 
operating results as a guide to financial policies and for the 
information of those financially interested. In the develop­
ment of methods to meet the new situation the importance 
of the purely accounting and financial uses of costs were not 
infrequently overrated.
Purely accounting uses of cost records have come to be 
viewed in a more accurate perspective, and accounting re­
finements and technicalities have been increasingly subor­
dinated to practical usefulness. At the same time, remark­
able results have been achieved in expediting the compila­
tion of costs by careful organisation, so that today large 
corporations frequently have completed cost figures for a 
month available for the operating executives within three 
or four days of its close.
The accountant called upon to devise a system of cost 
accounting will be wise to regard the accounting uses of the 
system as entirely secondary, and to aim at making the sys­
tem as valuable as possible to those controlling the policies 
and operations of the business. The sales manager, in fix­
ing prices, must estimate costs in advance of sale, and the 
value to him of a system which records actual costs lies 
mainly in the check it affords, on the correctness of his esti­
mates, and the extent to which it permits and facilitates the 
use of actual costs of the past as a basis for estimates of cost 
in the future under changing conditions.
The operating or production manager’s requirements are 
more extensive and more varied. He must be in a position 
to determine whether fluctuations in cost are due to con­
ditions within the control of the management or not, and 
if so, to localise the responsibility. He must, for instance, 
be in a position to determine such questions as whether a 
higher cost of material at one plant than at another is at­
tributable to less efficiency in purchasing, or to the use or 
the waste of more material, and how far apparent high costs 
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of production are really costs of production, and how far 
they are attributable to lack of production, i.e., to idle time 
and such causes. Every effort should therefore be made to 
frame a cost accounting system so as to afford as much light 
as is practicable on manufacturing operations and make that 
light available at the earliest possible moment.
Broadly, there are three main types of cost accounting 
systems. The first undertakes to determine the cost for each 
production order, which may cover either a single unit of 
production where units are large, or a batch of units where 
they are smaller. The second takes account of costs by 
separate processes or operations—thus determining a unit 
cost for each process or operation and leaving the cost of 
any article produced to be determined by bringing together 
the costs of several processes or operations through which 
it passes. The third seeks to determine costs by products 
or classes of products and to compute the costs of the units 
produced by dividing the total costs incurred in producing 
similar units in any period by the number of units produced 
in that period. Multiple products from a common raw ma­
terial, as in the case of petroleum and packing industries, 
constitute a separate and difficult problem.
An important question is the relation of the cost account­
ing to the general accounting records of the enterprise. 
From the standpoint of accounting technique the cost sys­
tem, which forms an integral part of a general accounting 
system, possesses a unity and completeness which cannot be 
achieved in any other way. It is, however, easy to pay too 
great a price for this artistic completeness, and there has been 
a marked disposition to employ methods under which the 
cost accounting is less closely tied to the general accounting.
The value of cost figures is greatly enhanced by compari­
sons either with past achievements or with an “ideal” or 
standard of cost. Much attention has been given to meth­
ods of cost accounting in complex industries, based on stand­
ard costs for specific articles, processes or operations, sup­
plemented by methods for adjusting these standard costs for 
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changes in conditions, and for ensuring that the aggregate 
costs allocated as the results of these adjustments are in actual 
or substantial agreement with the aggregate costs incurred as 
shown by the general books. For discussion of the sub­
division of costs, the reader must be referred to text-books. 
A warning may be given that accounting text-books are apt 
to over-rate and engineering text-books to under-rate general 
accounting and financial desiderata. In particular, the im­
portance may be emphasised of avoiding use of a cost sys­
tem in a way which would involve inventorying goods at 
more than true cost through the inclusion in costs of either 
(a) interdepartmental profits (and for this purpose wholly- 
owned subsidiary companies should be regarded as depart­
ments), (b) profits in the form of interest or otherwise, or (c) 
selling costs. All these items may, however, be included in 
appropriate ways in costs compiled for executive use in 
formulating policies.
Overhead costs per unit (up to the limit of economical 
production) decrease as the output increases, and vice versa. 
Sales may therefore be. advantageous, even though they do 
not reimburse direct costs and a rateable proportion of over­
head expenses. The cost accountant should therefore do 
all in his power, especially where profit margins are narrow, 
to segregate overhead costs, to analyse them and to interpret 
them to the executive, so as to ensure that they will be given 
due, but not undue, weight in the formulation of policies. 
The allocations of overhead are, at best, rough approxima­
tions, but much has been done to secure more accurate allo­
cations by computing overhead for individual departments, 
machines or tools, by adopting bases of apportionment, more 
carefully selected and more closely related to the actual facts 
of production than previously, and in similar ways.
In some systems, standard rates of burden rather than 
actual rates are charged into cost, being credited to clearing 
accounts to which actual overhead expenses are charged. 
Where this is done, watchfulness and judgment in dealing 
with these clearing accounts are imperative. This is, how­
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ever, only one illustration of the most important of all truths 
in cost accounting, that skill and judgment in applying, ad­
justing and interpreting cost methods in actual use are even 
more important than ingenuity in devising a system in the 
first instance.
Ill
AN EXAMINATION OF AFFIDAVITS IN
De Koven et al. v. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern 
Railway Company
(1923)
The case of the plaintiff rests substantially on Mr. Thomp­
son’s affidavit, as Professor Friday simply restates what Mr. 
Thompson has said. In his first affidavit Mr. Thompson 
propounded a method of determining the relative values of 
Lake Shore and Consolidated Company stock, based on the 
theory that, in income, expectation has a value graduated ac­
cording to the extent of mortgages ranking ahead of it. . . .
Mr. Thompson takes one element which admittedly af­
fects to some extent the market value of earning capacity 
(the extent of the fixed charges or mortgages to which in­
come is subject); assigns to that element a weight fixed by 
himself; calculates the relative values of the respective in­
come capitalizations with reference to this element alone; 
and then briefly dismisses all other elements of value by 
calling attention to certain elements which he claims would 
on comparison be favorable to the Lake Shore, arguing that 
therefore, if he took into account these other favorable fac­
tors, he would necessarily reach still higher values.
The fundamental importance to this method of the cor­
rectness of the weight assigned to the one element taken into 
consideration and the fallacy of the statement as to the other 
elements of value may be illustrated as follows: Suppose the 
problem were to determine the relation in areas between 
two rectangles, A, 14 feet long and 5 feet broad, and B, 6 
feet long and 414 feet broad; and suppose the proposition 
were advanced that it was a well-known mathematical fact 
that the areas of rectangles were to some extent dependent on 
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their length and that therefore the areas of the two rectangles 
were to one another at least as the squares of their lengths, 
i.e., as 196 to 25; that in reality this conclusion understated 
the relative size of rectangle A because the breadths had not 
been considered and the breadth of rectangle A is 5 feet and 
of B only 4½ feet. It is at once clear that the crucial ques­
tion involved in this proposition is the propriety of the step 
by which the method proceeds from the undoubtedly correct 
statement that the area of rectangles is affected by their 
length to the precise measurement of such effect. If the 
proponent of the method cannot demonstrate that this re­
lation is correctly expressed by the squares of the length, 
or if his opponents can disprove this claim, then no amount 
of evidence that areas of rectangles are affected by their 
length, or that the areas are affected by their breadth, or that 
where the length and breadth are equal the area is the square 
of the length, can be of any avail.
In Mr. Thompson’s calculation the corresponding crucial 
step is that in which he undertakes to measure precisely the 
effect of the influence of prior fixed charges or mortgages 
on the value of an income expectation. If this step cannot 
be successfully defended, no mass of evidence to show that 
market values are affected to some extent by the proportion 
of fixed charges to corporate income, or to show that esti­
mates of future earnings are made in financial practice, or 
any of the like propositions to which so much of Mr. 
Thompson’s second affidavit is devoted, can save his method 
from complete rejection.
Let us consider what the reply affidavits show and how far 
Mr. Thompson has been able to combat them.
The reply affidavits show clearly that the method em­
ployed by Mr. Thompson is not one generally recognized 
or commonly employed for similar purposes.
They show that the method is fundamentally defective 
because amongst other errors:
(1) Mr. Thompson, whilst making the extent of the mort­
gages to which the final net income is subject the 
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crucial test of value, has ignored the mortgages upon 
the income before it reaches the Lake Shore or the 
combined companies as the case may be; and
(2) The method by which Mr. Thompson arrives at the 
rate of capitalization of 15% of 46% of the net cor­
porate income in each case is incorrect, and that rate 
is not warranted upon a fair consideration of the facts.
They show that the error in the conclusion resulting from 
these two errors alone is so great that a correction thereof 
would lead to the conclusion on Mr. Thompson’s own 
method that the basis of consolidation is fair and equitable 
to the Lake Shore minority stockholders.
They further show that, tested by application to other 
cases, the results derived from Mr. Thompson’s method are 
incorrect.
Messrs. May, Porter and White (all having wide experi­
ence in matters involving the determination of the absolute 
and relative values of stocks) all testify that they have never 
known Mr. Thompson’s method or any method at all similar 
thereto employed for such purposes. Mr. Thompson in his 
reply says:
I submit that my method is novel only in this, that it 
reduced to concrete form a principle universally recognized 
in the financial world; and as evidence of that fact I submit 
herewith, out of a great number of citations from financial 
works and investors’ manuals, the following quotations.
The citation which comes nearest to supporting his method 
is from Sakolski:
Considered in relation to the funded obligations out­
standing, this item determines to some extent the investment 
values of these securities.
As well might Mr. Thompson quote Sakolski as authority 
for the undoubtedly correct statement that the area of a field 
depends to some extent on its perimeter as supporting a 
novel method invented by himself for determining areas 
from perimeters without regard to shape. The whole world 
of finance and the world of physics are full of influences 
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whose existence is recognized but which have never been 
measured.
In effect Mr. Thompson concedes the novel and untried 
quality of the method—and the fact that it is new is not with­
out significance. If the method were reliable the oppor­
tunities for its use would be innumerable; and its simplicity 
renders it extremely unlikely that the method would have 
remained so long undiscovered, seeing that the problem of 
determining relative values of securities has engaged for 
many years some of the keenest minds engaged in business.
IV
THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Versus MR. 
HOOVER *
(1926)
Summing up the impression one derives from an examina­
tion of the report † and the evidence, the Secretary was evi­
dently keenly alive to the fact that a rubber shortage was 
impending, and to the desirability of bringing to the atten­
tion of the American people, in a striking way, the need of 
some action to forestall this condition. This he has un­
doubtedly done.
If in doing so he has advanced theories and contentions 
which upon the evidence of his department seem incapable 
of being sustained, this merely confirms what some of the 
most ardent admirers of his ability and achievements have 
reluctantly concluded: that his undeniably great gifts lie 
rather in the fields of organization of effort and of public 
opinion than in the fields of economics and the dispassionate 
analysis of controversial facts. His plea for a policy of free­
dom of raw materials from governmental control suffers 
from a too strongly nationalistic approach, from an over­
statement of the case in specific instances, and from a failure 
to anticipate the obvious retort upon our own protectionist 
policies and to set forth the economic grounds upon which 
he distinguishes between the two policies and bases his 
appeal.
The evidence fails to demonstrate that the restriction 
scheme was either very beneficial to growers or highly in­
jurious to consumers. It rather raises doubt whether the
* Excerpt from "Rubber: The Inquiry and the Facts,” The Atlantic 
Monthly (June, 1926).
† Plantation Rubber in the East Indies, Department of Commerce (1925). 
See also Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 1st Session on H. R. 59 (1926).
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benefits to those whom it was intended to help were sufficient 
to justify its adoption..
The continuance of control after the rise of last summer 
may legitimately be criticized, but nothing in the nature of 
a serious grievance against the growers seems to be estab­
lished. They have, of course, conducted their operations 
with a view to gain, and not from altruistic motives; but, 
viewing the whole subject in perspective, and taking one 
year with another, it is evident that they have provided the 
raw materials upon which a major development of our in­
dustry and comfort is based, at prices which would not have 
been attractive to our own capital.
The problem of rubber supply is a serious one and may 
be said to have entered into a new phase during 1925. It 
is fortunate that the change should have come at a time of 
prosperity so that its effects were not of serious consequence 
to our manufacturers or to our consumers.
Our people have a genius for economy in production, and 
our national vice is extravagance in consumption. Stimula­
tion of the one and a slight curb on the other should suffice 
to bring about a satisfactory relation between demand and 
supply during the years immediately ahead, in which no 
great increase of production can be expected. The rise in 
prices will afford such a stimulation and such a check, and 
should at the same time encourage the plantation of new 
areas which will in the course of years provide for the natural 
expansion of demand.
If Americans find in the field an attractive opportunity 
for the employment of some of the country’s abundant sup­
ply of capital, well and good; the record certainly establishes 
no case for our entering the field on an uncommercial basis.
V
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPO­
RATE RELATIONS, G. O. MAY, CHAIRMAN, TO THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL
(1927)
Your committee believes that modern developments in the 
field of corporate relations have great social significance and 
importance and constitute a field in which valuable research 
may be undertaken. They suggest that any project should 
be so framed as to form part of a general review of the cor­
poration of today in connection with the broader problems 
of the relations in industry between capital, management, 
labor and the public interest. Such a general review would 
include:
I. An inquiry into the extent to which the business ac­
tivities of the country are carried on by corporations or 
quasi-corporations, in the aggregate and in specified 
fields, including comparisons with the past to indicate 
the trend and rate of change
II. A survey of the existing corporations in the United 
States with a view to classification according to—
(a) Character of activities
(b) Character of beneficial ownership *
(c) Effective control
(d) Size
*The general type of classification contemplated under the second sub­
heading is somewhat as follows:
(1) Investor owned (directly or through holding company)
Widely distributed
Closely held
Personally owned
(2) Customer owned
(3) Banker owned
(4) Management owned
(5) Employee owned
(6) Cooperatively owned
(7) Charitably or publicly, owned
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III. A study of the trends of recent corporate developments:
(a) The nature of the trends including the tendencies 
to develop new types of corporate stocks, towards 
employee ownership, management ownership, etc., 
and including particularly an examination of the re­
lations between beneficial ownership and effective 
control and management of corporations the owner­
ship of which is widely distributed
(b) The intended and actual effects of the methods 
being developed on the relations of those interested 
or engaged in the activity (beneficial owners, man­
agement and labor)
1. Inter se  
2. With the rest of the community
(c) The relative social importance of the principal 
trends noted
IV. A consideration of existing corporation laws and prac­
tice with a view to determining in what ways they tend 
to promote or interfere with the development of the in­
dustrial economy of the country along socially desirable 
lines.
For the first head of inquiry the bulk of the necessary 
material is, it is believed, available in the records of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
The second head of inquiry your committee regards as of 
very great importance. The corporations of the country 
are not a homogeneous group but differ widely in their es­
sential character. The corporation which is owned by a 
single stockholder is different in almost every respect from 
a corporation like the American Telephone & Telegraph 
Company, whose stock is widely distributed.
Your committee believes, however, that before an effective 
survey under this head can be undertaken there should be 
secured a substantial improvement in the statistical material 
available. It believes that, in particular, the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue is in a position to secure statistical data 
which would be of great value to the tax administration and 
at the same time would be of great value for broader eco­
nomic purposes. The question has been discussed with the
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Treasury and it is hoped that steps in the desired direction 
may be undertaken. Your committee recommends that this 
head of the inquiry be left in abeyance until this phase is 
further developed.
The fourth head of the inquiry covers a very wide field 
and your committee does not believe that more should be 
undertaken at this time than perhaps a general survey of 
the situation such as would enable the lines of a more ex­
tensive subsequent survey to be formulated.
The main recommendation of your committee is, there­
fore, a project covering subjects included under the third 
head of the inquiry as above outlined.
A suggested outline of the scope of such a project follows:
I. The ownership, direction and management of corpora­
tions and the trends and rates of change therein:
A. The extent to which property is held by publicly 
financed (as contrasted with personal, family or 
close) corporations in the United States:
1. In gross
2. In particular fields
3. The trend and rate of change in this respect
B. The nature and distribution of beneficial ownership 
in such property:
1. By ownership of obligations or redeemable pre­
ferred stocks entitling the holders to fixed divi­
dends or distributions
2. By ownership of non-redeemable preferred stocks 
and securities entitling the holders to participa­
tion in profits, other than fixed dividends or 
distributions
C. The sources from which the personnel of direction 
and management is drawn—the object being to as­
certain to what extent such personnel bears a rela­
tion to:
1. The group of beneficial owners as a whole
2. Particular divisions of that group
3. Groups otherwise interested in the corporations
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D. The extent to which direction and management is 
virtually separated from beneficial ownership:
1. Through legal devices
2. Factually, through mere size or otherwise
E. The methods and motives regulating the selection 
of direction and management, regard being had to 
fact rather than form
IL The situation considered from the standpoint of those 
interested in the enterprise, as beneficial owners, man­
agers or employees:
A. Considering the group as a whole—the effectiveness 
of the modern public corporation tested by:
1. Business success
2. Relations to other entities in the industry
3. Industrial conditions within the entity
B. Between owners and managers:
The cost—and rewards—of management
C. Between owners and managers and employees:
1. The merger of beneficial ownership and em­
ployees’ interest
2. The development of community of interest be­
tween employees and management (rather than 
owners)
III. The situation considered from the standpoint of eco­
nomic welfare and the public interest:
A. The effectiveness of the modern corporation from 
the standpoint of:
1. Service to customers—quality and adequacy
2. The trend towards or from monopoly
3. Public relations
IV. Development of the social regulatory machinery to meet 
the existing and prospective situation:
A. As between those in control and beneficial owners:
1. Legally through the creation of new or the ex­
tension of old legal rights and obligations and 
relationships
2. Through economic machinery such as regulatory 
functions of stock exchanges or other business 
bodies
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3. Through mores, the development of ethical 
standards in the several groups concerned
B. As between the corporate entity and the public:
1. Extension of the regulation of business in the 
public interest
V. Historical parallels, if any
VI. Conclusions
The reasons for making such a study are sufficiently clear 
to require little discussion. Manifestly, separation of man­
agement responsibility from beneficial ownership has already 
taken place in large measure, and is continuing to take place 
with great rapidity. Apparently, at the same time, new legal 
and economic relationships are being built up both within 
the corporate entity and between it and its public, its em­
ployees, and the state. These relationships are being forged 
partly on a basis of experience and partly as a result of 
underlying concepts of lawyers, business men, economists 
and statesmen. Old safeguards have become insufficient; 
new ones, if improvidently worked out, may harass economic 
development, and fail to protect. Even a new psychology is 
growing up as the United States becomes increasingly an 
investing creditor nation. Law, banking methods, business 
standards, all are involved. Underlying any philosophy 
there must be a sound understanding of the facts.
VI
SOME MEMORANDA
(1) CONSOLIDATED RETURNS
(1929)
Like most such questions, the question of consolidated re­
turns presents different phases in the case of public utilities 
and commercial businesses, respectively. The question of 
reflecting interests in companies controlled, but not sub­
stantially wholly owned, arises in relation to the earnings 
statement and the balance sheet. The problem as regards 
the earnings statement can, I think, be met without very 
much difficulty, the most important point being that the 
amount of the earnings accruing from companies in which 
there is a substantial minority interest should be shown sepa­
rately. In the case of the balance sheet, the pronounced 
difference between public utilities and commercial con­
cerns is that in the case of the latter the quick asset position 
is of crucial importance, while this point is relatively a 
minor one in the case of public utilities. In the case of 
commercial companies, I do not think a balance sheet is 
adequate if it shows a very large minority interest outstand­
ing and gives no indication whether that minority interest 
is mainly in the capital assets or in the current assets.
As a matter of fact, I have had some doubts about the 
suitability of the consolidated balance sheet to public utility 
accounting. The basic idea of consolidated accounting was 
that the subsidiary companies were essentially parts of the 
same business and that the allocations between them were 
almost entirely in the discretion of the management. The 
position in regard to public utilities which, though under 
the same ownership, are subject to regulation, is materially 
different; and I am by no means sure that the best form of 
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reporting for a group consisting of a holding company and 
a number of public utilities has yet been evolved.
I do not think it is desirable to minimize the difference be­
tween substantial ownership and mere control. Those who 
control but do not wholly own a corporation have a fiduciary 
obligation to the minority which is very real in equity and 
probably also in law, though not always fully observed. I 
think the application to companies barely controlled of 
methods based originally on substantial ownership is open 
to objection on this broad ground. Of course, each case 
differs in detail; a 25% minority interest may be only a 
means of giving one or more people an interest in the busi­
ness similar to that which might be given a branch manager, 
or it may represent an important and possibly justly dis­
gruntled body of stockholders.
One comes back as usual to the conclusion that there can 
be no satisfactory arbitrary rule of universal application nor 
any substitute for judgment. The one essential is to reveal 
fairly the effective position, and this may be done in different 
ways in different circumstances. I am inclined to think that 
one should aim to establish broad limits and allow discretion 
within those limits, satisfying oneself by inquiries from time 
to time that an honest and competent discretion is being ex­
ercised in particular cases.
Our own feeling is that roughly the burden of proof shifts 
at somewhere about 90%—above that point the presumption 
becomes increasingly strong in favor of consolidation; below 
that point the reverse is true.
I think the view correct that where companies are con­
trolled but not consolidated, the holding companies’ equity 
in their earnings and assets should be fairly disclosed in its 
annual reports in some way; in many cases this can best be 
done in a statistical statement.
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(2) THE CORPORATION LAW OF DELAWARE *
(1929)
Dear----- :
I have read with much interest the document containing 
suggested changes in the corporation law of Delaware. I do 
not see at the moment how greater license could be conferred 
on promoters and directors and at the same time any sem­
blance of rights preserved to stockholders or the State. I am 
particularly interested to note the conclusion that the dis­
cretion of the directors is such a perfect substitute for all 
other forms of protection to stockholders, and that the dis­
tinction between capital and income can be obliterated by 
legislation. Possibly some of our “manufacturers of securi­
ties” will find that the law as amended still unduly fetters 
corporate development, but there will be time enough to 
strike off these fetters if and when they are discovered. In 
the meantime no-one can, I think, deny that a substantial 
advance has been made along the primrose path.
Personally and unofficially yours, 
George O. May
P.S. I suppose there is no possible chance of a court hold­
ing that the granting of such freedom of action to directors 
implies corresponding responsibility.
(3) CAPITAL STOCK OF NO PAR VALUE
(1929)
The one substantial advantage which we recognize in 
capitalization through capital stock without par value is 
that which was stressed by the promoters of the first law, 
namely, that it facilitates the financing of corporations which 
have met with misfortunes and therefore would, as a practical 
matter, be unable to sell stock having par value at or above par, 
and would be legally unable to sell it at a price below par.
A second and psychological advantage is that the payment 
of dividends on stock without par value in some cases carries
* A letter written March 4, 1929.
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less suggestion of excessive profits than would a similar 
distribution on stock having par value. This consideration, 
it seems to us, would have weight in the case of companies 
which are large employers of labor and carry on an unregu­
lated business with the general public.
Against these advantages we feel that there are substantial 
disadvantages, and that these are particularly important in 
the case of companies incorporated in Delaware whose finan­
cial policy includes the regular payment of stock dividends.
We do not feel that the development of the no par value 
stock laws up to the present has been very sound or satis­
factory; particularly in the State of Delaware the changes 
in the law which have been made from time to time seem 
to us to have been determined by the exigencies of particular 
situations rather than by any clear and complete understand­
ing of the problem. As the law now stands the distinctions 
between capital and income are almost obliterated, and the 
freedom granted to treat what is essentially a capital contri­
bution as surplus, and to pay dividends either from such sur­
plus or from earnings, would, if generally availed of, soon 
destroy the significance of dividends. We think a reaction 
is to be expected and that signs of this reaction are to be 
found in such statutes as those of Ohio and Louisiana, which 
require a formal notification to stockholders in case a divi­
dend is paid from any source except profits earned—not to 
mention more rigid statutes such as that of Wisconsin.
It may be also that the removal of practically all restraint 
on directors in the statutes of a state may result in their be­
ing held to a higher degree of responsibility under the com­
mon law than if the statutes were more restrictive. We have 
heard this view expressed by lawyers of high standing, though 
it is perhaps not the majority view.
In what is perhaps one of the earliest of the English divi­
dend cases Lord Campbell said:
Dividends are supposed to be paid out of profits only, and 
when directors order a dividend, to any given amount, with­
out expressly saying so, they impliedly declare to the world
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that the company has made profits, which justify such a 
dividend.
This is clearly not today an accurate statement of the law 
in most states, or particularly in the State of Delaware, but 
it does seem to state the position fairly from the standpoints 
of financial morality and good practice. Cases may arise, 
especially in connection with mergers or consolidations, in 
which distributions from something not technically profits 
of the paying corporation may be justified, but these cases 
are exceptional and rare. The provisions of the Delaware 
law to which we have referred were probably drafted to meet 
such situations, and if their application were restricted to 
such cases no great harm would be done; experience, how­
ever, suggests that this will not be the case.
Under the Delaware law a dividend may perhaps be de­
fined as an allocation to stockholders of funds which are not 
capital. Such an allocation may be satisfied either in money, 
property, or additional stock of the corporation declaring the 
dividend; in the last-mentioned case the dividend becomes 
a stock dividend, the funds allocated become capitalized. In 
every case the amount of the allocation is necessarily, we 
think, the amount of the dividend. Though these proposi­
tions seem to us almost self-evident, we are aware that they 
have not been uniformly followed in actual practice. Issues 
of capital stock which have been termed “stock dividends” 
have been made without any contemporaneous allocation 
to capital, and stock dividends have been described in terms 
inconsistent with the conclusions above reached. In our 
judgment, however, when additional shares of capital stock 
without par value are issued without any contemporaneous 
allocation to capital of funds not previously a part of the 
capital of the corporation, the transaction is a splitting of 
stock or multiplication of stock, rather than a stock dividend. 
Further, we think that a description of a stock dividend paid 
on capital stock without par value in stock without par value 
as a dividend of so much per cent is erroneous and essentially 
meaningless. The amount of the dividend is the amount 
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allocated to capital in respect thereof. Where stock has a 
par value the rate of dividend' may be indicated either ex­
plicitly as a dividend of so many dollars a share, or implic­
itly as a dividend of so much per cent, which, the value being 
known, is readily susceptible of expression in dollars a 
share. Where stock has no par value the latter alternative is 
not available.
Under the Delaware statute the amount allocated to capi­
tal in respect of a stock dividend appears to be in the abso­
lute discretion of the directors. It would apparently be 
permissible to capitalize, say, 5 cents a share in respect of the 
stock issued as a dividend even though contemporaneously 
other stocks were being sold for cash at $100 a share. 
The effect of this liberality of the law seems to us to be two­
fold: First, that it imposes on directors a moral responsi­
bility to capitalize a reasonable sum in respect of the divi­
dends which they may declare; secondly, that it imposes on 
the responsible officers and directors of the corporation the 
obligation to describe the dividend clearly in terms of the 
amount a share capitalized in respect thereof. No rules 
regarding the amount to be capitalized have been formu­
lated, so far as we are aware, either by authority or by cus­
tom. In some cases amounts derived from previous practice 
while par stock was outstanding have been continued though 
the logic of the figure has ceased to exist; in other cases 
merely nominal figures have been capitalized. The Listing 
Committee of the New York Stock Exchange has indicated 
its view that the amount capitalized should be substantial, 
but has not, we think, given any more definite indication 
of its position. Our feeling is that the burden is normally 
on directors to justify their action in so far as they capitalize 
a sum less than the minimum price at which they would 
consider selling the stock to subscribers, though we recog­
nize that there may be ample justification for such a course 
in individual cases. The conversion of common stock to 
stock of no par value would, as we see it, add to the responsi­
bilities of the directors and involve the sacrifice of certain 
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psychological advantages in relation to dividend policy 
without compensating benefits. For these reasons we would 
advise against such a change unless there are important ad­
vantages in other directions, of which we have no knowledge, 
which tend to make the change expedient.
(4) ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK DIVIDENDS RECEIVED
(1929)
The periodical stock dividend policy is, as I understand it, 
predicated on the belief that in such businesses there is a 
continuous opportunity to invest new money at more than 
the going rate of return on comparable investments, and 
that the method of withholding cash dividends and declar­
ing stock dividends conserves this benefit to the stockholders 
to the full extent of the annual earnings in a most advan­
tageous way. Those who advocate this practice usually insist 
that it is legitimate only if it is reasonably expected that the 
earnings a share will not be reduced by the procedure 
adopted.
Even upon these assumptions I am convinced that it is 
wholly incorrect to treat such dividends received as income 
to the extent of the market value of the stock received at the 
time of its receipt. I say that it is wholly incorrect because 
I am convinced that it is incorrect on the basis of established 
accounting practice, is incorrect on the basis of any other con­
sistent and reasonable scheme of accounting that can be sug­
gested, is incorrect as a matter of economics, and should be 
incorrect as a matter of law.
The first point requires little or no discussion. Account­
ing for profits is, as I have frequently before said, not a 
matter of logical definition but a matter of established prac­
tice; but while practice varies, still, among all the varieties, 
one principle is almost universally observed, namely, that 
profits should not be taken credit for until realized. In the 
stock dividend cases the Supreme Court held that in common 
usage and therefore in law the term “income” included only 
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realized gains and not unrealized increment. Nothing is 
realized when a stock dividend is received.
It may be argued, however, that new conditions and new 
financial systems call for new principles of accounting, and 
it is, therefore, desirable to consider the question from the 
standpoint of one attempting to lay down sound rules of 
accounting to fit a new financial system in which the declara­
tion of such dividends is assumed to be an integral part. 
The question then arises, What basic principle could be sub­
stituted?
Three possible alternatives suggest themselves. The first, 
which would involve the least departure from the accepted 
practice of the past, would be to treat a legitimate periodical 
stock dividend as being income in the amount of the income 
of the paying corporation during the period covered thereby. 
It might be more nearly correct to limit the amount credited 
by the recipient to the amount capitalized by the payor in 
respect of the dividend, but no great harm should result from 
the more liberal policy of allowing a credit to the full extent 
of the realized income of the payor, though of course there 
would be need for safeguards against later duplication of the 
credit in respect of the part of realized income not capitalized 
on the declaration of the stock dividend.
The second alternative is the complete abandonment of 
the now practically universal rule that unrealized increment 
should not be treated as income or profit, and to determine 
profits by a single-entry method involving complete revalua­
tion at the close of every fiscal period. If this method were 
adopted, the stock dividend point would become immaterial 
because all assets, whether acquired by purchase or through 
stock dividends, would be revalued. It may be that there 
are some arguments for such a method of determination of 
profits; personally, I should be extremely sorry to see it 
adopted, and I do not think it is likely to command the 
support of any large section of the legal, business, banking, 
accounting, or economic opinion of the country. Further 
discussion of this point would be irrelevant to the present 
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issue because, as I have pointed out, if this method were 
adopted the treatment of stock dividends would become im­
material.
The third possible basis seems to me to be a recognition 
of the economic fact that a dividend, whether paid in cash 
or stock, is not a real source of gain to a stockholder; the real 
source of gain to him is the earning of a profit by the cor­
poration in which he holds stock. A dividend is merely 
a realization (and is a credit to income under the existing 
methods of accounting simply because it is a realization). It 
is upon such considerations that the use of the consolidated 
balance sheet and income account in the case of parent and 
subsidiary is based. So far as the present question is con­
cerned, the effect of its adoption would be the same as would 
follow from the adoption of the first suggestion considered. 
The credit to income could not exceed the earnings of the 
corporation paying the dividend.
It seems to me that the same conclusion is reached from 
an analysis of the nature of a share of stock. If a stockholder 
holding ten shares of a corporation receives during a year 
one share of stock as a stock dividend, he cannot properly 
treat this as income except to the extent that the eleven 
shares held at the end of the year represent something which 
was not represented by the ten shares held at the beginning 
of the year. A share of stock in a public company represents 
essentially a right to participate in the benefits of future 
earnings and opportunities; physical assets are important 
only so far as the proceeds thereof may be distributable or 
as they constitute instrumentalities for the production of 
earnings and opportunities. Among the things represented 
by the ten shares at the beginning of the year was a share 
of the benefits derivable from the opportunity to invest 
additional capital in the business on terms more advantage­
ous than the going rate of return on such investments. It is 
obvious that the eleven shares held at the end of the year 
represent no larger right under this head than the ten shares 
represented at the beginning of the year. Such part of the 
390 REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS
value of the eleventh share, therefore, as is based upon this 
right or opportunity has merely been transferred from the 
ten shares to the eleventh.
Assuming the market appraisal of this right or opportunity 
as a whole to be the same at the end as at the beginning of 
the year, the market value a share will fall to the extent of 
one-eleventh of the value a share assigned to the right in 
the market at the beginning of the year, though of course 
this effect may be offset by the effect of other changes in con­
ditions during the year. It may be that the psychological 
effect of the dividend action will be to raise the market valu­
ation of future opportunities; but upon a rigid analysis it is 
apparent that the right to benefit from psychological effects 
of the action of the directors attached to the stock held at 
the beginning of the year. The new stock does not represent 
any new property created during the year except that created 
by the investment of the income of the year.
The Supreme Court has held categorically that stock divi­
dends are not income. Admittedly the periodical stock divi­
dend (the kind here under discussion) is different in its na­
ture from the stock dividend that was before the Court in 
Eisner v. Macomber, but the line of reasoning contained 
in the last preceding paragraph of this memorandum leads 
to the conclusion that if the question were re-presented, the 
Court would be likely to extend its previous decision to cover 
periodical stock dividends, a conclusion reinforced by a 
reading of the Court’s decision. In any case it would be 
most unlikely to hold that such periodical stock dividends 
were income in an amount exceeding the amount of income 
earned and not distributed in cash by the distributing corpo­
ration during the period covered by the stock dividend.
It is not without significance that in Eisner v. Macomber 
the Act under consideration provided that stock dividends 
should be considered income to the amount of their cash 
value when received, and that the Government made no ef­
fort to support this position, apparently recognizing the im­
possibility of doing so successfully. It merely claimed that 
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the dividends were income to the extent of the profits upon 
which they were based. In the synopsis of the Attorney-Gen­
eral’s argument he is reported as arguing as follows:
The substance of the Act of 1916 is that no corporate earn­
ings are taxed as distributed gains which might not have been 
taxed as undivided profits when they accrued, and all such 
earnings which might have been taxed as undivided profits 
are taxed when distributed.
And as ending with the following:
His gain comes, not from the declaration of a dividend of 
any kind, but from what his capital has earned. The only 
effect of the dividend is to fix the date upon which, under 
the law, his share of corporate earnings, previously accrued, 
becomes taxable.
The only remaining point to be considered is whether the 
treatment of stock dividend as income to the amount of the 
value of the stock when received would be in the general 
interest. I feel sure that it would not.
Market values are affected by innumerable conditions, one 
of the most important of which may be monetary inflation. 
The result of this practice is to treat an increase in value 
due to monetary inflation as current income, analogous to 
interest and dividends based on actual earnings; and where 
the practice is adopted by a series of corporations, each one 
of which, except the first, holds stock in preceding companies, 
this effect of inflation is increased in geometrical progression; 
The practice seems to me to. be fraught with the greatest 
danger to the whole financial structure. It involves inserting 
the thin edge of the wedge of unrealized increment into the 
income account. If such increment is to be treated as in­
come, profits or earnings, it should be recognized frankly 
that a fundamental revision of existing business accounting 
practice is being effected.
392 REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS
(5) THE PROPRIETY OF A CORPORATION’S TRADING IN ITS OWN 
STOCK
(1929)
The question of the propriety of a corporation’s trading 
in its own stock may be considered from three points of view:
1. From the standpoint of corporations in general.
2. From the standpoint of a corporation which has invited 
the public to trade in its stock by listing that stock on 
a public exchange.
3. From the standpoint of the exchange on which such 
stock is listed.
Considered from the first of these standpoints, the question 
may be a difficult one and the conclusion doubtful. The ob­
jection to the practice seems to me to become clearer when 
the question is considered from the second standpoint and 
quite clear when considered from the third, which is the one 
in which the Committee on Stock Lists of the Exchange is 
interested
As is usually the case in the ethics of stock dealing, the 
objections to corporations’ trading in their own stock are 
more clearly manifest on consideration of the sale than of 
the purchase of stock. It may well be in the interests of all 
concerned for a corporation to purchase its own stock in 
certain circumstances; it seems to be doubtful whether it is 
ever right for a corporation to sell its own stock over the ex­
changes.
Certainly this seems objectionable from the standpoint of 
the Exchange, which is as much concerned with the rights 
of potential purchasers of stock as it is with the rights of 
existing stockholders. The main purpose of the Exchange 
is to offer opportunities for trading in securities under con­
ditions as nearly fair to both parties as can be secured. It 
should be, and is, always on its guard to prevent insiders’ 
gaining an undue advantage over the general public. In 
doing so, it is naturally handicapped by the impossibility 
of framing any precise rule to define insiders; but a corpo­
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ration, itself, clearly falls in such a category, and the Ex­
change should not countenance the corporation’s dealing 
with the general public in relation to its own stock over the 
exchanges.
Probably in the majority of cases no detriment to the gen­
eral public would result from the corporation’s being per­
mitted to buy its own stock over the Exchange. The only 
people who might conceivably have a right to object would 
be the vendors of such stock and possible purchasers of the 
stock. The vendors could hardly have a complaint, since the 
presence of the corporation in the market would tend to 
raise the price; nor could the potential purchasers have any 
serious cause of complaint, assuming always that the pur­
chases by the corporation were in good faith, because the 
corporation might be assumed to buy only when the stock 
was selling below what the management conceived to be its 
intrinsic value.
When, however, the case of the sale of stock by the cor­
poration is considered, the position is different. In such 
cases, the possible complainants would be the stockholders 
and the potential purchasers. The former would seem to 
have cause for complaint if the stock were sold below its true 
value, and the latter if it were sold above the true value.
Pursuing this line of thought, it seems to me clear that 
merely upon the consideration of abstract principles the 
Exchange is fully warranted in refusing to list stock of com­
panies which do not agree to refrain from trading in their 
own stock, and in reserving the right to make reasonable 
regulations governing any occasional purchases or sales. Ob­
viously, the arguments on the basis of abstract reasoning in 
favor of such a rule are fortified by consideration of the 
abuses in which the trading by corporations in their own 
stock is likely to result. Such abuses are illustrated by the 
many cases in which corporations bought their own stock 
during the market collapse of 1929, primarily for the purpose 
of supporting the value of the stock in the interest of insiders 
whose stock was pledged for loans.
VII
SOME BOOK REVIEWS
(1)
INTEREST AS A CQST
by Clinton H. Scovell 
New York (1924) *
Mr. Scovell’s book contains an attempt, which is not 
wholly consistent or convincing, to reconcile economic theory 
and practical cost accounting, as well as a discussion of the 
general accounting and legal phases of the subject. Com­
mencing with the statement that the “margin between sell­
ing price and cost is profit,’’ the author considers different 
kinds of cost, such as sacrifice cost and consumers’ cost, and 
ultimately decides that the objective of the cost accountant 
should be “entrepreneur’s cost.’’ At this point having per­
haps, as we have, referred to two dictionaries and found as 
the primary definition of “entrepreneur”: “One who gets up 
a musical entertainment,” he wisely undertakes to define “en­
trepreneur.” His definition is embodied in the following 
sentence:
By ‘entrepreneur’ is meant the person or persons— 
whether single proprietor, partners, or body of common 
stockholders—who own the capital goods and the product, 
hold control, and undertake the risks of operation.
Clearly there are here included qualifications which may 
or may not be united in the same individual or group. The 
defining paragraph, however, ends with the following sen­
tence:
An entrepreneur may receive managerial wages or salary 
as laborer, interest as capitalist and profit as entrepreneur.
* The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXXVII (June, 1929).
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Further, in his appendix the author quotes with approval 
Taylor’s statement:
In strict economic analysis, however, profits ought to be 
limited to the third element, the taking of responsibility and 
the making of final decisions.
This evidence leads to the inference that the term “entre­
preneur” is used in the common economic sense of someone 
standing back of labor, capital and management alike. If so, 
it may be questioned whether the standpoint of this some­
what shadowy individual is the most useful one from which 
to consider “cost” for practical purposes. Certainly also 
from this standpoint the cost of capital includes compensa­
tion for risk as well as for use, just as it includes accident 
insurance as well as wages.
Frequently, however, the author seems to regard profits 
as including, if not indeed being the compensation to, capi­
tal for risk (though not for use), and expresses it in terms 
of a percentage on the capital employed. As he also quotes 
and italicizes a reference by Taussig to “earnings of man­
agement or business profits,” it would seem that he is un­
willing to make a definite choice between three materially 
different concepts of profit and consequently of cost.
The uncertainty thus created is not dissipated by his dis­
cussion of specific rates, for he proposes a rate of 5%, 6% or 
7%; that is, a rate substantially higher than is necessary as 
pure compensation for use of capital but substantially less 
than is required to cover both use and risk.
On the accounting phase the author quotes Simpson’s 
Economics for the Accountant to the following effect:
Obviously he (the accountant) is not making his statements 
for anyone other than the common stockholders. On the 
balance sheet, for example, the surplus is not described as 
the. common stockholders’ surplus, but it so evidently be­
longs to them that no specific mention is necessary. Every 
accounting statement is made for the common stockholders, 
who may or may not be entrepreneur-capitalists but who are 
always entrepreneurs.
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We are not prepared to accept either of the arguments 
here advanced without question. The second point lies in 
the field of economics and may turn on the definition of 
“entrepreneur.” On the accounting point the author is 
clearly in error; surplus does not necessarily belong to com­
mon stockholders. It may, for instance, be used to pay divi­
dends on preferred stock in respect of either a past or a 
future period.
The review of court decisions does not lead to any very 
significant conclusions one way or the other, and indeed this 
is not a question upon which the courts could be expected 
to furnish guidance.
The author makes a valiant effort on behalf of his favorite 
theory, but it cannot be said that he has succeeded in putting 
it beyond the reach of controversy.
(2)
THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALMENT SELLING (2 vols.) 
by Edwin R. A. Seligman
New York (1927) *
Professor Seligman’s two volumes, The Economics of In­
stalment Selling, illustrate in a striking way the new tend­
ency in business to secure a broad basis of fact for business 
decisions rather than to rely on “hunches” and inspirations. 
Evidence abounds of the increasing use of basic statistics and 
special studies in the development of business policies. The 
tendency, like most other tendencies, is not without its 
dangers. There is the danger of predicating policies too 
largely on statistics; there is also the danger of predicating 
statistics too largely on policies. As Sir Josiah Stamp empha­
sized in a recent address, statistics are an invaluable aid to in­
telligence but never a substitute for it.
Nothing is further from our thought than to suggest that 
Professor Seligman’s work illustrates, the dangers as well as 
the tendency. Without regarding it as the last word on the
* The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLV (January, 1928).. 
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subject arid without accepting even Professor Seligman’s 
view that “an entirely new chapter is opening up in both 
theory and business life” and that “we now stand on the 
brink of another revolution in economic science and eco­
nomic life, scarcely inferior to its predecessor,” this publica­
tion must be recognized as an invaluable contribution to the 
study of a subject which is of undeniably great social im­
portance.
The first volume discusses the economic aspects of the 
problem, states the broad results of the studies undertaken, 
and formulates conclusions. The second gives statistics of 
the volume of instalment selling and retail selling, and also 
gives five separate studies entitled:
The consumers’ study
The merchandise study
The dealer study
The repossession study
The depression study
The reader is thus given the choice of accepting the conclu­
sions or re-examining the problem for himself on the basis 
of a substantial amount of authentic statistics.
To the layman the discussion of the economic meaning of 
the terms production and consumption will have little in­
terest. He will, however, readily agree that credit cannot 
be adjudged good or bad merely by labeling it production 
credit or consumption credit. Consumption is necessary to 
production since, in order to live, producers must consume, 
and if what they consume adds more than an equivalent to 
production such consumption is economically justified.
Probably instalment purchases of automobiles in com­
paratively few cases come within that most desirable cate­
gory of short-time credits, the self-liquidating transaction; 
the automobile will seldom earn currently for its owner 
enough to pay the deferred instalments. The evidence 
seems to indicate, however, that the credits arising from 
such purchases are usually in the class of secured credits.
The question that is uppermost in many minds is how 
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instalment sales of automobiles would be affected by a seri­
ous, and particularly a sudden, depression; and therefore 
many will turn at once to the “depression study” which 
deals with business in the anthracite region during the strike 
period, September, 1925—February, 1926. A study of the 
data suggests, however, that it does not afford an adequate 
basis for any very definite conclusions. Apparently the ac­
ceptance company whose records were studied only began 
buying paper in the district in August, 1924, and its pur­
chases suggest that its policy was conservative, perhaps be­
cause the strike was in prospect.
The purchases are given for a period of 24 months, of 
which 13 preceded and 5 followed the strike. The compara­
tive purchases for successive periods are significant, bearing 
in mind that normally the months from early spring to early 
summer would be those of heaviest business.
Sep.-Feb., 1924-25...................................... $114,000
Mar.-Aug., 1925........................................ 244,000
Sep.-Feb., 1925-26 (strike period)............  226,000
Mar.-July, 1926 (five months)................ 1,029,000
The purchases during six spring and summer months of 
1925 were scarcely more than those during an equal period 
covering fall and winter months and the strike period, and 
were about equal to one month’s purchases in the summer 
following the strike.
The effect of depression on automobile instalment sales 
still remains to be measured. It would be interesting to have 
a more exhaustive study than the volumes contain of the 
effect of depression on the piano and other classes of instal­
ment business for which longer records and more ample ma­
terial is available.
The dangers involved in the policy of taking used property 
in part payment for new are emphasized. This is a point 
on which accounting can exercise a real and helpful influ­
ence. Clearly property taken in trade should not be valued 
on the basis of the trade-in prices. In the past, adoption of 
this practice even with some reserve has been known to result 
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in used property being valued at higher figures than similar 
new units which were valued at manufacturing cost. The 
sound rule is that the used unit when made ready for resale 
should not stand at a higher percentage of its probable sale 
price than the new unit. Adoption of such a rule tends to 
keep the trade-in business on a financially sound basis.
Though Professor Seligman began his study with an open 
mind, he was fully convinced of the economic value of in­
stalment selling before it ended. His discussion may at 
times seem to suggest the advocate rather than the judge, but 
it is clearly the expression of honest conviction, not special 
pleading. In general his conclusions seemed well founded. 
A large amount of desirable buying is facilitated by instal­
ment selling. In desirable buying is included not only buy­
ing for directly productive uses, but buying which lightens 
the burden of heavy toil, shortens unduly long hours of 
labor, or in other ways adds to the efficiency or the just con­
tentment of the purchaser.
There is good and bad instalment selling of automobiles; 
good and bad buying. The nature of the buying is less 
susceptible of analysis, but in general the selling seems to be 
as economically sound as most selling. Down payments are 
substantial; the periods over which instalments are spread 
are reasonably short. The method is still on trial and the 
rapidity of its development cannot fail to cause some con­
cern, but the study seems to show that at least the worst 
fears are ill founded. Certainly all interested in the subject 
owe a debt to Professor Seligman for his thorough and able 
analysis of the problem.
(3) 
ACCOUNTING METHOD 
by C. Rufus Rorem 
Chicago (1928) *
The interest to the legal profession of such books as that 
of Professor Rorem, and others written for the use of stu-
* American Bar Association Journal (November, 1929). 
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dents, is twofold. They have a narrower usefulness as in­
dicating the commonly accepted rules covering the treatment 
of particular items; examination suggests that the general 
practice is as a rule fairly stated in Professor Rorem’s volume. 
They have, however, a broader interest in so far as they con­
vey an understanding of the underlying philosophy of ac­
counting, which is by no means generally understood by law­
yers. Upon this phase the first part of Professor Rorem’s 
book, which deals with “the rôle of accounting in modern 
economic life,” should be interesting to lawyers who have 
come to recognize the rapidly growing importance of that 
rôle. As the author points out, accounting today concerns 
itself not merely with the formal recording of business trans­
actions but with their analysis and interpretation also, and 
in the complex business life of today has become an eco­
nomic tool of the first importance. Upon the proper use of 
that tool, or in other words upon the correct interpretation 
of the facts recorded, depends in large measure the success 
or failure of business enterprises.
The book will not perhaps be entirely successful in clear­
ing up existing confusion regarding the principles and ob­
jectives of general corporate accounting—a confusion for 
which accountants are themselves largely responsible. They 
commonly state that a balance sheet is intended to be a state­
ment, as nearly accurate as possible, of financial position, but 
when the question is pursued it becomes clear that this is 
not the case. On the contrary a corporate balance sheet is 
usually a congeries of figures, some historical, some conven­
tional, and some reflecting actual current values, and its 
importance is subordinated to that of the profit and loss 
account.
What are profits and when do they emerge? is the question 
most frequently asked of accounts by lawyers, and indeed 
also by bankers, business men and economists. Now, profit 
earning is in general a process that is continuous and often 
drawn out, and the attribution of profits to particular short 
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periods of time, though a practical business necessity, does 
violence to fact and must therefore be arbitrary. The oft- 
stated rule that a profit should not be taken up until realized 
does not altogether meet the case, for not only is there the 
question, what constitutes realization, but there is the ob­
vious fact that a profit is usually a balance of a number of 
items, some positive, some negative, which cannot all be 
realized simultaneously. The determination of profits is, 
then, the result of method and opinion, not of logical defini­
tion, and the question arises how method and opinion are 
to be controlled,—the ultimate purpose being, as already 
stated, to attribute to a particular day, month or year a profit 
which is the result of interrelated transactions extending over 
much longer periods of time. The answer is that principles 
have in fact been evolved which seem in general to work 
satisfactorily, and that such rules have acquired authority 
and to some extent the force of law. The courts in England 
have held, for instance, when called upon to interpret statutes 
taxing profits without defining them, that the answer to the 
question, What are profits and when may they be deemed 
to have emerged? must be found in the practices of respon­
sible business men. But business practices are not uniform 
or unchanging, consequently there is usually more than one 
correct answer to the question, What are the profits of a 
given business for a given period? Our own statutes have 
recognized this condition and every Revenue Act since that 
of 1918 has provided that income shall be determined “in 
accordance with the method of accounting regularly em­
ployed by the taxpayer” unless that method does not cor­
rectly reflect income, in which case it is to be determined in 
accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Com­
missioner does clearly reflect income.
Both lawyers and economists have been bothered by the 
lack of fixed rules for determining profits and by the fact 
that two equally legitimate methods of accounting may give 
widely different results for a given period. It is possible that 
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the tendency to make the declaration of dividends less de­
pendent upon profits, which characterizes some new corpora­
tion laws, is in part due to legal dissatisfaction with the un­
certainty attaching to the determination of profits.
Some economists have favored the determination of profits 
by periodical valuations; the increase in net worth plus the 
amount distributed representing the profit for the period 
intervening between any two valuations; accounting being 
relied on only for a record of the assets and liabilities to be 
valued and for the analysis of the profits and not for the 
determination of the amount thereof. This method does 
not, however, in. practice give satisfactory results.
Professor Rorem explains the established accounting 
method as a continuous process of evaluation, with the pro­
viso that for certain purposes and in the case of certain assets 
and liabilities the valuations are conventionalized. While 
this view is interesting and often expressed, it may be doubted 
whether it is either particularly helpful or historically cor­
rect. When the accountant records an asset acquired at cost 
and retains it at that figure even though its value is greater 
than cost, he does so because it is the cost that is significant 
to him, not because he desires to value the asset and accepts 
cost as the measure of value, in default of any better. The 
point may be illustrated from the case of valuation of in­
ventories at cost where the market value is clearly in excess 
thereof. Dickinson, in his Accounting Practice and Pro­
cedure, page 93, says:
The object of the profit and loss account of a manufactur­
ing or merchandising concern is to ascertain as closely as 
possible the profits which have been realized on sales actu­
ally made; and for this reason raw materials on hand, and 
products partly or wholly manufactured, but not sold, should 
be entirely eliminated. In practice this result is obtained by 
valuing them at cost, no more and no less, and so exactly 
offsetting the charges to manufacturing account for materials, 
labor and expenses, in so far as the result of their combina­
tion in manufacturing processes is still uncompleted and 
unsold.
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This reflects the philosophy of accounting more accurately 
than Professor Rorem’s explanation of the use of cost in the 
case cited as being a conventional valuation.
Historically, it may be noted that the form of balance sheet 
under the English Companies Act of 1862 (the general cor­
poration law) called for the inclusion therein of plant and 
stock in trade “at cost with deduction for deterioration in 
value as charged to the reserve fund or profit and loss.’’ The 
provisions regarding accounts contained in the Act (which 
were to govern unless the articles of association of a company 
expressly provided otherwise) are interesting for their em­
phasis on the Income and Expenditure (or Profit and Loss) 
Account:
§ 79. Once at the least in every year the Directors shall 
lay before the Company in General Meeting a Statement of 
the Income and Expenditure for the past year, made up to a 
date not more than three months before such meeting.
§ 80. The Statement so made shall show, arranged under 
the most convenient heads, the amount of gross income, dis­
tinguishing the several sources from which it has been de­
rived, and the amount of gross expenditure, distinguishing 
the expense of the establishment, salaries, and other like mat­
ters: Every item of expenditure fairly chargeable against the 
year’s income shall be brought into account, so that a just 
balance of profit and loss may be laid before the meeting; 
and in cases where any item of expenditure which may in 
fairness be distributed over several years has been incurred 
in any one year the whole amount of such item shall be 
stated, with the addition of the reasons why only a portion of 
such expenditure is charged against the income of the year.
§81. A balance sheet shall be made out in every year, and 
laid before the Company in general meeting, and such bal­
ance sheet shall contain a summary of the property and lia­
bilities of the Company arranged under the heads appearing 
in the form annexed to this table, or as near thereto as cir­
cumstances admit.
In practice the provisions of § 80 were often modified 
in the articles of association of companies, and frequently 
only a balance sheet was required to be furnished; but there 
is no doubt that the amount and nature of the earnings and 
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the manner in which they are computed are the facts of para­
mount importance to investors in reasonably successful com­
panies, as the present market abundantly witnesses.
The constantly widening diffusion of corporate securities 
makes more important than ever before a proper disclosure 
to stockholders of corporate affairs, and this in turn requires 
that broad rules relating to the determination of corporate 
profits should be clearly established and given legal effect. 
To accomplish this result cooperation between theorists, 
practicing accountants, and lawyers experienced in business 
affairs is necessary.
Chapters 21 and 22 of Professor Rorem’s book contain a 
statement of working rules which is generally clear and ac­
curate, though this reviewer prefers to describe them as work­
ing rules of accounting rather than as working rules of ac­
counting valuation, as Professor Rorem terms them. These 
chapters are brief and illuminating and should be of real 
interest and value to the legal or general reader.
(4)
IRVING FISHER’S DEFINITION OF INCOME *
The method by which Professor Fisher attempted to con­
vince his European readers (the article was apparently first 
published in German in Vienna) that legislatures and courts 
were coming round to his views is more interesting than con­
vincing. He takes a few specific corollaries that would fol­
low from his general propositions and treats approval of 
those corollaries as implying at least a degree of concurrence 
in the basic proposition. Thus one of these corollaries is that 
stock dividends are not income. Hence Eisner v. Macomber, 
in which the Supreme Court so held, is quoted. But the 
quotation does not include the paragraph in which the Court, 
after referring to economic concepts, popular usages and dic­
tionaries, approved an earlier definition of the Court: “In-
* From an editorial discussion in The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLV 
(February, 1928), of Irving Fisher’s The Income Concept in the Light of Ex­
perience. 
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come may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from 
labor, or from both combined”—with the proviso that—“it 
be understood to include profits gained through a sale or 
conversion of capital assets,” which incidentally is not income 
upon Professor Fisher’s theory. He sums up his legal discus­
sion by saying that it shows “how the true theory of capital 
and income seems to be slowly working itself out.” But until 
the language just quoted is reversed, the theory that is being 
worked out cannot be claimed to bear any strong resemblance 
to that which Professor Fisher seeks to thrust upon us. By 
similar methods he even seeks to make it appear that his con­
cept is in accord with popular usage, though the mere fact 
that upon his theory such phrases as “spending more than his 
income” and “saving half his income” are meaningless is 
sufficient to demonstrate the contrary. It is difficult to see 
what good such articles accomplish beyond producing psychic 
income to their authors.
(5)
THE ECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTANCY
by John B. Canning
New York (1929) *
In a review of this work in The American Economic Re­
view for December, 1930, Professor Fisher says: “It would 
not seem an exaggeration to say that The Economics of Ac­
countancy: A Critical Analysis of Accounting Theory, by 
John B. Canning marks an epoch in the two branches of 
knowledge to which it relates—economics and account­
ancy.”
Even those who deem this praise extravagant must wel­
come the evidence that professors of economics do not carry 
the insensibilities of the economic man into their own work, 
but are human beings with genial human failings. The rela­
tion between the two professors is gracefully acknowledged 
in Professor Canning’s preface. If he is the father of the 
work, Professor Fisher is the grandfather; and the indulgence
• Written in 1929; not previously published.
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of grandparents is proverbial. Naturally enough, also, it is 
the family traits in the grandchild that particularly gratify 
the grandparent.
Not that it is necessary that one’s mind should be bound 
by family ties to that of Professor Canning in order to see 
value in his book. It is painstaking, informed, interesting, 
and stimulating. Least of all should accountants be unduly 
critical of the work, for Professor Canning displays a sym­
pathy with accountants and a knowledge and an apprecia­
tion of their work that is not common in other than purely 
professional writers.
It may, however, be questioned whether the relation be­
tween accountancy and economics is exactly that which 
Professor Canning suggests—as, for instance, where he says: 
“The economist will be quick to note that the accountant’s 
conception of assets is economic rather than legal.” It is 
fairly clear that accounting practices have not been con­
sciously influenced by economic thought to any considerable 
extent. The simple fact is that accounting is a tool of busi­
ness, and the development of accounting, like the develop­
ment of business law, has been determined by the practices 
of business men.
Professor Canning’s suggestion that the viewpoint of the 
accountant is not legal is based on inadequate premises. In 
the argument from which a sentence is quoted above, his 
conclusion is based on the fact that accountants are not gov­
erned by legal title in determining whether or not property 
is an asset of the corporation or enterprise with whose ac­
counts they are concerned. True; but property title is only 
one branch of law, and there are other branches which take 
cognizance of and aim to protect beneficial interests and ef­
fective ownerships where those are vested in other than 
the holders of the legal title.
Generally speaking, where accounting, and economic 
thought run along parallel lines, they do so because both are 
running parallel to business practice. Where accounting 
treatment diverges from economic theory, it is usually be-
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cause economic theory has diverged from business practice.
To accountants, as to business men, income is essentially 
a money concept, and the idea of psychic income leaves them 
cold. A definition of income which will make an income tax 
identical with a tax on expenditures seems to them a misuse 
of terminology, however interesting the underlying concept 
may be. . *
(6)
CORPORATION PROFITS
by Laurence H. Sloan 
New York (1929) *
In this book the author presents some statistics of the 
larger industrial corporations and some criticisms of the 
present contents of corporate reports. We may assume that 
the statistics are the best of the kind readily available, but 
if so we must recognize how unsafe it is to draw inferences 
from them without a careful study of each individual com­
pany.
To the fact that the data cover only two years the author 
points as the chief deficiency of the volume. A more im­
portant if less easily remedied deficiency is the lack of 
homogeneity in the material. This defect impairs the sig­
nificance of all the statistics, most seriously, perhaps, where 
computations are based wholly or largely on book values of 
capital, as, for instance, in Chapter IV, in which percentages 
of depreciation charges are discussed, and Chapter VII deal­
ing with the percentage of earnings on invested capital.
In any such discussions it is essential to understand how 
varied are the bases on which the capital assets of indus­
trial corporations are carried. The point is particularly im­
portant just now because in the last quarter of a century we 
have had radical changes both in the practice relating to in­
corporation and in price levels. Capital assets may be stated 
on the basis of cost or on the basis of a valuation. It may be 
a pre-war or a post-war basis. The cost may be a cost in cash
* Journal of the American Statistical Association (December, 1929). 
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or a cost in securities. If the latter, it may be a legal cost meas­
ured by a par value of a grossly inflated stock issue if the 
corporation was formed early in the century, or it may be 
greatly understated if the assets were acquired by a recent 
issue of stock without par value.
A computation which ignores such differences can scarcely 
be regarded as more significant than one showing the aver­
age consumption of food by a group of animals in which 
mice, rabbits and elephants are included in undisclosed pro­
portions. The difficulty of securing a really satisfactory 
grouping is undoubtedly great, but the reader is at least en­
titled to a clear statement of the defective character of the 
material used. It may be that the author appreciates fully 
the varied character of his material, and has satisfied himself 
that after making due allowance therefor his conclusions 
are valid and significant. He does not, however, succeed in 
creating such an impression.
The criticisms of present practice and the suggestions for 
improvement are of a rather perfunctory and elementary 
character, though put forward with an air of daring innova­
tion. The form of ideal report suggested bears a strong re­
semblance to the standard forms set forth in the first general 
corporation act in England, that of 1862.
The author reveals no understanding of the complexities 
of accounting in a large business corporation of today or of 
the philosophy of accounting. Those who hope to find in 
this work an important contribution to the solution of a 
question of great and growing importance will be disap­
pointed.
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 
by J. M. Keynes 
London (1936)
Dear Mr. Keynes:
I have been examining with interest your new book. Your 
explorations lead into fields in which I can scarcely claim to 
follow you, much less to criticize, and therefore I am not go 
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ing to make any general comment except that I gather the 
impression that you have at times deliberately overdrawn 
the picture in order to arrest attention. Your discussion of 
the influences which determine security prices, though acute 
and admirably presented, seems to me a case in point; but I 
have welcomed it as a useful corrective to the views of people 
like Mr. Frankfurter, who think that prices are determined 
mainly, if not solely, by intelligent analysis of the statistical 
information which is given to potential traders.
At page 103, however, you enter a field where I can feel 
reasonably at home, and here I will venture, if I may, to 
criticize. In your table based on Kuznets, the deductions 
clearly relate only to business capital formation, and there 
is no corresponding deduction in respect of state and private 
capital formation. Consequently, your “net” figure remains 
a gross figure in respect of these last-mentioned items (which 
constitute by far the larger part of the aggregate with which 
you are dealing) and is net only in respect of one part (con­
siderably less than half) of the whole. It follows that com­
ments based on that net figure rest on unsound premises. 
For instance, your point that Kuznets must have underesti­
mated the rate of depreciation and depletion is surely not 
well taken, since your percentage is arrived at by comparing 
the deduction in respect of business capital with the total 
amount of capital formation of all kinds.
In casting about for an explanation of the apparent statisti­
cal error, I noted that your discussion of the Kuznets figures 
began with the statement that his figures gave results similar 
to those given by the English figures of Mr. Colin Clark. I 
have been interested to find that, using only the figures for 
business capital formation for the four years, this statement 
is fully borne out, the percentage of net to gross capital 
formation being approximately 30% in one case and 33% 
in the other, whereas on the figures in your table the per­
centages are 70 and 33, which cannot be said to be strikingly 
similar. This has led me to wonder whether at least a part 
of your text may not have been written originally in relation
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to a table derived from Kuznets but dealing only with the 
formation of business capital.
I have found your book stimulating, and recognize the 
penetrating character of much of your analysis, though I 
have a feeling that you fail to distinguish adequately be­
tween what is theoretically possible and perhaps ideally de­
sirable in the way of a planned economy and what is actu­
ally attainable under modern political conditions.
Yours very truly,
George O. May 
February 25, 1936.
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